

April 24 2013 2:00 PM

ASSIGNED TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN K. SERKO
HEARING DATE: APRIL 26, 2013, at 9:00 A.M.
WITH ORAL ARGUMENT

KEVIN STOCK
COUNTY CLERK
NO. 12-2-11362-4

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
FOR PIERCE COUNTY**

J.S., S.L., and L.C.,

NO. 12-2-11362-4

Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' SUR-REPLY TO
DEFENDANTS VILLAGE VOICE
MEDIA HOLDINGS, L.L.C., d/b/a
Backpage.com; BACKPAGE.COM,
L.L.C.; NEW TIMES MEDIA, L.L.C.,
d/b/a Backpage.com MOTION TO
DISMISS

v.

VILLAGE VOICE MEDIA HOLDINGS, L.L.C.,
d/b/a Backpage.com; BACKPAGE.COM,
L.L.C.; NEW TIMES MEDIA, L.L.C., d/b/a
Backpage.com; and, BARUTI HOPSON,

Defendants.

Plaintiffs submit this sur-reply to address new arguments raised in the Backpage.com defendants' ("Backpage") 21-page reply brief regarding the proper pleading standard for this Court to dismiss a case under CR 12(b)(6).

A. Washington Law Expressly Rejects the Federal Court's Heightened Pleading Standard

For over 50 years, Washington courts have expressly rejected the federal court's heightened standard. *McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB*, 169 Wn.2d 96, 101-02 (2010). Thus, in Washington, "[u]nder CR 12(b)(6) a plaintiff states a claim upon which relief can be granted if it is possible that facts could be established to support allegations in the complaint."

Id. The *McCurry* Court further explained:

Plaintiffs' Sur-Reply to Backpage.com
Defendants' Mot to Dismiss - 1

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2 The [United States] Supreme Court's plausibility standard is predicated on
3 policy determinations specific to the federal trial courts. The *Twombly* Court
4 concluded: federal trial courts are incapable of adequately preventing
5 discovery abuses, weak claims cannot be effectively weeded out early in the
6 discovery process, and this makes discovery expensive and encourages
7 defendants to settle “largely groundless” claims. *See* 550 U.S. at 557–58, 559,
8 127 S.Ct. 1955. **Neither party has shown these policy determinations hold**
9 **sufficiently true in the Washington trial courts to warrant such a drastic**
10 **change in court procedure.**

11 **Nor has either party here addressed countervailing policy considerations.**
12 **For example, do current discovery expenses justify plaintiffs' loss of access**
13 **to that discovery and general access to the courts, particularly in cases**
14 **where evidence is almost exclusively in the possession of**
15 **defendants? Could runaway discovery expenses be addressed by better**
16 **means—perhaps involving more court oversight of the discovery process**
17 **or a change in the discovery rules?**

18 Currently this court lacks the type of facts and figures (specific to the
19 Washington trial courts) that were presented to, and persuaded, the United
20 States Supreme Court to alter its interpretation of Fed.R.Civ.P.
21 12(b)(6). *See Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 557–58, 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955. **We thus**
22 **have no similar basis to fundamentally alter our interpretation of CR**
23 **12(b)(6) that has been in effect for nearly 50 years,** *see Christensen*, 59
24 Wash.2d at 548, 368 P.2d 897, **and decline to do so here.**

25 **Even if such facts and figures had been presented, this court would be**
26 **hesitant to effectively rewrite CR 12(b)(6) based on policy considerations.**
27 **The appropriate forum for revising the Washington rules is the rule-**
28 **making process.** *See Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 579, 595, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (Stevens,
29 J., dissenting). This process permits policy considerations to be raised, studied,
30 and argued in the legal community and the community at large.

31 *Id.* at 103 (emphasis added).

32 Furthermore, although Backpage suggests this case would be over and done with if it
33 were in federal court, the district court rejected Backpage’s request for it to ignore factual
34 pleadings in the First Amended Complaint, as evidenced in its order on remand:

1 Plaintiffs have alleged claims against all defendants for civil conspiracy,
2 violation of the Sexual Exploitation of Children Act (“SECA”), unjust
3 enrichment, and ratification, which arise from Plaintiffs’ allegations that the
4 Backpage.com Defendants knowingly facilitated and promoted the sexual
5 exploitation of Plaintiffs through their website. It is difficult for this Court to
6 understand how there is “no real connection” between the claims against the
7 diverse and nondiverse defendants when it is alleged that the defendants
8 conspired to use the Backpage.com website as a means to sexually exploit
9 Plaintiffs.

10 Moreover, a number of federal courts have denied dismissal on a CR 12(b)(6),
11 when like here, the plaintiff alleged the website created, developed, or encouraged the
12 unlawful content. *E.g. Anthony v. Yahoo Inc.*, 421 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1262-63 (N.D.
13 Cal. 2006) (section 230(c)(1) did not apply where the plaintiff alleged that the
14 defendant created fake user profiles to persuade users to renew their subscriptions to
15 the defendant's online dating service); *Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusinessbureau.com*, 418
16 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1148-49 (D. Ariz. 2005) (immunity not appropriate at the pleading
17 stage where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant created the allegedly defamatory
18 content); *MCW, Inc. v. badbusinessbureau.com*, No. Civ.A.3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004
19 WL 833595, *10 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (concluding that the defendant could be held liable
20 for actively soliciting defamatory content and for creating “disparaging titles,
21 headings, and editorial messages”).

22 **B. Plaintiffs’ Factual Allegations Are Strongly Supported by Exhibits A and B,
23 Should be Accepted as True, and Should Not Be Treated As Mere Speculative
24 Legal Conclusions**

25 Plaintiffs have plead a number of factual allegations that, if proven, would negate
26 Backpage’s immunity defense.¹ Moreover, Plaintiffs attached over 2,000 pages of exhibits in

¹ As explained in *Fair housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com*, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008), “the message to website operators is clear: If you don't encourage illegal content, or design your Plaintiffs’ Sur-Reply to Backpage.com Defendants’ Mot to Dismiss - 3

1 support of these factual allegations, which clearly show the unlawful nature of the postings.
2
3 More importantly, these exhibits show that Plaintiffs’ factual allegations are not baseless or
4 speculative. For instance these exhibits support Plaintiffs’ allegations that Backpage’s posting
5 rules and requirements were created and developed to help users draft unlawful prostitution
6 ads, thereby increasing the use and viability of its website. These exhibits also support
7 Plaintiffs’ allegations that Backpage created and developed its “escort” section for unlawful
8 purposes—namely prostitution—and that Backpage chose the word “escort” because it means
9 “prostitute,” and therefore would most effectively convey the true meaning of each posting.
10 Not surprisingly, Backpage.com not once mentions Exhibits A and B in any of their briefing.

11 Furthermore, Backpage cites only one case, *State ex rel. Pirak v. Schoeter*, 45 Wn.2d
12 367 (1954), for the proposition “the Court should not assume that a complaint’s legal
13 conclusions are correct.” But, *Pirak* is inapposite to the present matter.

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15 In *Pirak*, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit to enjoin the state director of fisheries from
16 issuing licenses for the use of reef nets. In the complaint, the plaintiffs plead “reef nets” were
17 “fish traps,” and therefore were prohibited by RCW 75.12.060, which prohibits the use of
18 “fish traps” to catch salmon. In deciding the state’s 12(b)(6) motion, the *Pirak* Court
19 explained it did not have to accept the plaintiffs’ allegation that a “reef net” is a “fish trap”
20 prohibited by RCW 75012.060 because interpreting the meaning of a statute (i.e. whether
21 “fish trap” encompasses “reef nets”) is a legal, not factual, matter.

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website to require users to input illegal content, you will be immune.” Put another way, Backpage.com cannot encourage unlawful content on its website *and* be immune from liability stemming from it.

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2 For the present motion, this Court must decide whether Plaintiffs’ factual allegations
3 regarding Backpage’s efforts to create, develop, and encourage unlawful content, if proven,
4 would overcome Backpage’s immunity defense. Whether “escort” means prostitute, as
5 alleged in the First Amended Complaint, is a disputed issue of fact, not law.

6 To the extent Backpage relies on *Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 108 Wn. App., 454
7 (2001), that case is much different than the one at bar and is therefore also irrelevant. Most
8 notably, unlike the present case, Schneider did not allege Amazon created or developed the
9 defamatory content. Instead, he argued Amazon should be liable because it knew of the
10 defamatory postings and failed to remove them—acts clearly immune under the CDA.

11 **C. Backpage.com Does Not Have A Substantive Federal Right To Create, Develop,**
12 **and/or Encourage Unlawful Content On Its Website**

13 The Defendants’ argument that state procedural law somehow infringes on their
14 federal substantive rights is illogical and, at best, a red herring. The CDA does not give
15 Backpage a substantive federal right to create or develop unlawful content.² Indeed, “Section
16 230 of the CDA only applies if the interactive computer service provider is not also an
17 “information content provider,” which is defined as someone who is “responsible, in whole or
18 in part, for the creation or development of” the offending content. . *Roommates.com, LLC*,
19 521 F.3d at 1162 citing § 230(f)(3).” Likewise, the CDA does not grant Backpage.com a
20 substantive federal right to avoid discovery:

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22 Requiring website owners to refrain from taking affirmative acts that are
23 unlawful does not strike us as an undue burden. These are, after all, businesses
24 that are being held responsible only for their own conduct; there is no vicarious
25 liability for the misconduct of their customers. Compliance with laws of
general applicability seems like an entirely justified burden for all businesses,
whether they operate online or through quaint brick-and-mortar facilities.

26 ² Ironically, “[t]he primary goal of the [Communications Decency [Act] was to control the exposure of minors to indecent material.” *Batzel v. Smith*, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title v. (1996), and H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 81-91 (1996) (“

1 Insofar, however, as a plaintiff would bring a claim under state or federal law
2 based on a website operator's passive acquiescence in the misconduct of its
3 users, the website operator would likely be entitled to CDA immunity. This is
4 true even if the users committed their misconduct using electronic tools of
5 general applicability provided by the website operator.

6 *Id.* at 1189, fn 24.

7 Furthermore, none of the cases cited in Backpage's brief found that a state court's
8 lenient pleading standard infringed on the defendant's federal rights. Rather, each case
9 involved a final judgment in which the plaintiff's federal right to bring a claim was
10 improperly deprived by state law.

11 For instance, in *Brown v. Western Ry. Of Ala.*, 338 U.S. 294 (1949), the U.S. Supreme
12 Court reversed the state court's dismissal of the plaintiff's federal tort claim because the state
13 court improperly decided issues of fact, thereby negating the plaintiff's federal right to bring a
14 lawsuit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The state court explained that it based its
15 decision on a local rule of practice to construe pleading allegations most strongly against the
16 pleader. The U.S. Supreme Court issued a strong rebuke of the local law explaining, "[s]trict
17 local rules of pleading cannot be used to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery
18 authorized by federal laws."

19 The two other case cited in Backpage's brief, *Felder v. Casey*, 487 U.S. 131 (1988),
20 and *Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp.*, 123 Wn.2d 64 (1993), are even further off point, as
21 they were both decided on the basis of federal preemption, which has nothing to do with the
22 present case.
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2 For the foregoing reasons, in addition those raised in Plaintiffs' response brief,
3 Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court deny the Backpage.com Defendants' Motion to
4 Dismiss.

5 Dated this 24th day of April 2013.

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Certificate of Service

I, Ami Erpenbach, hereby declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that that I am employed at Pfau Cochran Vertetis Amala PLLC, and that on this 24th day of April, I served the above, via E-Mail, **E-Service**, Hand Delivery, and/or U.S.

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