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11  
12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
13 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

14  
15 TAMARA FIELDS, on behalf of herself and as  
a representative of the ESTATE OF LLOYD  
16 FIELDS, JR., HEATHER CREACH, on behalf  
of herself and as a representative of the ESTATE  
17 OF JAMES DAMON CREACH, J.C. (1), a  
18 minor, and J.C. (2), a minor,

19 Plaintiffs,

20 v.

21 TWITTER, INC.,

22 Defendant.

Case No. 3:16-cv-00213-WHO

**PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO  
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS  
THE SECOND AMENDED  
COMPLAINT**

Date: November 9, 2016  
Time: 2:00 p.m.  
Courtroom 2, 17th Floor

Hon. William H. Orrick

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**I. INTRODUCTION**

Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendant responsible for knowingly providing material support to ISIS in violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2331 *et seq.* (“ATA”). That Defendant violated the ATA is essentially beyond dispute; it is a matter of public record that Defendant provided ISIS with Twitter accounts and did so knowingly. Nevertheless, Defendant seeks to avoid liability by invoking the protections of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“CDA”). But the CDA does not apply to Plaintiffs’ claims because Plaintiffs do not seek to hold Defendant liable as a publisher or speaker. Their claims are not based on the dissemination of offensive content, but rather the provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS in the first place. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Twitter’s violation of the ATA does not rely on content at all beyond the causal allegations, and references to content for purposes of proving causation alone are not sufficient to invoke the protections of the CDA. Nor can the provision of a Twitter account itself be deemed publishing activity given that such activity is content-neutral. The CDA also does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims insofar as they are based on private communications which are not published.

In addition, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the ATA because they do not properly allege proximate causation. But under the ATA, Plaintiffs are not required to allege a “direct” link between Twitter’s provision of material support to ISIS and the deaths of Lloyd Fields, Jr. or James Damon Creach. Rather, because the provision of any kind of material support to terrorists helps them commit acts of terrorism, it is sufficient to allege that Defendant provided material support to ISIS and that ISIS is responsible for the deaths of Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach. That is precisely what Plaintiffs allege in the Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 48 (“SAC”).

**II. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE CDA****A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations Are Not Content-Based**

Defendant argues that the CDA bars Plaintiffs’ claims because the SAC “describe[s] a theory of liability based on Twitter’s knowing failure to prevent ISIS from disseminating content through the Twitter platform.” Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss SAC, ECF No. 49 (“Mot.”) at 7 (quoting *Fields v. Twitter, Inc.*, 2016 WL 4205687, \*5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2016)). That is incorrect. The theory of liability set out in the SAC is based purely on Defendant’s knowing provision of Twitter accounts to

1 ISIS, not content created with those accounts. All references to content in the SAC are limited to  
2 proving causation and thus do not implicate the CDA.

3 Plaintiffs claim that Defendant violated the ATA because it knowingly provided Twitter  
4 accounts to ISIS. In Section I of the SAC, labeled “TWITTER PROVIDED ACCOUNTS TO ISIS,”  
5 Plaintiffs allege that Twitter provided numerous accounts to ISIS, including to Al-Furqan, ISIS’s  
6 official media arm, and Al-Hayat Media Center, ISIS’s official public relations group. SAC ¶¶ 9-13.  
7 In Section II of the SAC, labeled “TWITTER PROVIDED ACCOUNTS TO ISIS KNOWINGLY  
8 AND RECKLESSLY,” Plaintiffs establish that ISIS is a well-known terrorist organization that  
9 Defendant knew that it was providing the terrorist group with accounts on its social network.

10 These sections of the SAC are devoid of references to content. They are not “riddled with  
11 detailed descriptions of ISIS-related messages, images, and videos disseminated through Twitter and the  
12 harms allegedly caused by the dissemination of that content.” Mot. at 2 (quoting *Fields*, 2016 WL  
13 4205687, \*6). The allegations in these sections are not “accompanied by information regarding the  
14 ISIS-related content disseminated from the accounts,” and they do not “describe a theory of liability  
15 based on Twitter’s knowing failure to prevent ISIS from disseminating content through the Twitter  
16 platform.” *Fields*, 2016 WL 4205687, \*5. In fact, they do not refer to or depend on content at all.  
17 Instead, Sections I and II set out a theory of liability based on Twitter’s provision of accounts to ISIS and  
18 not the use of those accounts.

### 19 **B. Providing Terrorists With Twitter Accounts Is Not Publishing Activity**

20 Defendants argue that, even if this framing of the theory of liability is accepted, ““decisions about  
21 whether particular third parties may have Twitter accounts’ are no different, for purposes of Section 230  
22 immunity, from decisions about ‘what particular third-party content may be posted.’” Mot. at 9 (quoting  
23 *Fields*, 2016 WL 4205687, \*6). That is inaccurate. The decision to provide ISIS with a Twitter  
24 account is wholly distinct from permitting ISIS to tweet propaganda. The content-neutral decision  
25 about whether to provide someone with a tool is not publishing activity as defined by the Ninth  
26 Circuit.

27 “[P]ublication involves reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw  
28 from publication third-party content.” *Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.*, 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009);

1 *id.* (A publisher is one who “reviews material submitted for publication, perhaps edits it for style or  
2 technical fluency, and then decides whether to publish it.”); *Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc.*, 824 F.3d  
3 846, 852 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Jane Doe’s failure to warn claim has nothing to do with Internet Brands’  
4 efforts, or lack thereof, to edit, monitor, or remove user generated content.”). Providing ISIS with a  
5 Twitter account is not publishing under these definitions because it does not involve reviewing,  
6 editing or deciding whether to publish or withdraw tweets. Nor is deciding whether someone can  
7 sign up for a Twitter account the same thing as deciding what content can be published; handing  
8 someone a tool is not the same thing as supervising their use of that tool. The CDA bars claims  
9 based on the latter, but the theory of liability in this case is based solely on the former. And, notably,  
10 many Twitter users who sign up for accounts never issue a single tweet. In other words, account  
11 creation and content creation on Twitter are two distinct activities.

12 *Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC*, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016) is distinguishable.  
13 There, the plaintiff alleged that Backpage.com was aiding human trafficking in the way that it  
14 constructed its website. The First Circuit found that despite being framed as a claim about the  
15 structure and operation of the site, the claim was really about what content would be published,  
16 including whether phone numbers would be displayed, whether email addresses would anonymized  
17 and whether photographs should have been stripped of their metadata. *Id.* at 20. Accordingly, the  
18 focus of the claims was really about what content could “appear on the website and in what form.”  
19 *Id.* at 21; *id.* at \*20 (“[S]ome of the challenged practices—most obviously, the choice of what words  
20 or phrases can be displayed on the site—are traditional publisher functions under any coherent  
21 definition of the term.”). Here, on the other hand, Plaintiffs’ claims are not tied to content in the  
22 same fashion. Indeed, apart from the causal chain, they are not dependent on content at all.  
23 Whereas the claims in *Backpage.com* were directly related to what content would appear and in what  
24 form, as well as word choices and phrases, Plaintiffs’ claims in this action are not similarly tied to  
25 content. Creating an account on Twitter does not involve any of these content-based decisions. Nor  
26 are Plaintiffs’ claims based on the structure and operation of Twitter.com; they do not claim that  
27 Twitter should have built its website differently, but that it should not have knowingly provided ISIS  
28 with access to accounts on the site at all. That was not the issue *Backpage.com*.



1           **C.       Reliance On Content For Proximate Causation Does Not Implicate The CDA**

2           All of the content-based allegations in the SAC are strictly limited to Section III, titled  
3 “TWITTER PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFFS’ INJURIES.” Because the Ninth Circuit has  
4 repeatedly held that the CDA does not bar claims simply because publishing activity is part of the  
5 causal analysis, these references to ISIS’s tweets have no bearing on the Court’s analysis under  
6 Section 230.

7           In *Internet Brands*, the plaintiff brought a negligent failure to warn claim based on her  
8 allegation that defendant knew rapists were using its website to lure victims. The Ninth Circuit ruled  
9 that the CDA did not apply despite the fact that Internet Brands’ publishing activity “could be  
10 described as a ‘but-for’ cause of [plaintiff’s] injuries. *Id.* at 853.

11                     Publishing activity is a but-for cause of just about everything Model  
12                     Mayhem is involved in. It is an internet publishing business. Without  
13                     publishing user content, it would not exist. As noted above, however,  
                      we held in *Barnes* that the CDA does not provide a general immunity  
                      against all claims derived from third-party content.

14 *Id.* Because the failure to warn claim did not depend on content outside of the causal analysis, the  
15 CDA was not a bar to relief.

16           The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in *Barnes*. In that case, the plaintiff filed a  
17 promissory estoppel claim against defendant Yahoo because she had relied on its promise that it  
18 would remove private information and photographs that her ex-boyfriend had posted. *Barnes*, 570  
19 F.3d at 1098-99. Yahoo’s failure to remove the offensive profile was a but-for cause of plaintiff’s  
20 injury “because without that posting the plaintiff would not have suffered any injury. But that did  
21 not mean that the CDA immunized the proprietor of the website from all potential liability.”  
22 *Internet Brands*, 824 F.3d at 853. Even though the causal chain required reference to published  
23 content, the CDA did not apply because the theory of liability was otherwise not based on Yahoo’s  
24 publishing functions.

25           These cases stand for the proposition that where a theory of liability relies on content purely  
26 for purposes of causation, but otherwise does not depend on content as a critical element, the CDA  
27 does not apply. Here, Sections I and II, which explain that Defendant violated the ATA because it  
28 knowingly provided ISIS with Twitter accounts, do not rely on or refer to content. All references to

1 content are limited to allegations of causation. Under the law as stated in *Internet Brands* and  
 2 *Barnes*, such references do not give rise to immunity under the CDA.



3 **D. Direct Messages Are Not Published**

4 Alternatively, Plaintiffs’ allege that Defendant is liable under the ATA because it provided  
 5 ISIS with Direct Message capabilities. SAC ¶¶ 43-45. Because Direct Messages are unpublished  
 6 private communications, this theory of liability does not seek to treat Defendant as a publisher or  
 7 speaker and, accordingly, the CDA does not apply.

8 As Twitter acknowledges, Direct Messages sent through its social network are private  
 9 communications:

10 Direct Messages are the private side of Twitter. . . . Communicate  
 11 quickly and privately with one person or many. Direct Messages  
 12 support text, photos, links, emoji and Tweets, so you can make your  
 13 point however you please. . . . Have a private conversation with  
 14 anyone on Twitter, even a friend of a friend. Direct messages can only  
 15 be seen between the people included.

16 *Id.* ¶ 43 (emphasis added). Twitter also advertises its Direct Messaging tool by stressing privacy:



17 *Id.* ¶¶ 44-45.

18 ISIS has used these Direct Messages to its great advantage. “ISIS reaches potential recruits  
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1 by maintaining accounts on Twitter so that individuals across the globe may reach out to them  
 2 directly. After first contact, potential recruits and ISIS recruiters often communicate via Twitter’s  
 3 Direct Messaging capabilities.” *Id.* ¶ 43.

4 These Direct Messages are “extensively monitored by [ISIS’s] emirs  
 5 and supervisors of the recruiting unit.” According to FBI Director  
 6 James Comey, “[o]ne of the challenges in facing this hydra-headed  
 7 monster is that if (ISIS) finds someone online, someone who might be  
 8 willing to travel or kill in place they will begin a twitter direct  
 9 messaging contact.” Indeed, according to the Brookings Institution,  
 10 some ISIS members “use Twitter purely for private messaging or  
 11 covert signaling.” ISIS has also been known to use Twitter’s Direct  
 12 Messaging capabilities for fundraising and operational purposes. . . .

13 Through its Direct Messaging tool, Twitter enables ISIS members to  
 14 receive private Direct Messages from potential recruits, terrorist  
 15 financiers and other terrorists with operational and intelligence  
 16 information. Giving ISIS the capability to send and receive Direct  
 17 Messages in this manner is no different to handing it a satellite phone,  
 18 walkie-talkies or the use of a mail drop, all of which terrorists use for  
 19 private communications in order to further their extremist agendas.

20 *Id.* ¶¶ 44-45.

21 This theory of liability, based on purely private content, is not barred by the CDA because it  
 22 does not involve publishing. The CDA provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive  
 23 computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another  
 24 information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The statute, however, does not define the  
 25 term “publisher” and so that word must be given its ordinary meaning. *Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp.*,  
 26 134 S. Ct. 870, 876 (2014) (“It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction’ that, ‘unless  
 27 otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common  
 28 meaning.’”) (quoting *Perrin v. United States*, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)); *Sebelius v. Cloer*, 133 S. Ct.  
 1886, 1893 (2013) (“As in any statutory construction case, ‘[w]e start, of course, with the statutory  
 text,’ and proceed from the understanding that ‘[u]nless otherwise defined, statutory terms are  
 generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning.’”) (quoting *BP America Production  
 Co. v. Burton*, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006)); *Cheffins v. Stewart*, 825 F.3d 588, 594 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We  
 adopt the ‘common practice of consulting dictionary definitions’ to clarify the ‘ordinary meaning’ of  
 terms used in a statute but not defined therein.”) (citing *Johnson v. Aljian*, 490 F.3d 778, 780 (9th  
 Cir. 2007)); *In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig.*, 779 F.3d 914, 927 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Because

1 this language is not defined in the statute, we apply its ordinary meaning.”) (quotation omitted);  
2 *Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc.*, 710 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We apply the  
3 fundamental precept of statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined, ‘words will be  
4 interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’”) (quoting *Perrin*).

5 The ordinary meaning of “publisher” is one who disseminates information to the public.  
6 *Klayman v. Zuckerberg*, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Although the [CDA] does not  
7 define ‘publisher,’ its ordinary meaning is ‘one that makes public,’ and ‘the reproducer of a work  
8 intended for public consumption.’”) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1837  
9 (1981)); *Publish Definition*, merriam-webster.com, <http://www.merriam->  
10 [webster.com/dictionary/publish](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/publish) (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (“to disseminate to the public”); *Publish*  
11 *Definition*, Dictionary.com, <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/publish> (last visited Oct. 4, 2016)  
12 (“to issue . . . for sale or distribution to the public”; “to issue publicly the work of”; “to make  
13 publicly or generally known”); *Publish Definition*, Black’s Law Dictionary (2d Pocket Ed.) (“To  
14 distribute copies (of a work) to the public.”). Accordingly, the CDA does not apply to claims based  
15 on purely private communications, including claims based on ISIS’s use of Twitter’s direct  
16 messages.

17 The legislative history behind the CDA is irrelevant in interpreting the term “publisher”  
18 because there is no ambiguity in the plain language of the statute. *Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park*  
19 *& Fly, Inc.*, 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (“Statutory construction must begin with the language  
20 employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately  
21 expresses the legislative purpose.”); *Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson*, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (In  
22 determining the plain meaning of statutory language, the court must “assume ‘that the legislative  
23 purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.’”) (quoting *Richards v. United*  
24 *States*, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)). While courts have noted that the CDA was enacted in reaction to the  
25 decision in *Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.*, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,  
26 1995) holding that an internet service provider could be liable for defamation, Congress did not  
27 define “publisher” according to its use in defamation law. Had Congress wanted to incorporate such  
28 a definition into the CDA, it surely knew how to do so. *Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.*, 534 U.S. 438,

1 461–62 (2002) (“We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a  
2 statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”); *Bauer v. MRAG Americas, Inc.*,  
3 624 F.3d 1210, 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). As the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly warned about the  
4 CDA in particular, “we must be careful not exceed the scope of the immunity provided by Congress.  
5 Congress could have written the statute more broadly, but it did not.” *Internet Brands*, 824 F.3d at  
6 853 (quoting *Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.Com, LLC*, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 n.15 (9th Cir.  
7 2008)).

8 In any event, even if Congress had intended that the defamation definition of “publisher” be  
9 applied in defamation cases, it makes no sense to apply that definition outside of the context of  
10 defamation claims. Here, Plaintiffs are not seeking to hold Defendant liable for the dissemination  
11 defamatory material. The ATA has nothing to do with defamation and there is no reason that a  
12 definition strictly confined to that area of law should apply to a statute like the ATA designed to  
13 prevent the provision of material support to terrorists. Moreover, the threat of the decision in the  
14 *Stratton Oakmont* case was that it potentially opened up interactive computer services to tremendous  
15 liability due to their outsized readership. *Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.*, 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir.  
16 1997) (“Interactive computer services have millions of users. . . . The specter of tort liability in an  
17 area of such prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect.”). Liability for private  
18 communications present no such threat.

19 **E. Barring Plaintiffs’ Claims Would Not Further The Goals Of The CDA**

20 Barring Plaintiffs’ claims in this case would be at odds with the purported goals of the CDA.  
21 First, in passing the CDA, “Congress wanted to encourage the unfettered and unregulated  
22 development of free speech on the Internet.” *Batzel v. Smith*, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003);  
23 *id.* at 1033 (Congress was “concern[ed] with assuring a free market in ideas and information on the  
24 Internet.”). But Congress surely did not intend to promote speech that aids designated terrorist  
25 organizations. To the contrary, it expressly prohibited such speech through the ATA’s material  
26 support provisions. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-B (defining “material support or resources” to include  
27 “training, expert advice” and “communications equipment”). Numerous courts have held that that  
28 violations of the ATA’s material support statutes do not implicate free speech concerns. *See, e.g.*,

1 *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project*, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010) (the ATA’s prohibition on providing  
2 material support to terrorists in the form of legal and political advocacy training is constitutional  
3 because such a ban is necessary to further the “[g]overnment’s interest in combating terrorism,”  
4 which “is an urgent objective of the highest order”); *Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego*, 742 F.3d 1144,  
5 1194 (9th Cir. 2014) (“There are, of course, certain types of speech that do not fall within the  
6 protection of the First Amendment, such as . . . speech that materially assists a foreign terrorist  
7 organization.”); *Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft*, 333 F.3d 156, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2003)  
8 (holding “as other courts have,” that “there is no First Amendment right nor any other constitutional  
9 right to support terrorists”). Accordingly, nothing about the allegations in this lawsuit infringe upon  
10 Congress’s goal of promoting free speech on the Internet. To the contrary, barring Plaintiffs’ claims  
11 in this case would directly contradict the express language of the ATA and expand the reach of the  
12 CDA far beyond its intended purpose.

13 Nor would allowing this case to go forward have a “chilling effect” on Internet free speech  
14 simply because it “would make operating an internet business marginally more expensive.” *Internet*  
15 *Brands*, 824 F.3d at 852. “Congress has not provided an all purpose get out-of-jail-free card for  
16 businesses that publish user content on the internet, though any claims might have a marginal  
17 chilling effect on internet publishing businesses.” *Id.* at 824. Here, at most, it would deter  
18 interactive computer services from knowingly providing material support to terrorists.

19 Second, Congress enacted the CDA in order “to encourage interactive computer services and  
20 users of such services to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other offensive material. . . .”  
21 *Batzel*, 333 F.3d at 1028. The CDA was enacted in large part in reaction to the decision in *Stratton*  
22 *Oakmont*, where the court held that Prodigy could be held responsible for libelous statements posted  
23 on one of its bulletin boards because it had proactively monitored that forum for offensive content.  
24 1995 WL 323710, at \*1-4. But this is not a case that has anything to do with Twitter’s efforts, or  
25 lack thereof, to edit or remove user generated content. Nothing about this case should discourage  
26 “Good Samaritan” filtering of third party content. Indeed, it defies credulity that a section entitled  
27 “Protection For ‘Good Samaritan’ Blocking And Screening Of Offensive Material” would create  
28

1 immunity for the knowing provision of material support to a terrorist organization.<sup>1</sup> Such an  
 2 interpretation of the CDA would expand that law far beyond its narrow language and purpose.  
 3 *Internet Brands*, 824 F.3d at 852 (“[L]iability would not discourage the core policy of section  
 4 230(c), ‘Good Samaritan’ filtering of third party content.”).

5 Various canons of statutory interpretation further counsel against a ruling that the CDA bars  
 6 Plaintiffs’ claims. First, such a ruling should be avoided because it would needlessly create a  
 7 conflict between the CDA’s protections for interactive computer services and the ATA’s prohibition  
 8 on providing material support to terrorists. *See Maracich v. Spears*, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2205 (2013)  
 9 (“The provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not  
 10 contradictory. . . . [T]here can be no justification for needlessly rendering provisions in conflict if  
 11 they can be interpreted harmoniously.”) (quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner, *Reading Law: The*  
 12 *Interpretation of Legal Texts* (“Scalia/Garner”) 180 (2012)). But a ruling that the scope of the CDA  
 13 does not cover the ATA violations alleged in this case would maintain a harmonious reading of the  
 14 two statutes. In addition, the CDA’s general language stating that “an interactive computer service”  
 15 should not “be treated as the publisher or speaker” must give way to the ATA’s specific prohibitions  
 16 against providing material support to terrorists, including in the form of “communications  
 17 equipment.” *Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard*, 133 S. Ct. 500, 504 (2012) (referring to “the  
 18 ancient interpretive principle that the specific governs the general (*generalia specialibus non*  
 19 *derogant*)”); Scalia/Garner 185 (“[T]he [general/specific] canon does apply to successive statutes.”).

### 20 **III. PLAINTIFFS ADEQUATELY PLEAD PROXIMATE CAUSATION**

21 Defendant argues that the SAC should also be dismissed “because it fails to plead facts

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 23 <sup>1</sup> At the oral argument on rehearing in *Internet Brands*, Judge Clifton questioned whether the CDA  
 applies at all to knowing violations of law:

24 And Congress intended to say and you don’t have to let anybody else  
 25 know that you’ve got this knowledge that bad stuff’s going on out  
 26 there? . . . In a provision labeled “Good Samaritan”? . . . I have  
 27 trouble looking at the statute seeing how a provision that’s entitled . . .  
 “Protection for a Good Samaritan blocking and screening offensive  
 materials” gets turned into a hall pass, a get out of jail free card when  
 it has something to do with the Internet.

28 *Jane Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc.*, Apr. 8, 2015 Unofficial Tr. at 33:25-34:6; 39:19-40:2.

1 sufficient to plausibly establish that Plaintiffs were injured ‘by reason of’ Twitter’s conduct.” Mot.  
 2 at 11. But this argument both misstates the applicable law and ignores Twitter’s role in the rise of  
 3 ISIS. The material support that Twitter has provided to ISIS more than adequately satisfies the  
 4 ATA’s proximate causation requirement.<sup>2</sup>

5 Proximate causation is established under the ATA when a defendant’s “acts were a  
 6 substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation,” and the injury at issue “was reasonably  
 7 foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence.”<sup>3</sup> *Rothstein v. UBS AG*, 708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d  
 8 Cir. 2013) (quoting *Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A.*, 318 F.3d 113, 123 (2d Cir. 2003)); *Linde v. Arab*  
 9 *Bank, PLC*, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“The causation charge the Court gave focused  
 10 solely on whether defendant’s acts were a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs’ injuries, and  
 11 whether such injuries were a foreseeable result of those acts.”). “A proximate cause determination  
 12 does not require a jury to identify the liable party as the sole cause of harm; it only asks that the  
 13 identified cause be a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” *Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC*, 893 F.  
 14 Supp. 2d 474, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“*Gill I*”) (quoting *Hydro Investors, Inc. v. Trafalgar Power*  
 15 *Inc.*, 227 F.3d 8, 15 (2d Cir. 2000)).

16 Importantly, there is no “directness” requirement for proximate causation under the ATA.  
 17 *Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC*, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[P]roposed language [for the  
 18 jury instructions] concerning the ‘directness’ of the relation between plaintiffs’ injury and  
 19 defendant’s acts was inappropriate in the ATA context.”). In cases involving the provision of  
 20 financial support to terrorist organizations, courts have refused to impose a “directness” requirement  
 21 for proximate causation under the ATA because money is fungible. *See, e.g., Boim v. Holy Land*

22 \_\_\_\_\_  
 23 <sup>2</sup> Defendant incorporates by reference “all of the arguments made in its motion to dismiss the FAC,  
 24 including the argument that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that would establish that Twitter  
 25 committed an act of “international terrorism” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1).” Mot. at 6 n.2.  
 Plaintiffs likewise incorporate by reference their responses to this argument. Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. To  
 Dismiss the FAC, ECF No. 31, at 16-20.

26 <sup>3</sup> Notably, the ATA does not require but-for causation. *Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC*, 97 F. Supp. 3d  
 27 287, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“As the only cases to directly address the issue have held, requiring ‘but  
 28 for’ causation would effectively annul the civil liability provisions of the ATA. That cannot have  
 been the intent of Congress in enacting them.”); *Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC*, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 507  
 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“‘But for’ cause cannot be required in the section 2333(a) context.”).



1 *Found. for Relief & Dev.*, 549 F.3d 685, 690-91 (7th Cir. 2008) (“*Boim III*”) (“Because money is  
2 fungible, the combination of the link to Hamas and the receipt of an amount that would have been  
3 sufficient to finance the shooting at the Beit El bus stop would be enough to show that the ‘material  
4 assistance’ of giving money caused the terrorist act that took David Boim’s life.”) (Posner, J.);  
5 *Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A.*, 925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 433–34 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[P]laintiffs who  
6 bring an ATA action are not required to trace specific dollars to specific attacks to satisfy the  
7 proximate cause standard. Such a task would be impossible and would make the ATA practically  
8 dead letter because ‘[m]oney is fungible.’”) (quoting *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project*, 561 U.S.  
9 1, 30 (2010)); *Gill I*, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (“The money used need not be shown to have been used  
10 to purchase the bullet that struck the plaintiff. A contribution, if not used directly, arguably would  
11 be used indirectly by substituting it for money in [ISIS’s] treasury. . . .”).

12 As the Supreme Court has noted, non-financial forms of material support to terrorists are just  
13 as fungible. In *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project*, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), plaintiffs sought a  
14 preliminary injunction because they wished to provide legal and political advocacy training to  
15 designated terrorist organizations, but feared that they would be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B  
16 for providing material support to FTOs. *Id.* at 10. The Supreme Court considered “whether the  
17 Government may prohibit” the provision of “material support to [terrorists] in the form of speech,”  
18 and focused on whether a ban on the kind of material support at issue was necessary to further the  
19 Government’s interest in combatting terrorism. *Id.* at 28. The Supreme Court, following the lead of  
20 Congress, determined that “foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by  
21 their criminal conduct that *any contribution to such an organization* facilitates that conduct.” *Id.* at  
22 29 (quoting Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat.  
23 1247, note following 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Findings and Purpose)) (original emphasis). The court  
24 likewise deferred to the expertise of the State Department which found that “all contributions to  
25 foreign terrorist organizations further their terrorism,” and that “it is highly likely that any material  
26 support to these organizations will ultimately inure to the benefit of their criminal, terrorist  
27 functions—regardless of whether such support was ostensibly intended to support non-violent, non-  
28 terrorist activities.” *Id.* at 33.

1 “Material support,” the court reasoned, “is a valuable resource by definition.” *Id.* at 30.

2 Such support frees up other resources within the organization that may  
3 be put to violent ends. It also importantly helps lend legitimacy to  
4 foreign terrorist groups—legitimacy that makes it easier for those  
5 groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds—all of which  
6 facilitate more terrorist attacks. . . . Indeed, some designated foreign  
7 terrorist organizations use social and political components to recruit  
8 personnel to carry out terrorist operations, and to provide support to  
9 criminal terrorists and their families in aid of such operations.

10 *Id.* at 30-31 (quotation marks omitted). It is thus unsurprising that the ATA’s material support  
11 statutes prohibit not only providing money to terrorist groups, but also “any property, tangible or  
12 intangible, or service,” which expressly includes “communications equipment.” 18 U.S.C. §  
13 2339A(b)(1). “The material-support statute is, on its face, a preventive measure—it criminalizes not  
14 terrorist attacks themselves, but aid that makes the attacks more likely to occur.” *Humanitarian Law*  
15 *Project*, 561 U.S. at 35.

16 Under this standard, Plaintiffs adequately establish proximate causation because they allege  
17 (1) that Twitter provided fungible material support to ISIS, and (2) that ISIS was responsible for the  
18 attack in which Lloyd Fields, Jr. and James Damon Creach were killed. As to the first point, there is  
19 little doubt that the accounts that Twitter provided to ISIS constitute material support. Twitter  
20 accounts are powerful communications tools that can be used in myriad ways to help spread terror.  
21 Recognizing the importance of these kinds of resources to terrorists, the ATA even defines “material  
22 support or resources” as including “any property, tangible or intangible, or service” such as  
23 “communications equipment.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A(b)(1); 2339B(g)(4). Twitter accounts  
24 undoubtedly meet this definition.

25 On the second point, Plaintiffs adequately allege that ISIS was responsible for the November  
26 9, 2015 in Amman, Jordan. The attack was carried out by Anwar Abu Zaid, who, according to  
27 Israeli intelligence, was a member of a clandestine ISIS terror cell. SAC ¶ 81. In addition, ISIS  
28 itself issued two separate claims of responsibility for the attack. *Id.* ¶ 80. Because material support  
to terrorists is fungible, and there is no requirement that such support be traced directly to an attack,  
it is enough that Plaintiffs have alleged that Twitter provided material support to ISIS and that ISIS  
carried out the attack in which one of its operatives killed Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach.

1 **IV. CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be denied in all respects.

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Respectfully submitted,  
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