Document Type
Article
Publication Date
9-13-2012
Abstract
While patent assertion entities (or patent “trolls”) have received a lot of attention, little of it has focused on the distributional impacts of their demands. The impact on PAEs on startups is crucial, because startups contribute to job creation and innovation, making them potential targets and sources of patents. To assess the impact of trolls on startups, I analyzed a comprehensive database of patent litigations from 2005 to the present, conducted a non-random survey of 223 tech company startups, and interviewed nearly twenty entities with relevant knowledge of startup patent issues.
I find that although large companies tend to dominate patent headlines, most unique defendants to troll suits are small. Companies with less than $100M annual revenue represent at least 66% of unique defendants and 55% of unique defendants in PAE suits make under $10M per year. Suing small companies appears distinguish PAEs from operating companies, who sued companies with less than $10M per year of revenue only 16% of the time, based on unique defendants. Based on survey responses, the smaller the company, the more likely it was to report a significant operational impact. A large percentage of responders reported a “significant operational impact”: delayed hiring or achievement of another milestone, change in the product, a pivot in business strategy, shutting down a business line or the entire business, and/or lost valuation. To the extent patent demands tax innovation, then, they appear to do so regressively, with small companies targeted more as unique defendants , and paying more in time, money and operational impact, relative to their size, than large firms.
Small companies can also benefit from a robust market in patents, both as sellers and buyers. The conditions of the majority of patent sales is unclear, but sales often take place when the company is in distress or transition, as growing young companies often lack the inclination, time, or extra patents to monetize their intellectual property. When patents are sold under firesale conditions, investors, creditors, and patent focused companies share in the profits, reducing the direct returns to the inventive entity. But growing companies can also buy patents from the marketplace "on-demand," overcoming some of the advantages of incumbents.
What can be done to decrease the harms of patent assertion and increase the benefits of a robust patent market to small companies and startups? Focusing exclusively on the first question, I present new data that suggest that a number of the reforms put in place over the last year, including by the America Invents Act, are having a positive impact. Fewer defendants are being named in patent suits. The new post-grant review provisions will reduce the leverage of patent plaintiffs in some cases. However, some of these reforms are out of the reach of startups. Prior user rights benefit older companies against younger patents, but don’t help new start-ups. Startup companies are usually cash-poor, but the fees required to challenge issued patents are considerable, and time-consuming. Litigation reforms to reduce the cost of defense are laudable, and likely deter some suits from being brought in the first place, but don’t reach small companies against whom litigation is threatened, but not brought. Increasing the cost of software patents would limit the number of patents but would also disadvantage startups that patent, relative to large companies and PAEs with large budgets. The distributional impacts of reforms need to be kept in mind, and I suggest some alternative reforms for the consideration of the courts, Congress, and the market.
Automated Citation
Colleen Chien,
Startups and Patent Trolls
(2012),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/553