
Don Edwards

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36. On June 25, 1971 Colson sent a memorandum to Haldeman in which he analyzed in detail the political ramifications of the publication of the first installments of the Pentagon Papers and government efforts to halt further publication. He considered among other things the political advantages which could accrue to the Administration from the criminal prosecution of Ellsberg.

36.1 Memorandum from Charles Colson to H. R. Haldeman, June 25, 1971 (received from White House).
During the last week of June 1971 Haldeman and Ehrlichman directed Colson to recommend a person to be responsible for research about the publication of the Pentagon Papers. One of Colson's several candidates for this position was his friend E. Howard Hunt, a retired career CIA agent.
38. On July 1, 1971 the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department sent a request to the FBI asking whether there was any electronic surveillance involving Daniel Ellsberg. According to the FBI, during the operation of the wiretap program authorized by the President in 1969, Ellsberg had been overheard 15 times on the telephone of Morton Halperin, one of the staff members of the NSC whose telephone was tapped. But no record of this overhearing was maintained in the regular files of the FBI.

38.1 Memorandum from O. T. Jacobson to Mr. Walters, May 12, 1973 (received from Department of Justice).

38.2 Memorandum from Robert Mardian to J. Edgar Hoover, July 2, 1971 and transmittal, July 3, 1971 (received from Department of Justice).

38.3 William Sullivan answers to written interrogatories of William Ruckelshaus, May 10, 1973 (received from Department of Justice).

38.4 Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, May 13, 1973, 8 (received from Department of Justice).
39. On July 1, 1971, Colson and Hunt discussed various aspects of the Pentagon Papers matter. On July 2, 1971, Colson sent a transcript of the recorded telephone conversation to Haldeman with the recommendation that Haldeman meet Hunt.

39.1 E. Howard Hunt testimony, 9 SSC 3665.

39.2 Memorandum from Charles Colson to H. R. Haldeman, July 2, 1971, and transcript of telephone conversation between Colson and Hunt, July 1, 1971, SSC Exhibit No. 148, 9 SSC 3877-80.
On July 6, 1971 Colson informed Ehrlichman that White House aide and speech writer Patrick J. Buchanan, Haldeman and Ehrlichman's first choice to head White House efforts on the Pentagon Papers matter, strongly believed he was not the man for the job. Colson urged Ehrlichman to meet with Hunt. On July 8, 1971, Buchanan sent a memorandum to Ehrlichman recommending against the project because, while there were dividends to be derived from "Project Ellsberg," none would justify the magnitude of the investigation being considered. Ehrlichman forwarded this memorandum to Haldeman to read and return.

40.1 Charles Colson testimony, Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee Executive Session, June 19, 1973, 447-48 (received from Senate Appropriations Committee).

40.2 Memorandum from Charles Colson to John Ehrlichman, July 6, 1971 (received from White House).

40.3 Memorandum from Patrick Buchanan to John Ehrlichman, July 8, 1971 and routing slip from John Ehrlichman to H. R. Haldeman (received from White House).
41. Effective July 6, 1971 Hunt was hired as a White House consultant and assigned the task of studying the Pentagon Papers and events leading up to American involvement in the Vietnam war. On the following morning Colson introduced Hunt to Ehrlichman.

41.1 White House pay records of E. Howard Hunt, July 6, 1971 to July 24, 1971 (received from White House).

41.2 E. Howard Hunt testimony, 9 SSC 3666.

41.3 E. Howard Hunt testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 6, 1971, 216-18 (received from White House).

41.4 Charles Colson testimony, Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee Executive Session, June 19, 1973, 449-50 (received from Senate Appropriations Committee).

41.5 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2532.

41.6 John Ehrlichman testimony, Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee Executive Session, May 30, 1973, 236-37 (received from Senate Appropriations Committee).

41.7 John Ehrlichman log, July 7, 1971 (received from SSC).
42. On July 7, 1971 Ehrlichman called General Robert Cushman, Deputy Director of the CIA, and informed him that Hunt had been asked by the President to perform special consultant work on security problems and that Hunt might be contacting Cushman sometime in the future for some assistance. Ehrlichman told Cushman he should consider Hunt to have pretty much carte blanche. Prior to the discovery of a transcript of Ehrlichman's conversation with Cushman, in February 1974, Ehrlichman testified that he could not recall this phone call, that he was certain the President did not instruct him to secure CIA aid for Hunt, and that it was not until July 24, 1971 that the President gave him special authority to call on the CIA for assistance in connection with the work of the Special Investigations Unit.

42.1 Partial transcript of a telephone conversation between General Cushman and John Ehrlichman, July 7, 1971 and attached affidavit (received from CIA).

42.2 General Robert Cushman testimony, 8 SSC 3290.

42.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2532.

42.4 John Ehrlichman testimony, Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee Executive Session, May 30, 1973, 285-88 (received from Senate Appropriations Committee).

42.5 John Ehrlichman testimony, House Armed Services Committee Executive Session, June 13, 1973, 647.
By memorandum dated July 6, 1971 entitled "More Pentagon Papers," Colson advised Ehrlichman that the Brookings Institution was conducting a study of American involvement in Vietnam; Colson characterized it as potentially another Pentagon Papers. According to Caulfield, a member of Dean's staff, Colson suggested that a fire be started at the Brookings Institution in the course of which the papers could be stolen. Caulfield objected to the plan and reported his objection to Dean. On July 11, 1971 Dean flew to San Clemente and told Ehrlichman that the Brookings Institution plan should be abandoned. Ehrlichman caused the project to be cancelled.

43.1 Memorandum from Charles Colson to John Ehrlichman, July 6, 1971 with attachment (received from White House).

43.2 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 919-20.

43.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2535-36.

43.4 John Caulfield testimony, SSC Executive Session, March 23, 1974, 41-44 (received from SSC).
44. Between July 1 and July 11, 1971 Assistant FBI Director William Sullivan told Robert Mardian, Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, that Sullivan had possession of the files and logs of the 1969-71 wiretaps, and that the taps were not entered in the FBI indices. Mardian has testified that Sullivan indicated to him that the files were extremely sensitive, that Sullivan was likely to be forced out of the FBI by Director Hoover with whom he had disagreed on FBI policy, and that he desired to turn over the logs to Mardian so that Hoover could not use them against the White House. On July 11, 1971, after seeking the advice of Attorney General Mitchell about what to do about the logs and files, Mardian flew to San Clemente, California on a military courier flight to report to the President.

44.1 Robert Mardian interview, FBI, May 10, 1973, 2-3 (received from Department of Justice).

44.2 William Sullivan answers to written interrogatories of William Ruckelshaus, May 10, 1973 (received from Department of Justice).

44.3 Robert Mardian testimony, 6 SSC 2392-93, 2404-05, 2407.

44.4 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 920, 1069-70.
45. On July 12, 1971 Robert Mardian met with the President and John Ehrlichman and related William Sullivan's concerns about the wiretap files and logs. The President directed Mardian to obtain the 1969-71 files and to deliver them to Ehrlichman. Mardian was also directed to verify that the copies of summaries sent to Kissinger and Haldeman were secure.

45.1 Robert Mardian testimony, 6 SSC 2393, 2405-08.

45.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2533-34.

46. On July 13, 1971 the Director of the FBI reported to the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice, that a review of the records of the FBI revealed that no conversations of Daniel Ellsberg had been monitored by electronic surveillance devices. On July 16, 1971 the FBI reported there had been no direct electronic surveillance of Morton Halperin.

46.1 Memorandum from Director of FBI to Assistant Attorney General of Internal Security Division, July 13, 1971 (received from Department of Justice).

46.2 Memorandum from Director of FBI to Assistant Attorney General of Internal Security Division, July 16, 1971 (received from Department of Justice).
On or about July 17, 1971, Ehrlichman assigned Egil Krogh, a member of Ehrlichman's staff, and David Young, who was then serving on the staff of the National Security Council, as co-chairmen of the Special Investigations Unit.
48. In the week following July 17, 1971, Krogh recruited Gordon Liddy, an ex-FBI agent, for the Special Investigations Unit, and Colson instructed Hunt to report to that unit. Office space, equipped as a high security area with a special alarm system and a scrambler telephone was made available in the Executive Office Building.


48.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 8, 1973, 590-91 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).

48.3 E. Howard Hunt testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 6, 1973, 222-24 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).

48.4 Charles Colson testimony, Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee Executive Session, June 19, 1973, 453-54 (received from Senate Appropriations Committee).
49. During the period from July 1971 to December 1971 Ehrlichman authorized Gordon Liddy to conduct an unspecified number of wiretaps on persons whose names have not been disclosed.

49.1 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2535.
50. Charles Colson's responsibility with respect to the Special Investigations Unit was to disseminate the information obtained by the Unit. In this connection, Colson prepared memoranda to Ehrlichman concerning efforts undertaken to encourage Congress to hold hearings on the Pentagon Papers matter.

| 50.1 | Charles Colson testimony, Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee Executive Session, June 19, 1973, 454-55 (received from Senate Appropriations Committee). |
| 50.2 | E. Howard Hunt testimony, SSC Executive Session, September 10, 1973, 100 (received from SSC). |
| 50.3 | John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2670. |
| 50.4 | Document entitled Elements of Project 'Et Al' and Agency Responsible, from the files of the Special Investigations Unit (received from White House). |
| 50.5 | Memorandum from Charles Colson to John Ehrlichman, July 14, 1971 (received from White House). |
| 50.6 | Memorandum for the record from David Young, July 20, 1971 (received from White House). |
| 50.7 | Memorandum from Charles Colson to John Ehrlichman, July 26, 1971 (received from White House). |
51. On July 22, 1971 Howard Hunt met CIA Deputy Director Cushman and asked for CIA aid in connection with an interview Hunt was going to have with an unidentified person. The CIA provided Hunt with, among other things, material for physical disguise and voice alteration, and "alias" identification in the name of "Edward Warren." The material furnished to Hunt was intended to be used by Hunt to interview one Clifton DeMotte who was believed to have information reflecting unfavorably on certain members of the Kennedy political grouping.

51.1 General Robert Cushman testimony, 8 SSC 3291-92.

51.2 Transcript of tape recorded conversation between General Cushman and Howard Hunt, July 22, 1971, SSC Exhibit No. 124, 8 SSC 3383-89.

51.3 E. Howard Hunt testimony, 9 SSC 3677.

51.4 CIA employee affidavit, May 18, 1973 (received from CIA).

51.5 CIA employee affidavit, May 9, 1973 (received from CIA).

51.6 General Robert Cushman testimony, Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee Executive Session, May 11, 1973, 158-59 (received from Senate Appropriations Committee).
52. On July 24, 1971, commencing at 12:36 p.m., the President held a meeting with Ehrlichman and Krogh. The day before The New York Times had published a story revealing details of the U.S. negotiating position in the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) talks then in progress. At the July 24 meeting there was a discussion of efforts to identify the source of the SALT leak and the use of a polygraph on State Department personnel suspected of being the source of the leak.


52.2 Tape recording of meeting among the President, John Ehrlichman and Egil Krogh, July 24, 1971, 12:36 to 12:48 p.m., and House Judiciary Committee transcript thereof.
Following the meeting among the President, Ehrlichman and Krogh the Special Investigations Unit conducted an investigation of the SALT leak, and received the assistance of the CIA in obtaining polygraph equipment and operators.


53.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2533.

53.3 Donald Stewart SSC interview, July 24, 1973, 1-2 (received from SSC).

53.4 CIA Director of Security testimony, Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee Executive Session, May 24, 1973, 393 (received from House Armed Services Committee).
54. Sometime prior to July 27, 1971 Young asked the Director of Security of the CIA to have a psychological profile of Ellsberg prepared. The project was personally authorized by CIA Director Helms. Young told both Helms and the CIA Director of Security that it was Ehrlichman's wish that the CIA undertake the project. By memorandum dated July 27, 1971 Young and Krogh advised Ehrlichman that preparation of the profile was underway.

54.2 CIA employee affidavit, May 9, 1973 (received from CIA).
54.3 Memorandum from Egil Krogh and David Young to John Ehrlichman, July 27, 1971 (received from White House).
54.4 Richard Helms testimony, 8 SSC 3235.
55. Hunt sent a memorandum dated July 28, 1971 to Colson entitled "Neutralization of Ellsberg." Hunt proposed the building of a file on Ellsberg to contain all available overt, covert and derogatory information in order to determine how to destroy Ellsberg's public image and credibility. Hunt suggested that Ellsberg's psychiatric files be obtained. Hunt suggested a CIA psychological assessment/evaluation on Ellsberg. Colson has testified that he forwarded Hunt's memorandum to Krogh. By memorandum dated August 3, 1971 Young reported to Colson that the psychological profile and certain other items mentioned in Hunt's memorandum were already underway and that the other suggestions in Hunt's memorandum were under consideration.

55.1 E. Howard Hunt testimony, 9 SSC 3674-75.
55.2 Memorandum from Howard Hunt to Charles Colson, July 28, 1971, SSC Exhibit No. 150, 9 SSC 3886.
55.3 Charles Colson testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 8, 1973, 638-39 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).
55.4 Memorandum from Egil Krogh and David Young to Charles Colson, August 3, 1971, SSC Exhibit No. 154, 9 SSC 3893 and note from Young to Krogh (received from White House).
55.5 United States v. Colson, Information, June 3, 1974.
55.6 United States v. Colson, transcript of proceedings June 3, 1974, 4-6.
36. On June 25, 1971 Colson sent a memorandum to Haldeman in which he analyzed in detail the political ramifications of the publication of the first installments of the Pentagon Papers and government efforts to halt further publication. He considered among other things the political advantages which could accrue to the Administration from the criminal prosecution of Ellsberg.

36.1 Memorandum from Charles Colson to H. R. Haldeman, June 25, 1971 (received from White House).
June 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:  
H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:  
CHARLES W. COLSON

SUBJECT:  
New York Times Article

Because I think that the New York Times/Kennedy-Johnson papers controversy is and will continue to be a very major issue with very important political ramifications, I think we should at each stage of the game very carefully assess where we stand, what our strategy is, short and long term, and we must be exceedingly careful not to overreact or to worry about the particular daily turn of events. This issue, in my opinion, has profound implications which could easily be extremely important, if not even decisive in the next election. Therefore, what happens tomorrow or even next week is of less consequence than how we play it over the long pull.

I think you know that I am very impulsive by nature. I tend to plunge hard into the issue of the moment and like to join battle on every hot topic that comes along. In this case, however, because I feel that the issues are so profound I am in effect advocating what is for me a very uncharacteristic caution.

Attached is a summary of where I think we stand at the moment, how I think the issues may develop and what some of their longer term implications are.
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June 25, 1971

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A. WHERE WE STAND TODAY

As Opinion Research has pointed out, this issue has not had the enormous impact on the public that one would expect from the intensive press coverage. To the extent that the public is aware of it, they do not understand the issues very well. I believe there are two perceptions:

1. We are against the press;

2. The government lies -- more specifically LBJ and the Democrats lied us into Vietnam.

The heartland isn't really aroused over this issue. There is nothing like the Calley case here. People know there is a controversy; but they're not entirely clear as to what it is all about. Partisan Republicans don't quite understand why we are suppressing information that could be damaging to the Democrats; some people, I am sure, think that we are covering up our own failures and most importantly, no one is really excited about what they regard as the leak of "ancient" documents. They do not understand the security issue (if on the other hand we prosecute Ellsberg and it becomes a notorious trial, this could spark a major readily understandable issue and a strong public reaction with our natural constituency rallying behind us.

The Democrats are horribly divided on this issue. They are split, confused, angry and scrambling to get away from it. As of today, they are delighted that the issue is focusing on Nixon vs. the New York Times, but most of them are very well aware that the major thrust of the controversy will eventually become the Kennedy-Johnson mishandling of the war as to which every possible Democratic candidate except McGovern, McCarthy, Bayh and Hughes stand to lose badly.

B. NIXON VS. THE PRESS ISSUE

Over the short term, this will remain a hot issue, but it will pass. After the court decision (regardless of the outcome) the vast majority of the people will forget it. The liberal press will keep bringing it up and will keep trying to knife us with it, but is it not the kind of an issue that will last. People just don't give a damn that we beat the New York Times in the Supreme Court or the New York Times beat us.
Those who believe we are anti-press will simply have their views confirmed even further, but most of those who believe we are anti-press aren't with us anyway. Those who believe the press is biased and irresponsible will continue to think so.

The prosecution of Ellsberg could have some positive benefits for us in that if he is really painted as a villain, the fact that he conspired with the press and the press printed the documents that he stole, is bound to have a bad ruboff on the press. Once again, however, the issue is going to tend simply to confirm beliefs people already have; it is not likely to switch very many people.

As for the working press, as a result of this controversy, they will like us even less and that is the case whether we win or lose in the Supreme Court. The vast majority of the press are hostile to us; that is a fact, not just our paranoia. Yet we somehow manage to continue to maintain a solid base of popular support; hence we will survive the continued -- yes, even aggravated -- hostility of the working press.

On balance, therefore, I don't see any real gain or loss out of the press issue. The only way in which it hurts us is that for the moment, it obscures what are the real issues; that is, the Democrats' mis-handling of the government during the Kennedy-Johnson years and the theft of classified documents. Hence, it is clearly in our interest to let this issue fade. The longer it remains around the longer it will take to get into the public's mind what we want to be the continuing issues that emerge from this controversy.

For these reasons, I would not recommend that we use the Vice President; that would only escalate the press issue. I would not recommend that we attack the press or that any Administration spokesmen attack the press. I would not even recommend that our supporters on the Hill start attacking the press because to do so would only keep the press issue itself alive. Let me qualify this by saying that I would prosecute any newsmen if it can be demonstrated (as in the case of Neil Sheehan perhaps) that they were conspirators in the theft of these documents or that they conspired in having them reproduced. It is worthwhile to paint an individual bad if it is part of the prosecution of a natural enemy like Ellsberg.
There are two points that we must make with respect to the whole press issue. We must make them through our most effective spokesmen and make them often enough so that we're sure that they are reasonably clear in the public's mind. We can then let the rest of the issue go away.

1. **This Administration cannot allow stolen documents to be distributed, printed in the press, etc.** Classified documents are classified for a good reason. Admittedly the government may overclassify. But we cannot risk having anyone take the law into his own hands to make that individual judgment, in effect to put himself above the law because one document could endanger lives—many lives.

2. **The Government has a duty to enforce the law.** When once the press was warned not to publish and then said that notwithstanding that warning it was going to publish, the Attorney General had no recourse but to bring the action he brought.

These two points need to be articulated very clearly, very crisply, very simply, very nonlegalistically. Several of our spokesmen can make the point. Klein does it very effectively when he goes around the country; Rogers is an excellent person to make the point (and we might get him to once the issue quiets down); the Attorney General can make this point as well. We should endeavor to get responsible lawyers around the country making the point. Professor Freund's argument in today's New York Times is very helpful. Finally the President should make these two points and just these two points, either in an address to the nation or in his next press conference. At the moment, I am very much inclined to think that an address to the nation would over-escalate the press issue and involve us much too deeply in the whole controversy. I think a press conference will probably be a far more desirable opportunity.

Over the long haul, we might well consider recommendations like Scali's that the President meet with a selective group of newsmen, perhaps the leaders of Sigma Delta Chi and the American Society of Newspaper Editors. These are things that can be done once the issue is quiet. They should not be done while the issue is hot because they will only escalate it and give the appearance that we are dealing from a position of weakness. In the course this can be done, both
to get a better understanding, face to face, with journalists and also to demonstrate that we are not "anti-press."

Further we can continue to push declassification and declassification practices and procedures. For example, at the right time an executive order or a clarifying memorandum pointing out the documents should not be classified unless there is a real national security reason will help make the point with the public that we do believe in the "right to know". Once again these should not be done now; they would only escalate the issue and would only appear to be reacting. We should over a period of time prove that we believe in the right to know by what we do. It is more important than what we say.

C. CREDIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT (AND THE DEMOCRATS IN PARTICULAR)

In my opinion, most people do in fact associate the Kennedy-Johnson papers with the Democrats. It is true that the issue is blurred; it is true that people believe that we are covering something up; partisan Republicans complain repeatedly that they can't understand why we are covering up Democratic papers and, of course, finally this has an impact on the office of the Presidency, its credibility and the credibility of government, generally.

As for the credibility of government, a case can be made that it has already reached its low point. This incident simply confirms what many people think anyway. According to Lou Harris's theory (and Howard Smith's interestingly enough) at least 50% of the American people at least will always believe what any President tells them because they want to believe what any President tells them. If the President goes on television and makes a flatout statement, people tend to want to believe it. They will still answer questions in polls that the government is not telling them all that it should or all that it knows, but they nonetheless will believe the President. I question, therefore, whether this incident has caused any further serious erosion of Presidential credibility -- maybe some but not a great deal -- and there are ways we can rebuild President Nixon's credibility. Indeed this incident may offer us an opportunity to do so by deed rather than by words.

For example, if we were to release authentic documents that demonstrate how the President arrived at his change in Vietnam policy (for example, a study of decisions leading up to the November 3 speech) we would not have to say that we are being candid, that we
are not covering up, we would prove that we are not. The more we talk about the fact that we are telling the truth, that there is no "credibility gap", that we are not misleading the people, the more people tend to be suspicious. In other words, talking about the fact that we are telling the truth, may in actual fact, be counterproductive. But doing things that demonstrate that we are telling the truth and that we have been telling the truth can be very powerful. The Kennedy-Johnson papers give us a real opportunity in this regard in that it permits us to do things that will be in vivid, sharp public contrast with the whole Kennedy-Johnson affair.

Further, we must make every effort to keep ourselves out of the controversy over the Kennedy-Johnson era. We must not attack LBJ; we must not defend LBJ; we must subtly, but very effectively encourage and fuel the division within the Democratic ranks without getting caught, because that simply would inject us back into it.

If we keep ourselves out of the fight over the Kennedy-Johnson papers and the issues they raise and at the same time demonstrate not by words but by deeds, our own candor and credibility, then it is my opinion that the President's credibility and indeed the government's credibility can be enhanced by this entire episode, rather than hurt by it. We can be the ones that restored credibility, honesty and candor to government and the contrast with the prior Administration is very dramatic and effective.

D. THE ELLSBERG PROSECUTION

There is another opportunity in this whole episode, that is the prosecution of Ellsberg. It could indeed arouse the heartland which is at present not very excited over the whole issue.

First of all, he is a natural villain to the extent that he can be painted evil. We can very effectively make the point of why we to do what we did with the New York Times; we can discredit the peace movement and we have the Democrats on a marvelous hock because thus far most of them have defended the release of the documents. If we can change the issue from one of release of the documents to one of the theft of the documents we will have some-thing going for us.
Secondly, a prosecution of Ellsberg can help taint the press (to the extent that that in fact helps us). If he indeed conspired with members of the press and he is painted black, they too will be painted black.

Third, this is a clear, clean, understandable issue. People can relate to it.

Fourthly, the prosecution of Ellsberg protects the credibility of our case against the New York Times. It will dramatize why we had to go to court, it will make the case clear to the public that the release of classified information can be harmful.

Fifth, it helps keep the whole Kennedy-Johnson papers issue very much alive and on the front pages.

Finally, this is a motivational issue, particularly if the Democrats are foolish enough to defend him.

E. KEEP THE DEMOCRATS DIVIDED AND FIGHTING

This should happen anyway but we would be foolish to simply lie back and assume it. We should ensure in subtle ways that it happens. This needs to be planned out with great thoroughness and executed with utmost care. The greatest risk would be to get caught in what we are doing or to have our efforts become obvious. I have not yet thought through all of the subtle ways in which we can keep the Democratic party in a constant state of civil warfare, but I am convinced that with some imaginative and creative thought it can be done.

Some examples do come to mind. The continued release of documents will keep the issue very much alive. We might of course orchestrate carefully and quietly a defense of LBJ; to the extent that his stock rises those who have now disowned him lose a valuable constituency. We could of course plant and try to prove the thesis that Bobby Kennedy was behind the preparation of these papers because he planned to use them to overthrow Lyndon Johnson (I suspect that there may be more truth than fantasy to this.)

The Ellsberg case, if pressed hard by us, will of course keep the issue alive. Developing the case factually of why the President changed the policies will continually bring the papers themselves back into the public spotlight.
We should encourage, not discourage, the Hill from carrying on intensive hearings and well publicized hearings over the Kennedy-Johnson papers and over how we got into Vietnam. If the Hill during the Fall makes a major production out of an investigation of why we got into Vietnam at the same time the President is winding the war down in Vietnam the contrast is once again very vivid. We don't need to spell it out; the public is smart enough to see on the one hand the horrors of how we got in and on the other hand, the skill with which the President is managing to get us out. I realize that Kissinger and others in the establishment at State and Defense will fight hard against these hearings. In my view, it can be in our political interest that they go on and be well publicized.

We can, of course, play up the Humphrey and Muskie comments of recent weeks which as time passes are going to look more and more stupid.

We can encourage through our political operation resolutions in various Democratic state conventions, damning the Johnson-Humphrey Administration and denouncing the Humphrey-Muskie ticket which ran in 1968 -- defending the Johnson Administration.

In short, there is a wide open political field which we can exploit if we play it right and keep ourselves out of it.

F. CONCLUSION

In recent days, an interesting collection of people whose political judgment I respect, have separately stated that they believe this incident has re-elected the President. While this is an obvious overstatement it does show how strongly people believe the politics of this issue will cut. People who have said this range from Lou Harris on one end of the spectrum to Bill White on the other, with Dave Bradshaw and a few of my liberal congressional friends tossed in the middle. (Bradshaw by the way is a very shrewd politician with excellent political instincts, whose judgment I have always found to be very close to the mark)
In short, I think it is very clear that there are profound political implications, that this offers us opportunities in ways we perhaps did not initially appreciate, that we can turn what appeared to be an issue that would impair Presidential credibility into one that we can use by effective contrast to improve the credibility of this Administration; and further, that it is a tailor-made issue for causing deep and lasting divisions within the Democratic ranks.

For this reason, I feel that we must not move precipitously or worry about tomorrow's headlines. We must keep our eye on the real target: to discredit the Democrats, to keep them fighting and to keep ourselves above it so that we do not appear to be either covering up or exploiting.

The foregoing thoughts need a lot of refinement, need to be sifted carefully through the staff, need a lot of creative input added and then our strategy needs to be very carefully executed. While I detest the term, this is one issue that calls for a full fledged, carefully thought out "game plan" that we pursue to the hilt.
37. During the last week of June 1971 Haldeman and Ehrlichman directed Colson to recommend a person to be responsible for research about the publication of the Pentagon Papers. One of Colson's several candidates for this position was his friend E. Howard Hunt, a retired career CIA agent.

37.1 Charles Colson testimony, Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee Executive Session, June 19, 1973, 447-48 (received from Senate Appropriations Committee).

37.2 Memorandum from Charles Colson to H. R. Haldeman, July 2, 1971 (received from White House).

37.3 E. Howard Hunt testimony, 9 SSC 3662.
EXECUTIVE SESSION

PURPORTED ATTEMPT TO INVOLVE THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE WATERGATE AND ELLISBURG INCIDENTS

Tuesday, June 19, 1973

U. S. Senate

Committee of the Senate on Appropriations
Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10:05 a.m., in room 1223, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John W. McClellan (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McClellan, Pastore, Young, and Hruska.

Chairman McClellan. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Colson, this is an inquiry which is of importance, and we have heretofore placed all witnesses under oath. We will ask you to stand and take the oath.

You do solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give before this Senate subcommittee in its inquiry pertaining to the activities of the CIA shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Colson. I do, sir.

Senator Hruska. Mr. Chairman, may I announce in advance that I have hearings commencing in 20 minutes on Clarence Kelley. The Attorney General will be there to testify. I would like to...
Mr. Colson. Do you wish to proceed with your statement?

Mr. Colson. If you would like me.

I have reviewed Mr. Ehrlichman's testimony of Wednesday, May 30, before this subcommittee. My recollections of certain matters about which you questioned Mr. Ehrlichman vary somewhat from his.

During the last week of June 1971, I was asked by Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman to recommend a person who might be assigned responsibility for the research involved in the Pentagon Papers publication -- a person who could deal with all aspects of the controversy and who could coordinate White House Staff activities. At that point, congressional hearings were anticipated on the matters covered by the Pentagon Papers and therefore the man selected had to be familiar with the political process, desirably have some foreign policy experience and have good research skills.

On July 2, I sent a memo to Mr. Haldeman recommending several people -- five or six -- who might be available for such a position. Some were in Government, some outside. One of those I recommended was Mr. Hunt. During the first week of July, I had several discussions with both Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman regarding possible candidates. At one point, Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman concluded that Mr. Buchanan of the White House staff be asked to take responsibility for this project. At Mr. Ehrlichman's behest, I talked to Mr. Buchanan.
By memorandum of July 6, I advised Mr. Ehrlichman that Buchanan strongly believed he was not the man for the job. In the same memo, I suggested, therefore, that Mr. Ehrlichman interview Howard Hunt; I had had a long talk with Hunt and found that he was eager to take on the assignment. None of the other candidates I had earlier suggested were either acceptable or available.

Senator Pastore. Mr. Colson, how did you come to know Mr. Hunt in the first place?

Mr. Colson. He and I are alumni of Brown University. I met him first socially, I think, in the early sixties. Then I was president of the Brown Club of Washington and he was vice-president. We got to know each other socially. We would have lunch occasionally, but purely my association with him initially was purely social.

Senator Pastore. Is it fair for me to assume that, out of the five or six names you recommended, that you, yourself, searched out Hunt rather than he searched you out?

Mr. Colson. Well, Hunt's name occurred to me, Senator, as a logical person.

Senator Pastore. But it was on your initiative?

Mr. Colson. Yes, sir.

Senator Krusha. Was his former experience with the CIA a factor in your thinking of recommending him?

Mr. Colson. Yes, sir.
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HADEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT: Possible Candidates

In addition to Howard Hunt, I have some other possible candidates. Russ Blandford is a real pro, totally loyal, very knowledgeable and would probably relish this assignment. He is presently Staff Director of the House Armed Services Committee (although he is a Republican). Blandford is now in his early 50's and has been sick with a kidney infection, but I assume this is only temporary. He is tough as nails and very discreet.

I assume someone has also thought of Deke Deloach who is now at Pepsi Cola and whom Kendall might loan us. I do not know why Deke left the FBI. I suspect because he saw no promotional opportunity. At one time he was very high on Hoover's lists; I do not know how he stands at the moment. He is a really shrewd operator.

A third possibility would be Ben Gilleas on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee. A professional investigator with the FBI, nowhere near as bright as Blandford, but a good, plodding, effective guy. (He could work under someone, but I doubt that his personality would make it with the President's; Blandford's would).

In addition to Mardian, one who you've thought about (it would seem to me he would have to move out of Justice), there is also the possibility of Pat Buchanan. Steve Karalekas, who is now in my office, is a hard line writer and might take over some of Buchanan's stock, if Pat will put on this full time.

As for Hill types, someone should also consider Sam Stratton. This is just his meat. He is articulate and ambitious and although he is a Democrat, he's totally on our side on these issues.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., AUGUST 3, 6, 7; SEPTEMBER 24 AND 25, 1973

Book 9

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973
TESTIMONY OF E. HOWARD HUNT, ACCOMPANIED BY
SIDNEY S. SACHS, COUNSEL

Mr. Hunt. I do.
Mr. Bash. Will you read it, please?
Mr. Hunt. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is E. Howard Hunt. I am here today to answer questions bearing on your current investigation. I have been informed that it is permissible for me to make a preliminary statement, and I want to take advantage of that opportunity. I will describe my personal background, my relationship to the Watergate entry, and the events which have befallen me since that day.

I was born in 1918 at Hamburg, N.Y. My father was a lawyer-judge; my mother was a pianist and a housewife. I was educated in the public schools of Florida and New York, and in 1940 graduated from Brown University. Six weeks later I volunteered to serve in the Armed Forces. While a destroyer officer on the North Atlantic convoy run before Pearl Harbor, I was injured and medically discharged. Later I volunteered and became an Air Force intelligence officer. In 1944, I volunteered for the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of CIA, and was sent to China where I was engaged in partisan warfare until the end of the war.

In 1949, I joined the CIA, from which I retired on May 1, 1970, having earned two commendations for outstanding contributions to operations ordered by the National Security Council.

During the 21 years I spent with CIA, I was engaged in intelligence, covert action, and counterintelligence operations. I was trained in the techniques of physical and electronic surveillance, photography, document forgery, and surreptitious entries into guarded premises for photography and installation of electronic devices. I participated in and had the responsibility for a number of such entries, and I had knowledge of many others.

To put it unmistakably, I was an intelligence officer—a spy—for the Government of the United States.

There have been occasions, as one might expect, when covert operations by the United States or other nations have been exposed. Such episodes have not been uncommon. When such mishaps have occurred it has been universally the practice for the operation to be disavowed and covered up. Usually, this has been done by official intervention with law enforcement authorities. In addition, the employing governments have paid legal defense fees. Salaries and family living expenses have been continued. Former CIA Director Helms has testified before this committee in regard to some aspects of this practice.

After retiring from CIA, I was employed by a firm whose officials maintained a relationship with CIA. Some months after I joined the firm, I was approached by Charles W. Colson, special counsel to the President, to become a consultant to the Executive Office of the President. Mr. Colson told me the White House had need for the kind of intelligence background which he knew I possessed. This was the basic reason for my employment, which I understood at the time was approved by John D. Ehrlichman, and now understand was approved also by H. R. Haldeman, both assistants to the President of the United States.
38. On July 1, 1971 the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department sent a request to the FBI asking whether there was any electronic surveillance involving Daniel Ellsberg. According to the FBI, during the operation of the wiretap program authorized by the President in 1969, Ellsberg had been overheard 15 times on the telephone of Morton Halperin, one of the staff members of the NSC whose telephone was tapped. But no record of this overhearing was maintained in the regular files of the FBI.

38.1 Memorandum from O. T. Jacobson to Mr. Walters, May 12, 1973 (received from Department of Justice).

38.2 Memorandum from Robert Mardian to J. Edgar Hoover, July 2, 1971 and transmittal, July 3, 1971 (received from Department of Justice).

38.3 William Sullivan answers to written interrogatories of William Ruckelshaus, May 10, 1973 (received from Department of Justice).

38.4 Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, May 13, 1973, 8 (received from Department of Justice).
Memorandum

DATE: May 12, 1973

FROM: INSPECTOR O. T. JACOBSON

TO: MR. WALTERS

SUBJECT: SENSITIVE COVERAGE PLACED AT REQUEST OF THE WHITE HOUSE


There follows a summary of findings in our current inquiry regarding this matter conducted pursuant to memorandum from Acting Director Ruckelshaus to Mr. Felt dated 5/4/73 captioned "Wiretaps on Newspapermen."

NARRATIVE:

From approximately Spring, 1969, to early Summer, 1971, the FBI at the request of the White House, provided highly sensitive wiretap coverage in the interests of national security. (The exact times of the coverage will be provided by the Intelligence Division separately in their review of the recovered material.) The White House requests were based upon an extreme concern over "leaks" arising out of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), especially from the National Security Council (NSC) to the news media. The original requests were from either Dr. Henry Kissinger or General Alexander Haig (then Colonel Haig) for wiretap coverage on knowledgeable NSC personnel and certain newsman who had particular news interest in the SALT talks. The specific requests for this coverage were made to either former Director J. Edgar Hoover or former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan (and on one occasion by General Haig to SA Robert Bales, FBI, White House liaison). Written authorization from the Attorney General of the United States was secured on each wiretap.

Upon authorization Mr. Sullivan or representatives of the then Domestic Intelligence Division, namely Special Agents Michael Joseph Rozamus, Bernard A. Wells, Jr., or former Number One Man Joseph Sisco, contacted principally Washington Field Office (WFO) Supervisor Courtland Jones, who would initiate the actual installations. When he received instructions from Bureau Headquarters, Jones would contact Special Agent Ernest Better, who headed the WFO Monitoring Station. Jones would furnish names, addresses and telephone numbers. Better in turn would furnish this information to Special Agent James C. Oates, who had liaison with the telephone company which would thereafter result in the physical completion of the wiretap operation.

Enclosures

- Messrs. Eardley, Felt, Miller, Walters

CONTINUED - OVER
Memo for Mr. Walters
Re: Sensitive Coverage

Ernest H. Belter, former SA (Retired), WFO

Belter recalls Spring of 1969, Supervisor Jones advised him WFO had received urgent request from W. C. Sullivan that White House concerned about leaks. Sullivan told Jones that some technical surveillances (wiretaps) would be initiated by WFO on names to be furnished by Sullivan. Belter was advised by Jones not to keep any written records. Jones subsequently gave Belter telephone numbers and addresses and he in turn furnished this information to SA James Gaffney who handled telephone company liaison. Belter was advised to have prepared only one transcription of written log. Belter advised that to the best of his recollection approximately 12 to 15 such wiretap requests were handled by him. (Interview Report Form on Ernest Belter, see tab 14.)

Supervisor James J. Gaffney, WFO

During Summer, 1969 (in his capacity as liaison representative for WFO with telephone company) he received oral instructions from Ernest Belter that certain wiretaps would be placed on certain phones in an attempt to uncover leaks at White House. Gaffney when he received oral instructions from Belter to institute these wiretaps would in turn orally request the telephone company representative to effect the requested wiretap. (Interview Report Form on James Gaffney, see tab 15.)

MONITORING EMPLOYEES, WFO

George T. Ross, Special Clerk, WFO

Assigned to Monitoring Section, WFO, 1969-1970, and until mid-1971. Had occasion to monitor telephone surveillance maintained on Dr. Morton Halperin. Ross said he recalls on one occasion he saw another employee’s log wherein an entry had been made that Daniel Ellsberg had stayed with Dr. Halperin over the weekend. During this visit Ellsberg made a call out of the Halperin residence to a now unrecalled individual in effort to set up a pot-smoking party. Ross said the name of Daniel Ellsberg meant nothing to him at the time he observed the name on the log. (Interview Report Form on George Ross, see tab 17.)

James D. Barnhardt, Special Clerk, WFO

Advised he was assigned duty of monitoring telephone surveillances, WFO, and so assigned in 1969-1970. Recalls he monitored telephone surveillance Dr. Halperin, who was employed at National Security Council. Barnhardt said that Dr. Halperin appeared to be close friend of a Daniel Ellsberg, who on occasion stayed at Halperin's house overnight. Barnhardt does not recall any
Memo for Mr. Walters
Re: Sensitive Coverage

Details relating to Ellsberg's visits. (Interview Report Form on James Barnhardt, see tab 16.)

Raymond Broz, Jr., Special Clerk, WFO

Advised that sometime beginning in mid-1969 he was assigned as a relief man in connection with monitoring wiretap of Dr. Halperin. Broz said the only thing he can recall is the fact that Halperin was a close associate of Daniel Ellsberg and that he conversed with Ellsberg in late 1969 and early 1970. Broz could not recall any details concerning conversations between Halperin and Ellsberg, nor could he recall the exact dates of these conversations. (Interview Report Form on Raymond Broz, see tab 18.)

DELIVERY OF WIRETAP SUMMARIES TO WHITE HOUSE

SA Robert H. Haynes, Supervisor, Intelligence Division

Haynes has been handling liaison functions with White House since mid-1969 and up until present time. Has impression that sometime beginning in 1969 Assistant Director Sullivan received requests from White House for installation of wiretaps on newsmen and certain White House Aides. Haynes reasonably certain that on one occasion General Haig telephoned him (Haynes) to request installation of wiretap on an individual, identity not now recalled by Haynes. Haynes merely orally passed this request on to Sullivan.

Haynes had knowledge that former SA Wells was preparing letters to White House regarding results of this coverage. Haynes believes he began delivering these letters to White House in September, 1969. In doing so, Haynes would get call from Miss Gandy, Director's office. Haynes would then go to Miss Gandy's office, note on yellow file copy, "Delivered by Liaison," and note the date and his initials. Letter was then sealed and personally delivered by him to the office of the addressee on the envelope. At first letters were addressed to Dr. Kissinger, sometimes a dual letter to Dr. Kissinger and the President, but ultimately the letters were addressed to H. R. Haldeman.

Sometime after Sullivan was designated Assistant to the Director and moved into Justice Building office, Haynes received telephone call from Lawrence Higby from the White House to come by and pick up the letters on the sensitive coverage. Sometime subsequently he believes he was told by Sullivan that Assistant Attorney General Mardian had made arrangements for the other letters to the President or Dr. Kissinger to be returned and he was sent to pick them up. He went to General Haig, who made
Robert Hardian memorandum

DO-6  OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
July 3, 1971

A copy of the attached had been sent to Assistant Director Brennan office and is being handled.

bmg
Memorandum

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: July 2

FROM: Robert C. Hardin
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

SUBJECT: Daniel Ellsberg
Electronic Surveillance

Daniel Ellsberg is under indictment for violation of 18 U.S.C., 793(e) and other sections (espionage). It is anticipated that his defense counsel will file a motion to produce all evidence obtained by electronic surveillance.

Therefore would you please supply us with electronic surveillance information on the above-named individual, following the form given in the memorandum from Assistant Attorney General, Will Wilson to you dated April 16, 1969, captioned "Electronic Surveillance, et al."

In addition, should your files reveal the individual or the premises in which he had a proprietary interest was subjected to electronic surveillance, we would appreciate your furnishing us with the following:

1. Logs disclosing the conversations of the defendant and logs of any of the premises in which the defendant is or was the owner, lessee, or licensee.

2. Any airtels which expand or summarize the portions of the logs disclosed unless fully reflected in the log itself.

SECRET
3. Any memoranda, including reports to the Department of Justice, which expand or summarize the portions of the logs mentioned above or which demonstrate pertinent leads which may have come from the electronic surveillance.

If your records indicate that the individual has used names other than that given, please check your electronic surveillance indices with respect to the additional names.

Finally, please refer to the Attorney General's memorandum of July 14, 1969, captioned "Electronic Surveillance" outlining certain procedures to be followed to insure against the monitoring of defendant's attorneys or defense strategy conversations in connection with the Dellenberger prosecution in Chicago. As Ellsberg is under indictment, similar procedures should be instituted by your Bureau with respect to the monitoring of future conversations of Ellsberg and any conversations, between any two persons, relating to defense strategy.

Because of the pendency of court proceedings we ask that you handle this matter as expeditiously as possible.
Mr. William C. Sullivan  
Director  
Office of National Narcotics Intelligence  

May 10, 1973  

Acting Director, FBI  

SENSITIVE COVERAGE PLACED AT REQUEST  
OF THE WHITE HOUSE  

I have been informed that upon interview by an Inspector and a Special Agent of this Bureau you requested that all questions concerning this matter be directed to you in writing and that you would thereafter, to the best of your ability, answer each question presented. The following is in response to that request:

Background

As you know, in early 1939 the FBI was requested to initiate sensitive coverage (wiretaps) of certain White House staff members and others in order to uncover possible leaks at the White House affecting the national security. The purpose of this interrogatory is to fully resolve details of that coverage. You are requested to respond to the following:

1. The identity of the White House official or officials who requested that the FBI initiate this sensitive wiretap coverage and identity of any follow-up calls for similar coverage on others.

2. By what method were these requests for wiretap coverage transmitted to the FBI?

3. To what FBI official(s) were these requests made?

4. Was written authorization received at the FBI from then Attorney General Mitchell, as was the procedure in other national security matters of this nature? Was a written authorization secured from the Attorney General on each? If not, why? If so, where might such written authorization now be located?

5. Were there records of these wiretaps kept by the FBI at any time?
Mr. William C. Sullivan

a. If so, describe such records.

b. Where, when, and by whom were such records kept?

c. Were these records maintained in your personal and official custody while serving as Assistant Director and Assistant to the Director?

d. If so, on whose order were they so maintained?

e. Who had access to these records while in your custody?

f. What became of the records in your custody?

6. If some records were maintained by FBI personnel other than yourself describe the records, identify the persons having custody, the period of time of such custody, the present whereabouts of such records, if known, and if not known, any information in your possession relating to their maintenance and disposition.

7. Identify the officials in the United States Department of Justice and the FBI responsible for carrying out the wiretap program. Specify the duties and responsibilities of each.

8. To the best of your recollection, name the individuals on whom wiretaps were placed.

9. To the best of your recollection, state the approximate times during which each wiretap was in operation.

10. To the best of your recollection, describe the results achieved from each wiretap.

11. Identify all FBI personnel who had any connection with the installation, review, analysis, recording and dissemination of the results of the wiretap information in question.

- 2 -
Mr. William C. Sullivan

12. To whom and in what manner was such information disseminated?

13. From whom and in what manner were instructions issued to discontinue the wiretaps?

14. To whom in the FBI were these instructions issued? When did all such activity cease on wiretaps, the records of which were maintained in your custody?

15. On October 5, 1971, you advised Mr. W. Mark Felt that you gave Charles D. Brennan (now SAC at FBI Office in Alexandria) a brief case containing the sensitive material obtained as a result of the above wiretaps with instructions to Brennan to give the brief case to then Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian. Describe in detail the contents of this brief case. Specifically cover whether it contained the authorizations from the Attorney General applicable to these wiretaps. When was this done? Was it done before or after you applied for retirement?

16. Who in the FBI made the decision to turn over internal FBI records directly to Mr. Mardian? What conversations did you have with others regarding this? With whom?

17. On whose authority was this decision made?

18. Why was this material turned over to Mr. Mardian?

19. What disposition was made of this material and by whom? Was the Attorney General aware of the disposition?

20. Were any copies made by you or anyone else to your knowledge of this sensitive material before or after its transmittal to Mr. Mardian? If so, what happened to them?

21. As this wiretap project was on-going, to whom in the White House or any other place were reports made concerning results obtained?

22. How were these reports conveyed (written or oral), and with what frequency were they made?
Mr. William C. Sullivan

23. Do you have any information which would indicate that any specific wiretap coverage continued after authorization was rescinded? If so, provide details.

24. Do you have any knowledge, or reason to believe that Mr. Mardian or anyone else turned over any material in this matter to Gordon Liddy, Howard Hunt, James McCord, John Dean, or anyone else at the White House or elsewhere? If so, provide details.

25. There have been leaks of FBI data concerning this matter to Time magazine and possibly other periodicals. Are you aware of the source of any such leaks? If so, provide details.

An expeditious response is requested.
TO: Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus  
Acting Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  

FROM: William C. Sullivan  
Director  
Office of National Narcotics Intelligence  

DATE: May 11, 1973  

SUBJECT: SENSITIVE COVERAGE PLACED AT REQUEST OF THE WHITE HOUSE  

Please refer to your memorandum to me of May 10, 1973. In answering your questions I will follow the format of your memorandum extending from question 1 through 25.  

1. In regard to the White House, I think it would be most appropriate if this question was addressed to Mr. Haldeman.  

2. By both conversations and written communications.  

3. The requests were made either directly of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover or indirectly through myself.  

4. Written authorization was secured from the Attorney General in each case.  

5. Yes, these records were maintained in my office at the FBI.  
   (a) The records included logs, summaries and correspondence.  
   (b) As indicated, these records were maintained in my office.  
   (c) Yes.  
   (d) They were maintained by me on the orders of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover. He did not want them in FBI files and said so on two or three occasions.  
   (e) Mr. Bernard Wells, then a supervisor in the Domestic Intelligence Division, myself, and any secretary selected to handle the dictation (restricted to two for the most part).  
   (f) These records, on Presidential and Attorney General request, were given to Mr. Robert C. Mardian, then Assistant Attorney General of the Internal Security Division of the Department.
6. The records were maintained, as indicated, in my office and not by personnel other than myself.

7. Apart from the secretaries, persons handling the wiretap program were Robert Haynes who handled liaison, Bernard Wells who handled the analysis and dictation, and myself handling administration.

8. To the best of my recollection, the individuals on whom wiretaps were placed included: O, N, C, L, D, and B. There were others but I do not remember them at this time (around 16-18).

9. I do not remember the approximate times but the general time period was from 1969 - 1971.

10. The records were considered to be very helpful in some cases and in others they were of little or no value. I do not recall the specific elements involved.

11. It is suggested that the identity of FBI personnel who were connected with the installations be secured from the Washington Field Office. I do not know who made the installations. I have already set forth those handling the materials at the Seat of Government.

12. The material was disseminated by letter over Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's signature to the White House. For some time the letters were addressed to and sent to the President and Dr. Kissinger. Later they were sent only to Mr. Haldeman.* A few summaries were prepared for the Attorney General in memorandum form.

13. As I recall, instructions to discontinue came from the White House and were relayed to Mr. Hoover.

14. In the main, these instructions were issued to me. However, Mr. Hoover did have some conversations with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, and Dr. Kissinger. As I recall, the wiretap activity ceased during the first part of 1971.

15. The contents of the case included logs and letters related to the special wiretaps project. As I recall, they did include the authorizations of the Attorney General. As previously indicated, on instructions this material was furnished to Mr. Nardian before my retirement.

16. I turned over the materials of this special project on instruction to Mr. Nardian. I had no conversation about it with others. It was my decision.

*In May 1970 there was a meeting at the White House of the President, Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Hoover. They decided the letters would go to [7907] Mr. Haldeman.
17. As previously stated, on instruction I turned over the material, following a discussion in depth with Mr. Mardian relative to security and possible abuses of the material.

18. As previously stated, this material was turned over to Mr. Mardian in response to Presidential and Attorney General request.

19. The material was to be given maximum security. Where and by whom I do not know. I do not know whether the Attorney General was aware of the disposition.

20. No.

21. To Dr. Kissinger and later this was changed to Mr. Haldeman.

22. They were written reports, hand-carried. I do not recall the exact frequency but they were sent over whenever anything appeared on the logs which were relevant.

23. No.

24. No.

25. No, I am not aware of the source of such leaks. However, judging from the nature of this information and the precise details if correct, it would seem that some of it may have come from inside the FBI.
Memorandum

TO: Mr. E. S. Miller
FROM: Mr. T. J. Smith

DATE: 5/13/73

SUBJECT: SENSITIVE COVERAGE PLACED AT THE REQUEST OF THE WHITE HOUSE

Pursuant to instructions of the Acting Director, I met him at 11:00 AM on 5/12/73 in the office of Mr. Leonard Garment at room 128 of the Executive Office Building. We met Mr. Fred Buzhardt who took us to a room with a vault and turned over to us two sealed boxes which we determined to be official records of the FBI which had been in the protective custody of former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan prior to his retirement in October, 1971.

Mr. Buzhardt said that the records should be examined and that a receipt describing them should be prepared and signed by me before they were removed from the vault. I then proceeded to examine the records and make an inventory in the form of a receipt. Each box was inventoried separately and a copy of the receipt prepared by me is attached for information.

I finished the inventory at about 2:30 PM and Mr. Garment then looked over the inventory receipt and I signed out of the vault with the two boxes of records at 2:45 PM. A Secret Service Agent who had remained in the vault area while the records were being inventoried drove me to the Federal Triangle Building where the Intelligence Division is located. The records are presently being maintained under secure conditions in your office.

The two boxes contain the original logs of intercepts of the various electronic surveillances operated; the original, signed letters to the Attorney General, each signed by him, requesting authorization to install the electronic surveillances; Original letters to President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Haldeman, and Mr. Ehrlichman reporting on the results of the electronic surveillances; the FBI yellow file copies on the above-mentioned letters; copies of letters to the Attorney General advising of discontinuances of the electronic surveillances; cover memoranda relating to letters to the Attorney General, The President, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Haldeman, and Mr. Ehrlichman; miscellaneous other correspondence, including cables to and from Paris relating to electronic surveillance coverage arranged by our Legal Attaché there, and general background information.

Enclosures

TJS; ts

MAY 29 1973

ROUTE IN, ENVELOPE

TOP SECRET

(7)

[7910]
The summaries are full of examples of careless and loose talk about matters being handled in the White House by the persons in the White House on whom coverage was placed. Even the wives had a habit of discussing their husbands' work unnecessarily. For example, in one case Mrs. \( \text{N} \), in a conversation with a cemetery lot salesman, revealed that her husband had been working long hours preparing a speech for President Nixon to deliver shortly.

Various of the White House personnel were often in contact with newspaper men, and some were involved in close personal relationships with newsmen.

With specific respect to any monitoring of Daniel Ellsberg, a review of the logs of the Halperin electronic surveillance revealed fifteen instances of Ellsberg on the Halperin national security electronic surveillance. There is attached hereto a rough draft summary of the Ellsberg intercepts. It is to be noted that aside from one conversation on 11/22/70, which perhaps established a rationale for Ellsberg's anti-war posture, none of the intercepts of Ellsberg were related in any way to the Pentagon Papers investigation. Some of the intercepted conversations related to drugs such as LSD and marijuana.

There is one folder in the material bearing the code word "\( \text{H} \)." This has to do with Joseph Kraft, the syndicated columnist. Nothing in the folder suggested that coverage of Kraft had been requested by the White House or anyone. However, a number of personal letters marked "Top Secret - Do Not File" addressed to Mr. Hoover suggests that Mr. Hoover was aware of the "\( \text{H} \)" project. In essence, Joe Kraft apparently made a European trip in 1969 and someone desired electronic coverage of him while he was abroad. Sullivan made a special trip to \( \text{H} \), where he apparently arranged through the \( \text{H} \) Attache to have the \( \text{H} \) authorities place a microphone in Kraft's hotel room in \( \text{H} \). There are logs indicating that microphone coverage was instituted and reported through the \( \text{H} \) Attache. There are no tickler or file copies of any summary memoranda to indicate that the results of the coverage on Kraft were ever furnished to anyone but Mr. Hoover.

For the time being all of these records are being maintained under secure conditions in Intelligence Division space. We will begin immediately to integrate the records into our regular "June" files and to prepare appropriate general and special electronic surveillance indices so that the integrity of FBI records will be restored.
39. On July 1, 1971 Colson and Hunt discussed various aspects of the Pentagon Papers matter. On July 2, 1971 Colson sent a transcript of the recorded telephone conversation to Haldeman with the recommendation that Haldeman meet Hunt.

39.1 E. Howard Hunt testimony, 9 SSC 3665.

39.2 Memorandum from Charles Colson to H. R. Haldeman, July 2, 1971 and transcript of telephone conversation between Colson and Hunt, July 1, 1971, SSC Exhibit No. 148, 9 SSC 3877-80.
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., AUGUST 3, 6, 7; SEPTEMBER 24 AND 25, 1973
Book 9
Mr. Hunt, your statement has, I think, put sufficiently in the record introductory material concerning your background and your career and your present status under the question of Judge Sirica; therefore, I will not go into those questions or repeat that.

In the early part of 1971, Mr. Hunt, did you discuss with Mr. Colson the possibility of your obtaining a position at the White House?

Mr. Hunt. I did.

Mr. Dash. Did you have a telephone conversation with Mr. Colson, and who initiated that telephone conversation?

Mr. Hunt. I had numerous telephone conversations with Mr. Colson.

Mr. Dash. I would appreciate your being a little more specific.

Mr. Dash. Yes.

On July 2, 1971—July 1, actually—did you receive a telephone call from Mr. Colson?

Mr. Hunt. I did.

Mr. Dash. Let me show you what purports to be a transcript of that conversation. Would you please look at it?

Mr. Hunt. I have examined the purported transcript, Mr. Dash.

Mr. Dash. Does that purport to be or reflect the conversation you had with Mr. Colson?

Mr. Hunt. It does; yes.

Senator Ervin. The document will be appropriately marked as an exhibit and received as such along with the introductory memorandum for Mr. Haldeman from Mr. Colson.

[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 148.*]

Mr. Dash. Now, in that conversation with Mr. Colson, did Mr. Colson question you concerning your viewpoints and attitudes concerning the Pentagon Papers of Mr. Ellsberg?

Mr. Hunt. Yes.

Mr. Dash. And would you look at page 2, the last line? Would you read that for the committee?

Mr. Hunt. Colson's question?

Mr. Dash. Yes.

Mr. Hunt. [reading].

Let me ask you this, Howard, this question: Do you think with the right resources employed that this thing could be turned into a major public case against Ellsberg and coconspirators?

Mr. Dash. How did you respond to that on the top of the next page?

Mr. Hunt. My response was as follows:

Yes, I do, but you have established a qualification here that I don't know whether it can be met.

Mr. Dash. Would you continue to read the next few lines?

Mr. Thomson. Pardon me, Mr. Dash. May we have copies?

Mr. Dash. You should have copies of that. I understand we are checking out that a full set of all these exhibits were handed out. Some of the people next to me have indicated that that particular transcript is not there.

Mr. Thomson. Are you making arrangements to have copies available?

Mr. Dash. Yes, they are being run off now. There should be a copy in the set that was given to every member and yourself, Mr. Thompson.

*See p. 3377.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., AUGUST 3, 6, 7; SEPTEMBER 24 AND 25, 1973
Book 9

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $3

[7918]
No. 145—(3573) Letter dated April 15, 1973, by former Attorney General Kleindienst in which he sets forth reasons why he had to recuse himself from any further contact or involvement in the Watergate case.

No. 146—(3623) Memorandum dated December 5, 1972, re: TSD photographs (includes photographs of Dr. Fielding's automobile, business establishment, "Postal Instant Press," etc.).

No. 147—(3634) Notes Henry Petersen gave President Nixon on April 16, 1973, re: John Ehrlichman, H. R. Haldeman, and Gordon Strachan, concerning Watergate investigation.


No. 149—(3670) Phone transcript of Conein, Hunt, and "F.C." (Colson) July 9, 1971.


No. 152—(3695) Phone transcript of conversation between E. Howard Hunt and Charles Colson, late November 1972.


No. 154—(3730) Memorandum to Charles Colson from Krogh and Young dated August 3, 1971, subject: "Reference to the Memorandum to you from Howard Hunt dated July 28, 1971, on Neutralization of Ellsberg".

No. 155—(3759) Photograph of John Buckley.


Note.—Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record.
July 2, 1971

EXHIBIT No. 148

MEMORANDUM FOR: H.R. Haldeman

FROM: Charles Colson

SUBJECT: Howard Hunt

The more I think about Howard Hunt's background, politics, disposition and experience, the more I think it would be worth your time to meet him. I had forgotten when I talked to you that he was the CIA mastermind on the Bay of Pigs. He told me a long time ago that if the truth were even known, Kennedy would be destroyed.

If you want to get a feel of his attitude, I transcribed a conversation with him yesterday on it. Needless to say, I did not even approach what we had been talking about, but merely sounded out his own ideas.
Conversation with Howard Hunt, July 1, 1971

H. Hello, young man, how are you?
C. Well, I'm doing alright. I haven't talked to you in a dog's age.
H. That's right, too long.
C. Tell me something, as a good observer of the political scene, what do you think of this Ellsberg prosecution?
H. I think they are prosecuting him for the wrong thing, possession. Isn't there a phase of the law that, aspect of the law, that focuses it on the theft aspect rather than just mere possession?
C. I don't know, it may be that there can be stiffer charges as the investigation develops.
H. I want to see him prosecuted. I do, that's how I feel about it; what I think is good for the Administration may very well be two different things and I gather that's what you're asking.
C. Do you think this guy is a lone wolf?
H. Yes, I do with the exception of the eastern establishment which certainly aided and abetted him. I think the whole thing was all mapped out well in advance. Don't you?
C. Do you think conspiracy here of people, you know, you've mentioned before the bureaucrats conspiring against the President?
H. Yes, yea, well when I first heard about this I assumed that Mort Halpern was responsible and then his name came out but in an ancillary way. Of course, I never knew the guy. One of the things that's fascinated me about Ellsberg is that he is an employee of CENIS——
C. Who?
H. The Center for International Studies at MIT which of course for many years was funded by the CIA and——
C. Not any more?
H. Well, that I don't know. It may be like Radio Free Europe and Radio Europe, those are things of the past. But it seems to me indispensable that he be prosecuted, but how he's going to avoid prosecuting Arthur Sulzberger and people like that.
C. Why avoid it?
H. Well, I don't know. If there is a good clear case rather than an "iffy" one I certainly would go for it. I think that the temper of the country is certainly such that it's required. I think there is a great deal of dismay and concern among the, let's say, the silent majority, that is our principal constituency that this hasn't been done, that it be expanded to include these people.
C. One question that occurs to me. This thing could go one of two ways. Ellsberg could be turned into a martyr of the new left (he probably will be anyway), or it could be another Alger Hiss case, where the guy is exposed, other people were operating with him, and this may be the way to really carry it out; we might be able to put this bastard into a helluva situation and discredit the new left.
H. It would a marvelous way if we could do it, but of course, you've got the Times and the Post and the Monitor and all sorts of things.
C. They've got to print the news, you know, if this thing really turns into a sensational case.
H. Well, you of course, you're in a much better spot to see how the Administration stands to gain from it and at this point, I would be willing to set aside my personal yen for vengeance to make sure that the Administration profits from this. Now it's turned out, I gather from noonday news reports, it's become apparent that JFK was the guy who slid us into this thing back in May or so of 1961.
C. Hell, you know that from where you were.
H. I knew that, yes, but it had never surfaced before.
C. Let me ask you this, Howard, this question. Do you think with the right resources employed that this thing could be turned into a major public case against Ellsberg and co-conspirators?
H. Yes, I do, but you've established a qualification here that I don't know whether it can be met.
C. What's that?
H. Well, with the proper resources.
C. Well, I think the resources are there.
H. Well, I would say so absolutely.
C. Then your answer would be we should go down the line to nail the guy cold?

H. Go down the line to nail the guy cold, yes. As, and you know, many people, far many more than myself have referred to the Otepka case you know as, by way of envious [sic] comparison. Here Otepka gave a few documents to a legally constituted Senatorial Committee and he's been hounded ever since and as Jack Kilpatrick said a few nights ago in his column, it depends on whose ox is being gored [sic].

C. Well, that's right. They pilloried [sic] this guy for a lot less than what these guys did. I just have the feeling that the Administration vs. the press issue is now over with and for better or worse, I don't think it hurt us at all, frankly because anybody who would turn against us because we're anti-press, we've already turned them against us.

H. You're absolutely right.

C. And that at this point, the profit to us in in nailing any son of a bitch who would steal a secret document of the government and publish it or would conspire to steal it . . .

H. . . . or aid and assist in its . . .

C. And that the case now can be made on that grounds where I don't see that we could lose.

H. It has to be made on criminal grounds and . . .

C. It also has to be this case, won't be tried in the court, it will be tried in the newspapers. So it's going to take some resourceful engineering to . . .

H. Well, I would think that Jack Kilpatrick would be very amenable to an approach of this nature. You probably know him, don't you?

C. Oh, sure, I know all those guys well.

H. I saw him on a hastily convened television panel against Wechsler and Kilpatrick is awfully, awfully good on this. He's a very clear thinker, he's got a legal background, too, I believe.

C. Well, I just wanted to get your reaction to this out of curiosity and we hadn't talked about it.

H. I want to see the guy hung if it can be done to the advantage of the Administration.

C. I think it can be done, I think there are ways to do it and I don't think this guy is operating alone.

H. Well, of course, he isn't operating alone. He's got a confabulation [sic] of people who are supporting him, aiding and abetting him, there's no question about it.

C. But, I'm not so sure it doesn't go deeper than that.

H. Oh, really? You're thinking of like O'Brien or . . .

C. Oh no, I'm thinking of the enemy . . .

H. . . . the real enemy. Well, of course, they stand to profit more, the most, no question about it. You've got codes and policy making apparatus stripped bear for public examination, all that sort of thing. Supposing we could get a look at these documents from inside the Kremlin or Peking. Helms could be retired forthwith and you'd cut down 90% of our expenditures over across the river. That's right, you won't need them anymore. If you've got that kind of thing. You don't need much more.

C. I think there is a fertile field here and I just thought I'd try it out on you to see what you thought of it.

H. Well, as I say, I'm of two minds on it. One, visirually I want to see this guy hung. My more cautious and reflective self says "let's not do it unless we can do it to the profit of the Administration".

C. Absolutely. What do you think of doing, the idea of declassifying a lot of these old documents now?

H. I think it's a fine idea. I'm all in favor of it and I would particularly like to see the Bay of Pigs stuff declassified including the alleged agreement that Castro made with JFK.

C. Because you were a part of that and knew it was a phoney [sic].

H. Sure.

C. Listen, I think nobody is going to get hurt by this except the other side.

H. Let's hope so. This has been very depressing as you can imagine to me and I've just been assuming that you have been involved up to you know what in this whole thing so far.

H. Weren't you the guy who told me, maybe the last time we were up to your house for dinner, that if the truth ever came out about Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs, that it would just destroy them?
H. Yea, I've written my memoirs of that, but, of course, I never published them. I've just been holding them for the edification of my heirs and assigns and possibly some university research institute eventually after I . . . .

C. Might want to talk to you about that. Howard, I'll be back to you.

H. Please do, and listen. I brought up about a month ago, several many pounds of fine, stone crabs. When are you going to come over and have them . . .

C. Well [sic] do it. I've never had so little time in my life.

H. Okay, thanks for calling.
40. On July 6, 1971, Colson informed Ehrlichman that White House aide and speech writer Patrick J. Buchanan, Haldeman and Ehrlichman's first choice to head White House efforts on the Pentagon Papers matter, strongly believed he was not the man for the job. Colson urged Ehrlichman to meet with Hunt. On July 8, 1971, Buchanan sent a memorandum to Ehrlichman recommending against the project because, while there were dividends to be derived from "Project Ellsberg," none would justify the magnitude of the investigation being considered. Ehrlichman forwarded this memorandum to Haldeman to read and return.

40.1 Charles Colson testimony, Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee Executive Session, June 19, 1973, 447-48 (received from Senate Appropriations Committee).

40.2 Memorandum from Charles Colson to John Ehrlichman, July 6, 1971 (received from White House).

40.3 Memorandum from Patrick Buchanan to John Ehrlichman, July 8, 1971 and routing slip from John Ehrlichman to H. R. Haldeman (received from White House).
Tuesday, June 19, 1973

Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:05 a.m. in room 1223, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John L. McClellan (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McClellan, Pastore, Young, and Hruska. Chairman McClellan. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Colson, this is an inquiry which is of importance, and we have heretofore placed all witnesses under oath. We will ask you to stand and take the oath.

You do solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give before this Senate subcommittee in its inquiry pertaining to the activities of the CIA shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Colson. I do, sir.

Senator Hruska. Mr. Chairman, may I announce in advance that I have hearings commencing in 20 minutes on Chaloner Bill. The Attorney General will be there to testify. I would like...
Mr. Colson. Do you wish to proceed with your statement?

Mr. Colson. If you would like me.

I have reviewed Mr. Ehrlichman's testimony of Wednesday, May 30, before this subcommittee. My recollections of certain matters about which you questioned Mr. Ehrlichman vary somewhat from his.

During the last week of June 1971, I was asked by Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman to recommend a person who might be assigned responsibility for the research involved in the Pentagon Papers publication -- a person who could deal with all aspects of the controversy and who could coordinate White House Staff activities. At that point, congressional hearings were anticipated on the matters covered by the Pentagon Papers and therefore the man selected had to be familiar with the political process, desirably have some foreign policy experience and have good research skills.

On July 2, I sent a memo to Mr. Haldeman recommending several people -- five or six -- who might be available for such a position. Some were in Government, some outside. One of those I recommended was Mr. Hunt. During the first week of July, I had several discussions with both Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman regarding possible candidates. At one point, Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman concluded that Mr. Buchanan of the White House staff be asked to take responsibility for this project. At Mr. Ehrlichman's behest, I talked to Mr. Buchanan.
By memorandum of July 6, I advised Mr. Ehrlichman that Buchanan strongly believed he was not the man for the job. In the same memo, I suggested, therefore, that Mr. Ehrlichman interview Howard Hunt; I had had a long talk with Hunt and found that he was eager to take on the assignment. None of the other candidates I had earlier suggested were either acceptable or available.

Senator Pastore. Mr. Colson, how did you come to know Mr. Hunt in the first place?

Mr. Colson. He and I are alumni of Brown University. I met him first socially, I think, in the early sixties. Then I was president of the Brown Club of Washington and he was vice-president. We got to know each other socially. We would have lunch occasionally, but purely my association with him initially was purely social.

Senator Pastore. Is it fair for me to assume that, out of the five or six names you recommended, that you, yourself, searched out Hunt rather than he searched you out?

Mr. Colson. Well, Hunt's name occurred to me, Senator, as a logical person.

Senator Pastore. But it was on your initiative?

Mr. Colson. Yes, sir.

Senator Bruska. Was his former experience with the CIA a factor in your thinking of recommending him?

Mr. Colson. Yes, sir.
MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN EHRlichMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON

I have just had another conversation with Buchanan who very strongly believes that he is not the man for this project. I doubt that I am going to be able to persuade him. I think it will take something from you or the President.

We probably should also think carefully whether in this frame of mind, he is indeed the right person.

I have had a long talk with Howard Hunt who is dying to get with it and will drop everything if we ask him to. I really think you perhaps should spend a few minutes with him to assure yourself as to the kind of man we're getting.
Date

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

For

From John Ehrlichman

Subject:

Comments:

Please return

ACTION: Please handle See me

Your recommendation

Draft reply for ___ sig.

Other
Having considered the matter until the early hours, my view is that there are some dividends to be derived from Project Ellsburg -- but none to justify the magnitude of the investment recommended.

At the very best, let us assume we can demonstrate, after three months investigation, that Ellsburg stole the documents, worked hand-in-glove with ex-NSC types, collaborated with leftist writers Neil Sheehan and Fox Butterfield, got together a conspiracy to drop the documents at set times to left-wing papers, all timed to undercut McGovern-Hatfield opposition -- what have we accomplished?

What benefit would be derived to the President and his political fortunes in 1972 -- and what damage visited upon his major political adversaries on the other side of the aisle.

To me it would assuredly be psychologically satisfying to cut the innards from Ellsburg and his clique in a major book expose of what they attempted to do, and what they did. But I have yet to be shown what benefit this would do for the President -- or for the rest of us, other than a psychological salve.

Most of the returns have already come in on this question -- and the media has emerged a two-to-one winner (Gallup). This is not surprising.
First, the media controlled absolutely how the controversy would be portrayed to the American people. Secondly, we decided not to contest the issue where we might have had a chance -- in the headlines. The speech drafted for the Vice President -- who was prepared to deliver it -- was killed. The remarks drafted for the President on several occasions, which would have been an implied and unmistakable rebuke to the New York Times, and created a President-Times collision, were rejected, time and again.

An issue that has been decided on the front pages of the nation's papers, and on the lead on the nation's network is not going to be turned around in the public mind by a few well-placed leaks to back-page obscurantists like Allen and Scott.

If we had wanted to contest this issue -- and the media would still have held the advantage -- we should have done it right out in the open, as the Times dared to do. They made their "Go" decision, pulled out all stops in publicity -- and we simply did not make an effective response out in the field. No covert backpage guerrilla war is going to take away the Times victory, which they can claim has been sealed by the Supreme Court.

This is not to argue that the effort is not worthwhile -- but that simply we ought not now to start investing major personnel resources in the kind of covert operation not likely to yield any major political dividends to the President.

The lessons of 1969 seem to me to be here apposite. Confronted with a challenge to his Presidency, the Old Man "pushed his skiff from the shore alone," and went directly to the nation, via networks, headlines -- the works. We overran the opposition, routed them. The Vice President a week later did the identical thing on the networks. Not by PJB letters to the editor, not by Herb Klein chatting with Frank Stanton, not by Ron talking with Dan Rather -- but head-on. That is our forte.
Because the other side dominates the media; because we are limited to a time frame of four-years, now diminished -- because we have the best podiums in the world -- the massive frontal assault is for us the siege gun, the major weapon. We are good at this -- and yet most of our resources, as is here being suggested, are utilized for dropping little nuggets to back-page supporters, and columnists and the like -- the sum total of which is roughly zero. The dividends are to be found in the headlines -- and our media resources are geared to the back pages.

That diversion finished -- let me provide a future example of what we should do. Rather than picking away at Halperin and Lynn and Ellsberg and leaking attacks about the crowd at Brookings -- let's undertake a major public attack on the Brookings Institution.

No one in the country knows what the thing is. We could have it attacked, discredited in the eyes of millions of people, and suspect in the eyes of millions of others -- thus, tainting every single anti-Nixon paper that came out of there, subsequent. This is what we have in the works right now; we have West Wing approval, and VP enthusiasm. The institutional, rather than the individual attack, the front-page headline, network attack -- not the back page nitpicking -- this is to me our strength and our approach. If the President and Vice President eschew an assault on the Times in the major controversy of the decade thus far -- Van Shumway cannot reverse the subsequent tide.

Finally, some thoughts.

If Lloyd Shearer is involved in this, a reading should be taken of all the anti-Vietnam positions taken in the Personality Parade section of Parade. (Jack Anderson told me, if I recall correctly, that Shearer did this and perhaps Parade can be discredited -- that section is a powerful one in terms of public opinion.)
Neil Sheehan, at the time of Dick Dudman's capture by the VC sent a telegram to Hanoi all but saying let him go, "Dudman is on our side." Our intelligence intercepted this -- and this could be utilized.

Fox Butterfield has visited Hanoi -- I just read a particularly slobbering piece by him out of the enemy capital which is being run in Edith Efron's new book on the media.

If Ellsberg is from MIT, his connections with Noam Chomsky might be explored.

In the last analysis, however, the permanent discrediting of all these people, while good for the country, would not, it seems to me, be particularly helpful to the President, politically.

Buchanan
Effective July 6, 1971 Hunt was hired as a White House consultant and assigned the task of studying the Pentagon Papers and events leading up to American involvement in the Vietnam war. On the following morning Colson introduced Hunt to Ehrlichman.

41.1 White House pay records of E. Howard Hunt, July 6, 1971 to July 24, 1971 (received from White House).

41.2 E. Howard Hunt testimony, 9 SSC 3666.

41.3 E. Howard Hunt testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 6, 1971, 216-18 (received from White House).

41.4 Charles Colson testimony, Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee Executive Session, June 19, 1973, 449-50 (received from Senate Appropriations Committee).

41.5 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2532.

41.6 John Ehrlichman testimony, Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee Executive Session, May 30, 1973, 236-37 (received from Senate Appropriations Committee).

41.7 John Ehrlichman log, July 7, 1971 (received from SSC).
**THE WHITE HOUSE**

**WASHINGTON**

**REQUEST FOR PERSONAL ASSIGNMENT**

Date: July 7, 1971

FROM: Charles W. Colson, Special Counsel to the President

Name of Proposed Employee: E. Howard Hunt

Position: Consultant (Title)

Grade and Salary: $100/per day worked

Payroll (check one): White House Office (Reg. Salary & Expenses)  
White House Office (Special Projects)  
Other (specify: )

Length of Assignment (check one):

Temporary (No. of Months or Not to exceed )

XX Indefinite

Permanent

Desired effective date: July 6, 1971

Justification for assignment:

Present place of employment or assignment: Robert R. Mullen and Co.  
1729 H. St., N. W., Washington, D.C.

I HEREBY ENDORSE AND AUTHORIZE THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PERSONNEL ACTION FOR MY OFFICE:

(Signature of Requesting Official)

---

**Attachmet(s) needed:** In all cases - "Information Needed Concerning New Personnel"

- For appointment other than White House rolls: SF 171, Application for Federal Employees

- If to be appointed White House rolls it is desirable to have SF 171 furnished, preferably attached to this request. Send to White House Personnel Office if not available as attachment to this request form.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REQUEST FOR COMPENSATION FOR PER-DIEM PERSONNEL (To be submitted bi-weekly)

3/23/71

INSTRUCTIONS: Prepare this form in DUPLICATE and submit PERSONNEL OFFICE, ROOM 6 E3. Claims for compensation for work performed should be filed as soon as possible after the pay period for which compensation is claimed. Show HOURS worked; "X" Not acceptable, being non-specific.

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

ADDRESS: WASHINGTON, D. C.

FROM: (Name of Official or Employee) E. Howard Hunt

TITLE: 002271 Consultant

REQUEST IS HEREBY MADE FOR COMPENSATION AS INDICATED BELOW:

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| NET TOTAL: | 56 |

CERTIFYING SIGNATURES:

(a) OFFICIAL or EMPLOYEE:

I certify that official duties were performed on the days indicated above in accordance with instructions which were received from Charles W. Colson whose title is Special Counsel to the President and no additional compensation will be claimed by me for this period.

E. Howard Hunt
(Signature of Official or Employee)

(b) APPROVING OFFICER (when necessary and appropriate):

I certify that the compensation requested above is correct and is approved for payment.

Lawrence K. O'Brien
(SPECIAL COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT)

REMARKS:

For White House Personnel Office use only:

Received on 3/23/71

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PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., AUGUST 3, 6, 7; SEPTEMBER 24 AND 25, 1973
Book 9

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[7945]
Mr. Thompson. Could we delay momentarily until we get copies of that, so we will be able to follow along?

Mr. Dash. I can continue the questioning without reference to that transcript, Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Thompson. All right.

Mr. Dash. Did you understand, by the way, Mr. Hunt, that from that conversation, Mr. Colson was exploring the idea with you of a major effort to discredit Mr. Ellsberg in the press?

Mr. Hunt. Yes.

Mr. Dash. Now, did Mr. Colson eventually offer you a position in the White House?

Mr. Hunt. He did.

Mr. Dash. And I think you have indicated in your statement that he referred to specific qualifications. Can you repeat that? What did he indicate to you were your qualifications which led you to that particular position? What qualifications?

Mr. Hunt. The fact that I had an investigative background of some years and also, that I had been involved in political action operations.

Mr. Dash. Now, were you interviewed by anyone besides Mr. Colson?

Mr. Hunt. Yes.

Mr. Dash. Who was that?

Mr. Hunt. Mr. John D. Ehrlichman.

Mr. Dash. At whose directions, Mr. Hunt, did you work when you took this position? Under whose directions?

Mr. Hunt. Under Mr. Colson's direction.

Mr. Dash. Can you describe your initial assignment under Mr. Colson?

Mr. Hunt. Mr. Colson instructed me to become the White House resident expert on the origins of the Vietnam war. At the same time, I had a collateral responsibility for determining certain leaks of highly classified information which included the leaks of the Pentagon Papers.

Mr. Dash. Now, is it true, Mr. Hunt, that from the beginning of your employment, Mr. Colson asked you to collect what could be called derogatory information about Daniel Ellsberg?

Mr. Hunt. Yes.

Mr. Dash. What was to be done with this information when it was collected?

Mr. Hunt. My assumption was that it would be made available by Mr. Colson or someone in his confidence to selected members of the media.

Mr. Dash. Did you by the way, early in your employment, collect the list of certain media representatives who might be interested in such material?

Mr. Hunt. I did.

Mr. Dash. Now, following the assignment you received from Mr. Colson, how did you develop the information on Mr. Ellsberg?

Mr. Hunt. It was developed through intensive study of reports furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Dash. Were there any other materials that you used?

Mr. Hunt. There were certain overt materials.
People v. Ehrlichman, et al. (A 300 388)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

E. Howard Hunt

June 6, 1973
Q      After your meeting with Mr. Colson, was a
meeting arranged with anyone from the White House?
A      Yes, sir.
Q      Who was that meeting with?
A      John Ehrlichman.
Q      I invite your attention to Grand Jury Exhibit 35,
previously marked for identification. Do you recognize the
person in that photograph?
A      Yes, sir.
Q      Who is that, sir?
A      Mr. John Ehrlichman.
Q      Did you actually meet Mr. Ehrlichman?
A      On one occasion.
Q      Where did that meeting take place?
A      It took place in Mr. Ehrlichman's office.
Q      Where was that?
A      In the White House, Executive Mansion itself.
Q      Do you recall the date that meeting took place?
A      No, sir, but it would have to be very late June
or the -- within the first few days of July.
Q      What year are we talking about?
A      We're talking about 1971.
Q      Would you tell us, please, the substance of your
conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman at that time?
A      To the best of my recollection, Mr. Hecht, I
was simply introduced to Mr. Colson -- by Mr. Colson -- to
Mr. Ehrlichman.

Mr. Colson said, "This is Howard Hunt. He's the
man I have been telling you about. I think he'll do very
well in the type of work we have contemplated. Do you have
any questions, John?"

Ehrlichman said, "You retired recently from
C.I.A."

I said, "Yes, I have, approximately a year ago."

We rose, shook hands, and that concluded the
meeting, to the best of my recollection.

Q. Had anything been said as of the time of that
interview with respect to your job title?

A. No, sir.

Q. Your salary?

A. No, sir.

Q. Your specific duties?

A. You're referring to Mr. Ehrlichman?

Q. Yes.

A. No, sir.

Q. Had you, at the time you met with Mr. Ehrlichman,
had some idea of what your job title and duties were going
to be if you were employed?

A. I knew only that I was to be termed a consultant.
The actual salary had not been fixed. I indicated no
particular interest in recompense.

Q. After your meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman had
terminated, what then next happened in connection with your
ultimate employment with the White House?

A. I filled out a series of employment applications,
forms for the Administrative Section of the White House.
learned that my compensation was to be a hundred dollars a day, or for days worked. And I know a field service investigation was conducted by the Secret Service.

Q. When were you actually notified that you were employed by the White House?

A. I was simply told by Mr. Colson, "You start today."

Q. I see. And as of the time Mr. Colson told you that you were to start today, had anything yet been said about your duties, specific duties?

A. Not prior to that moment, to the best of my recollection.

Q. All right. What happened after that moment occurred when you were told by Mr. Colson?

A. Mr. Colson indicated to me that there was a great deal of concern within the Administration, particularly within the Executive Branch itself, concerning the implications of the Vietnam War. There was a very active anti-war movement afoot in this country at that time.

Mr. Colson indicated to me that the feeling in the Executive Branch was that it was quite necessary to disassociate the current Administration from United States involvement in Vietnam War. And to that end, he asked me that I make a thorough study of whatever root source documents might be available in the government to make an accurate determination.

Q. Where did this conversation with Mr. Colson occur,
EXECUTIVE SESSION

PURPORTED ATTEMPT TO INVOLVE THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE WATERGATE AND ELLSBERG INCIDENTS

Tuesday, June 19, 1973

U. S. Senate

Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:05 a.m., in room 1223, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John L. McClellan (chairman)

Present: Senators McClellan, Pastore, Young, and Hruska.

Chairman McClellan. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Colson, this is an inquiry which is of importance, and we have heretofore placed all witnesses under oath. We will ask you to stand and take the oath.

You do solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give before this Senate subcommittee in its inquiry pertaining to the activities of the CIA shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Colson. I do, sir.

Senator Hruska. Mr. Chairman, may I announce in advance that I have hearings commencing in 20 minutes on Clarence Kelley. The Attorney General will be there to testify. I would like to...
Senator Morse. Of related activities?

Mr. Colson. The fact that he had been in the CIA, had been involved in new foreign policy, was familiar with some of the background of the period covered by the Pentagon Papers, it occurred to me that he would have requisite information on some of the issues that were to be explored.

Chairman McClellan. At that time, you were familiar with his background?

Mr. Colson. Yes, sir.

Chairman McClellan. You may proceed.

Mr. Colson. According to my diary, I took Mr. Hunt to Mr. Ehrlichman's office on July 7. I believe that I left Mr. Hunt with Mr. Ehrlichman so that they could talk alone. After that meeting, I asked Ehrlichman his opinion; he said he had been favorably impressed with Hunt. It was either on that day or during a phone conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman the next day that the decision was made to bring Hunt on as a consultant. I sometimes thereafter initiated the necessary administrative action by advising the staff secretary's office -- that is, the staff secretary for the entire White House staff.

To the best of my recollection, I did not call the staff secretary's office until sometime after Mr. Ehrlichman had given his approval to Mr. Hunt being hired as a consultant. I believe the date of the sixth must have been established later. Hunt had been actually spending time at the White House on the
sixth and seventh. There is no other way I can account for the
sixth being the date first officially recorded on the White
House personnel records. I might note that the consultant con-
tract was not executed until August 20, indicating that the
actual administrative processing may have been ordered well
after the date on which Hunt began his work.

For such an important assignment, the man hired would have
to have been interviewed by either Mr. Haldeman or Mr.
Ehrlichman; I had only been asked to make recommendations to
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman.

In response to a point that you raised, Senator Pastore,
during the Ehrlichman testimony, at no time did I add anyone to
the staff of the White House without the express approval of
Mr. Haldeman or, as in the case of Mr. Hunt, Mr. Ehrlichman.
The staff budget was very rigidly controlled and, in the case
of each professional person that I brought onto the staff, Mr.
Haldeman interviewed them first or, at the very least, approved
the hiring, the salary, and the budget allocation.

I do not seek to disavow responsibility for Howard Hunt
or for recommending him; he was my recommendation but the ulti-
mate decision to engage him was approved by Mr. Ehrlichman.

On the seventh or possibly the eighth of July, which
would have been by phone, I told Mr. Ehrlichman that Mr. Hunt
wanted to establish liaison with the CIA as well as with other
Government agencies.
Mr. Ehrlichman. As needed. We didn't have a system of weekly reports or monthly reports or anything of that kind but just when something came up that required my attention they would let me know.

Mr. Dash. And if it was important, they would report, would they not?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I would hope that most of my people would handle things themselves. Usually it got to me—I mean I am talking now about routine domestic things, they got to me as the last step before they went to the President.

Mr. Dash. Did you ever initiate any instructions to them?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I was asked to ratify a number of their decisions from time to time, and their practice, Young and Krogh we are now talking about.

Mr. Dash. Yes.

Mr. Ehrlichman. Their practice would be to send me periodic information reports or status reports or progress reports and sometimes those would contain requests for either approval of a decision that they had made or proposals that they had or something of that kind.

Mr. Dash. Is this the special investigations unit that later became, began to be known popularly as the plumbers?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes.

Mr. Dash. When did that occur?

Mr. Ehrlichman. That it became known as that?

Mr. Dash. Yes.

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't know. That was never a term that was familiar to me until it was used in the press.

Mr. Dash. Were you aware that there was actually a sign to the door, the plumbers?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. It may be apocryphal, I am not sure.

Mr. Dash. Now, did you actually interview Mr. Hunt before he was hired?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No; I had a meeting with Mr. Colson and Mr. Hunt after he was hired. It was in July of 1971 and I believe that is the only time I have seen Mr. Hunt.

Mr. Dash. Would it be fair to say that Mr. Colson very much wanted Mr. Hunt to be hired?

Mr. Ehrlichman. That would be fair to say.

Mr. Dash. And you acceded to his request?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, it was an accomplished fact, I think, by the time I saw him.

Mr. Dash. Now, did you make a call for Mr. Hunt to the CIA shortly after you saw him?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well I cannot recall ever making such a call.

Mr. Dash. Now, you said that the major responsibility of this unit developed because of the need for the unit to go ahead on an investigation of the so-called Pentagon leaks. Were there any other responsibilities or assignments given to this unit?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes.

Mr. Dash. Could you state what they were?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I can state some of them; I cannot state all of them.

Mr. Dash. The ones that you can?
EXECUTIVE SESSION

PURPORTED ATTEMPT TO INVOLVE THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE WATERSGATE AND ELLSBERG INCIDENTS

WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 1973

United States Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 1223, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John L. McClellan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators McClellan, Pastore, Young and Hruska.

Chairman McClellan. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Ehrlichman, we welcome you here this morning. We appreciate your response to our invitation to appear before the committee. I note you have counsel with you. In this particular inquiry in these executive sessions we have been having we have permitted counsel to be present. They can only, of course, advise you regarding your legal rights and so forth. Other than that, they are not permitted to ask questions or interrupt the proceedings in any way.

We have heretofore and in view of the delicacy of the inquiry that the committee is making and its importance we...
Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't know that, Senator.

Senator Pastore. You mean he did that on his own?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I say I don't know whether he have the authority or not. I suspect he did. But I can't tell you categorically.

Senator Hruska. At the time you first met him he was already on the White House payroll?

Mr. Ehrlichman. That day or the previous day.

The reason for the visit was an introductory visit and to discuss the project which he was going to undertake which was to analyze the Pentagon Papers to determine whether they were complete or not, whether there were any distortions. He was drawing on his experience of 20 years in the CIA plus some research that he proposed to do to permit him to make that analysis.

There was a suspicion that the Pentagon Papers were not the complete story and that was to be his project. He was a researcher, basically.

Chairman McClellan. When you say they were not the complete story, do you mean there was a suspicion that there were other papers taken?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir.

Chairman McClellan. What do you mean by "not the complete story"?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I mean this: That a team in the
previous Administration had put this study, called the Pentagon Papers, together. There was a suspicion among some of the people in our Administration that that had been an incomplete development of the subject matter; in other words, that it had been a very selective completion of documents.

Since they were now in the public domain, having been turned over to the press, the question was whether there were other pertinent documents or facts that ought to be added to the information in the public domain to make a complete story of the events leading up to the Vietnam situation.

Senator Pastore. When did you first find out about the existence of the Pentagon Papers?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I first found out after they began to appear in the press. I was not familiar with their existence prior to that. That does not mean much because that wasn't my field. I was almost never on the foreign affairs side of things.

Senator Pastore. The only reason why I asked the question is because you were talking about incompleteness.

Mr. Ehrlichman. This was alleged and I can't vouch for that. That is one of the reasons why Mr. Colson was anxious to have someone of Mr. Hunt's stated capabilities available to do an analysis. Mr. Colson was involved in the communications activities in the White House. He was working with Mr. Klein. They felt it was their proper function to
The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 1223, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John L. McClellan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators McClellan, Pastore, Young and Udall.

Chairman McClellan. The committee will come to order.

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We have carefully read the written testimony of the Hon. John F. Kennedy

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Mr. Erlichman. I don't know that, Senator.

Senator Ervin. 

Mr. Erlichman. I'm not sure he had that on his card.

Mr. Erlichman. I'm not sure he had the authority or not, I suspect he did, but I can't tell you categorically.

Senator Ervin. At the time you first met him he was already on the White House payroll?

Mr. Erlichman. That day or the previous day.

The reason for the visit was an introductory visit and to discuss the project which he was going to undertake which was to analyze the Pentagon Papers to determine whether they were complete or not, whether there were any distortions. He was drawing on his experience of 20 years in the CIA plus some research that he proposed to do to permit him to make that analysis.

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Mr. Sheldonman. This was alleged and I can't really
nor what. That is one of the reasons why Mr. Colson was
involved in communications activities in the White House. It was not
SATURDAY, JULY 3 - SUNDAY, JULY 4, 1971

Camp David

TUESDAY, JULY 6, 1971

6:15    Roosevelt Room
9:50    HRH, Colson
11:30   HRH, Colson
12:30   John Price
1:00    Lunch in Mess with Pete Ehrlichman, Cong. Vander Jagt
2:00    Harper, Keller, Morey, Waldmann, Whitaker, Morgan
3:00    Haircut
3:50    Peter Peterson
4:00    Shultz, Peterson, Flanigan, Whitaker, Rice, Heffner (R&D)
5:45    Russell Train, John Irwin (Under Secretary of State)

WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 1971

8:15    Roosevelt Room
9:00    Chuck Colson
9:30    Colson, Howard Hunt
11:30   John Dean, Tom Lattimer
12:00   George Shultz
1:00    Jack Vaughn
2:30    Car at west basement
3:00    Depart Andrews, Jetstar 4197
4:20    Arrive Buckley Field, Denver (refuel, drop Pete)
5:45    Arrive El Toro

THURSDAY, JULY 8, 1971

11:30   Bob DeHenderson

FRIDAY, JULY 9, 1971

10:30   President
1:00    Lunch with Leonard Firestone

MONDAY, JULY 12, 1971

8:15    Breakfast with Bob Mundin
9:45    Don Nixon
10:30   John Degan
42. On July 7, 1971 Ehrlichman called General Robert Cushman, Deputy Director of the CIA, and informed him that Hunt had been asked by the President to perform special consultant work on security problems and that Hunt might be contacting Cushman sometime in the future for some assistance. Ehrlichman told Cushman he should consider Hunt to have pretty much carte blanche. Prior to the discovery of a transcript of Ehrlichman's conversation with Cushman, in February 1974, Ehrlichman testified that he could not recall this phone call, that he was certain the President did not instruct him to secure CIA aid for Hunt, and that it was not until July 24, 1971 that the President gave him special authority to call on the CIA for assistance in connection with the work of the Special Investigations Unit.

42.1 Partial transcript of a telephone conversation between General Cushman and John Ehrlichman, July 7, 1971 and attached affidavit (received from CIA).

42.2 General Robert Cushman testimony, 8 SSC 3290.

42.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2532.

42.4 John Ehrlichman testimony, Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee Executive Session, May 30, 1973, 285-88 (received from Senate Appropriations Committee).

42.5 John Ehrlichman testimony, House Armed Services Committee Executive Session, June 13, 1973, 647.
AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF VIRGINIA ) ss. DV
COUNTY OF FAIRFAX )

being first duly sworn, state:

1. I was born on 8 March 1924 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. After serving as an Army officer in World War II and completing my college education, I joined the Central Intelligence Agency in October 1950. I have held the position of Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence since November 1969.

2. This affidavit is submitted at the request of Mr. William E. Colby to explain the circumstances of my discovery on February 4, 1974 of a file of stenographers' notes among which was the attached note of Miss Barbara Pindar summarizing a telephone conversation between Lt. General Robert E. Cushman, Jr. and Mr. John Ehrlichman on 7 July 1971.

3. Director Colby's secretary, Miss Barbara Pindar, came to my office on Monday morning, February 4, 1974. She said that Mr. Colby would like me to go through my files once more to make certain that there were no misplaced transcripts of conversations which had been recorded in the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The recording of visitors' conversations had been done on a very selective basis and this practice was discontinued after General Cushman left CIA in December 1971.
4. During the morning of February 4, 1974, I went through the papers in my safe in order to determine if any misplaced transcripts of conversations were located there. At the bottom of the second drawer were two folders of material that contained information used for General Walters' orientation briefings after he was appointed Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in March 1972. Under these briefing files I found a brown folder containing ten stenographic notes summarizing General Cushman's telephone conversations with members of the White House staff in 1969, 1970 and 1971. In this folder was a summary of General Cushman's 7 July 1971 conversation with Mr. John Ehrlichman.

5. These stenographic notes in this folder included summary of General Cushman's conversations with Dr. Kissinger on leaks of intelligence reports in the press, and his request for an analytical paper on Cambodia. There were also conversations with other White House officials on intelligence leaks and on requests for name checks of foreigners. The conversations with Dr. Kissinger were on top of the file of ten stenographic notes and one memorandum written by the CIA General Counsel. The note of General Cushman conversations with Mr. Ehrlichman on 7 July 1971 was included about two thirds of the way down in the file. I had looked at this file in May 1973 when Dr. Schlesinger requested employees to search all files for material which might have been related to Howard Hunt and the Watergate affair. At that time I noted the records of the conversations with Dr. Kissinger and others on matters which were completely unrelated to Watergate. I did not see the single page item on General Cushman's conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman about Howard Hunt, and presumably, inadvertently failed to uncover it when I was paging through these papers.
6. The file of summary notes of General Cushman's telephone conversations was maintained by his secretary. I usually did not see them when they were made because they were chiefly used by the secretaries to clarify questions which might be raised later.

DV

In many cases, General Cushman probably did not see them either.

In December 1971 Miss Barbara Pindar, General Cushman's secretary, and I reviewed General Cushman's papers after he left CIA to become Marine Commandant. I decided to retain only those papers which related to General Cushman's conversations with members of the White House staff.

020226

Affiant.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 5th day of February, 1974.

J. Helen Connor
Notary Public

(SEAL)
Volume I
CIA Materials Furnished to the Special Counsel, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives
Telephone Call to General Cushman from John Ehrlichman - 7 July 1971

Mr. Ehrlichman: I want to alert you that an old acquaintance, Howard Hunt, has been asked by the President to do some special consultant work on security problems. He may be contacting you sometime in the future for some assistance. I wanted you to know that he was in fact doing some things for the President. He is a long-time acquaintance with the people here. He may want some help on computer runs and other things. You should consider he has pretty much carte blanche.

(notes)

DV

NOTF: After the above conversation, General Cushman called to alert him. (CIA official staff has name)
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 31, AUGUST 1, AND 2, 1973
Book 8

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973

[7977]
General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. HAMILTON. When did you become Commandant?
General CUSHMAN. January 1, 1972.
Mr. HAMILTON. Before that date, General Cushman, were you the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency?
General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir; I was.
Mr. HAMILTON. What was your tenure at that position?
General CUSHMAN. I was there almost 3 years.
Mr. HAMILTON. Do you have the dates, sir?
General CUSHMAN. I don't have the date of taking office exactly. I think it was about April 15 when I moved into the Deputy Director's chair, April 15, 1969.
Mr. HAMILTON. I believe you told us at a staff interview your tenure there was from May 7, 1969, to December 31, 1971; is that correct, to the best of your recollection?
General CUSHMAN. That is correct. I had the figures with me.
Mr. HAMILTON. Did there come a time on or about July 7, 1971, when you received a call from the White House requesting CIA assistance in regard to a White House project?
General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir; I received a call on July 7, 1971, from Mr. Ehrlichman who said that Howard Hunt had been hired as a consultant to the White House on security matters, that he would be coming to see me, and could I lend him a hand or words to that effect.
Mr. HAMILTON. If the witness will excuse me and I think we are now beyond the preliminary questioning and beginning to get into the substantive part of the testimony. The other members of the committee have not yet returned and I know General Cushman's testimony is very important and relevant so the committee will stand in recess for a few moments until we have the return of our other members.
[Recess.]
Senator ERVIN. Proceed.
Mr. HAMILTON. General Cushman, now that other members of the committee have returned, I would like to ask you the same question I asked before we had that brief intermission.
Did there come a time around July 7, 1971, when you received a call from the White House requesting CIA assistance in a White House project?
General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. On July 7, 1971, I received a call from Mr. Ehrlichman who said that Howard Hunt had been hired as a consultant to the White House on security matters, that he would be coming to pay me a visit and could I lend him a hand.
Mr. HAMILTON. Now, did you consider this request from Mr. Ehrlichman to be a usual request, a commonplace request?
General CUSHMAN. This was the original such request that I could recall by Mr. Ehrlichman. I used to get calls frequently, of course, from other people saying that someone would come to call on me. Usually they were looking for a job, that sort of thing.
Mr. HAMILTON. But I take it that from the White House, with the exception of calls from the National Security Council, that this is the only call that you have had; is that correct?
General CUSHMAN. As far as I can recall, yes.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
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UNITED STATES SENATE
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Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, AND 25, 1973
Book 6

Printed for the use of the
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973
Mr. Ehrlichman. As needed. We didn't have a system of weekly reports or monthly reports or anything of that kind but just when something came up that required my attention they would let me know. Mr. Dash. And if it was important, they would report, would they not?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I would hope that most of my people would handle things themselves. Usually it got to me—I mean I am talking now about routine domestic things, they got to me as the last step before they went to the President.

Mr. Dash. Did you ever initiate any instructions to them?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I was asked to ratify a number of their decisions from time to time, and their practice, Young and Krogh we are now talking about.

Mr. Dash. Did you ever initiate any instructions to them?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Their practice would be to send me periodic information reports or status reports or progress reports and sometimes those would contain requests for either approval of a decision that they had made or proposals that they had or something of that kind.

Mr. Dash. Is this the special investigations unit that later became, began to be known popularly as the plumbers?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes.

Mr. Dash. When did that occur?

Mr. Ehrlichman. That it became known as that?

Mr. Dash. Yes.

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't know. That was never a term that was familiar to me until it was used in the press.

Mr. Dash. Were you aware that there was actually a sign to the door, the plumbers?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. It may be apocryphal, I am not sure.

Mr. Dash. Now, did you actually interview Mr. Hunt before he was hired?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No; I had a meeting with Mr. Colson and Mr. Hunt after he was hired. It was in July of 1971 and I believe that is the only time I have seen Mr. Hunt.

Mr. Dash. Would it be fair to say that Mr. Colson very much wanted Mr. Hunt to be hired?

Mr. Ehrlichman. That would be fair to say.

Mr. Dash. And you acceded to his request?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, it was an accomplished fact, I think, by the time I saw him.

Mr. Dash. Now, did you make a call for Mr. Hunt to the CIA shortly after you saw him?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well I cannot recall ever making such a call.

Mr. Dash. Now, you said that the major responsibility of this unit developed because of the need for the unit to go ahead on an investigation of the so-called Pentagon leaks. Were there any other responsibilities or assignments given to this unit?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes.

Mr. Dash. Could you state what they were?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I can state some of them; I cannot state all of them.

Mr. Dash. The ones that you can?
EXECUTIVE SESSION

PURPORTED ATTEMPT TO INVOLVE THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE WATERGATE AND ELLSBERG INCIDENTS

WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 1973

United States Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 1223, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John L. McClellan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators McClellan, Pastore, Young and Hruska.

Chairman McClellan. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Ehrlichman, we welcome you here this morning. We appreciate your response to our invitation to appear before the committee. I note you have counsel with you. In this particular inquiry in these executive sessions we have been having we have permitted counsel to be present. They can only, of course, advise you regarding your legal rights and so forth. Other than that, they are not permitted to ask questions or interrupt the proceedings in any way.

We have heretofore and in view of the delicacy of the inquiry that the committee is making and its importance we
cut-off. Had he called two or three weeks earlier, he would have had the same result. In my personal experience, the White House has never insisted that the White House do anything that the CIA objected to or the Deputy Director. That includes aid to Mr. Hunt and the psychological profile as well, as the record shows.

Senator Pastore. We keep using the words "White House". Do we mean the President? Do we mean somebody in the White House? I am afraid that much of the consternation on the part of the public with relation to what has happened is that the words "White House" are used as though it means the President.

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir.

Senator Pastore. Does this mean the President?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Not invariably. I think that is an important point, Senator. As we get into this Watergate business, the relationship between what some staff people did and what the President wanted done has a disparity. There was a spread. That is the reason I use the words "White House" rather than the word "President".

In my personal experience, my requests of the CIA were always at the specific instance of the President because that was not my regular beat. I would make requests of a domestic department at times without the President specifically saying, [sic] "Call the Department of Agriculture and tell them to do this or that," because I knew generally what his policy was. When I
got into the national security area, I was out of my field, and I never did make a step to ask the CIA to do anything without the President having authorized me to do so in advance.

So that when it is one of my transactions with relation to the CIA, I can say with confidence I was acting with specific Presidential authority. On the other hand, what the NSC relationship to the CIA was in terms of day-to-day requests, I can't answer because I don't now.

Senator Pastore. But you were the chief architect of the plumbers, were you not? The President talked to you, did he not?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir.

Senator Pastore. With relation to this matter of the leaks?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir.

Senator Pastore. And the fact that it had to be discovered and revealed?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir.

Senator Pastore. And those who were guilty had to be punished?

Mr. Ehrlichman. He looked to me.

Senator Pastore. He gave you the directorship of this so-called project?

Mr. Ehrlichman. In general terms; that is correct.

Senator Pastore. Therefore, when you talked to anybody after this authority was granted to you, you did not have to go
back to the President for every detail?

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is correct.

Senator Pastore. You had it within your power to pick up the phone and call the CIA as a result of the authority already given to you, without going back to the President and asking him specifically, "I want to call up CIA about Hunt"; is that correct?

Mr. Ehrlichman. You are correct. That dated from the 24th of July.

Senator Young. May I ask a question at this point? According [sic] to some of the testimony, as I understand, there was a meeting in your office with Mr. Helms and Mr. Osborne. Was the President informed as to what was discussed at that meeting? You say the President knew all the time what was going on.

Mr. Ehrlichman. That meeting was held, Senator, as a result of the President having approved a general plan of operation which he did on the 24th of July.

Senator Hruska. The plumbers?

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is correct. That meeting was then held on the 12th of August for the purpose of informing Director Helms [sic] of what the President's instructions were, and what his objectives were, and how the CIA would fit into that general pattern. The same kind of meeting was held with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense.

Senator Young. What authority did the President give you
or anyone else for the CIA to act in this matter?

Mr. Ehrlichman. He said that we could call on the CIA for assistance, and it was understood and implicit in his saying that, within legal limits. We were not authorized, as I understood it, to ask the CIA to do anything that they were not legally authorized to do by the 1947 Act.

Senator Pastore. When you say "we", you mean you?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. You see, while I had general accountability, Mr. Krogh was the operating manager of that unit and the President met with Mr. Krogh and his instructions, in fact, were made to Mr. Krogh in my presence, rather than to me in Mr. Krogh's presence. So that I had the -- well, I had the oversight, so to speak. Mr. Krogh did make regular reports to the President, saw the President, kept him informed of the progress of the thing, and he was really the operating manager.

I don't mean to cop out on this. I was certainly --

Chairman McClellan. The President himself was operating manager of the plumbers' group.

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, Senator. I said Mr. Krogh was.

Now, I would just wrap up this section on Hunt by perhaps reading from the summary, recognizing that we are getting short of time, and this is on page 16.

I recognize the difficulty for the committee in my testimony in the matter of the Cushman telephone call.

In candor, I would prefer to simply say to the committee,
EXECUTIVE SESSION

PURPOSED ATTEMPT TO INVOLVE THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE WATERGATE AND EISENHOWER INCIDENTS

WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 1973

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS. TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

United States Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:16 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 1333, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John L. McClellan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators McClellan, Pastore, Young and Hruska.

Chairman McClellan. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Ehrlichman, we welcome you here this morning. We appreciate your response to our invitation to appear before the committee. I note you have counsel with you. In this particular inquiry in these executive sessions we have been having we have permitted counsel to be present. They can only, of course, advise you regarding your legal rights and so forth. Other than that, they are not permitted to ask questions or interrupt the proceedings in any way.

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Columbia Reporting Company
OFFICIAL REPORTERS
300 SEVENTH STREET, S.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024

TELEPHONE 737-8333

SECRET

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT
OF
HEARINGS.

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

IN THE MATTER OF... BRIEFINGS
DATE... Wednesday, June 13, 1973
PAGE... 636... TO... 806 VOLUME... #8

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANS-
MISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER
TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
and accuracy. As far as I then knew, that was what he would be
doing for the White House. That same day, about 3:30 P.M., I
left for San Clemente. As of then I knew of no reason for
Hunt to have CIA aid.

One does not invoke CIA aid lightly, at least I never did.
I only did so a total of three times that I can recall, each
time at the specific instruction of the President.

I am certain that the President did not instruct me to
secure CIA aid for Hunt.

Thus, if in fact I called the General between July 7 and
July 13 from California for help for Hunt, it must have been
the first and only time I did so without Presidential direction
and apparently at the request of someone else who phoned me or
came to see me in California to ask me to do so. Such a thing
is possible, but not probable.

The CIA and the Plumbers:

The press has pyramided a number of inferences to make it
appear that I asked for CIA help so that Hunt could break into
Dr. Fielding's office in aid of the White House unit which was
trying to plug government leaks of secret documents.

Again, the chronological timing is such as to reduce the
probabilities of such a speculation to an inadmissible minimum.

First, the White House unit, the so-called "plumbers",
did not come into being until after Egil Krogh and I had met
with the President in Washington, July 24, 1971. Krogh had been
43. By memorandum dated July 6, 1971 entitled "More Pentagon Papers," Colson advised Ehrlichman that the Brookings Institution was conducting a study of American involvement in Vietnam; Colson characterized it as potentially another Pentagon Papers. According to Caulfield, a member of Dean's staff, Colson suggested that a fire be started at the Brookings Institution in the course of which the papers could be stolen. Caulfield objected to the plan and reported his objection to Dean. On July 11, 1971 Dean flew to San Clemente and told Ehrlichman that the Brookings Institution plan should be abandoned. Ehrlichman caused the project to be cancelled.

43.1 Memorandum from Charles Colson to John Ehrlichman, July 6, 1971 with attachment (received from White House).

43.2 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 919-20.

43.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2535-36.

43.4 John Caulfield testimony, SSC Executive Session, March 23, 1974, 41-44 (received from SSC).
July 6, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN EHRICHMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT: More Pentagon Papers

The attached is fascinating. It looks to me like we may soon expect another installment in the Pentagon Papers written by the same authors but doubtless more up to date.

You will note that this report is dated August 1969 and the indication is a 2-year study was to be conducted which would mean that we could expect something dropping on us this Fall.

In my opinion, this should be promptly investigated and Justice certainly has every reason to do so in view of the fact that Ellsberg was named as a member of the outside advisory group.

cc: H. R. Haldeman
    - John Dean
    - Pat Buchanan
NEW PROGRAM OF FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES
social affairs with particular attention to political development, it will also include China's external relations. Although this research will be separate from Brookings' policy studies of the U.S. politico-military role, some interconnection will be inevitable and useful. Professor Burnett will also prepare occasional papers on key policy issues relating to Asia and China. Both in preparing these papers and in undertaking his more basic Chinese studies, Professor Burnett will convene ad hoc discussion groups, made up of government and nongovernment experts—thus helping to maintain bridges between official and academic opinion in this vital area.

2. U.S. Military Programs for Developing Countries. Brookings Senior Fellow Ernest Lefever, who has just completed a study of the role of the military and police in the political development of tropical Africa, is beginning a review of U.S. programs for military training assistance to developing nations, focusing particularly on Latin America but seeking to draw conclusions of worldwide import. These U.S. programs—which shape the receiving countries' military capabilities, political development, and relations with the United States—are relevant to the U.S. politico-military role in the developing world not only for this reason but also because they bear on (i) the developing countries' ability to play a larger role in their own defense; (ii) political attitudes of the military in developing countries; and (iii) the scope and nature of U.S. commitments to these countries. A review of these U.S. programs is thus in order. The product of this work will be a book which assesses the effects of these programs to date and offers recommendations for the future.

3. United Nations. In all of this, the long-term possibilities for strengthening international alternatives to U.S. military action need to be considered. Brookings has already done considerable work in this field. Larry Fabian, Research Associate on our resident staff, has recently completed a draft of his study, "Preparedness for Peacekeeping." This study of UN capabilities for mobilizing manpower and resources analyzes political as well as technical issues; emphasis is on the policies and potential of key middle and small power peacekeepers, as well as the super-powers. It may lead to further Brookings research concerning peacekeeping by the UN and international agencies.

4. U.S. Policy and Vietnam—The Lessons Learned. A balanced and accurate history of our Vietnam experience, written with fidelity and judiciousness, while memories of the principal actors are still fresh, should have great value. Brookings is undertaking a two-year project to this end.
This project will seek to determine what lessons, if any, can be learned from the experience. These lessons can be important on several levels and with varying relevance to foreign policy making generally. On the broadest and most basic level, something may be learned about the U.S. role in the world—both our responsibilities and the limitations of our power. At the middle range, lessons can be learned about organization and procedures for decision making, and how to improve them. On the most concrete level,
social affairs, with particular attention to political development, it will also include China's
current relations. Although this research will be separate from Brookings' policy studies
of the U.S. politico-military role, some interconnection will be inevitable and useful.
Professor Barnett will also prepare occasional papers on key policy issues relating to Asia
and China. Both in preparing these papers and in undertaking his more basic Chinese
studies, Professor Barnett will convene ad hoc discussion groups, made up of government
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assesses the effects of these programs to date and offers recommendations for the future.

3. United Nations. In all of this, the long-term possibilities for strengthening interna-
tional alternatives to U.S. military action need to be considered. Brookings has already
done considerable work in this field. Larry Fabian, Research Associate on our resident
staff, has recently completed a draft of his study, "Preparedness for Peacekeeping." This
study of UN capabilities for mobilizing manpower and resources analyzes political as well
as technical issues; emphasis is on the policies and potential of key middle and small power
peacekeepers, as well as the super-powers. It may lead to further Brookings research con-
cerning peacekeeping by the UN and international agencies.

of our Vietnam experience, written with fidelity and judiciousness, while memories of
the principal actors are still fresh, should have great value. Brookings is undertaking a two-
year project to this end.

This project will seek to determine what lessons, if any, can be learned from the
experience. These lessons can be important on several levels and with varying relevance
to foreign policy making generally. On the broadest and most basic level, something may
be learned about the U.S. role in the world—both our responsibilities and the limitations
of our power. At the middle range, lessons can be learned about organization and proce-
dures for decision making, and how to improve them. On the most concrete level,
something may be learned about how to improve the accuracy of information and how to make the tools of analysis more rigorous and sensitive. The principal [unreadable] will be [unreadable] maps, newspapers and periodicals, and interviews with participants in Vietnam policy making.

The work will be discussed and carefully reviewed for objectivity, as it proceeds, by an outside advisory group representing varied viewpoints; its members so far include William Brecker, Daniel Ellsberg, Stanley Hoffman, John J. McCloy, and Adam Yarmolinsky. The study director is Daniel Ellsberg, who served in the Defense Department from 1967 to 1969, after prior experience in the academic community and with the Congress.

IV. Economic Development and Interdependence

Brookings program of foreign economic studies is still being elaborated. The initial program concentrates on economic development, but includes studies bearing on trade and financial relations among industrial countries. In addition to the work described below, Lawrence Krause, Stephen Marris, and Walter Salant of the Economic Studies Program are studying different aspects of the balance-of-payments problem, means of adjusting disequilibria in international payments, and possible improvements in the international monetary system.

1. Foreign Aid.* When Grotius wrote his treatise on interstate relations, foreign aid as we know it today had not been invented. Its arrival has powerfully altered traditional notions about these relations: An aid donor tends to become intimately involved in internal affairs of an aid recipient; a multilateral aid or development organization possessed of sufficient prestige and resources is likely to become a significant force affecting the policies of both donors and recipients.

The United States has now had almost twenty years' experience with aid relations between developed and developing countries. Robert E. Asher, William Adams Brown, Jr., Harry G. Johnson, Albert O. Hirschman, Wilfred Owen, and other Brookings authors have already made a major contribution to appraisal of this experience.
Three current Brookings studies continue in this tradition: (1) "American Foreign Assistance," by Robert E. Asher, builds on the work of a Brookings seminar which has met periodically to stimulate long-range thinking on the future of foreign aid in off-the-record discussions among government officials, scholars, and members of the Congress. A manuscript of this study is now being revised, in light of comment by outside reviewers to whom it was submitted. (2) "Economic Development via the 'Big Push,'" by Alan M. Strout, will analyze the need for and consequences of concentrated infusion of foreign resources as an aid to development in specific countries. It will be completed this fall.

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PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 25 AND 26, 1973
Book 3

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

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intelligence did not evidence what the President was looking for, but I
turned it over to Mr. William Baroody, telling him the President
wanted a speech as part of the counteroffensive to the Watergate
inquiry. Several weeks later Baroody reported, that he too agreed that
the information wasn't there for a speech.

While there were other things which occurred, that evidence the
concern about demonstrators, I believe the foregoing gives the com-
mittee a good sampling of the degree of concern.

CONCERN ABOUT LEAKS

The committee has asked me about concern over leaks. I believe that
most anyone who worked at the White House during the past 4 years
can attest to the concern that prevailed regarding leaks—any and all
leaks. This was a matter of frequent discussions among staff members
and in some instances leaks were investigated by Haldeman's or Ehr-
lichman's office. I have submitted to the committee documents evidenc-
ing the types of investigations made.

[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 34-2.*]

Mr. Dean. I began to understand the high degree of concern after
I got to know Mr. Jack Caulfield, who had been assigned to my staff.
I would guess that I had been at the White House almost 1 year,
before Mr. Caulfield told me that he had been directed by Mr. Ehrlich-
man to wiretap a newsmen's telephone in pursuit of a leak. Mr. Caul-
field told me that the wiretap was on for only a short period of time
because he believed the FBI had subsequently taken over. He told me
that he had been directed to perform the wiretap when Mr. Hoover
was unwilling, but Mr. Ehrlichman wished to proceed.

The wiretap was undertaken, as I recall, in late 1969 or early 1970.
Caulfield told me that it was performed by Mr. Ulasevich, Mr. John
Reagan, and himself. He later repeated the story to me telling me that
it had been a rather harrowing experience when he was holding the
ladder in a back alley of Georgetown while also trying to keep a look
out as another member of the group was working at the top of the
ladder. He also told me that he received what he referred to as the
"pair numbers" from Mr. John Davies, who was then on the White
House staff, but who had previously been employed or had an associa-
tion with the telephone company before joining the White House staff.

I do not know what information, if any, they obtained, nor do I
know any other details other than what I have related above. I have
no idea if the reason for the wiretap was related to national security
and I believe Mr. Caulfield told me it was indeed Joseph Kraft's tele-
phone they tapped.

While there was an always present concern about leaks, that concern
took a quantum jump when the New York Times began publishing the
Pentagon Papers in June 1971. After the initial legal skirmish to
enjoin publication of the papers had died down, the White House con-
cern about the problem of leaks had heightened.

To the best of my recollection—I have been unable to confirm this
through the White House records—it was late June or early July
that Jack Caulfield came to me to tell me that Mr. Colson had called
him in, at Ehrlichman's direction, and instructed him to burglarize

*See p. 1101.
The Brookings Institute in an effort to determine if they had certain leaked documents. What prompted Mr. Caulfield to come to me was that he thought the matter was most unwise and that his instructions from Mr. Colson were insane. He informed me that Mr. Ulasewicz had "cased" The Brookings Institute and that Mr. Ulasewicz had made a friendly contact with one of the security men in the building, but the security system at the Brookings building was extremely tight and it would be very difficult to break-in. Caulfield told me that he had so informed Colson, but that Colson had instructed him to pursue the matter and if necessary he should plant a firebomb in the building and retrieve the documents during the commotion that would ensue. Mr. Caulfield said Colson's entire argument for burglarizing the Brookings was based on a publication he had obtained indicating that the Brookings was planning for the fall—1971—a study of Vietnam based on documents of a current nature, and a former consultant to the National Security Council worked there.

Caulfield convinced me that Colson was intent on proceeding, by one means or another, so I advised Caulfield that he should do nothing further, that I would immediately fly to California and tell Ehrlichman that this entire thing was insane.

I flew to California on a military aircraft courier flight that was going to San Clemente. I sat with Mr. Robert Mardian on the flight, who told me he was going to see the President about a highly important matter that he could not discuss with me—a matter which I will refer to later. When I arrived in California I arranged to see Ehrlichman and told him that the burglary of Brookings was insane—and, to persuade him, probably impossible. He said OK and he called Mr. Colson to call it off, and I called Mr. Caulfield to tell him it was called off.

It was not until almost 1 year or more later that I learned the reason for Mardian's trip to see the President. Mr. Mardian later told me, in a social conversation, that he had gone to see the President to get instructions regarding the disposition of wiretap logs that related to newsmen and White House staffers who were suspected of leaking. These logs had been in possession of Mr. William Sullivan, an Assistant Director of the FBI, and were, per Mr. Mardian's instructions from the President, given to Ehrlichman.

I had occasion to raise a question about these logs with Ehrlichman during the fall of 1972, and he flatly denied to me that he had the logs. I did not tell him at that time I had been told he had them and it was about February 22 or 23 of this year. Time magazine notified the White House it was going to print a story that the White House had undertaken wiretaps of newsmen and White House staff and a response was being asked for and I further got into the matter.

The White House press office notified me of this inquiry. I called Mr. Mark Felt at the FBI to ask him first what the facts were, and second, how such a story could leak. Mr. Felt told me that it was true, that Mr. Sullivan knew all the facts and that he had no idea how it leaked. I then called Mr. Sullivan and requested that he drop by my office, which he did. He explained that after much haggling, that the wiretaps were installed, but as I recall, Mr. Sullivan said they did not have the blessing of Director Hoover. Mr. Sullivan explained to me that all but one set of the logs had been destroyed and all the internal
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Mr. DASH. Did you have any role in authorizing other wiretaps?
Mr. EHRLICHMAN. From time to time, I did.
Mr. DASH. What area, would you tell us?
Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Well, now we are in this area—
Mr. DASH. I am not asking for any specific taps. I am not asking for specificity.
Mr. EHRLICHMAN. National security, generally national security objectives. I am under a stricture which really doesn't permit me to be very responsive to your question.
Mr. DASH. We appreciate that and should there come a time when we have to get into it any more thoroughly, the committee can respond to that. But I am not going into any specific point.
Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I understand.
Mr. DASH. Did you authorize Mr. Liddy's wiretaps in your role of supervising the Special Investigations Unit?
Mr. EHRLICHMAN. In 1971, that was so. In 1969, as counsel, I authorized an attempt which never came to anything. It was not actually accomplished. But beyond that, it would have been in one of those two capacities, either as counsel in 1969 or in my relationship to this unit in 1971.
Mr. DASH. Were you aware of the electronic surveillance on Joseph Kraft's house?
Mr. EHRLICHMAN. That was the one that I was talking about in 1969 that, so far as I know, never happened.
Mr. DASH. Do you know who was involved in attempting to commit that wiretap?
Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes. Mr. Caulfield was.
Mr. DASH. I didn't hear you.
Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Mr. Jack Caulfield was.
Mr. DASH. Did you ever discuss that tap with the President?
Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I am sure I did.
Mr. DASH. Do you know what the purpose of the placing of that tap was?
Mr. EHRLICHMAN. It was a national security purpose.
Mr. DASH. Now, did it come to your attention that there was an effort to either break into the Brookings Institute or firebomb the Brookings Institute?
Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes.
Mr. DASH. Could you tell us how it came to your attention?
Mr. EHRLICHMAN. It came to my attention, I think, from John Dean at the time that he came to California, as he has described in his testimony.
Mr. DASH. And is his testimony essentially correct on that?
Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Well, I can't vouch for the hearsay aspects of it. He says Jack Caulfield told him that somebody else told him that I had authorized this thing, and that is hearsay so many times removed that it is very difficult to cope with.
Mr. DASH. Do you know who authorized it?
Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No, I don't.
Mr. DASH. Did you ever look into who authorized it?
Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No, I didn't.
Mr. DASH. What was he asking you to do about it?
Mr. EHRlichman. He was asking me to make sure that that didn't happen.
Mr. Dash. Did you?
Mr. EHRlichman. I believe I did.
Mr. Dash. How?
Mr. EHRlichman. By a phone call.
Mr. Dash. To whom?
Mr. EHRlichman. I can't recall, I am sorry to tell you.
Mr. Dash. If you could, we might know who authorized it.
Mr. EHRlichman. Out of fairness—I could give you a list of people it might have been, but it has been so long ago, I can't remember who it was, but it was whoever he suggested that I call.
Mr. Dash. I don't want to go into a guessing game. But Mr. Dean did say that it was his understanding that it was Mr. Colson who authorized it and that is a name that he had given to you.
Mr. EHRlichman. I can't testify of my own recollection on that and out of fairness to whoever is involved, I certainly would not want to lay before the committee a name here, because I can't vouch for it. I do remember the episode.
Mr. Dash. And you cut it off?
Mr. EHRlichman. I believe that did it. He was just, really, looking for somebody to give a little clout to his feeling that it shouldn't happen.

Mr. Dash. I think you did indicate that you were aware of Tony Ulasewicz' assignments, either for the White House or for some person at the White House?

Mr. EHRlichman. I don't know. My relationship with him, so to speak, ended at the time that I shifted jobs, in early 1970. He was a kind of facility of the counsel's office and he sort of went with the job.

Mr. Dash. Now, you did become aware at this point, I don't want to go into this specifically—of the activities of staff members of the special investigations unit, Mr. Hunt, and Mr. Liddy, with regard to the office of Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist?

Mr. EHRlichman. Yes, I did.

Mr. Dash. And when did the so-called break in of the Ellsberg psychiatrist take place?

Mr. EHRlichman. I have heard two dates, but it was around Labor Day of 1971.

Mr. Dash. And I take it that was a fact-gathering project?

Mr. EHRlichman. That was the fact-gathering project that I mentioned before in relation to the theft of the secrets and the turnover to the Russians and the dilemma we had of the Bureau not moving on this.

Mr. Dash. And when do you say that you learned of that break in?

Mr. EHRlichman. Within a day or two after my return from a Labor Day trip to Cape Cod.

Mr. Dash. Now, in the fall of 1971, did you also learn of the so-called Sandwedge plan which had been proposed for political intelligence gathering?

Mr. EHRlichman. I don't know exactly when that was. Is the date important to you? I could look for it.

Mr. Dash. No, I am more interested in what you knew or learned of Mr. Caulfield's recommendations.
Vol. 1

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

SENATE RESOLUTION 50 -- GENERAL INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Saturday, March 23, 1974

Washington, D.C.

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

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Mr. Lackritz. Let me ask you this, Mr. Caulfield. These memos are dated July 20 and July 27, 1971. It was shortly after the publication of the Pentagon Papers by the New York Times. Did any other individual in the White House ever ask you to take action with respect to the Brookings Institute?

Mr. Caulfield. Are you referring now to Mr. Colson?

Mr. Lackritz. I am asking you about any individual.

Mr. Caulfield. I have already spoken to the request made to me by Mr. Colson at a previous meeting that we have had, and if you want me to discuss that, other than that specific instance, the answer is no.

Mr. Lackritz. Then could you describe Mr. Colson's request to you? I take it it was about this period of time, was it not?

Mr. Caulfield. Well, again --

Mr. Lackritz. The summer of '71?

Mr. Caulfield. If you want to put in the time frame of the summer of '71, I would say yes.

Mr. Lackritz. What happened? What did Mr. Colson ask you to do?

Mr. Caulfield. Mr. Colson, during the period that we just indicated, called me into his office, which was a rather unusual procedure in and of itself, because I did not work fro...
stated that there was a high priority need to obtain papers from
the office of a gentleman named Leslie Gelb, who apparently
worked at the Brookings Institute in Washington. And Mr. Col-
son indicated that he thought that I could, in some fashion,
obtain those papers. And I stated to Mr. Colson, how do you
propose that I obtain those papers? And he made what I consi-
dered to be an asinine suggestion.

In substance, the suggestion was that the fire regulation
in the District of Columbia could be changed to have the FBI
respond to the scene of any fire in the District, and that if
there were to be a fire at the Brookings Institute, that the
FBI could respond and obtain the file in question from Mr. Les-
lie Gelb's office.

Mr. Lackritz. Did Mr. Colson suggest that you might
start that fire?

Mr. Caulfield. It was implied. That was the implication
of his statement, and I indicated to Mr. Colson I would like to
think about it, and hastily left the office, and literally ran
into the office of Mr. Dean, and advised him that if he was not
going to take the next plane out to San Clemente, I was. Be-
cause the stupidity of the suggestion defied description, in
my mind, and I so advised Mr. Dean, and told him that if he
wasn't going out, I was going to go out and apprise Mr. Erliche-
man, who was out there with the Presidential party, of the asi-
ninity of the suggestion.
Subsequently, Mr. Dean did go out to California, and upon his return he advised me to forget about the matter, that it was not going to be pursued any further.

Mr. Lackritz. Did he ask you to take any other course of action with respect to the Brookings Institute?

Mr. Caulfield. He said, while I am out there, ask Mr. Ulasewicz to go over and check, and find out what Brookings Institute is all about, who is in the building, and give him a report on that, which I did.

Mr. Lackritz. What was the purpose of your asking Mr. Ulasewicz to provide this information?

Mr. Caulfield. I do not follow the question.

Mr. Lackritz. Why did Mr. Dean want this information about who else was in the building? What value was that to Mr. Dean?

Mr. Caulfield. I think Mr. Dean was just doing the same thing that I was doing, attempting to delay any activities on the suggestion until such time as it could be terminated.

Mr. Lackritz. Did you ask Mr. Ulasewicz to, in fact, go case the building?

Mr. Caulfield. Well, I would object to the word "case" the building. He went to the building, took note of who was in the lobby of the building. I assure that I asked him to get a list of all of the people who occupied the building, and he did that.
building, which housed all kinds of major corporations and individuals of significant status, and I reported that back to Mr. Dean when he returned.

Mr. Lackritz. Then Mr. Dean told you to take no further action against the Brookings Institute?

Mr. Caulfield. That's right.

Mr. Lackritz. Did Mr. Ulasewicz write up a report for you on the Brookings Institute?

Mr. Caulfield. No.

Mr. Lackritz. So this information was communicated orally.

Mr. Caulfield. Orally, yes.

Mr. Lackritz. Do you have any other questions?

Mr. Lenzner. (Nods in the negative.)

Mr. Lackritz. Do you have any questions, Emily?

Ms. Sheketoff. (Nods in the negative.)

Mr. Lackritz. Do you know if Mr. Colson asked someone else to do a similar activity?

Mr. Caulfield. I never discussed it with Mr. Colson, other than at a wedding, when he raised the subject and thought it was a pretty funny joke.

Mr. Lackritz. When was this wedding?

Mr. Caulfield. This was in January of '72, when Mr. Dea got married.

Mr. Lenzner. I take it nobody else was present when Colson discussed it with you on either occasion?
44. Between July 1 and July 11, 1971 Assistant FBI Director William Sullivan told Robert Mardian, Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, that Sullivan had possession of the files and logs of the 1969-71 wiretaps, and that the taps were not entered in the FBI indices. Mardian has testified that Sullivan indicated to him that the files were extremely sensitive, that Sullivan was likely to be forced out of the FBI by Director Hoover with whom he had disagreed on FBI policy, and that he desired to turn over the logs to Mardian so that Hoover could not use them against the White House. On July 11, 1971, after seeking the advice of Attorney General Mitchell about what to do about the logs and files, Mardian flew to San Clemente, California on a military courier flight to report to the President.

44.1 Robert Mardian interview, FBI, May 10, 1973, 2-3 (received from Department of Justice).

44.2 William Sullivan answers to written interrogatories of William Ruckelshaus, May 10, 1973 (received from Department of Justice).

44.3 Robert Mardian testimony, 6 SSC 2392-93, 2404-05, 2407.

44.4 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 920, 1069-70.

At the onset of the interview Mr. Mardian was advised of his constitutional rights. He was specifically advised that he did not have to make any statements and if he did they could be used against him in a court of law. He was advised that he had a right to an attorney.

Mr. Mardian replied that he was an attorney and formerly an Assistant Attorney General of the United States and was aware of his rights.

Mr. Mardian was advised that this interview specifically pertained to records of wiretap information allegedly given to him on or about July, 1971, by Sullivan.

Mr. Mardian advised that on the advice of his counsel, Mr. David Bress, he could not answer any questions concerning material he may have received from Assistant Director 9. He said further that the President of the United States had issued an order that no Federal employee was to talk about matters concerning national security. He said that although he was not now a Federal employee, he felt the President's order applied to him. He said that he wanted to cooperate with the FBI, that he was specifically instructed by his attorney, Mr. Bress, to tell any inquiring Special Agent who may interview him from the FBI that General Alexander Haig had the information the FBI wanted and to go no further in his conversation or interview.

He said further that he felt compelled not to disclose any information concerning any direct communication he had had with the President of the United States and suggested that the information desired by the FBI could be obtained from General Haig, John Erlichman, H. R. Haldeman and Dr. Henry Kissinger.

Mr. Mardian was advised that for the purposes of this inquiry perhaps he, Mr. Mardian, would be willing to skirt the issues and the
Interview continue without specific references to people and specific circumstances. Mr. Mardian said that he would be willing to do this in order to show his cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He said he preferred his comments would be off the record and just between us. He was immediately advised by Inspector William Meincke that this could not occur and any ensuing conversation was definitely and positively on the record. Mr. Mardian said, "Well, let's try it."

Mr. Mardian was asked if he knew . He advised "Yes, I do." Mr. Mardian was asked if he recalled an incident in July of 1971 when he might have received a package or a bag containing information from . He replied "Yes," and then related the following information:

He said that he would like to start from the beginning and advised that sometime in July, 1971, Assistant to the Director of the FBI William C. Sullivan contacted him (the precise location he could not recall) and told him that he (Sullivan) was in trouble with the Director of the FBI, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, and expected that he might in fact be fired. He did not explain why. He said that he had information that was "out of channel," that he wanted to turn over to the President of the United States. He said this was wiretap information and that, in his opinion, Mr. Hoover could not be entrusted with this wiretap information. Mr. Sullivan continued in conversation saying that Mr. Hoover had used wiretap information to blackmail other Presidents of the United States and was afraid that he could blackmail Mr. Nixon with this information. Mr. Sullivan reiterated his request of Mr. Mardian to personally contact the President of the United States and pass along Mr. Sullivan's information and request.

Mr. Mardian said that he could not do this. Mr. Mardian said he told Mr. Sullivan that he worked for the Attorney General of the United States, who obviously was his immediate superior, and if he had any contact with the President at all, it must be with Mr. John Mitchell's full knowledge and that he would bring this to Mr. Mitchell's attention immediately. Mr. Mardian recalled that Mr. Sullivan appeared to be displeased with the fact that he, Mr. Mardian, would not go directly to the President. However, he cannot now recall any specific comments Mr. Sullivan made in this regard.

Mr. Mardian said that this was the first time he knew of the existence of "out-of-channel" wiretap information. He said he subsequently learned
that this wiretap was ordered by Dr. Henry Kissinger on behalf of the
President. He cannot recall if he learned this from the White House or
from Mr. Sullivan. He said this point is simply not clear in his mind.
In any event he is sure it was ordered by Dr. Kissinger and the purpose
of the wiretap was to determine who in the White House was leaking infor-
mation -- very vital information -- with regard to the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT) then in negotiation with Russia. Dr. Kissinger
had learned that the United States bargaining position with regard to SALT
was being threatened because the upper limits as well as the lower limits
which the United States would agree upon were known outside of the White
House. Dr. Kissinger felt that this was a very serious breach of national
security and, for that reason, suggested to the President that the wiretaps
be initiated.

Mr. Mardian said, as best he could recall, he went immediately to
Mr. Mitchell with Mr. Sullivan's request and information. He advised he
cannot recall the specific conversation other than the fact he simply
relayed Mr. Sullivan's request. He said Mr. Mitchell replied that he
would handle it.

Mr. Mardian said at this point his memory on time and dates is poor
but feels that it was in a very short period of time after his conversation
with Mr. Mitchell that he received a telephone call from the White House
in San Clemente, California. Mr. Mardian said he would prefer not to
say at this time who called him, but he received instructions at that time
to take the White House shuttle, an Air Force plane, from Andrews Air
Force Base and fly immediately to the White House at San Clemente,
California. He advised he complied with that instruction, made arrange-
ments, and immediately left. He said he believed this was on a Sunday
and feels sure that it was either the last two weeks of July or the first two
weeks in August of 1971. Upon further reflection, he said that it must
have been during the last two weeks of July because he maintains a residence
in California in close proximity to the Western White House in San Clemente
and that this house was rented until the end of July. He said that had the
house not been rented he is sure that he would have stayed there overnight,
and he now recalls that he did not stay at his own residence. Therefore,
he placed the time frame during the latter two weeks of July.

He said the following morning after his arrival in San Clemente,
California, he went directly to the Western White House and spoke with
the President of the United States, Mr. Nixon. He said he received at
Mr. William C. Sullivan  
Director  
Office of National Narcotics Intelligence  
Acting Director, FBI

May 10, 1973

SENSITIVE COVERAGE PLACED AT REQUEST OF THE WHITE HOUSE

I have been informed that upon interview by an Inspector and a Special agent of this Bureau you requested that all questions concerning this matter be directed to you in writing and that you would thereafter, to the best of your ability, answer each question presented. The following is in response to that request:

Background

As you know, in early 1969 the FBI was requested to initiate sensitive coverage (wiretaps) of certain White House staff members and others in order to uncover possible leaks at the White House affecting the national security. The purpose of this interrogatory is to fully resolve details of that coverage.

1. The identity of the White House official or officials who requested that the FBI initiate this sensitive wiretap coverage and identity of any follow-up calls for similar coverage on others.

2. By what method were these requests for wiretap coverage transmitted to the FBI?

3. To what FBI official(s) were these requests made?

4. Was written authorization received at the FBI from then Attorney General Mitchell, as was the procedure in other national security matters of this nature? Was a written authorization secured from the Attorney General on each? If not, why? If so, where might such written authorization now be located?

5. Were there records of these wiretaps kept by the FBI at any time?
Mr. William C. Sullivan

a. If so, describe such records.

b. Where, when, and by whom were such records kept?

c. Were these records maintained in your personal and official custody while serving as Assistant Director and Assistant to the Director?

d. If so, on whose order were they so maintained?

e. Who had access to these records while in your custody?

f. What became of the records in your custody?

6. If some records were maintained by FBI personnel other than yourself describe the records, identify the persons having custody, the period of time of such custody, the present whereabouts of such records, if known, and if not known, any information in your possession relating to their maintenance and disposition.

7. Identify the officials in the United States Department of Justice and FBI responsible for carrying out the wiretap program. Specify the duties and responsibilities of each.

8. To the best of your recollection, name the individuals on whom wiretaps were placed.

9. To the best of your recollection, state the approximate times during which each wiretap was in operation.

10. To the best of your recollection, describe the results achieved from each wiretap.

11. Identify all FBI personnel who had any connection with the installation, review, analysis, recording and dissemination of the results of the wiretap information in question.
12. To whom and in what manner was such information disseminated?

13. From whom and in what manner were instructions issued to discontinue the wiretaps?

14. To whom in the FBI were these instructions issued? When did all such activity cease on wiretaps, the records of which were maintained in your custody?

15. On October 5, 1971, you advised Mr. W. Mark Felt that you gave a brief case containing the sensitive material obtained as a result of the above wiretaps with instructions to give the brief case to then Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian. Describe in detail the contents of this brief case. Specifically cover whether it contained the authorizations from the Attorney General applicable to these wiretaps. When was this done? Was it done before or after you applied for retirement?

16. Who in the FBI made the decision to turn over internal FBI records directly to Mr. Mardian? What conversations did you have with others regarding this? With whom?

17. On whose authority was this decision made?

18. Why was this material turned over to Mr. Mardian?

19. What disposition was made of this material and by whom? Was the Attorney General aware of the disposition?

20. Were any copies made by you or anyone else to your knowledge of this sensitive material before or after its transmittal to Mr. Mardian? If so, what happened to them?

21. As this wiretap project was on-going, to whom in the White House or any other place were reports made concerning results obtained?

22. How were these reports conveyed (written or oral), and with what frequency were they made?
23. Do you have any information which would indicate that any specific wiretap coverage continued after authorization was rescinded? If so, provide details.

24. Do you have any knowledge, or reason to believe that Mr. Mardian or anyone else turned over any material in this matter to Gordon Liddy, Howard Hunt, James McCord, John Dean, or anyone else at the White House or elsewhere? If so, provide details.

25. There have been leaks of FBI data concerning this matter to Time magazine and possibly other periodicals. Are you aware of the source of any such leaks? If so, provide details.

An expeditious response is requested.
TO: Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus  
Acting Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  

FROM: William C. Sullivan  
Director  
Office of National Narcotics Intelligence  

DATE: May 11, 1973

DATE: May 11, 1973

SUBJECT: SENSITIVE COVERAGE PLACED AT REQUEST OF THE WHITE HOUSE

Please refer to your memorandum to me of May 10, 1973. In answering your questions I will follow the format of your memorandum extending from question 1 through 25.

1. In regard to the White House, I think it would be most appropriate if this question was addressed to Mr. Haldeman.

2. By both conversations and written communications.

3. The requests were made either directly of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover or indirectly through myself.

4. Written authorization was secured from the Attorney General in each case.

5. Yes, these records were maintained in my office at the FBI.
   (a) The records included logs, summaries and correspondence.
   (b) As indicated, these records were maintained in my office.
   (c) Yes.
   (d) They were maintained by me on the orders of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover. He did not want them in FBI files and said so on two or three occasions.
   (e) Mr. Bernard Wells, then a supervisor in the Domestic Intelligence Division, myself, and any secretary selected to handle the dictation (restricted to two for the most part).
   (f) These records, on Presidential and Attorney General request, were given to Mr. Robert C. Mardian, then Assistant Attorney General of the Internal Security Division of the Department.
6. The records were maintained, as indicated, in my office and not by personnel other than myself.

7. Apart from the secretaries, persons handling the wiretap program were **2** who handled liaison, Bernard Wells who handled the analysis and dictation, and myself handling administration.

8. To the best of my recollection, the individuals on whom wiretaps were placed included: **P**, **K**, **L**, **D** and **B**. There were others but I do not remember them at this time (around 16-18).

9. I do not remember the approximate times but the general time period was from 1969 - 1971.

10. The records were considered to be very helpful in some cases and in others they were of little or no value. I do not recall the specific elements involved.

11. It is suggested that the identity of FBI personnel who were connected with the installations be secured from the Washington Field Office. I do not know who made the installations. I have already set forth those handling the materials at the Seat of Government.

12. The material was disseminated by letter over Mr. J. Edgar Hoover’s signature to the White House. For some time the letters were addressed to and sent to the President and Dr. Kissinger. Later they were sent only to Mr. Haldeman. A few summaries were prepared for the Attorney General in memorandum form.

13. As I recall, instructions to discontinue came from the White House and were relayed to Mr. Hoover.

14. In the main, these instructions were issued to me. However, Mr. Hoover did have some conversations with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, and Dr. Kissinger. As I recall, the wiretap activity ceased during the first part of 1971.

15. The contents of the case included logs and letters related to the special wiretaps project. As I recall, they did include the authorizations of the Attorney General. As previously indicated, on instructions this material was furnished to Mr. Mardian before my retirement.

16. I turned over the materials of this special project on instruction to Mr. Mardian. I had no conversation about it with others. It was my decision.

*In May 1970 there was a meeting at the White House of the President, Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Hoover. They decided the letters would go to Mr. Haldeman.*

[8033]
17. As previously stated, on instruction I turned over the material, following a discussion in depth with Mr. Mardian relative to security and possible abuses of the material.

18. As previously stated, this material was turned over to Mr. Mardian in response to Presidential and Attorney General request.

19. The material was to be given maximum security. Where and by whom I do not know. I do not know whether the Attorney General was aware of the disposition.

20. No.

21. To Dr. Kissinger and later this was changed to Mr. Haldeman.

22. They were written reports, hand-carried. I do not recall the exact frequency but they were sent over whenever anything appeared on the logs which were relevant.

23. No.

24. No.

25. No, I am not aware of the source of such leaks. However, judging from the nature of this information and the precise details if correct, it would seem that some of it may have come from inside the FBI.
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, AND 25, 1973
Book 6

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coverup of the Watergate? Mr. Mitchell testified the reason he did it was because he was afraid the President would lower the boom, others because they assumed that the White House staff had approved this operation. What was your reason, Mr. Mardian?

Mr. MARDIAN. Senator, I do not know what you mean by "coverup." If you mean by coverup my not being forthcoming and disclosing everything I knew, I felt that my oath as an attorney prevented me from doing that.

Senator TALMADGE. Now, let me ask you another question. I believe you and Mr. Magruder and Mr. Mitchell were all together on June 19, as I recall, and there was something said about $40,000. Magruder, I believe, made the statement and asked Mr. Mitchell if he did not approve the $250,000 budget for the espionage activities. Did Mr. Mitchell answer in the affirmative?

Mr. MARDIAN. Pardon me, did you say June 19?

Senator TALMADGE. Or some time thereabouts. Or any date you can recall. I am not so much interested in the date as I am the subject matter of the conversation and the response.

Mr. MARDIAN. The date, I believe, was subsequent to that; was probably the latter part of that week. I think it was the 23d or 24th. I asked Mr. Magruder in the presence of Mr. Mitchell how much money he had given to Mr. Liddy. He said he had given Mr. Liddy or authorized Mr. Sloan to give Mr. Liddy $40,000. I must have registered surprise and said, "$40,000?" And Mr. Mitchell did much the same. And he turned to Mr. Mitchell and he said, "Well, that is not much out of the total budget of $250,000."

Mr. Mitchell's answer was, "But the campaign has not even started yet."

Now, that is the best of my recollection of that conversation.

Senator TALMADGE. You understood that declaration on the part of Mr. Mitchell to mean that he had approved the $250,000 operation, did you not—these espionage activities?

Mr. MARDIAN. If you want my—I do not know that the thought crossed my mind, did Mr. Mitchell authorize the $250,000. Based on the conversation I heard, I would assume that Mr. Mitchell, not having denied that statement, acquiesced in it. His response was, "I did not authorize $250,000; the campaign has not started yet."

Senator TALMADGE. Let me ask you something Senator Baker touched on briefly, but I do not think he covered it in detail. Did you make a trip in July 1972 by courier plane to see the President of the United States in San Clemente, Calif.?

Mr. MARDIAN. Yes, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. At the President's request?

Mr. MARDIAN. Yes, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. What was the reason for that trip?

Mr. MARDIAN. Prior to my making that trip, Mr. William Sullivan, Associate Director of the FBI, came to see me, told me he wanted to talk to me about a very sensitive matter. He told me that, and he, I guess, had expressed this to me for some period of time. He and Mr. Hoover were not getting along very well. He anticipated his removal as Associate Director and at that time, he was, in effect, the operating head of the FBI, other than Mr. Hoover. He told me that there were some very sensitive national security surveillance logs that were not,
I believe he used the word "in-channel"—I don't know that he did, but they were not kept in the ordinary course of business. They were kept in his safe in his office. He felt that the highly sensitive nature of those tapes was such that they should not be kept there, especially if he were to be removed from office.

He was concerned about what might be done with these tapes, and I am not positive of this. I don't know what Mr. Sullivan's recollection is. My recollection is that Mr. Hoover might use these tapes for the purpose of preserving his position as Director of the FBI. And he felt that the White House should be aware of this. I told him that I would convey this information to the Attorney General.

Senator TALMADGE. And what was the President's direction?

Mr. MARDIAN. I didn't talk to the President that time. I merely told the Attorney General of my conversation.

Senator TALMADGE. Didn't you go out to see the President himself?

Mr. MARDIAN. It was subsequent to that. I had not heard from the Attorney General. I had several inquiries from Mr. Sullivan. I said I had done what I said I would do. Subsequent to that time—I don't know the date—I got a call, I believe it was on a Sunday. The call was from the western White House. I think it was Mr. Ehrlichman. It may have been Mr. Haldeman. He told me that the President would like to talk to me and whether it would be convenient for me to take the courier plane—a mail plane goes back and forth from Andrews to El Toro Marine Base, I believe on a regular daily basis—it goes one day and comes the next. I would be able to take the courier plane that day so that I would be available to see the President the following morning. I said I would.

I went to Andrews and I took that courier plane.

Senator TALMADGE. And what did the President tell you to do with these?

Mr. MARDIAN. Pardon me. Do you want the conversation with the President?

Senator TALMADGE. I want to find out what the President directed you to do with these reports that Sullivan had.

Mr. MARDIAN. He directed me to obtain the reports from Sullivan and deliver them to Mr. Ehrlichman.

Senator TALMADGE. And did you do so?

Mr. MARDIAN. Yes, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. And what did those tapes concern?

Mr. MARDIAN. The tapes concerned electronic surveillance authorized by the President, I was told, at the request of the Director of the National Security Council.

Senator TALMADGE. And what has happened to them? Are they still in the White House?

Mr. MARDIAN. I understand from news reports that they are in the possession of the Bureau.

Senator TALMADGE. The reason at that time was to keep Mr. Hoover from having access to these reports?

Mr. MARDIAN. I think I have related what I was told and you will have to draw your own conclusion from that, Senator.

Senator TALMADGE. That was what Sullivan told you and what you reported to the President?

Mr. MARDIAN. Yes, sir.
before he took the job that no one employed in the committee at that
time had been involved; he accepted that, and he didn't want to hear
any more about it, or words to that effect.

Senator Weicker. And yet at that particular moment in time, you
were indicating to him that such assurances that had been given to
him just weren't fact?

Mr. Mardian. I think the very import of what I told him should
have indicated that to him; yes, sir.

Senator Weicker. At any subsequent time, did you again try to
make contact with Mr. MacGregor, or was that it?

Mr. Mardian. Sir, I tried on numerous occasions prior to that time,
and I think that was the last attempt.

Senator Weicker. That was the last attempt you made to communi-
cate with him your misgivings?

Mr. Mardian. By that time, I was pretty much out of Watergate
as such. This was around August 20, 21. Whenever it was, the first
opportunity I could see him down there.

Senator Weicker. Mr. Mardian, there are three areas that I would
like to handle and I will try to restrict my questioning on the first
go-around. But specifically, they do relate to the commonly called
Pentagon Papers and to the Kissinger tapes and to your handling
of the Internal Security Division in these three areas.

I would like to cover some of the same ground that Senator Tal-
madge covered to try to get a more complete story on your flight to San
Clemente and your receipt of what I refer to, what has been referred to
as the Kissinger tapes.

As I understand it, in late September of 1971, you were contacted
by Mr. William Sullivan on the matter that he had these tapes and
he wanted to hand them over to somebody; is that correct?

Mr. Mardian. Late September?


Mr. Mardian. I think it was far earlier than that. It must have
been June.

Senator Weicker. June of 1971?

Mr. Mardian. That is my best recollection—June or July.

Senator Weicker. Was it due to the fact that he felt he was on his
way out and he had these tapes and he wanted to transmit them to
some responsible individual?

Mr. Mardian. I tried to relate as best I can what he told me, that they
were not in the ordinary channels of the Bureau, they were in his office
safe, that his opinion was that he was going to be terminated pretty
soon. He was concerned about what would happen to them if they fell
into the possession of his successor.

Senator Weicker. Now, at that time, did he also indicate to you
that—what was he referring to? Was he referring to the logs?

Mr. Mardian. He was referring to logs of national security
surveillances.

Senator Weicker. That were in his possession?

Mr. Mardian. Yes, sir.

Senator Weicker. Did he at that time indicate also to you as to who
possessed the summaries of the logs?

Mr. Mardian. I don't recall the specific conversation, Senator.

Because of the number of them, I wasn't sure at what time, whether he
delivered me the summaries or the logs, and as it now develops, according to Mr. Sullivan, they were logs and summaries and correspondence.

Senator WEICKER. In order to—all right.

Upon his initial communication with you, did you then go to the Attorney General?

Mr. MARZIAN. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. And ask for his recommendations on this matter?

Mr. MARZIAN. I didn't ask for recommendations. I don't think. I merely related to the Attorney General what Mr. Sullivan had told me.

Senator WEICKER. And did the Attorney General give you a response as to how to handle Mr. Sullivan's offer?

Mr. MARZIAN. No, sir.

Senator WEICKER. Why do you think Mr. Sullivan came to you with this offer?

Mr. MARZIAN. Mr. Sullivan was a friend of mine and I think he probably had—I am sure he had quicker access to me than anyone else in the Department.

Senator WEICKER. And do you feel it was because of his dislike of the Director that he didn't turn to his immediate superior, the Director of the FBI?

Mr. MARZIAN. Based upon what he told me, he was concerned about the motives of the Director.

Senator WEICKER. And what were those motives as he described them to you?

Mr. MARZIAN. My best recollection is that he thought that the Director might use, as I have said, these logs to maintain his position as Director.

Now, I don't know what Mr. Sullivan's recollection of it is, but that is my recollection.

Senator WEICKER. He didn't indicate to you as to why he felt that the Director could use these logs to maintain his position?

Mr. MARZIAN. I have given it to you the best I can, Senator.

Senator WEICKER. All right, let's proceed then with the subsequent events. You did not then go back to Mr. Sullivan prior to flying out to California to meet with the President to get any portion of the materials that he held?

Mr. MARZIAN. No, sir.

Senator WEICKER. In your meeting at San Clemente you met with the President on this matter specifically?

Mr. MARZIAN. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. And what did you describe to the President as the situation?

Mr. MARZIAN. I believe I simply told him, in response to his question, what Mr. Sullivan told me.

Senator WEICKER. Did you tell the President that you had received no instructions from the Attorney General or was that discussed in any way?

Mr. MARZIAN. No, sir.

First, I told the Attorney General, and the next thing—I didn't hear from the Attorney General on it—the next thing I knew, and it was sometime later, the Attorney General at that time, as I recall, was at the American Bar Association convention in England—in London.

Senator WEICKER. What did the President order done?
Let's move on to the—is there anything further? I don't want to leave this; I don't want you to speculate. I don't want hearsay information, I only want your firsthand testimony. What you are telling this committee is you returned to Mr. Sullivan and ordered him to turn over those materials in his possession relative to the Kissinger tapes?

Mr. MARDIAN. I didn't order him. I told him what my instructions were and he—

Senator Weicker. On the authority of the President, is that correct?

Mr. MARDIAN. I told him that is where my instructions came from. I may not have. I don't know. I may have said the Attorney General, I am not sure. My recollection is that I told him that I talked to the President, and that those were my instructions.

Senator Weicker. So that at that particular moment in time he had nothing further to do but empty out his drawers and give you the materials therein, is that right? You received those materials right then?

Mr. MARDIAN. No, sir.

Senator Weicker. You did not?

Mr. MARDIAN. No, sir.

Senator Weicker. When did you receive them?

Mr. MARDIAN. I don't recall; it was sometime later.

Senator Weicker. Why the delay, Mr. Mardian?

Mr. MARDIAN. Well, he didn't have them with him. My conversation with him took place in my office.

Senator Weicker. Well, by sometime later, in other words you are only indicating a matter of hours or are you indicating a matter of days or weeks?

Mr. MARDIAN. It may have been a day, it may have been 2 days; I don't know. It may have been a week. I am not—

Senator Weicker. Obviously this was a matter of some urgency if, in fact, you had been put aboard a courier plane to fly out to California and given orders personally by the President. This is not something that is just left hanging. It was obviously a matter of considerable urgency to the President, wasn't it?

Mr. MARDIAN. The urgency, if there was any, is the President wanted to talk to me and if he was in San Clemente and I was in Washington and if a plane was leaving, I don't think he would have thought anything of having me get on a plane and get out there.

Senator Weicker. So there wasn't anything particularly urgent about picking up these materials from Mr. Sullivan?

Mr. MARDIAN. I did not obtain any expressions of urgency. The only urgency was on the part of Mr. Sullivan.

Senator Weicker. Did you think it rather strange that he should go the route of you to Mr. Ehrlichman rather than to have these materials handed over to the Director of the FBI?

Mr. MARDIAN. The purpose was to take them out of the custody of his office because of the concern he expressed with respect to the Director of the FBI.

Senator Weicker. All right, then, Mr. Mardian, the concern then just wasn't Mr. Sullivan's concern. It was also the concern of yourself and the concern of the President; is that correct?

Mr. MARDIAN. I can't say that I was concerned. I didn't know—I didn't want to assess the dispute between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Hoover.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 25 AND 26, 1973
Book 3

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[8043]
The Brookings Institute in an effort to determine if they had certain leaked documents. What prompted Mr. Caulfield to come to me was that he thought the matter was most unwise and that his instructions from Mr. Colson were insane. He informed me that Mr. Ulasewicz had "cased" the Brookings Institute and that Mr. Ulasewicz had made a friendly contact with one of the security men in the building, but the security system at the Brookings building was extremely tight and it would be very difficult to break in. Caulfield told me that he had so informed Colson, but that Colson had instructed him to pursue the matter and if necessary he should plant a firebomb in the building and retrieve the documents during the commotion that would ensue. Mr. Caulfield said Colson's entire argument for burglarizing the Brookings was based on a publication he had obtained indicating that the Brookings was planning for the fall—1971—a study of Vietnam based on documents of a current nature, and a former consultant to the National Security Council worked there.

Caulfield convinced me that Colson was intent on proceeding, by one means or another, so I advised Caulfield that he should do nothing further, that I would immediately fly to California and tell Ehrlichman that this entire thing was insane.

I flew to California on a military aircraft courier flight that was going to San Clemente. I sat with Mr. Robert Mardian on the flight, who told me he was going to see the President about a highly important matter that he could not discuss with me—a matter which I will refer to later. When I arrived in California I arranged to see Ehrlichman and told him that the burglary of Brookings was insane—and, to persuade him, probably impossible. He said OK and he called Mr. Colson to call it off, and I called Mr. Caulfield to tell him it was called off.

It was not until almost 1 year or more later that I learned the reason for Mardian's trip to see the President. Mr. Mardian later told me, in a social conversation, that he had gone to see the President to get instructions regarding the disposition of wiretap logs that related to newsmen and White House staffers who were suspected of leaking. These logs had been in possession of Mr. William Sullivan, an Assistant Director of the FBI, and were, per Mr. Mardian's instructions from the President, given to Ehrlichman.

I had occasion to raise a question about these logs with Ehrlichman during the fall of 1973, and he flatly denied to me that he had the logs. I did not tell him at that time I had been told he had them and it was about February 22 or 23 of this year, Time magazine notified the White House it was going to print a story that the White House had undertaken wiretaps of newsmen and White House staff and a response was being asked for and I further got into the matter.

The White House press office notified me of this inquiry. I called Mr. Mark Felt at the FBI to ask him first what the facts were, and second, how such a story could leak. Mr. Felt told me that it was true, that Mr. Sullivan knew all the facts and that he had no idea how it leaked. I then called Mr. Sullivan and requested that he drop by my office, which he did. He explained that after much haggling, that the wiretaps were installed, but as I recall, Mr. Sullivan said they did not have the blessing of Director Hoover. Mr. Sullivan explained to me that all but one set of the logs had been destroyed and all the internal
Mr. Dean. That is correct.

Senator Weicker. Would you describe to the committee the nature of that interview?

Mr. Dean. After I learned of the inquiry, I called Mr. Mark Sullivan or Mr. Mark Felt and asked him, first of all, if in fact it were true because I had never had a confirmation from anyone; I thought I ought to get a direct confirmation. He told me “Do you really want to know?” and I said “Yes, I think I should know,” and he told me that, “Yes, it had occurred,” and said that “Bill Sullivan has all the facts on this. He was involved in it and he knows all those facts.” I then asked Felt if he knew how it had leaked and he said he didn’t have any idea. I then called Sullivan and told him that, I asked him if he would come to my office, and he did come to my office, and I said that I had this inquiry from the press office regarding this and I had some information that in fact it had happened, and I wondered what the facts were, and Mr. Sullivan then recounted the fact that he had been involved in this and told me that he had at one point gotten the most trusted people in the Washington field office to undertake the function. That subsequently he had, when Director Hoover was trying to get copies of the logs that he had either before that time or contemporaneously with this time, he had told the Washington field office people to destroy all of the other logs so it ended up there was one set of logs and related memorandums that were in the custody of Sullivan, and there was some removal of these persons’ instructions and I don’t have all these details because Sullivan didn’t give them to me, and give them to Mardian, and Mardian had possession of them apparently at the time he went to the west coast to get instructions as to what he was to do with them.

Senator Weicker. Mr. Dean, let me be very clear here so we try to put this story together. You were informed earlier in 1972 by Mr. Mardian that he has in his possession the logs of the Kissinger taps, is that correct?

Mr. Dean. That is correct. No, not that he has them, that he had turned them over.

Senator Weicker. He had received them and he had turned them over to Mr. Ehrlichman.

Mr. Dean. That is correct.

Senator Weicker. And then in 1973 in an interview with Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Sullivan indicated to you that the taps were accomplished by the Washington field office of the FBI. That they had a set of the logs and the taps, he had a set of the logs and tape or the logs and the summaries, I beg your pardon, the logs and summaries.

Mr. Dean. Yes, that Sullivan had them in. No, Sullivan told me that he had turned them over to Mardian.

Now one or the other, at the time that the Time magazine inquiry came in there was also an effort to determine how this had leaked and that was very much a part of the conversation I had with Sullivan as to how this could leak, and I recall discussing with Sullivan also who else knew about this, and he told me that he thought that Hoover had told and he mentioned the name of the person and I cannot recall it at this time, and this person, in turn, had mentioned that he understood to Governor Rockefeller and Governor Rockefeller in turn told Dr. Kissinger. Also in dealing with Mr. Felt I had asked him if he had
any idea how it had leaked because there was concern as to what the
source of the story was as well as the leak.
Senator Weicker. Did Mr. Sullivan indicate to you that summaries
of the logs had gone to several persons in the White House?
Mr. Dean. When I was dealing with Sullivan, he didn't seem to
know the final disposition of the logs and we didn't discuss whether the
logs had gone over to the White House at that time, during the time
that they were, the wiretaps were being taken.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Dean, I am not talking about the final dis-
position of the logs and summaries but rather where the summaries of
the logs went at the time that they were being done.
Mr. Dean. No, sir. Sullivan did not tell me where they had gone, to
the best—I have no recollection of that and I think I would have
remembered it.
Senator Weicker. I mean be very careful on this point. He indicated
to you, No. 1, according to the testimony that you set down to the best
of your recollection that Mr. Hoover disapproved of these particular
set of taps, is that correct?
Mr. Dean. That is the impression I had. I had been told sometime
before after Mr. Mardian left the Department of Justice and went
to the reelection committee that something had to be done for Bill
Sullivan. Now he always worked on the assumption that I knew that
Sullivan had done some very important thing for the White House.
I was never clear on exactly what it was that Mr. Sullivan had done
that the White House owed him some favor for. But I can recall on
repeated occasions this coming up and also it came up with respect to
a man by the name of Mr. Brennan and who was with the FBI. I was
somewhat on the periphery of this and was never quite clear and the
best I can do now I am just trying to put together the tidbits of knowl-
dge that I did have.
Senator Weicker. Well, you interviewed Mr. Sullivan yourself as to
t his involvement in the Kissinger tap situation?
Mr. Dean. Yes, I did.
Senator Weicker. And I just want to make sure what it is that—
Mr. Dean. I think if you were to talk to Mr. Sullivan he would call
I was most interested in how it had leaked because Mr. Felt had told
me in fact it had happened. I was, of course, aware of the taps occur-
ing because of the information that Mardian had given me and I do
not recall exactly when Mardian had told me this but I was merely
collecting a whole series oftidbits of information as much information
at the White House that did come to me was through tidbits. My im-
mediate focus at the time I was dealing with Sullivan was how in the
world we were going to deal with the story that was in Time magazine
and after I collected the information I was able to collect as to who
did know I called Ehrlichman and told him the facts and he said
"Deny it."
Senator Weicker. Did he tell you who prepared the summaries of
the logs?
Mr. Dean. No, sir: he did not.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman. I think one point that I would like
to make clear here is that I have had a rather lengthy discussion with
Mr. Sullivan on the subject matter which is being discussed here now, I
know that it would not be fair for me to state what the substance of