



1-1-2011

Florida v. HHS - Amicus Brief of Washington Legal Foundation et al.

Washington Legal Foundation

Follow this and additional works at: <http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca>

 Part of the [Health Law Commons](#)

Automated Citation

Washington Legal Foundation, "Florida v. HHS - Amicus Brief of Washington Legal Foundation et al." (2011). *Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation*. Paper 162.
<http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca/162>

This Amicus Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Projects and Empirical Data at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

Nos. 11-11021-HH & 11-11067-HH

IN THE
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF FLORIDA, BY AND THROUGH
ATTORNEY GENERAL PAM BONDI, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellants.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
Case No. 10-CV-91-RV/EMT

**BRIEF OF THE WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS AS *AMICI CURIAE*
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES, URGING AFFIRMANCE**

Ilya Somin
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
(703) 993-8069

Daniel J. Popeo
Cory L. Andrews
Counsel of Record
WASHINGTON LEGAL
FOUNDATION
2009 Mass. Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 588-0302

Counsel for Amici Curiae

State of Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.
Eleventh Circuit Docket Nos. 11-11021-HH & 11-11067-HH

**CIRCUIT RULE 26.1 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT**

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 and 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1, the undersigned counsel certifies that Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) is a non-profit corporation organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code; it has no parent corporation, does not issue stock, and no publicly held company has a 10% or greater ownership interest.

The undersigned counsel further certifies that, in addition to the parties and entities identified in the Certificate of Interested Persons filed by Appellants and Appellees, the following persons and entities may have an interest in the outcome of this case:

- a. WLF (*amicus curiae*)
- b. Jonathan Adler (*amicus curiae*)
- c. George Dent (*amicus curiae*)
- d. Michael Distelhorst (*amicus curiae*)
- e. James W. Ely, Jr. (*amicus curiae*)
- f. Elizabeth Price Foley (*amicus curiae*)
- g. Kurt Lash (*amicus curiae*)
- h. David N. Mayer (*amicus curiae*)

- i. Andrew Morris (*amicus curiae*)
- j. Leonard J. Nelson, III (*amicus curiae*)
- k. Stephen B. Presser (*amicus curiae*)
- l. Ronald J. Rychlak (*amicus curiae*)
- m. Steven J. Willis (*amicus curiae*)
- n. Todd J. Zywicki (*amicus curiae*)
- o. Cory L. Andrews (counsel for *amici curiae*)
- p. Daniel J. Popeo (counsel for *amici curiae*)
- q. Ilya Somin (counsel for *amici curiae*)

/s/ Cory L. Andrews
Cory L. Andrews
Counsel for Amici Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTERESTS OF *AMICI CURIAE* 1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 2

ARGUMENT 6

I. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS’S POWERS UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 6

 A. Existing Commerce Clause Precedents Do Not Give Congress The Power To Regulate Mere Inactivity 6

 1. *Gonzales v. Raich* 7

 a. The individual mandate does not regulate “economic activity” 8

 b. The individual mandate cannot be upheld as a regulation of non-economic activity to implement a broader regulatory scheme 9

 c. *Raich*’s rational basis test does not apply to this case 10

 2. Other Commerce Clause precedents do not support the Department’s position 13

 B. The Status Of Being Uninsured Is Not An Economic Activity 15

 1. “Economic decisions” are not economic activities 16

 2. No unique feature of the health care market transforms being uninsured into economic activity 18

II. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 20

 A. The Scope Of The Necessary And Proper Clause 22

- B. The Individual Mandate Fails The Five-Part Test Adopted By
The Supreme Court In *United States v. Comstock*.....23
 - 1. The individual mandate is not backed by a long history of
federal involvement.....24
 - 2. The individual mandate does not accommodate
state interests26
 - 3. The individual mandate is extremely broad in scope26
- C. The Individual Mandate Is Not “Proper”28
- CONCLUSION30

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	Page(s)
CASES:	
<i>Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius</i> , 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010)	3, 21
* <i>Gonzalez v. Raich</i> , 545 U.S. 1, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States</i> , 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348 (1964).....	15
<i>Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n</i> , 452 U.S. 264, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).....	12, 14
<i>Katzenbach v. McClung</i> , 379 U.S. 294, 85 S. Ct. 377 (1964).....	14-15
<i>Kinsella v. Singleton</i> , 361 U.S. 234, 80 S. Ct. 297 (1960).....	22
<i>Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner</i> , 2010 WL 4860299 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010)	16
<i>M’Culloch v. Maryland</i> , 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).....	4-5, 22
<i>Mead v. Holder</i> , 2011 WL 611139, Civ. No. 10-950 (GK), (D.D.C. Feb 22, 2011)	20
<i>NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.</i> , 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937).....	14
<i>Perez v. United States</i> , 402 U.S. 146, 91 S. Ct. 1357 (1971).....	14
<i>Printz v. United States</i> , 521 U.S. 898, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).....	21, 28

	Page(s)
* <i>United States v. Comstock</i> , 130 S.Ct. 1949 (2010)	<i>passim</i>
<i>United States v. Darby</i> , 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941)	14
* <i>United States v. Lopez</i> , 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)	<i>passim</i>
<i>United States v. Lopez</i> , 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), <i>aff'd</i> , 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)	17
* <i>United States v. Morrison</i> , 529 U.S. 598, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000)	<i>passim</i>
<i>United States v. S.E. Underwriters Assoc.</i> , 322 U.S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162 (1944)	25
<i>United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.</i> , 315 U.S. 110, 62 S. Ct. 523 (1942)	14
<i>Wickard v. Filburn</i> , 317 U.S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82 (1942)	13, 14
 CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY PROVISIONS:	
U.S. CONST. art. I	<i>passim</i>
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3	6
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12	29
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18	21, 22
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006)	23, 26, 27
Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1990)	12, 17

	Page(s)
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).....	<i>passim</i>
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)	11, 12
MISCELLANEOUS:	
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, & James Madison, THE FEDERALIST (1788).....	3, 28
Gary Lawson & Patricia Granger, <i>The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause</i> , 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993).....	28
Ilya Somin, <i>Taking Stock of Comstock: The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Limits of Federal Power</i> , 2009-10 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 239 (2010)	24
Ilya Somin, <i>The Individual Health Insurance Mandate and the Constitutional Text</i> , ENGAGE: THE JOURNAL OF THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY PRACTICE GROUPS, Vol. 11, No.1 (March 2010)	15
Jennie Jacobs Kronenfeld, <i>THE CHANGING FEDERAL ROLE IN U.S. HEALTH CARE POLICY</i> (Praeger Publishers, 1997)	25
John H. Cochrane, <i>What to Do About Preexisting Conditions</i> , WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2009.....	27
John H. Kerr & Marjolein C.H. Vos, <i>Employee Fitness Programmes, Absenteeism and General Well-Being</i> , 7 WORK & STRESS 179 (1993)	10
Kurt T. Lash, <i>A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment</i> , 60 STAN. L. REV. 895 (2008)	28
Randy E. Barnett, <i>The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause</i> , 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183 (2003).....	28

Page(s)

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966)8

* Denotes authorities primarily relied upon.

INTERESTS OF *AMICI CURIAE*¹

The Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) is a public interest, law and policy center with supporters in all 50 states. WLF regularly appears before federal and state courts to promote economic liberty, free enterprise, and a limited and accountable government. WLF routinely litigates in support of efforts to ensure a strict separation of powers between federal and state governments as a means of preventing too much power from being concentrated within a single governmental body.

The remaining *amici* are all legal scholars specializing in constitutional law and related fields. Based on their substantial legal expertise, they believe that Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act exceeds the bounds of Congress's constitutional authority. *Amici* include Jonathan Adler, Professor of Law and Director, Center of Business Law and Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; George Dent, Schott-van den Eynden Professor of Law, Case Western University School of Law; Michael Distelhorst, Professor of Law, Capital University Law School; James W. Ely, Jr., Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law Emeritus, Vanderbilt University Law School; Elizabeth Price Foley,

¹ Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c), *amici* state that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and that no person or entity, other than *amici* and their counsel, made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation and submission of this brief. All parties to this dispute have consented to the filing of this brief.

Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law; Kurt Lash, Alumni Distinguished Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Program on Constitutional Theory, History and Law, University of Illinois College of Law; David N. Mayer, Professor of Law and History, Capital University Law School; Andrew Morris, University of Alabama School of Law; Leonard J. Nelson III, Professor of Law, Samford University's Cumberland School of Law; Stephen B. Presser, Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History, Northwestern University School of Law; Ronald J. Rychlak, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law; Steven J. Willis, Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law; and, Todd J. Zywicki, Foundation Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Congress's authority to regulate interstate commercial *activity* includes the power to compel commercially *inactive* individuals to enter into commercial activity.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court's grant of summary judgment below should be affirmed. Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which seeks to compel most Americans to purchase health insurance by 2014, goes well beyond any previous exercise of federal authority. *See* §1501(b), 10106, Pub. L. No. 111-

148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (“PPACA”). Even the broadest Supreme Court precedents interpreting the limits of federal power do not give Congress the authority to force Americans to purchase a product they do not want.²

The “first principles” of the Constitution are that it “creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.” *United States v. Lopez*, 514 U.S. 549, 552, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45). As James Madison observed, “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” *Id.* The federal government, Madison emphasized, is not granted “an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 39. These principles are both vindicated and preserved by the district court’s ruling below.

The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate “economic activity” and “noneconomic activity” when controlling the latter is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity.” *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S. Ct. at 1631; *see also United States v. Morrison*, 529 U.S. 598, 610, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2000) (quoting *Lopez*). But nothing in the Court’s Commerce Clause precedents

² This brief addresses only the Department’s Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause arguments. *Amici* have previously addressed elsewhere the Department’s Taxing Clause arguments. *See* Amicus Br. of Wash. Legal Found. & Const. Law Scholars, *Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius*, 2010 WL 3952344, at *17-20 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2010).

gives Congress the power to force private citizens to engage in economic transactions they prefer to avoid.

Apparently conceding that some “activity” is required to trigger the Commerce Clause power, the Department argues that the individual mandate regulates “the practice of consuming health care services without insurance.” Appellants’ Br. at 28. Yet the individual mandate regulates neither consumption nor any other activity, but applies instead to virtually all uninsured Americans *whether or not* they consume health care services. If the individual mandate operated as the Department claims, one could simply avoid the mandate by not consuming health care services; but such “opting out” is not allowed.

If, as the Department suggests, the Commerce power extends to all economic *decisions* as well as all economic activities, Congress would enjoy unlimited authority to mandate any kind of behavior. After all, any decision to do (or not do) virtually anything has some economic impact. Nor is there any special attribute of the health care market that makes refusal to purchase health insurance more of an “economic activity” than the decision to refrain from purchasing any other product.

Finally, the Supreme Court’s Necessary and Proper Clause precedents give Congress wide latitude to determine what kinds of regulations are “necessary” to implement Congress’s other enumerated powers. *See, e.g., M’Culloch v.*

Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-15 (1819) (ruling that such measures need not be “absolutely necessary,” but merely “useful” or “convenient” to the execution of other powers). But they do not give Congress the kind of sweeping power asserted by the Department in this case. Indeed, the individual mandate runs afoul of at least three of the five criteria for evaluating Necessary and Proper Clause cases recently utilized by the Supreme Court in *United States v. Comstock*, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). *Comstock* cited five factors in justifying its decision to uphold a claim of congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause: “(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long history of federal involvement in this arena, (3) the sound reasons for the statute’s enactment in light of the government’s custodial interest in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in federal custody, (4) the statute’s accommodation of state interests, and (5) the statute’s narrow scope.” *Id.* at 1965. A majority of these criteria weigh against the individual mandate.

Section 1501 also violates the Necessary and Proper Clause’s requirement that legislation authorized by it must be “proper.” Historical evidence suggests that “proper” legislation at the very least must not upset the constitutional balance of power between the federal and state governments by giving Congress virtually unlimited authority. The logic of the Department’s argument for the individual mandate does just that.

ARGUMENT

I. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS'S POWERS UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE.

The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court divides Congress’s Commerce Clause powers into three categories: (1) regulation of “the use of the channels of interstate commerce”; (2) “[r]egulat[ion] and protect[ion] [of] the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities”; and (3) “regulat[ion] [of] . . . those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 558-59, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.

The individual mandate obviously does not fall under either the first or second of these categories. The Department’s Commerce Clause argument instead hinges on the third category—regulation of “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” The fatal flaw in the Department’s position is that none of the Supreme Court precedents interpreting the Commerce Clause allow Congress to force ordinary individuals to engage in commercial activity.

A. Existing Commerce Clause Precedents Do Not Give Congress The Power To Regulate Mere Inactivity.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Commerce Clause

does not grant Congress unlimited power. “The Constitution . . . withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation.” *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 566, 115 S. Ct. at 1633; *see also Morrison*, 529 U.S. at 608, 120 S. Ct. at 1748 (“Even under our modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress’ regulatory authority is not without effective bounds.”).

Even the broadest judicial interpretations of the Commerce Clause do not give Congress the power to regulate inactivity. Instead, they strictly limit Congress’s authority to the regulation of “economic activity” and noneconomic activity whose restriction is necessary for the implementation of a regulatory scheme aimed at controlling interstate commercial transactions.

1. *Gonzales v. Raich*.

The Supreme Court’s most expansive Commerce Clause precedent to date, *Gonzales v. Raich*, 545 U.S. 1, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005), illustrates this point well. *Raich* was the first and only case where the Court upheld the regulation of intrastate, noncommercial activity under the Commerce Clause. *Raich* ruled that Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce could justify a federal ban on the possession of medical marijuana that had never been sold in any market or left the state where it was grown. Respondents Angel Raich and Diane Monson grew marijuana solely for personal consumption for medical purposes. *Id.* at 7, 125 S.

Ct. at 2200. Despite the lack of any direct involvement in commerce, the Supreme Court ruled that the Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to forbid this activity. Although the Department relies heavily on *Raich*, see Appellants' Br. at 24-43, the decision fails to justify the individual mandate.

Raich interprets Congress's Commerce power expansively in three ways: by allowing Congress broad authority to regulate "economic activity"; by permitting regulation of noneconomic activity as part of a broader regulatory scheme aimed at interstate commercial activity; and, by applying a "rational basis" test. But nothing in *Raich* supports the argument that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate an individual's decision not to engage in commercial activity.

a. The individual mandate does not regulate "economic activity."

Raich reaffirmed that Congress has the power to regulate "economic activity." It adopted a broad definition of "economics," which "refers to 'the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.'" *Raich*, 545 U.S. at 25-26, 125 S. Ct. at 2211 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)). Expansive as this definition may be, an individual's mere status of being uninsured does not qualify. Choosing not to purchase health insurance involves neither production, nor distribution, nor consumption of commodities. Indeed, someone who chooses not to purchase insurance has chosen *not* to consume or distribute the commodity in question. Nor is he or she

“producing” any commodity by refusing to purchase insurance. By contrast, the *Raich* defendants *were* engaged in “economic activity” since they were both producing and consuming marijuana.

b. The individual mandate cannot be upheld as a regulation of noneconomic activity necessary to implement a broader regulatory scheme.

Like *Lopez* and *Morrison* before it, *Raich* indicates that “Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.” *Id.* at 37; 125 S. Ct. at 2217. But as all three cases demonstrate, this power applies only to the regulation of “noneconomic *activity*.” *Id.* It does not cover regulation of inactivity or the refusal to engage in economic transactions. Angel Raich and Diane Monsen had not been inactive or merely refused to engage in some transaction. To the contrary, they were actively involved in the production and consumption of medical marijuana.

If *Raich* was interpreted to permit regulation of mere inactivity, Congress would have the power to compel any citizen to help enforce its regulatory schemes. It could force individuals to purchase General Motors cars to assist the struggling auto industry, or to purchase financial products from banks that received federal bailout funds. Likewise, Congress could require individuals to purchase products from any industry with political clout. It could require individuals to purchase

memberships in exercise clubs in order to increase their physical fitness, which would further increase their economic productivity and stimulate interstate commerce. *See* John H. Kerr & Marjolein C. H. Vos, *Employee Fitness Programmes, Absenteeism, and General Well-Being*, 7 WORK & STRESS 179 (1993) (providing evidence that employee physical fitness increases productivity).

In sum, there is no limit to the regulatory authority Congress could claim under the Department's interpretation of the Commerce Clause. The federal government would have the power to force citizens to engage in any activity that might conceivably affect commerce. This is precisely the kind of unconstrained police power that the Supreme Court has expressly rejected. *See Morrison*, 529 U.S. at 618, 120 S. Ct. at 1754 (noting that "the police power" is "denied the National Government and reposed in the States").

c. *Raich's* rational basis test does not apply to this case.

Raich applied the deferential "rational basis" test to the government's claims, ruling that "[w]e need not determine whether [defendants'] activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a 'rational basis' exists for so concluding." *Raich*, 545 U.S. at 22, 125 S. Ct. at 2208. The Department claimed below that the rational basis test should be applied in the present case as well, *see* R.E. at 130-33, and it repeats this argument in its opening brief on appeal. *See* Appellants' Br. at 24 (arguing that the court need

only determine “whether a ‘rational basis’ exists” for Congress to conclude that Americans’ collective health care decisions “‘substantially affect interstate commerce.’”).

But the *Raich* Court never indicated that the rational basis test applies in a case where the government seeks to regulate inactivity rather than positive action. Instead, the Court explicitly applied the test applied to the government’s regulation of Raich and Mosen’s “*activities, taken in the aggregate.*” *Raich*, 545 U.S. at 22, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 (emphasis added).

The Department apparently assumes that Congress’s mere assertion of Commerce Clause authority is enough to trigger the rational basis test. But neither *Raich* nor any previous Supreme Court precedent suggests this. To the contrary, *Raich* applied the standard only to a regulation of “activity.”

Neither *Lopez* nor *Morrison* applied the deferential rational basis test, despite the government’s invocation of the Commerce Clause. In *Morrison*, the Court struck down the challenged section of the Violence Against Women Act despite that the government’s claim of a substantial impact on interstate commerce was “supported by numerous [congressional] findings” that would have been more than enough to pass muster under the rational basis test. *Morrison*, 529 U.S. at 614, 120 S. Ct. at 1752. Although *Morrison* did not explicitly reject the rational basis test, the Court’s failure to apply the test in favor of a considerably higher

standard of scrutiny suggests that, at the very least, rational basis review does not apply to regulations of intrastate noneconomic activity such as gun possession in a school zone (*Lopez*) or sexual violence (*Morrison*).

Indeed, both *Lopez* and *Morrison* emphasized that “‘simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.’” *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 n.2 (quoting *Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., Inc.*, 452 U.S. 264, 311 101 S. Ct. 2352, 2376 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)); *Morrison*, 529 U.S. at 614, 120 S. Ct. at 1752 (same). Had *Lopez* and *Morrison* applied the rational basis test, these decisions would inevitably have gone the other way. In *Morrison*, Congress had compiled extensive evidence of possible effects of gender-based violence on interstate commerce. *Morrison*, 529 U.S. at 614, 120 S. Ct. at 1752. In *Lopez*, Justice Breyer’s dissent indicated a variety of ways in which a rational basis existed for believing that gun possession in school zones might have such effects. *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 615-24, 115 S. Ct. at 1657-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As Justice Breyer emphasized, if we “ask whether Congress could have had a *rational basis* for finding a significant (or substantial) connection between gun-related school violence and interstate commerce . . . the answer to this question must be yes.” *Id.* at 618, 115 S. Ct. at 1659. If the rational basis test does not apply to regulation of noneconomic

intrastate activity (as in *Lopez* and *Morrison*), it surely cannot apply to attempts to reach mere inactivity.

2. Other Commerce Clause precedents do not support the Department's position.

The Supreme Court's pre-*Raich* Commerce Clause precedents provide even less support than *Raich* for the Department's position. As the Court pointed out five years before *Raich* in *Morrison*, "in every case" where it has "sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor" and had a "commercial character." 529 U.S. at 611 n.4, 120 S. Ct. at 1750 n.4.

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82 (1942), a case relied on by the Department, *see* Appellants' Br. at 41-43, was one of the Supreme Court's broadest interpretations of Congress's Commerce Clause power. Yet its facts differ radically from those of the present case. *Wickard* upheld the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act's restrictions on wheat production as applied to Roscoe Filburn, an Ohio farmer who produced wheat for consumption on his own farm. 317 U.S. at 115, 121-27, 63 S. Ct. at 84, 87-90. The Court noted that restriction of home-grown, home-consumed wheat was a necessary component of Congress's scheme to "raise the market price of wheat" because, without such regulation, home-grown wheat could serve as a substitute for wheat sold in the

market and depress demand for the latter. *Id.* at 127-29, 63 S. Ct. at 90-91.

Unlike the instant case, *Wickard* addressed a regulation of economic activity. Roscoe Filburn sold “a portion of [his wheat] crop” on the market and “fe[d] part to poultry and livestock on the farm, some of which is sold.” *Id.* at 114, 63 S. Ct. at 84. Filburn’s wheat production was unquestionably part of a commercial enterprise that sold goods in interstate commerce. As the Court noted in *Lopez*, *Wickard* “involved economic activity in a way that possession of a gun in a school zone does not.” *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 560, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.

Until *Raich*, all of the Court’s post-New Deal decisions sustaining exercises of congressional power under the Commerce Clause involved regulations of economic activity involving the sale or production of goods or services.³ Unlike the individual mandate, these laws clearly regulated preexisting commercial activity.

Nor is the individual mandate analogous to those cases upholding civil rights statutes that ban racial discrimination by motels and restaurants. *See Katzenbach v. McClung*, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S. Ct. 377 (1964) (upholding regulation

³ *See, e.g., Hodel*, 452 U.S. at 264, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (upholding regulation of commercial mining); *Perez v. United States*, 402 U.S. 146, 91 S. Ct. 1357 (1971) (upholding regulation of commercial loan sharking); *United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.*, 315 U.S. 110, 62 S. Ct. 523 (1942) (upholding regulation of price of milk); *United States v. Darby*, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor Standards Act regulation of employment conditions); *NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*, 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937) (upholding National Labor Relations Act regulation of employment relations).

of discrimination against customers of a commercial restaurant); *Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States*, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348 (1964) (upholding federal ban on discrimination against customers of a hotel serving interstate travelers). Such federal antidiscrimination laws apply only to businesses engaged in preexisting commercial activity in a regulated industry. By contrast, uninsured individuals are by definition *not* participating in the insurance business. Thus, the individual mandate is actually analogous to a statute that requires individuals to patronize a restaurant or hotel even if they had no previous intention of doing so. See Ilya Somin, *The Individual Health Insurance Mandate and the Constitutional Text*, ENGAGE, Vol. 11, No. 1, Mar. 2010, at 49.

B. The Status of Being Uninsured Is Not An Economic Activity.

Apparently conceding that some “activity” is required to trigger the Commerce Clause power, the Department argues that the individual mandate regulates “the practice of consuming health care services without insurance.” Appellants’ Br. at 28. Yet the individual mandate regulates neither consumption nor any other activity, but applies instead to virtually all uninsured Americans *whether or not* they consume health care services. If the individual mandate operated as the Department claims, one could simply avoid the mandate by not consuming health care services; but such “opting out” is not allowed.

The Department attempts to circumvent the constitutional bar on Commerce

Clause regulation of inactivity by depicting the state of being uninsured as activity under Supreme Court precedent. This argument comes in two forms: a broad version claiming that any “economic decision” can be regulated under the Commerce Clause, and a narrow one focusing on supposedly unique characteristics of the health care market. Both versions fail for similar reasons: they ultimately give Congress unconstrained power to mandate virtually anything, something the Supreme Court has repeatedly said is impermissible.

1. Economic decisions are not economic activities.

The broad version of the Department’s argument claims that any decision with economic effects qualifies as an economic activity. *See* Appellants’ Br. at 39-40 (“But such economic preferences are plainly subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause.”). The Department cites with approval a district court decision upholding the mandate on the grounds that the Commerce Clause reaches not merely economic activity but economic *choices*. *See id.* (citing *Liberty Univ. Inc. v. Geithner*, 2010 WL 4860299, at *15 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010)). This recent decision by the Western District of Virginia concludes that “decisions to pay for health care without insurance are economic activities Because of the nature of supply and demand, plaintiffs’ choices directly affect the price of insurance in the market, which Congress set out in the Act to control.” *Liberty Univ.*, 2010 WL 4860299, at *15.

The flaw in this argument is obvious. The “nature of supply and demand” means that any decision to do or not do *anything* will affect the price of some good or service. If someone chooses not to purchase a car, that will affect the price of cars. If a person chooses to sleep for an hour rather than work, he will earn less money, which in turn means that he will engage in less consumer spending or investment, which will affect the prices of various goods. By this reasoning, Congress could not only force people to purchase any product of any kind, it could force them to engage in just about any other kind of activity that affects the price of some good or service that Congress sets out to control.

The Department’s “economic decisions” doctrine also contravenes Supreme Court precedent. Under this approach, *Lopez* would have been decided the other way. Carrying a gun into a school zone—the action forbidden by the Gun Free School Zones Act invalidated in that case—is clearly an “economic decision” under the Department’s reasoning. In the aggregate, such actions surely have an effect on prices in various markets, including the market for guns and the market for illegal drugs in schools. Indeed, Alfonso Lopez was paid \$40 to carry his gun in a school zone for the purpose of transferring it to a member of a drug gang who probably intended to use it to defend the group’s commercial interests in a “gang war.” *United States v. Lopez*, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), *aff’d*, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).

2. No unique feature of the health insurance market transforms being uninsured into economic activity.

In addition to insisting that Congress can regulate any “economic decision,” the Department also argues that the individual mandate regulates “activity” because of the special nature of the health care market: “[T]he means that Congress selected are specifically adapted to the unique conditions of the health care market: participation is essentially universal; the need for medical treatment may arise unexpectedly; the cost of care may overwhelm the typical family budget; and individuals are legally entitled to expensive medical services in times of need without regard to their ability to pay.” Appellants’ Br. at 19.

Since everyone eventually participates in the health care market, the Department reasons, choosing not to buy health insurance constitutes activity in the form of an economic decision to try to consume health care services later without paying for them. *See id.* at 10 (“As a class, people who endeavor to pay for health care services through means other than insurance shift significant costs to other participants in the interstate health care market.”).

In reality, it is simply not true that everyone consumes health care. Some people rely on charity or home remedies, while others never get sick enough to require medical treatment before they die. And while it may be true that the overwhelming majority of people participate in the health care market in some way, this does not differentiate health care from virtually any other market.

If the relevant “market” is defined broadly enough, one can characterize any decision not to purchase a good or service exactly the same way. Tellingly, the Department does not claim that everyone will inevitably purchase health *insurance*. There are many other ways to get health care, including paying out of pocket, self-insurance, and relying on charity, among others. The appellant defines the market as “health *care* services.” *Id.* at 7 (emphasis added).

The same sleight of hand could justify any other mandate Congress might care to impose. As the district court below properly noted, “[u]niqueness is not an adequate limiting principle as every market problem is, at some level and in some respects, unique. If Congress asserts power that exceeds its enumerated powers, then it is unconstitutional, regardless of the purported uniqueness of the context in which it is being asserted.” R.E. at 2050.

Consider the case of a mandate requiring everyone to purchase General Motors cars in order to help the auto industry. There are many people who do not participate in the market for cars. But just about everyone participates in the market for “transportation.” In the words of the Department, “people who endeavor to pay for [transportation] services through means other than [car ownership] shift significant costs to other participants in the interstate [transportation] market.” Appellants’ Br. at 10. After all, everyone moves from place to place in some way.

The same logic can be used to justify virtually any other mandate Congress might care to impose—even a mandate requiring everyone to see the most recent Harry Potter movie. After all, just about everyone participates in the market for *entertainment*. Choosing not to go to the movies is just an “economic decision” to pay for entertainment services later.

The same flaw undermines the claim that health care is distinctive because service providers are sometimes required to provide free care. *See, e.g., Mead v. Holder*, Civ. No. 10-950 (GK), 2011 WL 611139, at *18 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011). The only reason why that difference may be constitutionally relevant is that failing to purchase health insurance has adverse economic effects on producers. But, in that respect, failing to purchase insurance turns out to be no different from failing to purchase any other product. Whenever someone fails to purchase a product, producers are made economically worse off than they would be if the potential buyer had made a different decision.

Health insurance is undoubtedly an important good. But it has no unique characteristics that transform failure to purchase it into an “economic activity.”

II. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE.

The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the

Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The Supreme Court has described the Clause as “the last, best hope of those who defend *ultra vires* congressional action.” *Printz v. United States*, 521 U.S. 898, 923, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2378-79 (1997). But if the individual mandate cannot be upheld under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot salvage it.

The Department contends that the individual mandate is permissible under the Necessary and Proper Clause because it is needed to effectuate the PPACA’s regulations forcing insurance companies to accept customers with preexisting health conditions, which is an exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. In its *amicus* brief in a parallel lawsuit, WLF refuted the claim that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes the individual mandate. *See Amicus Br. of Wash. Legal Found., Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius*, 2010 WL 2661289 (E.D. Va. June 18, 2010).

Here, *amici* emphasize two critical points: that the individual mandate runs afoul of the standards for Necessary and Proper Clause claims established by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in *United States v. Comstock*, 130 S.Ct. 1949 (2010), and that it fails the requirement that any exercise of federal power under the Clause be “proper” as well as “necessary.”

A. The Scope Of The Necessary And Proper Clause.

The Necessary and Proper Clause is not a free-standing grant of power. Instead, it gives Congress only the authority to enact legislation that “carr[ies] into Execution” other powers granted to the federal government by the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The Supreme Court recently reiterated this principle, emphasizing that every statute authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause “must itself be legitimately predicated on an enumerated power.” *Comstock*, 130 S. Ct. at 1964; *see also Kinsella v. Singleton*, 361 U.S. 234, 247-48, 80 S. Ct. 297, 304 (1960) (noting that the Necessary and Proper Clause “by itself, creates no constitutional power”).

But even if a statute actually helps to execute an enumerated power, it still may not be authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause. In its famous ruling in *M’Culloch v. Maryland*, the Supreme Court outlined several constraints on Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause:

Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.

M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).

This passage outlines four constraints on the range of statutes authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause: (1) the “end” pursued must be “legitimate” and

“within the scope of the constitution”; (2) the means must be “appropriate” and “plainly adapted to that end”; (3) the means must “not [be] prohibited” elsewhere in the Constitution; and, finally (4) the means must be “consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.” A statute that is “improper” in nature can be rejected as inconsistent “with the letter and spirit of the Constitution” or because it is “inappropriate.”

B. The Individual Mandate Fails The Five-Part Test Adopted By The Supreme Court In *United States v. Comstock*.

In *United States v. Comstock*, the Supreme Court held that Section 4248 of the Adam Walsh Act was valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause. *See Comstock*, 130 S.Ct. at 1956-67. That provision gave federal prison officials the power to detain “sexually dangerous” federal prisoners after the completion of their sentences. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 4248. The Court cited five factors justifying its decision to uphold Section 4248: “(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long history of federal involvement in this arena, (3) the sound reasons for the statute’s enactment in light of the Government’s custodial interest in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in federal custody, (4) the statute’s accommodation of state interests, and (5) the statute’s narrow scope.” *Id.* at 1965.

A majority of these criteria weigh against the individual mandate: the lack of a deep history of federal involvement, the failure of the PPACA to accommodate

state interests, and the statute’s extraordinarily broad scope. A fourth factor (the possible lack of “sound reasons” for the statute’s enactment) is potentially ambiguous. The fifth—“the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause”—is a constant that does not vary from case to case. *See* Ilya Somin, *Taking Stock of Comstock: The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Limits of Federal Power*, 2009-10 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 239, 260-67 (assessing implications of *Comstock* for the present case).

1. The individual mandate is not backed by a long history of federal involvement

As the district court emphasized below, “the notion of Congress having power under the Commerce Clause to directly impose an individual mandate to purchase health insurance is ‘novel’ and ‘unprecedented.’” R.E. at 2039. There is no history of comparable federal regulation. Although the federal government has adopted previous statutes regulating health care, it has never compelled ordinary citizens to purchase health insurance or other health care products. It has never forced citizens to purchase products of any kind merely as a consequence of their status as residents of the United States. *See id.* (“Never before has Congress required everyone to buy a product from a private company (essentially for life) just for being alive and residing in the United States.”). Nor have the courts previously sustained such a law.

Comstock relied on a 155-year history of federal involvement in the relevant

field. *See Comstock*, 130 S. Ct. at 1958-59 (tracing the relevant history of federal involvement back to 1855). There is no history of previous federal regulation remotely comparable to the individual mandate. Indeed, the Supreme Court denied Congress the power to regulate insurance policies (for health care or otherwise) until 1944, when it overruled longstanding precedents forbidding such regulation. *See United States v. S.E. Underwriters*, 322 U.S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162 (1944). Until only the last few decades, there was very little federal health care regulation of any kind.

In contrast to the lengthy history of federal involvement at issue in *Comstock*, “[f]ederal involvement in health is *a fairly new occurrence in U.S. history.*” Jennie Jacobs Kronenfeld, *THE CHANGING FEDERAL ROLE IN U.S. HEALTH CARE POLICY* 67 (Praeger Publishers, 1997) (emphasis added). “While a few laws and special concerns were passed prior to the twentieth century, the bulk of the federal health legislation that has health impact . . . has actually been passed in the past 50 or so years.” *Id.* Indeed, modern health care in the United States “occupies a completely different place in the economy, in the mind of the public, and in its impact on the government at all levels than it did 100 years ago, at the beginning of the twentieth century, or at the beginning of the country in the late 1700s, when the U.S. Constitution was adopted.” *Id.* at 1.

2. The individual mandate does not accommodate state interests.

Section 4248 of the Adam Walsh Act accommodated state interests by giving states the option of confining “sexually dangerous” former prisoners themselves. *Comstock*, 130 S. Ct. at 1962-63. Indeed, it even let states assume custody of the former prisoners and then release them at will. *Id.* at 1963. The federal government could confine a “sexually dangerous” former federal inmate only if the state government consented to it. And the state could even assume custody of the inmate in question and immediately set him free. *Id.*

In contrast, the PPACA’s individual mandate applies throughout the country, even in the many states where elected state governments oppose it and would prefer a different system of health insurance regulation. Moreover, states are given no right to avoid the mandate or exempt their citizens from it. Significantly, a majority of the states in the nation have now challenged the constitutionality of the individual mandate, a strong indication that many state governments believe the PPACA runs counter to their interests. Far from “requir[ing] accommodation of state interests,” the individual mandate runs roughshod over them. *Comstock*, 130 S.Ct. at 1962 (emphasis in the original).

3. The individual mandate is extremely broad in scope.

Comstock upheld Section 4248 in large part because of its “narrow scope.” *Id.* at 1965. It emphasized the fact that the statute “has been applied to only a

small fraction of federal prisoners.” *Id.* at 1964. In marked contrast, the individual mandate is extraordinarily broad. It forces millions of people to purchase insurance products against their will. As the text of PPACA itself indicates, “[t]he requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will add millions of new consumers to the health insurance market.” PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(C).

The individual mandate clearly fails at least three prongs of the five-part test laid out in *Comstock*. The other two do little to strengthen it. Whether Congress enjoyed “sound reasons” for enacting the mandate is at the very least debatable. Many economists believe that it is possible to provide coverage for preexisting conditions without resorting to compulsion on the massive scale undertaken by the PPACA. *See, e.g.,* John H. Cochrane, *What to Do About Preexisting Conditions*, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2009. At the very least, the “sound reasons” underlying the mandate are not nearly as clear as those supporting Section 4248 in *Comstock*.

The final consideration outlined in *Comstock* is the “breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause.” *Comstock*, 130 S.Ct. at 1965. This factor, however, is identical in every case. It cannot by itself justify upholding a statute. If it could, the other four considerations would be superfluous.

In sum, a majority of the factors outlined in the five-part *Comstock* test weigh heavily against the mandate. A fourth is ambiguous at best. And the final

factor never varies from case to case, and therefore cannot be the basis for upholding legislation on its own.

C. The Individual Mandate Is Not “Proper.”

In order to be a valid exercise of congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, a statute must be “proper” as well as “necessary.” *See Printz*, 521 U.S. at 923-24, 117 S. Ct. at 2378-79 (holding that a law that is not “proper” can exceed the scope of Congress’s power under the Necessary & Proper Clause). The Supreme Court has provided very little guidance on the definition of “proper.” But evidence from the Founding era suggests that a proper statute must, at the very least, not depend on a constitutional rationale that gives Congress virtually unlimited power to legislate in areas traditionally reserved to the states.⁴ As James Madison explained in *Federalist No. 39*, the Constitution does not give the federal government “an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 39.

⁴ *See* Randy E. Barnett, *The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause*, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 215-20 (2003) (discussing the relevant evidence); Gary Lawson & Patricia Granger, *The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause*, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 297 (1993) (arguing that the evidence shows that “proper” means that laws “must be consistent with principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and individual rights”); Kurt T. Lash, *A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment*, 60 STAN. L. REV. 895, 921 (2008) (citing evidence that the original meaning of the Constitution precludes any reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause that has “the effect of completely obliterating the people’s retained right to local self-government”).

The Department's interpretation of the Clause threatens to do just that. Remarkably, it contends that "[g]overning precedent does not permit a court to override Congress's judgment about the appropriate means to achieve objectives" where a provision is "rationally related to the exercise of a constitutionally enumerated power." Appellants' Br. at 33, 34. But virtually any imaginable regulatory measure is "rationally related" to some enumerated power in some way. For example, a federal statute requiring citizens to exercise every day is rationally related to Congress's power to raise and support armies. *See* U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 12. Citizens who exercise regularly might make more effective draftees. Similarly, a statute requiring individuals to wake up early might increase their economic productivity by ensuring that they get to work earlier, and would thereby be "rationally related" to Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce.

The Department claims that such a sweeping interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause was adopted by the Court in *Comstock*. *See* Appellants' Br. at 33-34 (quoting *Comstock*, 130 S. Ct. at 1957). *Comstock* did indeed indicate that "in determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power." *Comstock*, 130 S.Ct. at 1956-57. But the fact that courts must "look to" the presence or absence of a "rational relationship" does

not mean that this is the end of the constitutional inquiry. The Court also indicated that assertions of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause are subject to the five-factor test described above. If a rational relationship were sufficient in and of itself, Congress would have “a plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation.” *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 566, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, *amici* respectfully request that the Court affirm the judgment below.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Cory L. Andrews

Ilya Somin
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
(703) 993-8069

Daniel J. Popeo
Cory L. Andrews
WASHINGTON LEGAL
FOUNDATION
2009 Mass. Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 588-0302

Counsel for Amici Curiae

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned counsel certifies, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a), that the foregoing brief is in 14-point, proportionately spaced Times New Roman font. According to the word processing software used to prepare this brief (Microsoft Word), the word count of the brief is exactly 6,999 words, excluding the cover, corporate disclosure statement, certificate of interested persons, table of contents, table of authorities, certificate of service, and this certificate of compliance.

/s/ Cory L. Andrews
Cory L. Andrews

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned counsel certifies that on May 11, 2011, the original plus six true and correct copies of the foregoing brief were shipped by UPS next day delivery to the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The undersigned counsel further certifies that on May 11, 2011, one true and correct copy of the foregoing brief, with first class postage prepaid, has been deposited in the U.S. Mail and properly addressed to the persons whose names and addresses are listed below:

Neal Kumar Katyal
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Room 5143
Washington, DC. 20530

David Boris Rivkin, Jr.
Lee Alfred Casey
Andrew Grossman
Baker & Hostetler LLP
1050 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20036

Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky
Baker & Hostetler LLP
45 Rockefeller Plaza, 11th floor
New York, NY 10111

Larry James Obhof, Jr.
Baker & Hostetler LLP
1900 E. 9th Street, Suite 3200
Cleveland, OH 44114

Blaine H. Winship
Scott Douglas Makar
Timothy David Osterhaus
Office of the Attorney General, Florida
The Capitol, Suite PL-01
400 South Monroe Street
Tallahassee, FL 32399

Katherine Jean Spohn
Office of the Attorney General,
Nebraska
2115 State Capitol
Lincoln, NE 68509

William James Cobb, III
Office of the Attorney General, Texas
209 W. 14th Street
Austin, TX 78711

Gregory Katsas
Jones Day
51 Louisiana Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20001-210

/s/ Cory L. Andrews

Cory L. Andrews