3-20-2012

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I. Introduction

International humanitarian law (IHL)—also called the law of armed conflict or the law of war—governs the conduct of hostilities and the protection of persons during armed conflict. It does not, however, govern the decision to use military force; this is the domain of the *jus ad bellum* and public international law. In a course on international criminal law, IHL—also known as the *jus in bello*—becomes relevant whenever war crimes charges are contemplated. Such charges are only appropriate where there is an armed conflict and where parties have breached the applicable IHL. Other ICL crimes—such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and terrorism—may be committed within or without an armed conflict. Fully understanding the law governing war crimes thus requires a familiarity with IHL—the goal of this supplement.

As long as groups of people, and later states, have waged war, there have been rules in place defining acceptable behavior in armed conflict. Indeed, “[t]he end of a great war frequently brings a revision of the laws of war in its wake.” Allison Marston Danner, *When Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War*, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006). Historically, IHL rules evolved along parallel tracks. One set of treaties emerging from international conferences in The Hague and elsewhere concerned the means and methods of warfare. These treaties sought to limit the tactics of war and prohibit the use of certain weapons that cause excessive suffering (“Hague Law”). The most important of the Hague treaties is the Fourth Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907) and its annexed regulations, which take as a basic premise that the means and methods of warfare are not without limits.

A second set of treaties sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva (“Geneva Law”) established protections for individuals uniquely impacted by war, especially those who do not—or who no longer—participate directly in hostilities. Most importantly, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949—which enjoy universal ratification among the states of the world—provide specific protections to four classes of protected persons: the wounded and the sick in the field (Geneva Convention I); the wounded and sick at sea (Geneva Convention II); prisoners of war (Geneva Convention III); and civilians (Geneva Convention IV). Certain forms of injurious conduct committed against these protected persons (such as acts of murder, torture, inhuman treatment, causing great suffering, destruction of property, unlawful confinement, denials of due process, and hostage-taking) constitute so-called “grave breaches” of the treaties and are punishable as war crimes.

The law of war originally and almost exclusively addressed international armed conflicts, with notable exceptions such as the Lieber Code governing the Union Forces during the U.S. Civil War. Thus, the four Geneva Conventions primarily apply to such conflicts, defined at Article 2, common to all four Conventions, as “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High

* See Articles 50, 51, 130, and 147 of the Geneva Conventions.
Contracting Parties.” Within the Geneva Conventions, only Article 3, also common to all four Conventions and considered a convention-in-miniature, sets forth a minimum set of rules governing non-international armed conflicts. Note that commentators often speak of “international” versus “internal” armed conflicts. The drafters of the Geneva Conventions, however, deliberately chose the formulation “not of an international character.”

In 1977, the Geneva Conventions were supplemented by two Protocols* to reflect the changing nature of armed conflict. Protocol I provides a detailed set of rules concerning the obligation to discriminate between military and civilian targets; defines international conflicts as including, “armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination”; expands the category of lawful combatants to include some members of guerrilla movements; and further defines and clarifies rules governing mercenaries. Protocol II elaborates on the minimum rules in Common Article 3 governing non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) and reflects a trend toward minimizing the differences between the rules that govern international and non-international armed conflicts.

Neither Common Article 3 nor Protocol II by their own terms contains a penal regime on the theory that crimes committed by individual combatants within NIACs would be prosecutable under domestic law. Nonetheless, when the U.N. Security Council created the statutes governing the first two ad hoc international tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it contemplated that war crimes could be charged under international law in non-international armed conflicts. Indeed, the armed conflict in Rwanda was primarily internal, and even the conflict in the former Yugoslavia had both international and internal aspects.

A web of bilateral and multilateral treaties has rendered international humanitarian law the most codified area of international law. A rich body of customary international law has also developed to supplement this extensive treaty regime. See Customary International Humanitarian Law (Jean–Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald–Beck, eds., 2005). In many respects, the customary international law of IHL reflects the convergence of these various strands of IHL and the creation of a more complete corpus of law. The legacy of evolution, codification, and now enforcement of IHL belies the claim by Cicero that silent enim leges inter arma—the laws are silent among those at war.

**II. When Does International Humanitarian Law Apply?**

The definitions of many war crimes raise complex IHL questions. These include: what constitutes a proper military objective? What level of force may lawfully be employed against such a target? Was the victim of an act of violence a protected person (such as a civilian or prisoner of war who are generally immune from attack) or a combatant (who is targetable at any time by virtue of his or her status)? Is a particular tactic a lawful ruse or an unlawful act of perfidy? All of these questions hinge, however, on an a priori question: Is IHL even applicable? This is the subject of the next case. As

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* A third Protocol adopted in 2005 added a new and entirely secular distinctive emblem (a red diamond) to mark protected objects.
you review it, pay particular attention to the standard the tribunal employs to determine the existence of an armed conflict and whether this standard changes depending on the classification of the conflict.

The following excerpt is from a case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) involving the war in Kosovo (see map above). The defendant, Fatmir Limaj, was a Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) commander alleged to be responsible for directing military operations and the administration of a prison camp in a region of Kosovo. Limaj was indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity in early 2003 and was arrested soon thereafter by Slovenian authorities. The charges stemmed from allegations that KLA forces under Limaj’s command and control unlawfully detained Serb and Albanian citizens in cruel conditions. In addition, the Prosecution alleged that when Serb forces retook the area around the camp in 1998, Limaj’s co-accused and subordinate, Haradin Bala, marched detainees from the camp into the mountains west of Priština and then executed half of them.


1. The Existence Of An Armed Conflict And Nexus

(a) Law
83. In order for the Tribunal to have jurisdiction over crimes punishable under Article 3 of the Statute [prescribing war crimes], two preliminary requirements must be satisfied. There must be an armed conflict, whether international or internal, at the time material to the Indictment, and the acts of the accused must be closely related to this armed conflict.

84. The test for determining the existence of an armed conflict was set out in the Tadić Jurisdiction Decision and has been applied consistently by the Tribunal since:

An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.294

Under this test, in establishing the existence of an armed conflict of an internal character the Chamber must assess two criteria: (i) the intensity of the conflict and (ii) the organisation of the parties. These criteria are used “solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian law.” The geographic and temporal framework of this test is also settled jurisprudence: crimes committed anywhere in the territory under the control of a party to a conflict, until a peaceful settlement of the conflict is achieved, fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

85. The Defence submit that in determining the existence of an armed conflict for the purposes of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction the Chamber may consider the insurgents’ control over a determinate territory, the government’s use of the army against the insurgents, the insurgents’ status as belligerents, and whether the insurgents have a State-like organisation and authority to observe the rules of war. This submission draws on the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) Commentary to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which is the basis for the charges brought under Article 3 of the Statute. In the relevant part, the Commentary lists different conditions for the application of Common Article 3 which were discussed at the Diplomatic Conference for the Geneva Conventions. The Commentary explicitly clarifies, however, that this list is “in no way obligatory” and is suggested merely as “convenient criteria” to distinguish a genuine armed conflict from an act of banditry or an unauthorised or short-lived insurrection. It further states:

Does this mean that Article 3 is not applicable in cases where armed strife breaks out in a country, but does not fulfil any of the above conditions (which are not obligatory and are only mentioned as an indication)? We do not subscribe to this view. We think, on the contrary, that the Article should be applied as widely as possible.300

294 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Oct. 2, 1995). * * *

300 ICRC Commentary to Geneva Convention I, p 50.
86. The drafting history of Common Article 3 provides further guidance. Several proposed drafts of what later became known as Common Article 3 sought to make its application dependent, *inter alia*, on conditions such as an explicit recognition of the insurgents by the *de jure* government, the admission of the dispute to the agenda of the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, the existence of the insurgents’ State-like organisation, and civil authority exercising *de facto* authority over persons in determinate territory. However, none of these conditions was included in the final version of Common Article 3, which was actually agreed by the States Parties at the Diplomatic Conference. This provides a clear indication that no such explicit requirements for the application of Common Article 3 were intended by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions. **

88. The Defence submit even further that the extent of organisation of the parties required for establishing an armed conflict, as well as, generally, the level of its intensity, have not yet been defined by the jurisprudence of the Tribunal. They submit that the law does not require the impossible and that, in order to be bound by international humanitarian law, a party to a conflict must be able to implement international humanitarian law and, at the bare minimum, must possess: a basic understanding of the principles laid down in Common Article 3, a capacity to disseminate rules, and a method of sanctioning breaches. They also refer to Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, which requires a higher standard for establishment of an armed conflict, and submit that in order for Additional Protocol II to apply it must be established that the insurgent party (in the present case, the KLA) was sufficiently organised to carry out continuous and persistent military operations and to impose discipline on its troops, that it exercised some degree of stability in the territories it was able to control and had the minimum infrastructure to implement the provisions of Additional Protocol II.

89. The Chamber does not share this view. The two determinative elements of an armed conflict, intensity of the conflict and level of organisation of the parties, are used “*solely for the purpose* as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian law.” Therefore, some degree of organisation by the parties will suffice to establish the existence of an armed conflict. This degree need not be the same as that required for establishing the responsibility of superiors for the acts of their subordinates within the organisation, as no determination of individual criminal responsibility is intended under this provision of the Statute. This position is consistent with other persuasive commentaries on the matter. A study by the ICRC submitted as a reference document to the Preparatory Commission for the establishment of the elements of crimes for the ICC noted that:

> The ascertainment whether there is a non-international armed conflict does not depend on the subjective judgment of the parties to the conflict; it must be determined on the basis of objective criteria; the term ‘armed conflict’ presupposes the existence of hostilities between armed forces organised to a greater or lesser extent; there must be the opposition of armed forces and a certain intensity of the fighting.
90. For these reasons the Chamber will apply the test enumerated in the Tadić Jurisdiction Decision to determine whether the existence of an armed conflict has been established. Consistently with decisions of other Chambers of this Tribunal and of the ICTR, the determination of the intensity of a conflict and the organisation of the parties are factual matters which need to be decided in light of the particular evidence and on a case-by-case basis. By way of example, in assessing the intensity of a conflict, other Chambers have considered factors such as the seriousness of attacks and whether there has been an increase in armed clashes, the spread of clashes over territory and over a period of time, any increase in the number of government forces and mobilisation and the distribution of weapons among both parties to the conflict, as well as whether the conflict has attracted the attention of the United Nations Security Council, and, whether any resolutions on the matter have been passed. With respect to the organisation of the parties to the conflict Chambers of the Tribunal have taken into account factors including the existence of headquarters, designated zones of operation, and the ability to procure, transport, and distribute arms. \(^{314}\)

(b) Findings

93. The Indictment alleges that an armed conflict between Serbian forces and the KLA existed in Kosovo not later than early 1998. The Chamber heard evidence and is satisfied that the Serbian forces involved in Kosovo in 1998 included substantial forces of the Army of Yugoslavia (“VJ”) and the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (“MUP”), i.e. the police, and, therefore, constitute “governmental authorities” within the meaning of the Tadić test. The Chamber will discuss below whether the Prosecution has established that the KLA possessed the characteristics of an organised armed group, within the meaning of the Tadić test, and whether the acts of violence that occurred in Kosovo in the material time reached the level of intensity required by the jurisprudence of the Tribunal to establish the existence an armed conflict.

(i) Organisation of the KLA

95. Progressively from late May to late August 1998 the territory of Kosovo was divided by the KLA into seven zones: Drenica, Dukagjin, Pashtik, Shala, Llap, Nerodime, and Karadak. Each zone had a commander and covered the territory of several municipalities. The level of organisation and development in each zone was fluid and developing and not all zones had the same level of organisation and development; this was significantly influenced by the existence and extent of the KLA’s presence in each zone before April 1998. \(^{**}\)

98. While, not necessarily without fail, the Chamber accepts that, generally, zone commanders acted in accordance with directions from the General Staff. The “Provisional Regulations for the Organisation of the Army’s Internal Life” of the KLA (“Regulations”) were distributed to the various units by the General Staff. \(^{**}\)

100. \(^{**}\) The General Staff was also active in organising issues of overall importance for the functioning of the KLA, such as the supply of weapons. \(^{**}\)

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\(^{314}\) Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, paras. 23-24 (June 16, 2004).
101. Further, it was the General Staff that issued political statements and communiqués which informed the general public in Kosovo and the international community of its objectives and its activities. Political Statement No. 2 of the KLA, issued by the General Staff on 27 April 1998 and published in the Kosovo newspaper “Bujku” two days later, described the KLA and its political goals as follows:

The KLA constitutes the integrity of the armed forces of Kosovo and its occupied territories, and its aim is the liberation and unification of the occupied territories of Albania.

110. The KLA Regulations further support the existence of such an organisational structure and hierarchy. Although the Regulations are dated “1998” and the precise date of their promulgation is not identified, the Chamber accepts from the evidence, and finds, that at least by the end of June 1998 these Regulations were available and were being distributed among KLA soldiers at various positions.

111. The Regulations, inter alia, established several ranks of KLA servicemen, defined the duties of the unit commanders and deputy unit commanders, as well as the duties of the company, platoon, and squad commanders, and created a chain of military hierarchy between the various levels of commanders. It was declared in the Regulations that “obedience, respect and orders strictly follow the chain of military hierarchy.” The Regulations authorised an officer at a higher level “to demand from an officer beneath him the enforcement of the law, of regulations, of orders, instructions, etc.” and provide that “a junior officer is obliged to carry out orders, decisions, instructions, etc.” Further, the Regulations contained explicit provisions directed to guaranteeing that orders would be executed down the hierarchy.

123. The evidence varies considerably as to the supply and use of uniforms in the KLA in the period before August 1998. Some evidence indicates that by February 1998 most of the KLA soldiers had uniforms with badges identifying their allegiance, although the evidence indicates that the military uniforms were of varying nature. Some KLA soldiers wore some self-made uniforms. Others had no uniforms at all. As with most things the position regarding uniforms improved as the end of 1998 neared. While the existence of a uniform may be indicative of the existence of a well-organised entity, in the view of the Chamber, this factor alone is not determinative in this case of the existence of an organised military structure, as it has little bearing on the functioning of the KLA, especially having regard to its rapid expansion after March 1998 which undoubtedly placed unanticipated strain on the provision of commodities such as uniforms, at a time when other needs were clearly more relevant to the military functioning of the KLA.

125. Indicative of the extent of the KLA’s organisation is its role in the negotiations with representatives of the European Community and foreign missions based in Belgrade. Jan Kickert, a diplomat with the Austrian Embassy in Belgrade, indicated that by the middle of 1998 it had become evident that a solution of the Kosovo crisis would not be achieved without the involvement of the KLA. [Three meetings took place in July 1998 with representative of the European Union, the international community, and the KLA.]
129. As this evidence confirms, by July 1998 the KLA had become accepted by international representatives, and within Kosovo, as a key party involved in political negotiations to resolve the Kosovo crisis. This discloses and confirms that by that time the KLA had achieved a level of organisational stability and effectiveness. In particular this gave it the recognised ability to speak with one voice and with a level of persuasive authority on behalf of its members. **

134. In the Chamber’s finding, before the end of May 1998 the KLA sufficiently possessed the characteristics of an organised armed group, able to engage in an internal armed conflict.

(ii) Intensity of the Conflict

135. Sporadic acts of violence between Serbian forces and the KLA occurred in Kosovo in 1997 and early 1998. Some of these acts of violence were discussed by the Chamber earlier in this decision. The most significant of them was the attack at the end of February 1998 and in early March 1998 on the villages Qirez/Cirez, Likoshan/Likosane, and Prekazi-i-Poshtem/Donjie Prekaze located in the Drenica area, in the course of which 83 Kosovo Albanians were killed. International observers present in Kosovo at the time testified that these events marked a turning point in the development of the conflict in Kosovo.

136. Around 5 March 1998 a police action was carried out in the area of Kline/Klina-Laushe/Lausa, located southwest of Prekazi/Prekaze. Reports indicated that buildings were attacked with heavy weapons and mortars. A group of diplomats who visited Prekazi/Prekaze on 8 March 1998 reported great devastation to a limited number of buildings, continuing heavy police presence and a complete absence of civilian activities. Houses were torched, burned, or fired at. Serbian forces from the Ministry of the Interior (“MUP”) and forces associated with Serbian special units equipped with armoured personnel carriers and other heavy vehicles were involved in the operation. **

159. On or about 23 June 1998 the KLA took control of a coal mine and the village of Bardhi-i-Madh/Veliki Belacevac, 10 km west of Prishtina/Pristina. Shooting could be heard in the area for the entire day and Kosovo Albanian residents were reported to have fled to Prishtina/Pristina. ***About a week later the Serbian forces attempted to retake the mine. Reports indicate that the Serbian forces used tear gas, that automatic gunfire and explosions were heard in the area, and that security forces, the VJ, and armed Serbian civilians were involved in this operation. This was the first action in which the participation of the VJ was officially confirmed by the Serbian side. ***

166. As discussed earlier, tanks and armoured vehicles, heavy artillery weapons, air defence systems, armored personnel carriers, machine guns, and explosives, among other weapons, were used in the conflict. **

168. The Defence submit that a series of regionally disparate and temporally sporadic attacks carried out over a broad and contested geographic area should not be held to amount to an armed conflict. In the Chamber’s view, the acts of violence that took place in Kosovo from the end of May 1998 at least until 26 July 1998 are not accurately described as temporally sporadic or geographically disperse. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, periodic armed clashes occurred virtually continuously at
intervals averaging three to seven days over a widespread and expanding geographic area.

169. The Defence further submit that a purely one-sided use of force cannot constitute protracted armed violence which will found the beginning of an armed conflict. In the Chamber’s view, this proposition is not supported by the facts established in this case. While the evidence indicates that the KLA forces were less numerous than the Serbian forces, less organised and less prepared, and were not as well trained or armed, the evidence does not suggest that the conflict was purely one-sided. KLA attacks were carried out against a variety of Serbian military, community and commercial targets over a widespread and expanding area of Kosovo. Further, KLA forces were able to offer strong and often effective resistance to Serbian forces undertaking military and police operations. While very large numbers of Serbian forces, well equipped, were deployed in the relevant areas of Kosovo during the period relevant to the Indictment, the KLA enjoyed a significant level of overall military success, tying up the Serbian forces by what were usually very effective guerrilla-type tactics.

(iii) Conclusion

171. The Chamber is satisfied that before the end of May 1998 an armed conflict existed in Kosovo between the Serbian forces and the KLA. By that time the KLA had a General Staff, which appointed zone commanders, gave directions to the various units formed or in the process of being formed, and issued public statements on behalf of the organization. Unit commanders gave combat orders and subordinate units and soldiers generally acted in accordance with these orders. Steps have been established to introduce disciplinary rules and military police, as well as to recruit, train and equip new members. Although generally inferior to the VJ and MUP’s equipment, the KLA soldiers had weapons, which included artillery mortars and rocket launchers. By July 1998 the KLA had gained acceptance as a necessary and valid participant in negotiations with international governments and bodies to determine a solution for the Kosovo’s crisis, and to lay down conditions in these negotiations for refraining from military action.

172. Further, by the end of May 1998 KLA units were constantly engaged in armed clashes with substantial Serbian forces in areas from the Kosovo-Albanian border in the west, to near Prishtina/Pristina in the east, to Prizren/Prizren and the Kosovo-Macedonian border in the south and the municipality of Mitrovica/Kosovka Mitrovica in the north. The ability of the KLA to engage in such varied operations is a further indicator of its level of organisation. Heavily armed special forces of the Serbian MUP and VJ forces were committed to the conflict on the Serbian side and their efforts were directed to the control and quelling of the KLA forces. Civilians, both Serbian and Kosovo Albanian, had been forced by the military actions to leave their homes, villages and towns and the number of casualties was growing.

173. In view of the above the Chamber is persuaded and finds that an internal armed conflict existed in Kosovo before the end of May 1998. This continued until long after 26 July 1998.

174. Further, the Chamber is satisfied that the requisite nexus between the conduct alleged in the Indictment and the armed conflict has been established. In
particular, the Chamber refers to its findings that the prison camp where the alleged crimes occurred was established after the KLA took control of the village, that it was run by KLA members, and that the camp effectively ceased to exist after the KLA lost control of the [region]. Those detained in it were principally, if not solely, those who were or who were suspected of being Serbians or Kosovo Albanians who collaborated with the Serbian authorities.

NOTES & QUESTIONS

1. Case History & Outcome. Limaj was ultimately acquitted on the ground that although he was in a position of command over the KLA, there was insufficient evidence that he played any role at the prison camp or in the mountains where the prisoners were executed. His acquittal was affirmed on appeal. **Prosecutor v. Limaj, et al. Case No. IT-03-66-A, Judgement (Sept. 27, 2007).** One of his co-accused, Haradin Bala, was convicted of the murder, torture, and cruel treatment of prisoners and sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment. This sentence reflected the fact that Bala was following orders. **Prosecutor v. Limaj, et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgement, para. 726 (Nov. 30, 2005).** The Trial Chamber dismissed all of the crimes against humanity counts in both cases on the ground that the conduct alleged was not part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. **Id.** at para. 228. Hence, the central importance of the war crimes charges, which depend on the existence of an armed conflict but not a larger attack on a civilian population.

2. Tadić and the Definition of Armed Conflict. In **Tadić**, the Trial Chamber determined that an armed conflict exists:

   whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.

**Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT–94–1–A, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (October 2, 1995).** Note that the **Tadić** Trial Chamber defines “armed conflict” and not “war.” This is in keeping with the lexicon of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as well. Why might this be so? Is the definition of “armed conflict” formulated by the **Tadić** Appeals Chamber a useful one? What violent situations might it exclude?

3. Armed Conflict in Kosovo. What is the test employed by the Trial Chamber in determining the existence of an armed conflict in the region within Kosovo? What evidence was most dispositive in your view? What would be the implications if the defendants had succeeded in convincing the Trial Chamber that there was no armed
conflict underway during the time in question? Are there other factors beyond those mentioned by the tribunal that you would consider important. For example, are the political motivations of the parties at all relevant? What if the violence is entirely one sided? Can this be an armed conflict or is some measure of mutuality required?

4. Nexus and Causation. In para. 174 above, the Court mentions the necessity of showing a nexus between the alleged war crime and the state of armed conflict. How was the nexus satisfied in this case? Is it necessary to show a causal relationship between an armed conflict and an alleged war crime? In a decision involving the prosecution of three Serbian military officials for war crimes in the Foča area of the former Yugoslavia, the Appeals Chamber noted that such a causal relationship was not necessary:

58. What ultimately distinguishes a war crime from a purely domestic offence is that a war crime is shaped by or dependent upon the environment—the armed conflict—in which it is committed. It need not have been planned or supported by some form of policy. The armed conflict need not have been causal to the commission of the crime, but the existence of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit it, his decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was committed. Hence, if it can be established, as in the present case, that the perpetrator acted in furtherance of or under the guise of the armed conflict, it would be sufficient to conclude that his acts were closely related to the armed conflict. The Trial Chamber’s finding on that point is unimpeachable.

59. In determining whether or not the act in question is sufficiently related to the armed conflict, the Trial Chamber may take into account, inter alia, the following factors: the fact that the perpetrator is a combatant; the fact that the victim is a non-combatant; the fact that the victim is a member of the opposing party; the fact that the act may be said to serve the ultimate goal of a military campaign; and the fact that the crime is committed as part of or in the context of the perpetrator’s official duties.

60. The Appellants’ proposition that the laws of war only prohibit those acts which are specific to an actual wartime situation is not right. The laws of war may frequently encompass acts which, though they are not committed in the theatre of conflict, are substantially related to it. The laws of war can apply to both types of acts. The Appeals Chamber understands the Appellants’ argument to be that if an act can be prosecuted in peacetime, it cannot be prosecuted in wartime. This betrays a misconception about the relationship between the laws of war and the laws regulating a peacetime situation. The laws of war do not necessarily displace the laws regulating a peacetime situation; the former may add elements requisite to the protection which needs to be afforded to victims in a wartime situation.

The Prosecutor v. Kumarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement (June 12, 2002).

5. Public Reception of the Case. The acquittal of Limaj was greeted with jubilation in the streets of Kosovo. Just prior to the issuance of the judgment, upwards of 20,000 residents took to the streets in Kosovo’s capital city of Priština to proclaim the innocence of the defendants. The judgment was largely seen as a vindication of the
KLA, whom Serbian authorities had branded as a terrorist organization. Why might this be the case? In what way can IHL be used by parties to legitimize themselves or de-legitimize their opponents? A second set of indictments involving the KLA also resulted in acquittals of high ranking KLA members, including the former Prime Minister of Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, et al., Case No IT-04-84-T, Judgment (April 3, 2008). Both judgments drew criticism from Serbia and renewed accusations that the ICTY is biased against Serb defendants. The Appeals Chamber—for the first time ever—ordered a partial re-trial of the Haradinaj et al. case on the ground that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to take adequate measures to secure the testimony of key witnesses and failed to “appreciate the gravity of the threat witness intimidation posed to the trial’s integrity,” even though the prosecutor had exceeded the time limit for his case.” Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, et al., Case No IT-04-84-A, Judgment, para. 40 (July 21, 2010). The re-trial commenced in August 2011.

6. Witness Intimidation. The Haradinaj case was plagued with irregularities, including difficulties with obtaining evidence and witness testimony—a point specifically identified by the Trial Chamber. Indeed, the tribunal noted at the outset of its Judgment that it had encountered significant difficulties in securing the testimony of a large number of witnesses. Many witnesses cited fear as a prominent reason for not wishing to appear before the Trial Chamber to give evidence. The Trial Chamber gained a strong impression that the trial was being held in an atmosphere where witnesses felt unsafe. This was due to a number of factors specific to Kosovo/Kosova, for example Kosovo/Kosova’s small communities and tight family and community networks which made guaranteeing anonymity difficult. The parties themselves agreed that an unstable security situation existed in Kosovo/Kosova that was particularly unfavourable to witnesses. Given these circumstances, the Trial Chamber made use of all its powers under the Rules to ensure the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings as well as the protection and well-being of witnesses who appeared before it.

Haradinaj, Case No IT-04-84-T at para. 6. Upwards of nine potential witnesses wound up dead, including three who had been in a witness protection program, and many others refused to testify voluntarily or without protective measures. One crucial witness who refused to appear, Shefqet Kabashi, was charged with contempt of court in 2007; he pleaded guilty. Was it an abuse of discretion on the part of the Trial Chamber to refuse to delay the trial further to secure the presence of prosecution witnesses? Should the Appeals Chamber have granted the re-trial under the circumstances or was this unfair to the accused? How should international tribunals balance the competing priorities of expediency, witness protection, and fairness to all parties, including the victims and the prosecution? Do fair trial rights extend even to the prosecution? Article 20(1) of the ICTY’s Statute requires the tribunal to “ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.” For a discussion, see Heidi L. Hansberry, Too Much of a Good Thing in
III. Conflict Classification

If a situation meets the definition of an armed conflict, thus triggering the application of international humanitarian law, the next question is whether the armed conflict is an “international” or “non-international” one. The law of war has historically made a distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts, with the former having a more comprehensive prescriptive framework and more rigorous enforcement regime. During the negotiations around the four Geneva Conventions, the ICRC and a handful of state delegates sought to include rules governing internal armed conflicts within the treaties. In the face of stiff resistance from other members of the international community, however, these advocates were only able to obtain a cryptic reference to armed conflicts “not of an international character” in Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions.

Before reading the next case excerpt, which comes from the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court, compare how the four Geneva Conventions and their Protocols define their respective material fields of application:

• Geneva Conventions, Common Article 2:

In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.

• Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3:

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions…

• Protocol I, Article 1:

3. This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to those Conventions.

4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

• Protocol II, Article 1:

1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions or application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.

2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.

From these provisions, can you construct a conflict classification typology? How many different types of conflict are contemplated? What contribution does Protocol I make to the definition of an “international armed conflict”? Is it still relevant today? How does the field of application differ between Common Article 3 and Protocol II? Are all types of conflicts and situations of violence addressed in these treaties? Do you think there are situations that are not covered that should be? How might world events have influenced the drafting of the two Protocols? Revisit this typology at the end of the next Section. In so doing, consider why we have different treaty regimes for international armed conflicts (IACs) and non-international armed conflicts (NIACs).

The next excerpt comes from the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC and involves the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The DRC has been wracked by conflict for many years. The events in question occurred in the Ituri district, which borders Uganda and Sudan, is home to 20 different ethnic groups (including the Lendu and the Hema), and is rich in natural resources. The case involves Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, alleged founder of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) and its military wing, the Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC). Both organizations are affiliated with the Hema ethnic group. Lubanga, also the commander-in-chief of the FPLC, was the first defendant to go to trial before the ICC.

The opinion below mentions Bosco Ntaganda, Lubanga’s former Deputy Chief of General Staff for Military Operations within the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC). A warrant for Ntaganda’s arrest was originally filed under seal so that Ntaganda would not abscond or threaten potential witnesses. It was later unsealed when the Office of the Prosecution and the Registry, which houses the Court’s Witness Protection Program, determined that witnesses would not be endangered. Like Lubanga, Ntaganda is alleged to have committed the war crime of enlisting, conscripting, and deploying children in armed conflict. Although Ntaganda remains at large, the trial of
two other DRC defendants—Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ndgudjolo Chui—is underway before the ICC. The cases are before the Court as a result of the DRC’s self-referral of ICC crimes committed within its territory.

Lubanga had originally been charged under Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the ICC Statute with the war crimes of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into “armed forces or groups” and using them to participate actively in hostilities. In so charging, the Prosecutor implicitly characterized the relevant conflict as a NIAC. (Virtually the same crime involving recruitment into “the national armed forces” could be charged in connection with an international armed conflict pursuant to Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi)). As you’ll see, the Pre-Trial Chamber disagrees with this assessment. In the final judgment, however, the Trial Chamber ultimately reversed the Pre-Trial Chamber on this point. As you’re reading the excerpt below, consider the grounds on which the Trial Chamber might reverse.

2. The Characterization Of The Armed Conflict

200. In his Document Containing the Charges, the Prosecutor considers that the alleged crimes were committed in the context of a conflict not of an international character. The Defence contends however that consideration should be given to the fact that during the relevant period, the Ituri region was under the control of Uganda, Rwanda, or the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). In the view of the Defence, the involvement of foreign elements, such as the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF), could internationalize the armed conflict in Ituri. Furthermore, in her closing statement at the confirmation hearing, the Representative of Victim a/0105/06 asserted that the involvement of Uganda and Rwanda in the Congolese conflict, including in Ituri, was a matter of common knowledge. She added, however, that the characterization of the armed conflict had to be done on a case-by-case basis. In her opinion, regardless of the type of armed conflict, the Statute offers exactly the same protection, adding that the Union des Patriots Congolais (UPC) had set up a quasi-state structure which could be described as a “national armed force.”

201. According to articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi)[governing IACs] and 8(2)(e)(vii) [governing NIACs] of the Statute and the Elements of the Crimes in question, conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years and using them to participate actively in hostilities entails criminal responsibility, if

[t]he conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict; or the conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character. * * *

* Ed.: Portions of this opinion have been issued under seal. In particular, the names of certain witnesses and other pieces of evidence have been redacted.
204. In this case, the Chamber concurs with the Representative of Victim a/105/06, that the protection afforded by the Statute against enlisting, conscripting and active participation in hostilities of children under the age of fifteen years is similar in scope, regardless of the characterization of the armed conflict. Thus, as will be discussed below, articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Statute criminalize the same conduct, whether it is committed in the context of a conflict of an international character or in the context of a conflict not of an international character. Consequently, the Chamber considers that it is not necessary to adjourn the hearing and request the Prosecutor to amend the charges.

a. From July 2002 To June 2003: Existence Of An Armed Conflict Of An International Character

205. The Chamber observes that neither the Statute nor the Elements of Crimes provide a definition of an international armed conflict for the purposes of article 8(2)(b). Only footnote 34 of the Elements of Crimes states that the term “international armed conflict” includes military occupation. Accordingly, the Chamber finds that, pursuant to article 21(1)(b) of the Statute, and with due regard to article 21(3) of the Statute, it is useful to rely on the applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict.

206. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, which is applicable to international armed conflicts, provides that:

In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.

207. The Commentary on the Geneva Conventions states that any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed

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* Ed.: Article 21 (Applicable Law) states that:

(1) The Court shall apply:
   (a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
   (b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict;
   (c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world. ** *

3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.
forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties
denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts,
or how much slaughter takes place. The respect due to human personality is not measured
by the number of victims.276 ** **

209. The Chamber considers an armed conflict to be international in character if it
takes place between two or more States; this extends to the partial or total occupation of
the territory of another State, whether or not the said occupation meets with armed
resistance. In addition, an internal armed conflict that breaks out on the territory of a
State may become international—or, depending upon the circumstances, be international
in character alongside an internal armed conflict—if (i) another State intervenes in that
conflict through its troops (direct intervention), or if (ii) some of the participants in the
internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other State (indirect intervention).

210. Regarding the second alternative, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has specified
the circumstances under which armed forces can be considered to be acting on behalf of a
foreign State, thus lending the armed conflict an international character. In *Tadić*, the
Appeals Chamber set out the constituent elements of the “overall control” exercised by a
foreign State on such armed forces:

[C]ontrol by a State over subordinate armed forces or militias or
paramilitary units may be of an overall character (and must comprise more
than the mere provision of financial assistance or military equipment or
training). … The control required by international law may be deemed to
exist when a State … has a role in organizing, co-ordinating or planning
the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training
and equipping or providing operational support to that group.279

211. The Chamber holds the view that where a State does not intervene directly
on the territory of another State through its own troops, the overall control test will be
used to determine whether armed forces are acting on behalf of the first State. The test
will be met where the first State has a role in organizing, co-ordinating or planning the
military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping the
group or providing operational support to it.

212. The Chamber notes that in the judgement rendered on 19 December 2005 in
the case of the *Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda*, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) observed that, under customary international law, as reflected in Article 42
of the Hague Regulations of 1907, territory is considered to be occupied when it is
actually placed under the authority of the hostile army, and the occupation extends only
to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.280

213. In order to reach a conclusion as to whether a State, the military forces of
which are present on the territory of another State as a result of an intervention, is an
occupying Power, the ICJ held that it would need to “satisfy itself that the Ugandan

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276 International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary to the IV Geneva Convention relative to the
280 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (*Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda*),
armed forces in the DRC were not only stationed in particular locations but also that they had substituted their own authority for that of the Congolese Government.”

214. In the opinion of the ICJ, the fact that General Kazini, commander of the Ugandan forces in the DRC, appointed Adèle Lotsove as Governor of the new province of Kibali-Ituri in June 1999 is clear evidence of the fact that Uganda established and exercised authority in Ituri as an occupying Power.

215. The ICJ considered “that there is also persuasive evidence that the UPDF incited ethnic conflicts and took no action to prevent such conflicts in Ituri district.” In this regard, the ICJ relied, amongst other documents, on a report by MONUC on events in Ituri between January 2002 and December 2003 which states that “Ugandan army commanders already present in Ituri, instead of trying to calm the situation, preferred to benefit from the situation and support alternately one side or the other according to their political and financial interests.”

216. The ICJ considered that the conduct of the UPDF as a whole is clearly attributable to Uganda, being the conduct of a State organ, and that “the conduct of any organ of a State must be regarded as an act of that State.”

217. The ICJ finds in its disposition “that the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military activities against the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the latter’s territory, by occupying Ituri and by actively extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces having operated on the territory of the DRC, violated the principle of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of non-intervention” and that it can be considered as an occupying power.

218. The Chamber further notes that in his statement, [REDACTED] refers to the [REDACTED] military training [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] also refers to the taking hostage of Thomas Lubanga by Chief Kahwa and to the fact that the Ugandan authorities immediately initiated steps to secure his release. Similarly, in his statement, [REDACTED] refers to discussions with the Ugandan authorities regarding security matters and the “organis[ation of] UPDF/UPC patrols.” He states that [REDACTED] “UPC forces were taking up position behind the UPDF’s positions.”

219. In addition, the Chamber recalls that [REDACTED] states that from August 2002 to March 2003, [REDACTED] the Congolese, but that the area was under total Ugandan control. Indeed, he adds that the Ugandans supplied them with arms after training them and [REDACTED] with the Ugandans when [REDACTED]. According to him, it was [REDACTED] restructure the army of the Congolese that problems arose with Uganda which led to the UPDF attack on Bunia on 6 March 2003.

220. On the evidence admitted for the purpose of the confirmation hearing, the Chamber considers that there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that, as a result of the presence of the Republic of Uganda as an occupying Power, the armed conflict which occurred in Ituri can be characterized as an armed conflict of an international character from July 2002 to 2 June 2003, the date of the effective withdrawal of the Ugandan army.

221. Similarly, some of the evidence admitted for the purpose of the confirmation hearing bears on the role of Rwanda in the conflict in Ituri after 1 July 2002, and indicates that Rwanda backed the UPC and was particularly involved within the UPC. It would seem that Rwanda was supplying not only ammunition and arms to the UPC, but also soldiers. The evidence admitted for the purpose of the confirmation hearing also
includes indications that Rwanda was advising the UPC. There is also substantial evidence before the Chamber to the effect that Uganda stopped backing the UPC as a result of the UPC’s alliance with Rwanda.

222. In this regard, [REDACTED] presents a diagram summarizing the “chain of command, or at least … the power games played out in the relations that the UPC’s main players had with the Hema community and the UPC’s main ally, Rwanda.” The diagram indicates that orders were issued directly from Rwanda through its President and the Hema community. The witness states that [REDACTED] understanding of the UPC chain of command is based exclusively on the explanations [REDACTED].

223. In addition, the Chamber observes that according to the same [REDACTED], “Bosco [Ntaganda] had more of a hold over the UPC’s Rwandan-speaking militia men. [REDACTED] confirmed to [REDACTED] that Bosco [Ntaganda] received his orders as much from Kigali as from Lubanga.” From his statement, it would also seem that during the fighting in Bunia in March 2003, Floribert Kisembo himself “received contradictory orders from his two masters: on the one hand he had gotten orders from Thomas LUBANGA, and on the other hand he had gotten orders from Kigali.”

224. [REDACTED] also refers to military assistance from Rwanda, which supplied ammunition and arms and sent instructors to Mandro Camp.

225. In addition, the Chamber recalls that [REDACTED] points out in [REDACTED] testimony that relations between the UPC and Rwanda would come to the fore again starting in late 2002.

226. However, in light of the paucity of evidence before it, the Chamber is not in a position to find that there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that Rwanda played a role that can be described as direct or indirect intervention in the armed conflict in Ituri.

b. From 2 June 2003 To December 2003: Existence Of An Armed Conflict Not Of An International Character Involving The Ugandan People’s Conference

227. The Document Containing the Charges, filed by the Prosecution on 28 August 2006, states that Thomas Lubanga Dyilo committed war crimes under article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Statute between July 2002 and December 2003. It is therefore necessary to review the events that occurred between 2 June 2003 and late December 2003.

228. Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Statute deals with “other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character.”

229. Article 8(2)(f) of the Statute defines “conflicts not of an international character” for the purposes of article 8(2)(e) of the Statute, and provides that:

Paragraph 2(e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.
230. In addition, the introduction to the chapter of the Elements of Crimes dealing with this provision states that “[t]he Elements for war crimes under article 8, paragraph 2, of the Statute shall be interpreted within the established framework of the international law of armed conflict.”

231. In this connection, the Chamber notes that Protocol Additional II to the Geneva Conventions of 8 June 1977, which applies to non-international armed conflicts only, sets out criteria for distinguishing between non-international armed conflicts and situations of internal disturbances and tensions. According to its Article 1.1, Protocol Additional II applies to armed conflicts “which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party and between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.”

232. Thus, in addition to the requirement that the violence must be sustained and have reached a certain degree of intensity, Article 1.1 of Protocol Additional II provides that the armed groups must: (i) be under responsible command implying some degree of organization of the armed groups, capable of planning and carrying out sustained and concerted military operations and imposing discipline in the name of a de facto authority, including the implementation of the Protocol; and (ii) exercise such control over territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.

233. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has held that an armed conflict not of an international character exists whenever there is a resort to “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.” This definition echoes the two criteria of Protocol Additional II, except that the ability to carry out sustained and concerted military operations is no longer linked to territorial control. It follows that the involvement of armed groups with some degree of organization and the ability to plan and carry out sustained military operations would allow for the conflict to be characterized as an armed conflict not of an international character.

234. The Chamber notes that article 8(2)(f) of the Statute makes reference to “protracted armed conflict between … [organized armed groups].” In the opinion of the Chamber, this focuses on the need for the armed groups in question to have the ability to plan and carry out military operations for a prolonged period of time.

235. In the instant case, the Chamber finds that an armed conflict of a certain degree of intensity and extending from at least June 2003 to December 2003 existed on the territory of Ituri. In fact, many armed attacks were carried out during that period, causing many victims. In addition, at the time, the Security Council also adopted a

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302 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR75, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 70.

304 According to MONUC’s Special Report on the Events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003, the above-mentioned attacks caused approximately 400 deaths. Furthermore, for the whole of the period in question, the hostilities in Ituri caused the displacement of tens of thousands of people. See, for example, paragraph 82 of the Special Report: “[t]he total of the new internally displaced persons as a result of the May events in Bunia was reportedly 180,000 persons.” (DRC-OTP-0129-0358).
resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and was actively seized of this matter during the entire period in question.  

236. The Chamber also finds that there are substantial grounds to believe that between 2 June and late December 2003, the armed conflict in Ituri involved, *inter alia*, the UPC, the Party for Unity and Safeguarding of the Integrity of Congo (PUSIC), and the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI); that the UPC and the FNI fought over control of the gold-mining town of Mongbwalu; that various attacks were carried out by the FNI in Ituri during this period; that a political statement was signed in mid-August 2003 in Kinshasa by the main armed groups operating in Ituri calling on the transitional government to organize “a meeting with us, current political and military actors on the ground, so as to nominate by consensus, new administrative officials for appointment;” that at the very beginning of November 2003, the UPC carried out a military operation against the town of Tchomia, which was then under PUSIC control; and, finally, that the UPC/Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC) armed forces controlled the towns of Iga Barriere and Nizi at the very least in December 2003.

237. The Chamber finds that there are substantial grounds to believe that these three armed groups were in fact organized armed groups within the meaning of article 8(2)(f) of the Statute. Thus, it seems clear that the FNI was capable of carrying out large-scale military operations for a prolonged period of time. In addition, none of the participants at the confirmation hearing appear to dispute the fact that these were indeed organized groups. The Defence itself stated that very soon after their creation, PUSIC and the FNI succeeded in gaining lasting control over territories previously controlled by the UPC/FPLC.

**NOTES & QUESTIONS**

1. **Case Outcome.** In March 2012, in a 600-page opinion, Lubanga was found guilty of conscripting and enlisting children in armed conflict and using them in military hostilities during the conflict in Ituri. This marks the first judgment of the ICC. The trial consumed six years since the time of his arrest and transfer to the Court in 2006. Sentencing will be forthcoming.

2. **The War in Ituri (1999-2003).** The war in Ituri was devastating. It resulted in the deaths of over 60,000 people and the displacement of many more. As was the case in Rwanda, ethnic tensions in the Ituri region span decades but were exacerbated by colonial rule and the Belgian practice of favoring one group over others. The immediate trigger for the recent war, however, concerned land disputes. These soon evolved into proxy conflicts waged by neighboring states competing for access to the region’s natural resources. Ituri Province today plays host to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nation’s largest military deployment to date. The conflict in Ituri is part of a series of

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305 See Security Council resolution S/RES/1493 of 28 July 2003: “Deeply concerned by the continuation of hostilities in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly in North and South Kivu and in Ituri, and by the grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law that accompany them,” the Security Council “[a]uthorizes MONUC to use all necessary means to fulfill its mandate in the Ituri district … requests the Secretary-General to deploy in the Ituri district, as soon as possible, the tactical brigade-size force by mid-August 2003.”
conflicts plaguing the DRC, collectively called the Second Congo War, involving
government troops, multiple armed groups, and the intervention of other regional powers,
including Uganda, Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe, and Rwanda. Over 5 million people died in
this larger conflict, mostly from disease, malnutrition, and starvation. How did the
classification of the conflict in Ituri change over time according to the ICC?

3. **Conflict Classification.** The applicability of IHL treaties depends on the
characterization of a conflict as international or non-international. How have modern
geopolitical realities, especially during and since the Cold War, challenged this
distinction between the two types of conflict? Did the conflict in central Africa fit cleanly
in this binary distinction? When does a conflict that began as an internal armed conflict
become an international one? In the *Lubanga* decision above, what were the facts and
types of evidence relied upon by the tribunal to determine that the conflict in the region in
question was an international one? On what authority did the Trial Chamber rely in
formulating the test it employed? Why is the occupation by Uganda of parts of Ituri
relevant to the classification of the conflict, especially given that Lubanga’s militia was
not necessarily linked to Uganda.

4. **Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo.** The ICC cites the case of
*DRC v. Uganda* before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Upon assuming power
over the DRC (formerly Zaire) in May 1997, President Laurent-Désiré Kabila allowed
Ugandan troops into the eastern regions of the country to help maintain security. A year
later, however, when Kabila called for the withdrawal of these troops, Uganda refused
and in fact began providing support to various Congolese militias opposed to the regime
in Kinshasa. Uganda claimed it was exercising its right of self-defense against cross-
border attacks emanating from anti-Ugandan insurgent, Congolese, and Sudanese forces.
In the case in question, the ICJ determined that Ugandan troops acted unlawfully by
remaining on DRC territory and substituting their own authority in Ituri for that of the
Congolese government. How is this case relevant to the *Lubanga* case? Does the
question of whether Uganda’s presence in the DRC have a bearing on the qualification of
the acts committed as war crimes? Should it? What standard of proof is applied by the
ICJ in determining state responsibility? This finding laid the foundation for further
findings that the government of Uganda was responsible for violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law, not only by its own troops but also by various other
non-state actors present in the occupied territory. What level of involvement by a foreign
state is enough to internationalize what would otherwise be a NIAC? Should the level of
involvement necessary to internationalize a NIAC be the same as the level of
involvement necessary to ascribe state responsibility?

5. **Conflict Classification at Trial.** In the final judgment, the Trial Chamber
reversed the Pre-Trial Chamber on the issue of conflict classification. The Trial Chamber
reasoned as follows:

563. [A]lthough there is evidence of direct intervention on the part of
Uganda, this intervention would only have internationalised the conflict
between the two states concerned (viz. the DRC and Uganda). Since the
conflict to which the UPC/FPLC [Lubanga’s militia] was a party was not
“a difference arising between two states” but rather protracted violence
carried out by multiple non-state armed groups, it remained a non-
international conflict notwithstanding any concurrent international armed conflict between Uganda and the DRC.

564. As discussed above, there is evidence that during the relevant timeframe the UPDF [Ugandan armed forces] occupied certain areas of Bunia, such as the airport. However, it is unnecessary to analyse whether territory came under the authority of the Ugandan forces, thereby amounting to a military occupation, because the relevant conflict or conflicts concern the UPC and other armed groups.

565. Focusing solely on the parties and the conflict relevant to the charges in this case, the Ugandan military occupation of Bunia airport does not change the legal nature of the conflict between the UPC/FPLC and * * * FRPI rebel groups since this conflict, as analysed above, did not result in two states opposing each other, whether directly or indirectly, during the time period relevant to the charges. In any event, the existence of a possible conflict that was “international in character” between the DRC and Uganda does not affect the legal characterisation of the UPC/FPLC’s concurrent noninternational armed conflict with the APC and FRPI militias, which formed part of the internal armed conflict between the rebel groups.

Do you agree? This ruling, however, was of no moment, as the ICC Statute penalizes the use of child soldiers in all conflict scenarios.

6. **Occupation.** The law governing belligerent occupation dates back at least as far as the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. These rules apply from the time a state establishes what amounts to effective control over another sovereign’s territory until it relinquishes control to the indigenous authorities. Thus, the mere presence of foreign troops on the territory of another state does not *ipso facto* constitute an occupation. Whether a situation of occupation exists is not dependent upon any declaratory act or subjective intent; rather, it is the objective facts on the ground that govern. An over-arching obligation of the occupying power is to restore and maintain public order on the occupied territory while respecting the laws in force. To this end, Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations states:

> The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passes into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.

World War II—and the mistreatment of the civilian population it occasioned—made it clear that the Hague Convention’s provisions did not provide adequate protection to civilians in situations of occupation. Accordingly, the Fourth Geneva Convention imposes more detailed—and rigorous—obligations on the occupying power (*see, e.g.*, Part III of the treaty). Persons who find themselves in the territory that is under the
control of an occupying power are considered protected persons within the meaning of the fourth Geneva Convention. Article 4 of this treaty defines its “protected persons” as:

those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.

For a discussion, see Prosecutor v. Naletilić & Martinović, Case No IT-88-34-T, Judgement (March 31, 2003). The law of belligerent occupation does not apply to non-international armed conflicts. Why not? Consider the way in which a situation of occupation might impact international criminal law and its enforcement. For example, would a situation of occupation bear on who might be charged and for what crimes?

7. **Human Rights in Occupied Territory**. The question of whether or not a state’s human rights obligations apply both during times of war and extraterritorially remains contentious. Several states—including the United States—have taken the position that IHL displaces human rights law in times of armed conflict (the so-called *lex specialis* rule). In addition, it is argued that human rights obligations do apply when a state acts extraterritorially. The European Court of Human Rights, however, has held that when states exercise effective control over a territory outside its borders, even when IHL also applies, they are under a duty to respect and ensure the rights and freedoms set out in the European Convention on Human Rights. See Loizidou v. Turkey, Applic. No. 15318/89 (Dec. 18, 1996) (holding that Turkey was under a duty to respect the applicant’s right to property by virtue of its occupation of northern Cyprus).

8. **The United States Position**. The United States recently revised its position on this question in connection with a filing before the Human Rights Committee, a body charged with supervising state compliance with the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights (ICCPR). In an earlier submission, when addressing whether the ICCPR applied to detainees in the so called “Global War on Terror” the United States had argued that:

The United States also notes that the legal status and treatment of such persons is governed by the law of war.

*See* Second and Third Periodic Report of the United States of America to the UN Committee on Human Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, para. 130 (Oct. 21, 2005), available at [http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/55504.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/55504.htm). In its most recent submission, however, the United States backtracked and noted:

With respect to the application of the Covenant and the international law of armed conflict (also referred to as international humanitarian law or “IHL”), the United States has not taken the position that the Covenant does not apply “in time of war.” Indeed, a time of war does not suspend the operation of the Covenant to matters within its scope of application.
The United States stated that “typically” it is international humanitarian law that regulates the conduct of states in armed conflict situations, according to the doctrine of *lex specialis*. In the next breath, however, the U.S. submission stated that:

In this context, it is important to bear in mind that international human rights law and the law of armed conflict are in many respects complementary and mutually reinforcing. These two bodies of law contain many similar protections [such as the prohibition against torture].


9. **Conflict Classification in the Age of Terrorism.** How have other geopolitical realities in the modern era, especially during and since the Cold War, challenged the distinction between international and internal armed conflicts? How would you characterize the war in Afghanistan since 2002? In Iraq since 2003? Against Al Qaida? Are there multiple ways one might argue this point? As in *Lubanga*, did the classification evolve with time? What hinges on conflict classification? The U.S. Supreme Court, in a challenge to the military commission system established by President George W. Bush brought by Osama Bin Laden’s driver, ruled that conflict originating in Afghanistan is, at a minimum, a non-international armed conflict to which at least Common Article 3 applies. *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, 548 U.S. 557, 628-30 (2006); see also *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality). Because the phenomenon of transnational terrorism does not easily fit within the traditional IHL classification paradigm, some commentators have argued that such a binary distinction is no longer useful. *See*, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn, *Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict*, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 295 (2007).


- 1989: Al Qaeda reportedly formed by Osama Bin Laden.
- 1992: Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for bombing a hotel in Yemen where U.N. and U.S. soldiers were billeted while providing humanitarian relief in Somalia.
- 1993: The First World Trade Center bombing; Al Qaeda did not claim responsibility. The U.S. prosecuted several individuals, including the so-called Blind Sheik, Omar Abdel-Rahman.
- 1998: Issuance by Bin Laden of a second *fatwā* declaring the killing of Americans and their allies to be an individual duty for every Muslim. In August of this year, two bombs exploded within the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.
response to the attacks, President Bill Clinton invoked the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and ordered an armed attack against suspected al Qaeda sites in Sudan and Afghanistan. The U.N. General Assembly condemned the U.S.’s actions, but a similar Security Council resolution failed. The U.S. indicted Bin Laden for conspiracy to attack defense utilities of the United States (18 U.S.C. § 2155(b)), and for his involvement in the bombing of the U.S. embassies.

- 1999: The indictment against Bin Laden is amended to include charges for conspiracy to kill Americans.
- 2000: Members of Al Qaeda attacked the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen.
- September 11, 2001: Members of Al Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
- September 18, 2001: Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40) authorizing the U.S. to use “all necessary and appropriate” force against those “nations, organizations, or persons” responsible for the 9/11 attacks.
- October 7, 2001: Air and some ground operations began in Afghanistan pursuant to Operation Enduring Freedom.

The U.S. did not attribute other attacks against U.S. targets that occurred prior to Sept. 11th (such as the 1996 attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia) to Al Qaeda. Does this question of when the armed conflict commenced have any impact on international criminal law and the ability to prosecute these acts under domestic or international law? Are any of the acts of violence discussed above war crimes? If not, how else might they be charged under international criminal law?

11. Child Soldiers. Many conflicts in Africa involve the recruitment, enlistment, and deployment of child soldiers, although youth have been involved in conflicts all over the world. Some such children have been forcibly abducted by rebel groups, civil defense groups, and even government forces. Others have joined voluntarily for ideological, political, or economic reasons or to seek retaliation for harms committed against their communities. Many child soldiers are used in combat; others play support roles, such as porters, spotters, couriers, spies, looters, and cooks. Girl children are particularly, but not exclusively, vulnerable to gender-based and sexual violence. In 2000, the U.N. General Assembly adopted an Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. See G.A. Res. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000). The Protocol, which entered into force in 2002 and governs only national armed forces, sets 18 as the minimum age for recruitment and direct participation in hostilities, although youth may enlist at age 16 or above so long as certain safeguards (such as parental and informed consent) are in place. In this regard, the Protocol seeks to raise the age of recruitment and participation; Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions and the Convention on the Rights of the Child all set 15 as the minimum age, although states are to give priority to older youth. The Child Soldiers Protocol also obliges states parties to approach child soldiers with an ethos of rehabilitation. In particular, Article 6(3) states parties agree to

    take all feasible measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction recruited or used in hostilities contrary to the present Protocol are
demobilized or otherwise released from service. States Parties shall, when necessary, accord to such persons all appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration.

For more information on child soldiers, see *Child Soldiers International*, http://www.child-soldiers.org/home. For a nuanced discussion of the phenomenon of child soldiers, and the way in which they tend to be essentialized as either hapless victims or violent sociopaths, see Mark Drumbl, *Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy* (2012). These treaties are directed at states; what rules govern, or should govern, the participation of young people in non-state armed groups?

12. **Girl Soldiers.** The role of women and girl soldiers in conflict is often overlooked. Non-combat functions undertaken by many girl (and boy) soldiers—cooking, cleaning, transport, entertainment—may not trigger treaties that proscribe the “direct participation” of children in activities whose purpose is to “cause harm to the personnel or equipment of the enemy forces.” As such, they are often left out of Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) programs aimed at child soldiers in the post-conflict period. For a discussion, see Noëlle Quénivet, *Girl Soldiers and Participation in Hostilities*, 16 AFRICAN J. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW 219 (2008).

13. **Child Soldiers & The United States.** There are 144 parties to the Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers, including the United States, which ratified the treaty in 2002. The United States—along with Somalia—is not a party to the parent Convention on the Rights of the Child. In 2008, President George W. Bush signed into U.S. law the Child Soldier Accountability Act, which penalizes the recruitment and use in combat of children under the age of 15. See 18 U.S.C. § 2442. At the same time, the United States has held child soldiers at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base. Omar Khadr, for example, was seized at age 15 and has been in custody for upwards of 10 years. He is accused of throwing a grenade that killed U.S. Special Forces during a firefight. He was subjected to harsh interrogation practices while still a minor. His Department of Defense case file is available here: http://www.defense.gov/news/commissionsKhadr.html. After entering a plea, he is slated to be released to Canada, where he was born. The United States also released Mohammed Jawad, another child soldier held in Guantánamo, to his native Afghanistan. Jawad was between 12 and 16 when he was seized. For a discussion of the Khadr case, tracing its treatment in multiple fora including U.S. federal courts asserting *habeas* jurisdiction, U.S. military commissions, Canadian courts, and U.N. human rights institutions, see Richard Wilson, *Omar Khadr: Domestic and International Litigation Strategies for a Child in Armed Conflict*, 11(1) SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. ____ (forthcoming 2013).

**IV. Means and Methods of Combat**

International humanitarian law places limits on the use of force in pursuit of a military objective. These principles first found expression in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and their annexed regulations. Subsequent treaties in this tradition regulate or prohibit particular weapons systems, such as the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare; the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention; and the 1997 Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer or Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions expanded upon many of the Hague Convention’s basic principles, signaling the convergence of Hague and Geneva Law. Although not all states (including the United States and Israel) have ratified Protocol I, many of its means and methods provisions are considered to be customary international law.

The Hague treaties and their progeny regulate the use of force within armed conflicts with reference to the principles of humanity, necessity, distinction, and proportionality. While these four principles obviously overlap, they each provide distinct guidance for the regulation of armed conflict. The principle of humanity, for example, prohibits the use of means and methods of warfare that produce unnecessary suffering. The principle of necessity requires that armed attacks be designed and intended to defeat the opponent militarily. This principle can be traced at least as far back as the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, which declared in its preamble that “the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.”

In this vein, the principle of distinction requires that parties to an armed conflict distinguish between legitimate military targets, such as combatants and their installations, and illegitimate targets, such as civilians or cultural property. Article 48 of Protocol I provides that “Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants.” To this end, Article 52(2) of Protocol I states:

> Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

The definition of military objective has two elements: (a) the target must make an effective contribution to military action, and (b) its destruction must offer a definite military advantage in the circumstances at the time. The concept of military advantage is evaluated with reference to the conflict as a whole and not just within the context of a specific attack. Civilian objects lose their protected status if they are used to make an effective contribution to military action.

Civilian and civilian objects are immune from direct attack. Relatedly, Article 51(4) of Protocol I prohibits indiscriminate attacks, which are defined as:

(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol;

and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.
Article 57 requires that those who plan or decide upon attacks must “do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects.” Moreover, according to Article 58, warring parties may not co-locate military objectives and civilian objects. The principle of distinction has also been interpreted to prohibit certain types of weapons that, by their very nature, do not discriminate among lawful and unlawful targets.

The principle of proportionality under IHL states that when military force is used against a proper military objective in the vicinity of civilians or civilian objects, parties may employ only that level of force that is proportional to the military objective to be gained in light of the risk to civilians and civilian objects.” If a choice of weaponry, tactics, or force levels is available, the commander or combatant must choose the approach that will cause the least incidental harm. Civilian casualties—euphemistically referred to as “collateral damage”—in and of themselves are thus not necessarily unlawful. Rather, it is only deliberate attacks and attacks that cause damage to civilians and civilian objects that is excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage of the attack that are prohibited. This analysis mandates a sliding scale: more “collateral damage” is tolerated as the anticipated military advantage increases. If there is no risk to protected persons or things by an attack, no proportionality analysis is required. Moreover, the assessment of legality is based on the information available at the time of attack.

Individuals who plan and implement attacks are to take additional precautions in the conduct of military operations to protect the civilian population per Article 57. To this end, they must: “take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss or civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.” They must also cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

Finally, “effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.”

Certain violations of these principles are designated war crimes in Article 3 of the ICTY Statute concerning “Violations of the Laws or Customs of War,” which include, but are not limited to:

* Note that the principle of proportionality finds expression in the *jus ad bellum* as well, in particular in connection with the exercise of self-defense. In this context, proportionality requires that any response to an armed attack be calibrated to repel the original attack and prevent future attacks. In the *jus in bello*, the principle of proportionality applies to particular attacks, a smaller unit of analysis, and aims to ensure that excessive force is not employed in relation to the military advantage sought and the risk to civilian casualties (so-called collateral damage).
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.

Similar crimes are set out in Article 8(2)(b) (governing IACs) and 8(2)(e) (governing NIACs) of the ICC Statute.

Many of the war crimes cases pending in international and hybrid courts concern violations of so-called Geneva Law—deliberate harm to protected persons. These include cases alleging the mistreatment of civilians and prisoners of war in captivity. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić, et al., Case No. IT–96–21–A, Judgement (Feb. 20, 2001) (concerning the mistreatment of Bosnian Serbs detained in the Čelebići Camp). There are a number of additional cases concerned with the direct targeting of civilians. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT–95–14–A, Judgement (July 29, 2004) (reversing the Trial Chamber’s findings that the defendant ordered his troops to attack a village devoid of military objectives). Abuses against civilians are often highly salient in armed conflict situations. By contrast, there are very few cases addressed to the challenge inherent to adjudicating the principle of proportionality following an attack against a military objective that has also resulted in harm to civilians or civilian objects. Such cases require a prosecutor to meet a heavy burden; he or she must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that—under the circumstances at the time—the force used was excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated and the potential risk to civilians.

A notable exception can be found in the opinion below concerning Operation Storm, an effort to retake parts of Croatia from Serbian forces. Before you read the excerpt, review Articles 48-52 and 57-58 of Protocol I. The defendant in question was charged under Articles 3 (war crimes) and 5 (crimes against humanity) of the ICTY Statute (see supra) with, inter alia:

1. Deportation and forcible transfer as a crime against humanity as a result of “the threat and/or commission of violent and intimidating acts, the effect of which was to displace, transfer or deport the Krajina Serbs from the area (including causing them to flee or leave the area)”;
2. Wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity as a war crime.
1. Introduction

1. The Accused, Ante Gotovina, Ivan Ćermak, and Mladen Markač, are jointly charged in the Indictment with crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war allegedly committed from at least July 1995 to about 30 September 1995 against the Serb population in the southern Krajina region of Croatia (see map above).

2. According to the Indictment, by the time Croatia declared independence on 25 June 1991, an armed conflict had erupted in certain areas of Croatia between the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and other Serb forces on the one hand and the Croat armed forces on the other. By the end of 1991, the JNA and various Serb forces controlled approximately one-third of the territory of Croatia. On 21 December 1990 the Croatian Serbs announced the creation of a Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina, which on 19 December 1991 proclaimed itself the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) and appointed its own president, Milan Martić.

3. According to the Indictment, by at least July and early August 1995 Croatian leaders, officials and forces conceived, planned, established, and implemented a military operation called “Operation Storm” to re-take territory in the Krajina, a part of the area in Croatia that had been self-proclaimed as the RSK and that was largely inhabited by Serbs. The major part of the military operation began in full on 4 August 1995, and on 7 August 1995 the Croatian government announced that the operation had been successfully completed. Follow-up actions allegedly continued until 15 November 1995. The Prosecution alleges that before, during, and after the major military operation of Operation Storm there was an orchestrated campaign to drive the Serbs from the Krajina region. The Prosecution further alleges that from at least July 1995 to about 30 September 1995, Croatian government, military, police, security and/or intelligence forces persecuted the Krajina Serbs through deportations and forcible transfers;
destruction of Serb homes and businesses; plunder and looting of Serb property; murder; the shelling of civilians and cruel treatment; unlawful attacks on civilians and civilian objects; the imposition of restrictive and discriminatory measures; discriminatory expropriation of property; unlawful detentions and disappearances.

4. The Prosecution alleges that from at least 4 August 1995 to 15 November 1995, Ante Gotovina was the Commander of the Split Military District (MD) of the Croatian Army (HV) and the overall operational commander of Operation Storm in the southern portion of the Krajina region. It further alleges that from at least July 1995 to about 30 September 1995, he participated in the planning and preparation of the operational use of Croatian forces in Operation Storm and continuing related operations and actions. The Prosecution also alleges that he possessed effective control over all units, elements and members of the HV that comprised or were attached to the Split MD, and other forces that were subordinated to his command and operated and/or were present in the southern portion of the Krajina region during Operation Storm. As Commander of the Split MD, he was responsible for maintaining order among, and disciplining and supervising the conduct of, his subordinate personnel. * * *

79. In orders dated 2 August 1995, Gotovina and Marko Rajčić [chief of artillery of the Split MD] ordered the formation of artillery groups [including TS-3 within Operation Group North and TS-4 within Operation Group Šibenik]. To provide artillery support, Gotovina further ordered the formation of artillery groups within the units carrying out the combat operations, using the units’ own artillery resources. These artillery groups were to engage in the focal tasks of their respective units. Gotovina ordered that ammunition be provided to artillery at their initial positions and further supplies to be provided based on consumption, within the amounts authorized. Rajčić provided further details on the organization of the Split MD, in particular with regard to its artillery units. * * * The artillery groups were tasked with providing artillery support for infantry brigades and regiments by firing at targets within the composition of enemy brigades and combat groups, as well as with firing at military objectives, such as targets in Knin and in the operative depth of the enemy’s defence. * * * When firing at strategic targets and targets in the operational depth, such as those in Knin, the artillery groups were under the command of the Split MD Commander Gotovina, who operated through Rajčić. When firing at targets at the closer tactical level, or within positions of the enemy brigades, the commanders of units for which the artillery group was providing support decided the targets. These commanders could request and direct the fire, based on their plans and lists of targets. If new targets were discovered at the tactical level, this would be communicated to the unit that was capable of engaging the new target and neutralizing it. If a lower level commander sought artillery support, he would contact his superior command, along his axis of attack. When a request for support reached Rajčić, he would call the commander of an artillery group and assign it to provide support to the requesting unit. According to Rajčić, this resource sharing ensured that the Split MD was always in full control and maintained constant oversight of firing upon in-depth targets, so that it could react promptly and stop irrational action or fire if necessary. The HV planned for around 75 per cent of the HV artillery to focus its fire on the forward defence line of the enemy, at a tactical depth. The HV planned for the remaining 25 per cent to open fire into the operational depth, at strategic targets. The commander of each artillery group was bound to prepare a written report * * * of the targets they fired on at the tactical level. In
Zadar, where Gotovina had set up a group of officers who coordinated and oversaw the execution of orders, the information would be analyzed, and if there were any disturbances, then the information would be forwarded to Rajčić and Gotovina at the main command in Sajkovići.

4.4 Unlawful Attacks On Civilians And Civilian Objects

1161. The Indictment charges the Accused with unlawful attacks on civilians and civilian objects as underlying acts of the crime against humanity of persecution, from at least July 1995 to about 30 September 1995, in the Indictment municipalities. The evidence received by the Trial Chamber has been focused on a number of towns, with the overwhelming majority of evidence dealing with Knin during the first days of Operation Storm.

1162. The Trial Chamber has received evidence with regard to artillery projectiles impacting on or nearby Kistanje, Kaštanj, Kaštel Žegarski in Nadvoda municipality, and Polaća and hamlets in the Plavno Valley, both in Knin municipality, on 4 and 5 August 1995. The evidence is insufficient for the Trial Chamber to determine the number of projectiles fired at these towns or, with only a few exceptions, to determine the times and locations of impacts of the projectiles. Moreover, the evidence insufficiently establishes whether there was an Serbian Army of Krajina (SVK) presence in these towns or whether there were other objects offering a definite military advantage if fired at. The towns are not mentioned in the HV’s artillery orders by Gotovina, Rajčić, Firšt, or Fuzul. The artillery reports which the Trial Chamber has received in evidence do not provide further details as to what the HV fired at in or nearby these towns. Under these circumstances, the Trial Chamber cannot determine what the forces firing artillery projectiles which impacted on or nearby the aforementioned towns targeted. The Trial Chamber does not consider an unlawful attack on civilians or civilian objects in these towns to be the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence. Instead, the Trial Chamber considers that the evidence allows for the reasonable interpretation that the forces who fired artillery projectiles which impacted on or nearby these towns were deliberately targeting military targets. Under these circumstances, the Trial Chamber will not further consider these incidents in relation to Count 1 of the Indictment. ***

1164. [The Prosecution’s expert witness Harry Konings, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Royal Netherlands Army,] testified about the properties of the different types of artillery weapons, including with regard to their ranges and rates of fire. Specifically, Konings testified that Howitzers are high angle indirect fire weapon systems, whose projectiles follow a ballistic trajectory after being fired from the barrel at an angle. 155-millimetre Howitzers can fire shells with a rate of fire of two to three rounds per minute with a well-trained crew, although sustained fire is generally one round per minute. 130-millimetre Howitzers are comparable to 155-millimetre Howitzers and have ranges of up to 28 kilometres. Mortars are characterised by the delivery of high-angle fire and a high rate of fire of up to 10 or more rounds per minute, over a relatively short range. The 120-millimetre mortar has a rate of fire of four to six rounds per minute with a range of up to eight kilometres. Rockets have their own propulsion systems and are fired from rocket launchers, which tend to have high rates of fire. 128-millimetre rocket systems have maximum ranges of between 12 and 22 kilometres.
1165. With regard to the accuracy of artillery weapons, Konings testified that artillery, mortar and rocket systems are designed to combat area targets, such as concentrations of forces, supply areas, larger command posts or other areas of 100 to 150 metres, with fired rounds landing apart from each other over a certain area, providing area coverage. These systems are too inaccurate to engage smaller, point targets, such as a single vehicle or a command post of less than 50 by 50 metres, and a high number of projectiles would have to be fired at a point target to destroy or neutralize it. For example, Konings noted that a single command post may be less than 50 by 50 metres, while the probable error of a 155-millimetre projectile at long range was also 50 metres. In general, the rocket systems used in 1995 were less accurate than the artillery systems, such as Howitzers or mortar systems. The accuracy of conventional fire support systems with unguided ammunitions, such as Howitzers and mortars, is affected by internal characteristics, such as the differences between individual guns, known as gun-to-gun variations, which lead to probable errors in range and deflection. For example, Konings testified that these internal characteristics can lead to differences in the location of impact of an unguided 155-millimetre shell fired at 14.5 kilometres with a certain charge of up to 55 metres in range and five metres in deflection. Their accuracy is further affected by external factors, such as air temperature and density, wind speed and direction, flight time, muzzle velocity, propelling charges temperature, and the weight and height of the projectile. By measuring the applicable data on external factors, the variations can be corrected. The probable errors increase the further the target is from the fire unit. For example, Konings testified with regard to the location of impact of an unguided 155-millimetre shell fired at 14.5 kilometres with a certain charge, that an increase of muzzle velocity by one metre per second would cause the shell to impact 26 metres further; a tail wind of one knot would cause the shell to impact 18 metres further; a lower or higher air temperature causes changes of 20 metres per degree; air density can lead to a difference of 60 metres and the spinning movement of the shell can cause a difference of 20 metres, if not corrected. Accuracy is also affected by the precise locations of fire unit and target coordinates. Depending on whether it uses ten, eight or six digits, a grid system of coordinates gives an accuracy of up to one, ten or 100 metres. In case one of the coordinates is inaccurate, the commander of an artillery unit can adjust the fire, by firing single shells in order to close in on the target, until the 50-metre mark has been reached, and then firing for effect. **

1175. [Defense expert Geoffrey Corn, a professor and IHL expert] testified that Knin was a critical command, control, and communication centre serving enemy forces, as well as a logistical centre. Corn considered the use of Multi-Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRLs) against the SVK Main Staff headquarters and the Northern barracks to be understandable, as they presented critical command, control, communications, and intelligence targets. Multiple barrel rocket launchers could degrade these targets by destroying communications antennas, cables, and equipment, while enemy forces required to move in and around the area would be disrupted. As commander in chief and President of the RSK, Martić was a lawful military objective, and although the probability of killing or disabling Martić by artillery attack was limited, if Gotovina believed Martić to be an important component in SVK decision-making, the potential operational advantage in disrupting the SVK command and control structure would be substantial. Further, indirect, harassing fire at the TVIK factory, an apparent logistics
supply facility and ammunition components production facility, would degrade the enemy’s ability to use the resources stored there to re-supply forces engaged in combat. The Knin police station was also a valuable military objective, because police forces had been mobilized to participate in hostilities and harassing fire could demoralize police forces unaccustomed to combat operations, as well as disrupt the communication capability in the station, which could have been used to augment military communications disrupted by other attacks. * * *

1181. On 1 August 1995, Rajčić attended a planning meeting in Split for Operation Storm with Gotovina and [others]. At the meeting, the commanders were informed of the upcoming operation and the intended implementation of the Chief of the HV Main Staff’s directive. At the meeting, Gotovina emphasized that the operation was aimed only at enemy soldiers and that the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) facilities near SVK positions should not be endangered. He also warned those present to instruct their subordinates that enemy prisoners of war and civilians should receive proper treatment and protection. He further stressed that there was a shortage of ammunition, so the artillery needed to be as precise as possible and could only target the military objectives that provided the highest military advantages. According to Rajčić the HV had less ammunition at its disposal than had been anticipated during the planning stage.

1182. Following the 1 August 1995 meeting, Rajčić prepared the artillery engagement plan, by reviewing the source lists of potential military objectives and taking into account the available ammunition. The basis for the development of target lists was a database from which the targets were chosen. The HV updated and reviewed its source lists on a daily basis, based on information from the intelligence departments. * * * Certain military objectives did not appear on these source lists, as it had been determined beforehand that the collateral damage would be too high. For instance, the fuel station near the Atlagic Bridge over the Krka River in Knin was a military objective that did not appear on the source list, as engaging it with artillery could result in contaminating the river, which was a source of drinking water. Further, the source lists included items that served as visual reference points, such as churches, and were not military objectives to be fired upon. The lists also included structures for which the HV estimated that there was a high chance that enemy military forces may use them during the battle. Smaller facilities that were not visible from the altitude the HV’s unmanned drones flew at were named after the visible dominant facilities in their vicinity.

1183. According to Rajčić, the HV discussed the protection of the civilian population and the instructions were as they had always been in operations he had participated in with Gotovina, that civilians were not to be targeted and civilian casualties and damage to civilian property should be minimized. Gotovina told Rajčić that with regard to using artillery in the civilian-populated areas of Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac and Gračac, maximum precision and proportionality should be respected. According to Rajčić, Gotovina was aware of the relative inaccuracy of artillery and knew that the HV had trained, experienced artillery troops who were able to exceed standards of precision in artillery fire. Gotovina also informed Rajčić of his concerns about the probable range of errors of the artillery weapons should the deviation of a missile or shell exceed the size of the target, specifically with regard to strategic level targets such as the SVK Main Staff and communications centre. Rajčić told Gotovina that 130-millimetre guns and 122-millimetre launchers were not capable of being fired at the SVK Main Staff and the
communications centre and hitting only those targets, without causing damage to the surrounding area. Gotovina told Rajčić to analyse the possible collateral damage of projectiles missing these targets, as the SVK Main staff was a highly interesting target in combat.

1184. Rajčić analyzed the possible collateral damage of firing at targets in Knin and concluded that the harm to citizens and material damage to surrounding buildings would be “to a lesser extent.” In coming to this conclusion, Rajčić considered the use of contact-fuse shells, which cannot pierce concrete buildings, as well as the characteristics of the targets, their area, their surface area, the surrounding buildings, and the quality of construction. He also considered the intelligence information that there had been substantial emigration of civilians from Knin and that there was a curfew in place in Knin, which affected the expected number of civilians on the streets and in buildings at 5 a.m. According to Rajčić, when using artillery against military objectives in urban areas, the choice of the time of day was an important consideration in minimizing collateral damage to civilians, when deciding the weapon, type of fire and amount of ammunition. According to Rajčić, the selection and targeting within the tactical and operational deployment of the enemy was preceded by a thorough intelligence assessment of the terrain, deployment and enemy strength, and weather conditions. Rajčić made the final selection of military objectives by considering both military necessity and possible collateral damage and civilian casualties. The choice of weapon to be fired at a certain target was determined by range and by which weapon would cause the least collateral damage while still achieving the military advantage. It was decided that the MBRLs were going to fire early in the morning. Rajčić submitted the artillery plan to Gotovina on 1 August 1995. 

1188. According to Rajčić, the formulation “putting the towns under fire” meant that the targets in those towns were to be under constant fire, which referred to a combat activity known as harassing fire and disruptive fire on enemy combat elements. Rajčić testified that it was clear to all commanders of subordinate units that this meant that these towns contained important military units, facilities and commands, and referred to firing at previously selected targets with specific coordinates, according to the existing plans and source lists. The artillery units received a textual tabular segment of the attachment for artillery and the groups also had a list of targets with the coordinates for the military objectives, based on which the commanders of the artillery groups drew their operations maps. The lists of military objectives were re-checked prior to the operation to ensure the accuracy of the x-y-z coordinates. On 3 August 1995, Rajčić visited the Chiefs of Artillery at the various OGs, as well as the Command of each artillery group, to coordinate planned artillery targets and check that everyone understood their tasks. According to Rajčić, the HV did not intend to use artillery to force civilians to flee the Krajina. Instead, the HV’s plan was to shock, disorient and disrupt the leadership and communications of the SVK. The plan relied heavily on artillery, as well as the synchronization of fire and the element of surprise. In order to generate the strongest effect, the first strike had to be powerful, simultaneous, and coordinated, firing on targets on the enemy front line of defence and in depth on commands and communication centres.

1189. The Trial Chamber has received evidence on the targets identified by the HV, including in Knin, prior to Operation Storm primarily from Rajčić, who testified that
on the tactical level, the targets for Operation Storm were command posts of brigades; firing positions of the artillery; communication centres and relay nodes; depots for military equipment, combat reserves and troops; roads and bridges; fortified combat features and enemy defence trenches; and any targets that would emerge during combat. The targets at the tactical level were in the enemy disposition, whereas the targets established for the Corps Artillery at the operational level were in the settlements of Knin, Benkovac, and Gračac. On the operational level, the firing targets were the SVK Main Staff, the Ministry of Defence headquarters, the SVK communications centre, the bridges and the railway station, all in Knin; the police stations in Knin and Gračac; the military barracks facilities in Knin and other towns; and cross-roads in the towns of Knin, Drvar, Benkovac, and Gračac.

1191. According to Rajčić, the Main SVK headquarters, the adjacent communications centre, and the SVK 7th Krajina Corps headquarters in the Northern barracks were the main and highest pay-off targets in Knin. These targets needed to be hit with all available assets, as they were critical to the success of the entire operation. The HV also selected Milan Martić as a target in Knin and information regarding his location and residence was constantly updated, based on surveillance and intelligence efforts. Although there was no clear line of sight from the HV’s positions to the settlement of Knin before Operation Storm, HV intelligence officers determined the coordinates of Martić’s apartment (designated KV-610) based on sources which Rajčić believed may have included aerial photography by pilotless drones, cadastral [land ownership] plans, and information spread by word of mouth. Martić’s apartment was located in an otherwise civilian apartment building. According to Rajčić, the HV took the rules of distinction and of proportionality into account when deciding whether to target the apartment block, where other civilians may have been present. In this context, Rajčić considered the information that the SVK had an evacuation plan and a plan on how to take care of civilians, that the buildings in the area were of good quality, and that the residents would try to take care of the population in the area. Rajčić opined that it would have been unacceptable to fire at the residential complex with 122-millimetre MBRLs, because they would damage the buildings around the target, due to their higher density of projectiles covering a broader area. * * *

1228. On 30 July 1995, HV Rear admiral Davor Domazet reported that the HV’s taking of Grahovo, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, on 28 July 1995 had created conditions for it to threaten Knin directly, which had caused local Serbs to fear an HV attack on the entire RSK. Domazet further stated that more and more people were leaving the Krajina area and moving to the Republika Srpska and the FRY [former Yugoslavia], although the latter had issued a decree closing its borders with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia out of fear of a mass influx of people from the Republika Srpska and RSK. Those who could not leave were preparing shelters in houses, and evacuation routes had been designated. * **

1229. Alain Gilbert [posted in Knin as United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) General Alain Forand’s aide-de-camp] testified that on or around 29 July 1995 up until the eve of Operation Storm, the population of the town of Knin began to leave and there was a state of panic there. Witness 6 testified that by 4 August 1995, between five and ten per cent of the population of Knin had already left the city. Some had left by private vehicles and some on a bus four or five days before Operation Storm.
Robert Williams [an intelligence officer for the Canadian contingent of UNPROFOR] testified that he could not clearly assess the amount of civilians present in Knin at the time of his visit on 3 August 1995, but he recalled that he did not see many civilians on the streets.

1230. Murray Dawes [a former civilian UN accommodation officer] testified that the majority of Knin’s inhabitants were elderly Serbs and Serb women and children, since most of the Serb men were out at the front lines. * * * Dawes further testified that based on information relayed to him by Serbian municipal employees working in the property recorder’s office, he knew that, just prior to the end of July 1995, Knin’s population expanded from 15,000 to 30,000 people. According to the witness, as the HV took over Grahovo on 28 July 1995 and proceeded along the eastern side of Knin, Knin’s population swelled noticeably with people leaving their local villages. The population in Knin rose to a level which seemed to the witness greater than what the town was able to accommodate in such a short amount of time. The individuals coming into Knin, immediately preceding Operation Storm, were also mostly elderly Serbs, Serb women and children, not fighting age males. Dawes recalled seeing individuals living in makeshift camps along some of the roads in town. Andrew Leslie [Chief of Staff of UNCRo Sector South in Knin] testified that Knin had a population of about 35,000 people immediately prior to 4 August 1995 although it was around 20,000 or 25,000 in March 1995. The reason for this increase was the rise of tensions and the expectation of imminent hostilities that had made people from villages and towns closer to the zone of separation move into Knin. According to Leslie, a part of the local population from Knin had left during roughly the week prior to 4 and 5 August 1995 but this did not constitute a sizeable reduction in the population. In his report of 12 August 1995, Leslie noted that 1,000 persons had fled Knin by the time of the attack.

1231. Petar Pašić [mayor of Knin] testified that he prepared a letter to the citizens of Serb ethnicity in Knin, which he sent to the Croatian news agency and which was broadcast on Croatian television and radio and on a Serbian news agency on 2 August 1995, telling the Serbs to renounce their dissident authorities and to acknowledge the Republic of Croatia as their sole homeland. Pašić’s letter stated that Knin had been flooded with 35,000 people and that in the preceding days, barriers had been erected around the town preventing the population from leaving in light of the Krajina’s likely collapse.

1232. Witness 54 testified that in the days before Operation Storm, he saw refugees in Knin coming from the villages of Strmica and Golubić in Knin municipality and other villages just below Mount Dinara, who told the witness they were escaping the shelling of these villages. Hussein Al-Alfi, the UN Civil Affairs Coordinator, later renamed Political and Human Affairs Coordinator, for Sector South in Knin from June 1995 to January 1996, testified that in early August 1995, the RSK declared a curfew by radio, forbidding residents from being outside before 6 a.m. On 4 August 1995, around 4:05 a.m., Al-Alfi was taken to the UN compound in Knin. He saw no civilians on the streets of Knin at that time. * * *

1244. According to Rajčić, during Operation Storm, the HV fired 122-millimetre rockets at the SVK Main Staff in Knin, the headquarters of the RSK Ministry of Defence, which was in the same building, and a roundabout intersection in the centre of Knin. The HV also fired at the communications centre, which was housed in the main post office,
the TVIK factory, known as KV-750 on target lists, and a target referred to as Hospital, or KV-710, which Rajčić described as a cross-roads north of the Slavko Rodić barracks. The HV also fired at the Slavko Rodić barracks, known as target KV-250, as well as at the cross-roads of the roads leading to Strmica and Vrlika on the periphery of Knin in Kninsko Polje. * * * The HV also fired 13 to 16 shells of 130 millimetres at Milan Martić’s residence, known as KV-610, which was in one of the housing blocks near the police station. The chance of hitting or injuring Martić by firing artillery at his building was very slight, but the HV aimed to pressure him into signing a capitulation. According to Rajčić, the repeated fire achieved the desired harassment and pressure effect, instilling a sense of insecurity in Martić. * * *

1315. According to an interview of Milan Martić that was published in Vreme International on 24 August 1996, with regard to the attack on Knin on 4 August 1995, Martić stated that he was with his family in his apartment in Knin at the time of the first attack, which he claimed he survived only by chance, as two projectiles passed nearby his apartment. * * *

1517. Novaković testified that in the first hours of the attack of 4 August 1995, people were panic-stricken and started leaving Knin. * * * Novaković testified that these people had left Drniš spontaneously, out of fear of shelling, before the RSK evacuation order was issued and before evacuation plans were worked out.

1518. * * * According to Mile Mrkšić [commander of the SVK Main Staff], people left Knin prior to the HV troops advancing into Knin because they feared encirclement, but also because they could not stand the firing from the mortars and rocket launchers any more. People were also afraid because of the excessive force used by the Croatian government previously in Western Slavonia. The Supreme Council, including supreme commander Martić and the President of the Assembly, met and Mrkšić explained that if the civilian population were to withdraw, defending the area would be a big problem. After 4 p.m. on 4 August 1995, Martić told Mrkšić that he had consulted Milan Babić, as a member of the Supreme Command, who was in Belgrade, by telephone and that they had agreed that the civilian population should be moved from the Krajina. The Supreme Council decided that civilians should leave the territory “into the depth” so that they would be out of harm’s way. * * *

1520. The order by Milan Martić, with the time and date 4:45 p.m. on 4 August 1995, called for the evacuation of all inhabitants not fit for combat from the municipalities of Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Drniš, and Gračac. The order further stated that the evacuation was to be carried out in a planned manner according to prepared plans. * * * The order also stated that help for the evacuation should be sought from the UNPROFOR Sector South headquarters. * * *

1910. The evidence shows that the HV reported firing a total of twelve shells of 130 millimetres at Milan Martić’s apartment on two occasions between 7:30 and 8 a.m. on 4 August 1995. Further, on the evening of 4 August 1995, the HV fired an unknown number of 130-millimetre shells at a location marked R, in a predominantly civilian residential area, on Prosecution Exhibit 2337 [a map of Knin with Rajčić’s markings] where they believed Martić to be present. The Trial Chamber has found above that firing at Martić’s apartment could disrupt his ability to move, communicate, and command and so offered a definite military advantage. Rajčić recognized that the chance of hitting or injuring Martić by firing artillery at his building was very slight. Rajčić testified that the
HV sought to harass and put pressure on Martić and that the HV took the rules of distinction and of proportionality into account when deciding whether to target the apartment block. The Trial Chamber considers that Martić’s apartment was located in an otherwise civilian apartment building and that both the apartment and the area marked R on P2337 were in otherwise predominantly civilian residential areas. The Trial Chamber has considered this use of artillery in light of the evidence on the accuracy of artillery weapons reviewed above and the testimony of expert Konings on the blast and fragmentation effects of artillery shells. At the times of firing, namely between 7:30 and 8 a.m. and in the evening on 4 August 1995, civilians could have reasonably been expected to be present on the streets of Knin near Martić’s apartment and in the area marked R on P2337. Firing twelve shells of 130 millimetres at Martić’s apartment and an unknown number of shells of the same calibre at the area marked R on P2337, from a distance of approximately 25 kilometres, created a significant risk of a high number of civilian casualties and injuries, as well as of damage to civilian objects. The Trial Chamber considers that this risk was excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage of firing at the two locations where the HV believed Martić to have been present. This disproportionate attack shows that the HV paid little or no regard to the risk of civilian casualties and injuries and damage to civilian objects when firing artillery at a military target on at least three occasions on 4 August 1995.

1911. The Trial Chamber considers that the deliberate firing at areas in Knin which were devoid of military targets is inconsistent with Rajčić’s explanation of the HV artillery orders. Instead, it is consistent with the plain text of those orders to put towns under artillery fire, meaning to treat whole towns, including Knin, as targets when firing artillery projectiles during Operation Storm. The interpretation of the HV’s artillery orders as being orders to treat whole towns as targets is also supported by the TS-4’s reporting of firing at Knin or at the general area of Knin on two occasions on 4 and 5 August 1995 * * *. This interpretation is further supported by the general impression gained by several witnesses present in Knin during the attack, that the shelling impacted all over Knin and was indiscriminate. Moreover, the interpretation is consistent with the insufficient regard paid to the risk of civilian casualties and injuries and damage to civilian objects in the disproportionate firing at two locations where the HV believed Martić to have been present. Consequently, the Trial Chamber finds that on 4 and 5 August 1995, at the orders of Gotovina and Rajčić, the HV fired artillery projectiles deliberately targeting previously identified military targets and also targeting areas devoid of such military targets. In light of the language of the artillery orders and considering that the HV did not limit itself to shelling areas containing military targets, but also deliberately targeted civilian areas, the Trial Chamber finds that the HV treated the town of Knin itself as a target for artillery fire. The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that as a result the HV’s shelling of Knin on 4 and 5 August 1995 constituted an indiscriminate attack on the town and thus an unlawful attack on civilians and civilian objects in Knin.

1912. Considering the evidence on the ethnic composition of Knin, the Trial Chamber finds that the unlawful attack on civilians and civilian objects in Knin discriminated in fact against Krajina Serbs. In establishing the intention with which this unlawful attack was committed, the Trial Chamber has considered the language of the

* Eds. The Chamber found that Knin was Serbian by a large majority. See id. at para. 856.
HV’s artillery orders and the deliberate shelling of areas devoid of military targets. ***
The Trial Chamber further considers that the unlawful attack against civilians and civilian objects was committed in the context of a wider discriminatory attack against Krajina Serbs. The Trial Chamber finds that the unlawful attack on civilians and civilian objects in Knin was carried out with the intention to discriminate on political, racial, or religious grounds.

1913. Considering circumstances such as the ethnicity of the victims and the time and place where the acts took place, the Trial Chamber finds that the unlawful attack against civilians and civilian objects was part of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population. In conclusion, the Trial Chamber finds that the unlawful attack on civilians and civilian objects in Knin on 4 and 5 August 1995 constituted persecution as a crime against humanity.

NOTES & QUESTIONS

1. Case Outcome. The ICTY sentenced General Gotovina to 24 years for war crimes and crimes against humanity on a joint criminal enterprise theory of responsibility. The Prosecutor also charged Gotovina under a superior responsibility theory, but the Trial Chamber made no findings in this regard and limited itself to the joint criminal enterprise ruling, even though Gotovina’s alleged omissions were central to the case. Make a list of the “good” and “bad” facts in evidence from the defendant’s perspective. Based on your assessment, is the case rightly decided? Do you think it was lawful for the Croatian forces to target Milan Martić, the “president” of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK)? If so, was he targetable while asleep in his residence in a civilian neighborhood? Did Martić himself violate IHL by embedding himself within a civilian neighborhood?

2. Competing Narratives. With respect to the two-day Operation Storm, two narratives emerged in the evidence presented at trial. It is clear that the lightning-fast operation coincided with a massive exodus of the Serbian population from the area four years after many of its Croatian inhabitants had themselves been pushed from the area by Serbian forces. Was this a case of retaliatory ethnic cleansing and persecution, as alleged in the indictment and believed by some observers, or a natural response to armed conflict conditions and an evacuation order by the Serb leadership, as others have argued? The Operation also occasioned looting and plunder. But by whom: Soldiers under Gotovina’s command and control, civilians, or retreating Serbian forces? In its Judgment, the Trial Chamber squarely adopted the ethnic-cleansing narrative. In so doing, it relied heavily on Gotovina’s operations order, which directed his forces to “place [Knin] under attack,” and the fact that approximately 5% of the projectiles employed struck farther than 200 meters from any lawful military objective. The entire opinion is ultimately premised on a finding that Gotovina ordered a direct attack on civilians in the Krajina. The rest of the Judgment balances on this finding like an inverted pyramid. This finding thus serves as the basis for the wanton-destruction war crimes charge. The crimes against humanity convictions rely on the indiscriminate attack as the predicate widespread/systematic attack against a civilian population. The attack also serves as a key actus reus for the persecution count and the other inhumane acts count. The attack is conceived of as one of the means by which the Croatian forces effectuated the deportation of the Serbian
population (the other being the subsequent acts of plunder). Finally, the attack serves as one of two “substantial contributions” made by the defendant to the apparent joint criminal enterprise. (The other was an omission; that is, the failure to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent and punish foreseeable crimes committed in connection with effectuating the joint criminal enterprise).

3. Proportionality. The principle of proportionality requires those who plan and implement attacks to balance the anticipated military advantage with the anticipated harm to civilians and to civilian objects. How would you formulate the proportionality calculus likely employed by Gotovina, particularly as it relates to the attack on President Martić’s residence? How does your application of proportionality change given the testimony that Gotovina knew he was unlikely to actually kill Martić? Does the potential to disorient Martić, and potentially sever or at least impede his command over the RSK forces, offer a weighty enough military advantage to the Croatian forces to justify the potential harm to civilians? The record was unclear as to how many civilians were in fact present in Knin at the time of the attack; how was Gotovina to do a proper proportionality analysis under the circumstance without this knowledge? Who bears the burden of proving the number of civilians in the area at the time of the attack? Is the failure to obtain definitive information a war crime? Gotovina’s chief of artillery testified that the Croatian troops were highly trained and skilled at engaging in precision targeting; should they be subjected to a more rigorous proportionality calculus as a result? There were no civilian casualties in Knin. What, then, is the crime for which the tribunal convicted Gotovina? Are judges from varied legal and cultural backgrounds likely to have different intuitions about how to balance the strategic value of a target and the moral cost of harm to civilians? Will they necessarily undertake the same assessment ex post that the defendant undertook ex ante?

4. Appeal. The defendant has appealed the Judgment against him. Not surprisingly, his 120-page brief challenges the Trial Chamber’s characterization of the attack as unlawfully directed against civilians. The defense points out that the Trial Chamber concluded that almost 95% of the Croatian Army’s artillery rounds were aimed at military objectives. For the 5% that fell further from any military objective contained on the Croatian Army’s target list, Gotovina’s lawyers argued that the Trial Chamber failed to consider other reasonable explanations, such as

- the existence of opportunistic and mobile targets in the form of Serbian forces or tanks;
- equipment malfunction;
- the existence of additional military objectives not previously identified on target lists;
- destruction by mortar fire by Serbian forces (there was evidence in the record of some Serb assets in town); or even
- a larger acceptable range of error for the weapons systems employed.

The defense also argues that Gotovina did no more than engage military objectives on the front lines and within the Serb army’s operational depth. It concedes the mass departure of the Serbian population, but contends that based on the evidence presented at trial, a
reasonable finder of fact could reach alternative explanations. For example, it argues that Knin’s residents may have been:

- adhering evacuation orders issued by the Serbian army,
- following their family or neighbors,
- in fear of making contact with Croatian forces or other authorities,
- understandably motivated by a desire to avoid the armed conflict, even one lawfully fought, or
- long gone in advance of the Operation given rumors of its imminence.

Indeed, it seems that no Serb civilian actually testified that he or she left the Krajina in response to unlawful shelling. Who bears the burden of proof in showing that any targets were unlawful civilian objects or that excessive force was used? How did the Trial Chamber assign the burden of proof?

5. **The United States and Operation Storm.** Virtually invisible within the opinion is the role played by the United States in Operation Storm. It has been alleged that the U.S. trained and provided intelligence, strategic and potentially other forms of support to Croatian troops involved in the Operation, which proved to be decisive in the conflict against the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia and contributed to President Slobodan Milošević’s eventual capitulation. Is it likely that Gotovina would have ordered an attack on civilians given the amount of U.S. involvement and oversight in the operation? More on the U.S. role in Operation Storm may come to light in a different courtroom. A private military contractor then called Military Professional Resources, Inc., and subsequently acquired by L-3 Communications, was hired to train and equip the Croatian military. The company is now subject to a class action lawsuit filed in Chicago in August 2010 (case number 10-cv-5197). The suit, brought by Serbian refugees, alleges that MPRI enabled genocide and ethnic cleansing in the Krajina.

6. **The “Rendulic Rule.”** General Lothar Rendulic served in the German army during World War II. Following Germany’s surrender in 1945, Rendulic was prosecuted in the so-called Hostages Trial (U.S. v. List, et al., VIII Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 38 (1949)) by a military commission convened to try “lesser” war criminals than those prosecuted by the Nuremberg Tribunal. Rendulic was implicated, *inter alia*, in ordering a scorched earth campaign in northern Norway and Finland. As German troops retreated through the area in the winter of 1944, they destroyed foodstuffs and potential shelter in order to slow what they thought was an impending Russian advance. As it turned out, the Russians were not in pursuit, and this destruction proved unnecessary and excessive. Nonetheless, articulating what later became known as the Rendulic Rule, the commission held that Rendulic’s actions had to be judged on the basis of his knowledge at the time, not on what later emerged as the actual facts. Specifically, it held:

We are not called upon to determine whether urgent military necessity for the devastation and destruction in the province of Finmark actually existed. We are concerned with the question whether the defendant at the time of its occurrence acted within the limits of honest judgment on the basis of the conditions prevailing at the time. The course of a military operation by the enemy is loaded with uncertainties. ... It is our considered
opinion that the conditions, as they appeared to the defendant at the time were sufficient upon which he could honestly conclude that urgent military necessity warranted the decision made. This being true, the defendant may have erred in the exercise of his judgment but he was guilty of no criminal act. We find the defendant not guilty on this portion of the charge.

*Id.* at 1297.

7. **Targeted Killing Under International Humanitarian Law.** When, if ever, is the killing (some would say “assassination”) of a political leader lawful under international law? In the wake of the revelation of potential assassination plots against foreign leaders emanating from the United States, U.S. Presidents Gerald Ford issued an executive order (E.O. 11905 (1976)) banning assassination. Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan renewed this order (E.O. 12036 (1978), and E.O. 12333 (1981), respectively). E.O. 12333, for example, provides: “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.” These Orders have been interpreted to recognize exceptions in conventional military, counterinsurgency, and counter-terrorism operations. See Col. W. Hays Parks, *Memorandum on Executive Order 12233 and Assassination* (Nov. 2, 1989), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Use of Force/October 2002/Parks_final.pdf. In his memo, Parks concludes that

clandestine, low visibility or overt use of military force against legitimate targets in time of war, or against similar targets in time of peace where such individuals or groups pose an immediate threat to United States citizens or the national security of the United States, as determined by competent authority, does not constitute assassination or conspiracy to engage in assassination, and would not be prohibited by the proscription in EO 12333 or by international law.

In Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, the U.S. has engaged in targeted killing of high-value Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives, at times using Predator and Reaper drone aircraft. Do such killings run afoul of these executive orders, which have never been publically repealed or repudiated? Is IHL implicated in these killings? What about international human rights? Assuming IHL applies, are such killings lawful under IHL or may they constitute willful or treacherous killings of a protected person, the denial of quarter, or summary executions? Would it be preferable if wars were waged as a series of targeted killings rather than through combat on more traditional battlefields large-scale aerial bombardment? Which types of attack create the greater risk of collateral damage? Is there a duty to endeavor to capture opponents rather than kill them?

8. **Direct Participation in Hostilities.** Civilians are entitled to immunity from attack “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” See Article 51(3), Additional Protocol I (applicable in international armed conflicts); Article 13(3), Protocol II (applicable in non-international armed conflicts). Thus, someone charged with willfully killing a civilian in the context of an armed conflict can as a defense put on proof that the victim was directly participating in hostilities. See *Prosecutor v. Strugar,*
Case No. IT-01-42-A, Judgement, paras. 164-186 (July 17, 2008). How is a tribunal to determine when a civilian is directly participating in hostilities? The International Committee of the Red Cross recently completed a process of developing interpretive guidance concerning when individuals lose their civilian protection for the purposes of targeting. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 90 Int’l Rev. of the Red Cross 991 (2008). According to this guidance, in order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, a specific act must meet the following cumulative criteria:

- The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm);
- There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation);
- The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus).

The DPH doctrine is a conduct-based targeting doctrine. To respond to arguments by states that IHL should recognize a status-based targeting doctrine in NIACs as is the case in IACs, the ICRC also recognized a function-based targeting doctrine. Individuals who are members of organized armed groups and who undertake a “continuous combat function” are deemed targetable at any time so long as they maintain their combat function. What constitutes a “combat function”?

9. Co-Belligerency. In IACs, states cooperating against a common foe are considered to be in a state of co-belligerency. Co-belligerency can be created through formal treaty alliances or informally through cooperative action. Co-belligerency is linked to the concept of neutrality in IHL. According to this principle, an armed conflict between two parties automatically creates a state of armed conflict with the opposing state(s)’ allies, unless the latter declare themselves to be neutral. Such a concept does not find expression in the classic law governing NIACs, although it has been argued that it is not difficult to make the conceptual leap from states as co-belligerents to organized armed groups engaged in NIACs as co-belligerents, especially where they make common cause against a state. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2047 (2005). As one U.S. district court noted, “‘co-belligerents’ as that term is understood under the law of war” means “fully fledged belligerent fighting in association with one or more belligerent powers” but does not include organizations that “merely share an abstract philosophy or even a common purpose with al Qaeda—there must be an actual association in the current conflict with al Qaeda or the Taliban.” Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74-75, n.17 (D.D.C. 2009). What are the implications of recognizing a notion of co-belligerency in NIACs?

10. Cultural Property. Cultural property is subject to special protections under IHL. Indeed, there is an entire treaty, the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, devoted to this. Article 1 of the treaty defines cultural property as:

movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above…

Article 4 indicates that states parties must respect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as within the territory of other High Contracting Parties by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and by refraining from any act of hostility directed against such property.

Such obligations, however, may be disregarded “in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver.” Parties are also to protect against pillage, theft, and vandalism directed against cultural property. These protections also apply to non-international armed conflicts per Article 19(1):

In the event of an armed conflict not of an international character occurring within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the provisions of the present Convention which relate to respect for cultural property.

PROBLEMS

1. Military Objectives, Proportionality & Necessity. Consider the following targets, attacks, and tactics. Are the targets in question proper military objectives, subject to attack? Were the attacks and/or tactics in question consistent with the principles of proportionality, humanity, and necessity, and were adequate precautions undertaken? Would a war-time order to attack these targets or engage in this conduct constitute a war crime giving rise to individual criminal responsibility? Would you recommend prosecution if you were a prosecutor with penal jurisdiction over these events?

- During the Ethiopia/Eritrean war (1998-2000), Ethiopia undertook the aerial bombardment of the Hirgigo Power Station. The Station is located 10 miles from the port city of Massawa, which is home to an Eritrean naval base. The station was not yet fully operational when it was hit, and the Eritrean military forces had their own electricity-generating facilities. In an arbitral
commission set up to hear claims arising out of the conflict, Eritrea introduced evidence that its arsenal was acquired abroad and its indigenous manufacturers did not produce military equipment. Ethiopia introduced evidence that Eritrea had placed anti-aircraft weaponry in the immediate vicinity of the station. Was the station a proper target or was a war crime committed?

• In a non-international armed conflict, the armed forces of the territorial state using drone surveillance see mechanics in rebel-controlled territory servicing vehicles that are known to transport rebel troops. The vehicles are pickups that have been weaponized. Can the vehicles be targeted? Can the mechanics? What if the drones see mechanics in rebel-controlled territory servicing a fleet of standard, unmarked pickup trucks of a kind seen transporting rebel troops in the past?

• During the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999, NATO intentionally bombed the state-owned Serbian Radio and TV Station (RTS) at approximately 2:00 a.m. Between 10 and 17 people were killed and many others were injured. The strike was part of a larger attack on Serbian Command, Control & Communication (C3) assets, including electricity grids, transformer stations, command posts, transmission towers, and control buildings of the Yugoslav radio relay network. NATO also justified the bombing on the grounds that RTS was used by the Serbian leadership to disseminate pro-Serb propaganda and President Milošević had barred the broadcast of less-biased western media reports. In light of the high degree of redundancy in the Serbian system, broadcasting recommenced within hours of the strike—an eventuality that NATO had anticipated. The record is unclear as to whether NATO gave advance warning of the planned attack. There was some indication that foreign journalists had been warned and vacated the area. Tony Blair, then United Kingdom’s Prime Minister, blamed the Serbian authorities for failing to evacuate the building. Was the attack lawful under IHL? How would your answer change, if at all, if the RTS broadcasts were inciting violence against non-Serbs?

• Hamas is a Palestinian political party and militant group that has governed the Gaza Strip, the area of the Palestinian Territories that borders Egypt and Israel, since the 2006 elections. It has also been classified as a terrorist organization by a number of states, including the United States. Hamas and Israel have exchanged fire for years; these clashes erupted into full-blown armed conflict in 2009. During this so-called Gaza War, Israel engaged in a practice of “roof-knocking.” This entailed firing a non-explosive or light (10-20 kg) munition at a building that was suspected of housing weapons or being used as a terrorist headquarters. The goal was to offer a warning that would enable civilians to leave the building and area before it was subject to a full-scale attack. The Hamas leadership, in response, developed the practice of encouraging civilians climb up to their roofs to deter attack. Israel’s reaction to this counter-tactic was mixed. At times, it would: call off the strike, direct its “roof knocking” to the empty areas of the roof in order to scare civilians off, or—when the target was a high value one—carry on
with the attack even where civilians did not leave the premises after being subjected to a warning shot. In 2009, for example, Israel proceeded with the planned strike, killing a high-ranking Hamas official, Nizar Ghayan, and his family. Ghayan was accused of mentoring suicide bombers and allowing his home to be used as an ammunition silo. This practice of “roof knocking” was criticized in the Goldstone Report, commissioned by the U.N. Human Rights Council to investigate violations of human rights law and IHL in connection with the Gaza War, as “reckless in the extreme” if meant to serve as a warning to civilians. See Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009), at para. 523. At the same time, the Report acknowledged the “significant efforts by Israel to issue warnings” so that civilians could get out of harm’s way. See id. at para. 37. Is roof-knocking lawful under IHL?

• Using explosives, tanks, and anti-aircraft weapons, the Afghan Taliban regime destroyed the famous Banyan Buddhas, colossal statues dating from the 5th century that were carved from the living rock. The destruction was accomplished in March 2001, prior to 9/11 attacks and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. The Taliban justified their actions under Islamic law on the ground that the statues were “graven images” and “idolatrous.” The statues had not been designated as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. At the time, the Taliban was engaged in a NIAC with the Northern Alliance, a coalition of rebel groups.

• In the early days of the 2003 Iraq War, civilians pulled down a statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square. Did the statue constitute protected cultural property? If so, was its destruction lawful under IHL? Does your evaluation of this event change if a U.S. marine psychological warfare team initiated the attack on the statue? What if this event had occurred during the later period of time when the United States occupied the country? The photo below depicts a U.S. service member putting a rope around the statue’s neck. At one point, a U.S. flag was placed over the statue’s face, but this was later removed before the statue was toppled.
2. **Targeted Killings in Yemen.** Yemen is located on the tip of the Arabian Peninsula (see map below). After achieving independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the country split into two (North and South Yemen) and spent decades wracked by conflict. In 1978, Ali Abdullah Saleh assumed power of Northern Yemen. In 1990, the country re-unified under Saleh’s leadership with the drafting of a unity constitution. Peace was short-lived, however. A civil war broke out again in 1994, and the south re-declared its independence. This declaration was never internationally recognized or fully effectuated, and the secessionists eventually went into exile. The Yemeni population elected President Saleh twice to the presidency in 1999 and 2006. This relative calm was punctuated by Al Qaida attacks against western targets within Yemen. In 2000, Al Qaida militants attempted to attack the U.S.S. *The Sullivans* and successfully attacked the U.S.S. *Cole* in the Gulf of Aden while it was refueling, killing 17 U.S. sailors and injuring many others. A French oil tanker, *MV Limberg*, was also attacked in the area in 2002.
In 2009, a group calling itself Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) emerged. The group is believed to be populated by former mujahedeen from Afghanistan as well as Saudi and Yemeni Al Qaida members. Although its name suggests a link to Al Qaida proper, it is unclear whether this is truly an Al Qaida franchise. It is also unclear how hierarchical the group is or if different cells enjoy operational autonomy. Part of AQAP’s activities are focused on Yemeni government targets, including the security and military forces, which are attacked using perfidious means as well as classic guerilla and military tactics. Thousands of civilians have been displaced by hostilities. In January 2010, the government “declared war” on AQAP. In addition to these in-country activities, AQAP has also been associated with attacks within the United States, such as the rampage by Nidal Malik Hasan in Fort Hood in November 2009; the failed efforts in 2009 of the so-called Christmas Day bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab; and the 2010 Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad. All three attackers had links to Anwar Al Aulaqi, a dual U.S.-Yemeni citizen and al Qaida cleric, ideologue, and propagandist. Originally the editor of Inspire, Al Qaida’s jihadist magazine, it has been alleged that Al Aulaqi had increasingly assumed an operational role in AQAP by, for example, recruiting members, facilitating training camps, fundraising, and planning attacks on the United States.

President Saleh authorized U.S. maneuvers in the country against AQAP and other al Qaida operatives in 2009 and has since collaborated on at least some of these missions. U.S. activities are undertaken by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), a sub-unified command dedicated to joint special operations that is tasked with tracking suspected terrorists, and the Central Intelligence Agency. One of those killed was Al Aulaqi, who had been in U.S. sights for some time. Although the complete details of how Anwar Al Aulaqi met his demise may never be fully known, it is possible to piece together a composite account by drawing on press coverage, government legal briefs, and statements from the Obama Administration. The following narrative assumes the accuracy of such public records, bearing in mind that much relevant information remains classified.

* It was reported that he had
been placed on a list of individuals whom the JSOC was specifically authorized to kill. This list is colloquially called the “kill or capture list.” Since at least April 2010, Al Aulaqi was on a separate list of suspected terrorists whom the CIA was authorized to kill. The Treasury Department also included him on a list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) suspected of “supporting acts of terrorism and for acting for or on behalf of AQAP.” See Designation of Anwar Al-Aulaqi Pursuant to Executive Order 13224 and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, 75 Fed. Reg. 43233, 43234 (July 23, 2010). Pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267, he was next identified as an individual associated with Al-Qaeda and thus subjected to a global asset freeze and travel ban. See Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee Adds Names of Four Individuals to Consolidated List, U.N. Doc. SC/9989 (July 20, 2010). The revelation that the National Security Council had authorized Al Aulaqi’s killing provoked a lawsuit by Al Aulaqi’s father and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) seeking injunctive relief. The lawsuit failed on standing and political question grounds. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).

Al Aulaqi had apparently twice evaded death by drone attacks in December 2009 and May 2011. He was finally killed in a remote area of Northern Yemen near the town of Khashef on September 30, 2011, by a Hellfire missile fired from an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV or drone) deployed from a base somewhere in the Arabian Peninsula. Killed along with him was another U.S. citizen, Samir Khan, who also edited Inspire. There is no indication that the United States was aware of Khan’s presence in the car, but his death has not been treated solely as collateral damage.

As the Arab Spring flourished in 2011, protests in Yemen began calling for the ouster of President Saleh. As the violence in Yemen escalated, the President was seriously injured in an assassination attempt in June 2011. Unlike other leaders in the region, Saleh—working with the Gulf Cooperation Council—agreed to transfer power to a new government. Fighting appears to be taking place on multiple fronts at the moment. In the capital of Sana’a, various tribal factions—ostensibly under the leadership of Sheikh Sadiq al-Amar, a dissident former General—have targeted governmental installations and the country’s Republican Guard, which is under the command of the President’s son. Meanwhile, Islamist militants affiliated with AQAP control parts of Southern Yemen and continue to launch attacks against government targets. Government forces are attacking protesters around the country. And, a secessionist movement remains active in the south, although it does not appear to be formally linked to AQAP.

Meanwhile, using remotely piloted vehicles and fighter jets, the United States continues to engage in targeted killing in Yemen. According to The Long War Journal—a web journal that tracks military actions against terrorist targets—all told, the United States has launched approximately seventeen separate strikes inside Yemen since December 2009 against AQAP operatives and other targets, such as suspected training camps. Of these, eleven were launched since May 2011. See Bill Roggio, US Drone Strike Kills 11 AQAP Leaders, Fighters, THE LONG WAR JOURNAL (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/01/us_drone_strike_kill.php. The targets of this campaign are ostensibly AQAP militants and installations rather than rebels, although there is apparently some comingling of these various anti-government forces.
Does IHL govern the United States’ conduct in Yemen? If so, what is the predicate armed conflict? Is there an armed conflict between AQAP and the government of Yemen? Between the United States and AQAP? Or, has the United States intervened in what is essentially a civil war in Yemen between the government and anti-government forces? Is the conflict in Yemen linked to the conflict in Afghanistan—or to the larger, global conflict with Al Qaida—or is this a new conflict? What degree of nexus would be required to assert such a linkage and how far could a conflict with a transnational terrorist group like Al Qaida extend geographically? Does it matter that while the United States has provided assistance to the government of Yemen it has also attacked targets in Yemen of its own choosing? How would you characterize any conflict(s) taking place in Yemen? Is IHL the correct framework for evaluating the legality of killing U.S. citizen Anwar Al Aulaqi? What other legal regime(s) might also apply?

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