55. On April 15, 1973 at approximately 7:30 p.m., Ehrlichman requested a meeting with Dean. Dean's attorney discussed this request with Petersen who advised against such a meeting. Dean arranged to have the President told that Dean was acting out of loyalty to the President and that Dean felt the meeting requested by Ehrlichman was inappropriate at this time. The President telephoned Petersen and spoke with him from 8:14 to 8:18 p.m. and from 8:25 to 8:26 p.m. Petersen told the President about Ehrlichman's request to meet with Dean. The President asked if Petersen would have any objection to his meeting with Dean. Petersen said he had no objection. The President arranged to meet with Dean that evening.

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording and other evidence of the President's telephone conversations with Petersen, the President has produced edited transcripts of the recordings. A summary of these transcripts has been prepared.

55.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1014-15.
55.2 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, February 14, 1974, 20-22 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
55.3 Henry Petersen testimony, 9 SSC 3635, 3648.
55.4 Message from John Dean to the President, received by Lawrence Higby, 8:15 p.m., April 15, 1973, SSC Exhibit No. 34-48, 3 SSC 1313.
55.5 Summary of White House edited transcript of a telephone conversation between H. R. Haldeman and Larry Higby, April 15, 1973, prepared by House Judiciary Committee staff.
55.6 Summary of White House edited transcript of a conversation between the President and Henry Petersen, 8:14 to 8:18 p.m., April 15, 1973, prepared by House Judiciary Committee staff.

55.7 Summary of White House edited transcript of a conversation between the President and Henry Petersen, 8:25 to 8:26 p.m., April 15, 1973, prepared by House Judiciary Committee staff.

55.8 President Nixon daily diary, April 15, 1973, Exhibit 20, In re Grand Jury.
that Mitchell had met briefly with Ehrlichman but not with the President. Ehrlichman said that Mitchell was not talking which certainly did not surprise me. And I certainly was not surprised that he would not talk with Ehrlichman either. I then pulled the list I had prepared out of my pocket and told them that I had discussed everyone’s problem with my lawyers and my lawyers had had conversations with the prosecutors as well and I thought that the following persons would be indicted, I then read them the list. I told them that my attorney had learned from his discussions with the prosecutors that not only was Dean the target of the grand jury but Ehrlichman and Haldeman were also very much targets of the grand jury. Ehrlichman said that he had just talked with Kleindienst a few days earlier about the grand jury and that he had no such report from Kleindienst. I said that my lawyer appears to know more than the Attorney General does because I believe he is probably more informed in that he had had direct conversations with the prosecutors. I did not tell them at that point that I had had private meetings with the prosecutors or that I had told the prosecutors of the extent of involvement of Haldeman and Ehrlichman. When this meeting ended I was quite confident that I had gotten the message through to Ehrlichman and Haldeman that they had a serious problem themselves and I had put them on final notice that I was not playing the coverup game any longer.

It was late that night that I realized that indeed, my message had gotten through. About 1 o’clock on Saturday night or Sunday morning, I received a call from Mr. Shaffer. He said that the prosecutors had called him and that they were going to have to breach the agreement they had made regarding keeping all of my conversations with them private. The prosecutors had reported to Mr. Shaffer that the Attorney General had called Mr. Petersen and them and wanted a full report on everything that was going on before the grand jury and where the grand jury was headed. The meeting with the Attorney General was to occur about 2 a.m., at the Attorney General’s home. The prosecutors also reported that the reason they felt they had to breach the agreement was because the Attorney General was being summoned to the President’s office the next morning to discuss the entire matter. I told Mr. Shaffer that I had hoped to tell the President personally that I had gone to the prosecutors several weeks ago but that I had understood why this was occurring and obviously there was nothing we could do about it. I told Shaffer that we certainly have gotten the message through to Ehrlichman and Haldeman that they have problems and that the coverup may begin to unravel at last.

On Sunday, April 15, I went to Mr. Shaffer’s office for an all-day meeting. I learned during the day that Ehrlichman had been trying to reach me during the better part of the day but I decided not to return his call. When I returned home about 7:30, the White House operator called me again and said that Ehrlichman had been trying to reach me. I then returned his call. He told me that he was going back to the office to do some work that night and would be in about 8 p.m. and would like to meet with me very much. I told him I would meet with him.

I was quite aware of the reason that Ehrlichman wanted to meet with me because I was sure that he had learned from the President what was going on as a result of the President’s meeting with Klein-
dienst and Petersen and the fact that I had been to the prosecutors had obviously come out. As I have noted earlier, I had not at any time discussed Presidential involvement with the prosecutors so the discussions that Petersen and Kleindienst had with the President obviously focused on the involvement of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean, Mitchell, Magruder, Strachan, and others that I had discussed. After Ehrlichman's call, I called Mr. Shaffer and we discussed the wisdom of the meetings. I told him I did not want to meet with Ehrlichman and he agreed. Subsequently, I tried to reach Ehrlichman to turn the meeting off but I learned that he was already en route to the office.

I called Mr. Shaffer back and told him that I thought I ought to meet with the President and I should call Rosemary Woods and have her give a message to the President. He said that he saw no problem with my talking with the President to tell him why I had gone to the prosecutors. I attempted to reach Rosemary Woods but she was out of the city. I then wrote out a message for the President and phoned Mr. Higby and requested that Higby relate the matter to Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and on to the President. I have submitted a copy to the committee of the message I sent to the President at 8:15 Sunday, April 15.

[The document was marked exhibit No. 34-48.]

Mr. Dean. In short, I told the President that I hoped he did not interpret my going to the prosecutors as an act of disloyalty, that I did not wish to speak with Ehrlichman at this time, that I would meet with him if he wished to discuss the matter with me, and that I thought that he should get his legal advice from Henry Petersen. Within 45 minutes of sending this message I had a call from the White House operator informing me that the President wished to meet with me at 9 o'clock.

It was shortly after 9 when I arrived at the President's EOB office. As I was driving into the White House I wondered to myself if the meeting was a set-up. By a set-up I mean, was the President going to try to smoke out of me what Ehrlichman and Haldeman obviously had been trying to do and had not been able to do, would not be able to get out of me because they knew very well that I would not play any games with the President. I decided I could not worry about that and I had a duty to explain to the President why I was doing what I had done.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT—APRIL 15

The President was very cordial when we met. I was somewhat shaken when I went in to meet him because I knew I had taken it upon myself to end the cover-up and what I had started was going to cause serious problems for the President. I shall attempt to recall the highlights of the conversation that transpired on the meeting which occurred about 9 o'clock on April 15.

I told the President that I had gone to the prosecutors. And, that I did not believe that this was an act of disloyalty but, rather in the end it would be an act of loyalty. I told him I felt this matter had to end. I informed the President that I told the prosecutors of my own involvement and the involvement of others. At one point in the conversation I recall the President asking me about Haldeman's knowledge

*See p. 1313.
UNIVERS STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

IN RE: POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF 18 USC 2511 and 2512

Grand Jury Room No. 3
United States District Courthouse
3rd & Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Thursday, February 14, 1974

The testimony of JOHN W. DEAN, III, was presented
to a full quorum of the Grand Jury.

BEFORE:

RICHARD BEN-VENISTE, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

JILL VOLNER
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

GERALD GOLDMAN, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

GEORGE T. FRAMPTON, JR., ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice
Q  Now, there came a time, on the 15th of April, when you met with the President. Is that correct?

A  That is correct.

Q  And what led up to that meeting?

A  Well, there were, of course, a series of events, starting with my volunteering myself to the original Watergate Prosecutors. It culminated when I had told Mr. Haldeman and
Ehrlichman that I thought that they were targets of the Grand Jury in the eyes of the prosecutors, and they had asked me why I thought that, and I did not reveal to them, at that time, I'd been to the prosecutors and been dealing with them for several weeks, trying to explain to the prosecutors what had happened.

Rather, I told them that my attorneys had told me this which, in fact, was true, and that this really got their attention because Mr. Ehrlichman told me that he had talked to Kleindienst and he was unaware of any such pursuit by the U. S. Attorney's Office of the Grand Jury.

So that was the 14th we had that conversation. It might have been the 15th. Well, anyway, I'm giving you the events leading up to my arrival on the 15th.

I had a call -- I'd been with my attorney all day, and I had a call from Mr. Ehrlichman, apparently, several times in the latter part of the day, requesting that I return the call, and I didn't do it until I arrived home about 7:30.

When I called him, he told me that -- and, of course, I was aware from the preceding evening, what had gone on, that Mr. Glanzer had called my attorney to tell him that they were going to have to report to the Attorney General that I had been to visit them.

Since I was well aware of the fact that Mr. Ehrlichman was probably aware of it by now, also.
And when I got Ehrlichman on the telephone about, oh, quarter of eight, or so, he told me that he just happened to be going back into the office and he would enjoy chatting with me, if I would come by his office. I said, "All right." I really said not much more, and then called my lawyer, Mr. Shaffer, and told him that Ehrlichman wanted to meet with me. I told Mr. Shaffer I didn't want to meet with Ehrlichman but I thought, indeed, I should meet with the President and tell him what I had done. Mr. Shaffer agreed.

I tried to reach Rosemary Woods, thinking that she would take the message directly to the President without having to go through Haldeman and Ehrlichman. She was at a funeral out of the city. So I was left with no alternative but to go through Mr. Haldeman and I called Mr. Higby.

I gave him a message, which I wrote down right after I did it, and I think it's a public document now.

As a result of that call to Mr. Higby, in which I indicated he should inform Haldeman and Ehrlichman and, I assumed, Mr. Haldeman would inform the President, my phone started ringing about thirty minutes later. And it was the White House operator indicating that the President wanted to meet with me about 9:00 o'clock.

I told her I would be in as soon as I could get in, and I don't think I arrived quite at 9:00, but shortly thereafter, and that's what prompted me --
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., AUGUST 3, 6, 7; SEPTEMBER 24 AND 25, 1973
Book 9

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WASHINGTON : 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
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The afternoon meeting between the President and Henry Petersen referred to by Senator Gurney in the bracketed portion of page 3648 actually took place on April 15, 1973.
man to conduct an investigation. I never asked him for the product of Ehrlichman's investigation, nor do I know what it consisted of.

Mr. Thompsox. Did you ever discuss with the President the possibility of his talking to Liddy or Liddy's lawyer?

Mr. Petersen. No, sir. During the course—I did suggest to the President that he ought to hear John Dean himself, that he ought to hear from John Dean what John Dean was telling the prosecutors to aid the President in making up his mind with respect to his future course of conduct toward Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

At my home later that Sunday evening, on April 15, Charlie Shaffer, Mr. Dean's lawyer, called and present were Mr. Silbert and Mr. Glazer, stated that he—Dean had had a call from Mr. Ehrlichman who wanted to meet with Dean and requested our advice. We told him not to meet with Mr. Ehrlichman but that it would be perfectly agreeable to meet with the President. Thereafter he called back and said that Mr. Dean had sent a message back to the White House suggesting that he would be happy to meet with the President, and what have you. The President called me that evening and said he had received that message and should he meet with him and I said by all means. He called again to say that the meeting had been set up. He called then again around 9:30 or 9:45—I did not know that Mr. Dean was still there—and said that he had received information that Liddy was waiting for some sort of signal from the White House, and the President, as to whether or not he should be cooperative or testify and the President charged me with conveying that information to Mr. Liddy. I got in touch with Mr. Tom Kenney, who is local counsel for Mr. Liddy, passed that message on to him. I was thereafter called around midnight by Mr. Maroulis, who is principal counsel for Mr. Liddy and imparted the same information, namely, that Mr. Liddy was not cooperating out of any sense of misguided loyalty or loyalty to the administration, or what have you, that he was misguided and the President wanted him to cooperate. Mr. Maroulis thanked me for the information and that was it. We have not heard from Mr. Liddy.

Mr. Thompsox. Did the President ever tell you anything else that was discussed in his conversation with Dean on April 15?

Mr. Petersen. No; I did not want to hear it.

Mr. Thompsox. Why?

Mr. Petersen. The reason I did not want to hear it was because we were in negotiation with Mr. Dean and that negotiation was predicated upon certain promises, that he would make certain disclosures to us in order for us to determine whether or not an immunity should be accorded him upon our representation that we would not use that information directly or indirectly against him if no deal was struck. So I did not want to receive information that came from Mr. Dean from any other source in order to keep that situation, very difficult situation, as clean as it could possibly be. The President offered to let me hear the tape and I did not want to hear it.

Mr. Thompsox. Up until April 30, when Dean was discharged, had Dean told the prosecutors anything that would in any way implicate the President in obstruction of justice or anything along those lines? Did he mention a September 15 conversation, for example, or that he had previously told the President of these matters and the President had failed to act?
Senator Gurney. Did you know at any time, Mr. Petersen, that Hal- deman and Dean were trying to get the CIA to stop the investigation of the FBI as far as the Mexican money was concerned?

Mr. Petersen. Only to the extent of Pat Gray's conversation with me on or around July 5.

Senator Gurney. What did he tell you at that time?

Mr. Petersen. He didn’t tell me he had been contacted by the White House. He told me he had been in contact with CIA and that there was some, it was a very guarded conversation type of thing, well, need to know situation, and I simply, well, that may be, but don’t accept that unless you accept it in writing, but I had no more information than that on that.

Senator Gurney. You didn’t know anything about the White House involvement?

Mr. Petersen. No.

Senator Gurney. Just CIA?

Mr. Petersen. That is right.

Senator Gurney. At any time during this whole sad affair, either last year or this year, until the events that transpired around April did anybody try to pressure you to stop or slow down or soft-pedal this investigation that you were in charge of?

Mr. Petersen. No, sir, the only thing that could possibly cast in that category would be the call from Ehrlichman with respect to Stans' subpoena and, you know, frankly, that didn’t bother me too much, As I told Kleindienst, he just made a mistake. But no one else. There was some pressure to get the indictment out, get the indictment, they wanted it out by September 1. We couldn’t do that, I frankly promised them September 1, we couldn’t do it until September 15. That didn’t impair the investigation. We were ready to go to trial in November, but Judge Sirica had a bad back and continued the thing on his own motion.

Senator Gurney. Let me inquire about the contacts you had with the President of the United States. The log here shows a great many phone-calls as well as some meetings. Of course, you have covered some of them.

Mr. Petersen. Some of them, yes, sir.

Senator Gurney. What about those four phone calls which the President initiated to you after your afternoon meeting with him on April 5. What were those about?

Mr. Petersen. The first was should I meet with John Dean. Yes. The second was a meeting has been set up, The third was if Liddy is not talking because of any sense of misguided loyalty to me, you had better disabuse him and I am issuing orders to you to that effect. The fourth one, I have had a meeting with Dean, he has given me basically what he has told you and I think it has been helpful.

Senator Gurney. Without going over all of these, because I know you have covered some of them, but I can’t identify what you have and what you haven’t. Generally, what was the President calling you about during this period of time?

Mr. Petersen. Status reports, immunity, the Ellsberg thing, Strachan's testimony. We had Strachan like this and Magruder on one side and Strachan on the other and we finally decided to put them both
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
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Stock Number 5570-01963
No. 34-42—(1005) Memorandum for the file re: Maroulis conversation with Dean on March 29, 1973, concerning Maroulis’ client, G. Gordon Liddy

No. 34-43—(1006) John Dean’s Camp David report with attached handwritten notes

No. 34-44—(1010) Summation of Segretti involvement in Watergate case

No. 34-45—(1011) Memorandum by John Dean re: Meeting with John Mitchell, April 10, 1973

No. 34-46—(1012) Memorandum by John Dean of his meeting with Fred LaRue on April 13, 1973, re: LaRue’s appearance before grand jury

No. 34-47—(1013) List of names denoting “Pre, post, and potential o/j”

No. 34-48—(1014) Message from John Dean to the President, April 15, 1973

No. 34-49—(1017) Two letters to the President on White House stationery, dated April 16, 1973. (Letter of resignation and letter requesting indefinite leave of absence)

No. 34-50—(1018) Letter from John Dean to the President, April 16, 1973, Request for indefinite leave of absence

No. 34-51—(1018) Draft statement re: Grand jury’s investigation into Watergate and leave-of-absence requests from H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and John Dean

No. 35—(1062) Document concerning operational restraints on intelligence collection

No. 36—(1062) Memorandum for Mr. Huston from H.R. Haldeman re: Domestic intelligence review, dated July 14, 1970

No. 37—(1062) Memorandum for H.R. Haldeman from Tom Huston re: Domestic intelligence, dated August 6, 1970

No. 38—(1062) Memorandum from Tom Huston to H.R. Haldeman, dated August 7, 1970. Subject: Domestic Intelligence Review


No. 40—(1062) Memorandum dated September 10, 1970, for H.R. Haldeman from Tom Huston re: Future air hijackings and use of increased intelligence information

No. 41—(1062) Note from Sol Lindenbaum to John Dean with attached memorandums regarding procedures to commence domestic intelligence operation

No. 42—(1062) Memorandum dated September 21, 1970, to H.R. Haldeman from Tom Huston. Subject: IRS and Ideological Organizations, with attachments

No. 43—(1062) Submitted for identification only, not for publication, and will be retained in the files of the committee.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record.
Message to the P
8:15

Sun April 15th

To Higby from H—to P
also inform E

(1) I hope you understand that my actions are motivated by total loyalty to you & the Presidency. If that is not clear now, I believe it will become clear.

(2) E has requested to meet with me tonight, but I believe it is inappropriate for me to meet with him at this time.

(3) I am ready & willing to meet with you at any time to discuss the matter.

(4) You should take your counsel from Henry Petersen who I assure you doesn't want the Presidency hurt.

Note.—This is printed from handwritten notes which were not legible enough for photographing. The original copy is retained in committee files.

(1313)
On April 15, 1973, at some hour not stated in the transcript, Higby telephoned Haldeman and gave him the following message from Dean for the President: "(1) I hope you understand my actions are motivated totally out of loyalty . . . . to you and the President . . . . [a]nd if it's not clear now . . . . it will become clear." "(2) Ehrlichman requested to meet tonight . . . . but I feel inappropriate at this time . . . . I am ready and willing to meet with you, meaning the President," Higby said, "at any time to discuss these matters." "(3) I think you, meaning the President," Higby said, "should take your counsel from Henry Petersen who I assure you does not want the Presidency hurt."

Higby said Dean had called from his home, and would not speak directly to Haldeman.
On April 15, 1973, the President telephoned Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. Their conversation lasted from 8:14 to 8:18 p.m. The President asked Petersen if there was anything further he wanted to report before their 12:30 meeting the following day. Petersen replied that there was not really anything that added to what they had discussed earlier that day. (p.1)

Petersen told the President that Dean's counsel told the prosecutors that he would not permit Dean to plead guilty to any charges unless some agreement could be worked out. Petersen explained to the President that without an agreement, Dean would go to trial and plead not guilty. Petersen stated that Dean's counsel took the position "that it would be a travesty to try Dean and not try Ehrlichman and Haldeman." (pp. 1-2)

The President asked Petersen whether that inhibited them from using the information supplied by Dean during his preliminary negotiations with the prosecutors. Petersen told the President that the information could not be used for any purpose unless Dean pleaded. (p. 2)

Petersen told the President that Dean had received a telephone call from Ehrlichman requesting a meeting with Dean for eight o'clock that evening. Petersen said that they suggested to Dean that he not meet with Ehrlichman. Petersen said that they had been advised by Dean's counsel that Dean was writing a note to the President advising him that what Dean was doing was in the President's interests and that would become apparent as the situation unfolded. (pp. 2-3)
Petersen told the President that he saw no objection to the President's meeting with Dean. The President told Petersen that he was going to meet Dean because he was "not going to screw around with this thing." Petersen agreed with the President's suggestion that the President ask Dean to tell him the whole truth. (p. 3)

Petersen advised the President that a signal from him might bring out the truth from Liddy. (p. 3) Petersen said that Liddy had indicated to Mitchell that he would do whatever he was told to do by Mitchell. Petersen suggested to the President that the prosecutors tell Liddy that they had discussed the situation with the President and he believed it was vitally important that Liddy tell all he knew. The President said, "I get it. Uh huh. OK." (p. 4)
On April 15, 1973 the President called Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen and they spoke between 8:25 and 8:26 p.m. The President told Petersen that he was trying to reach Dean but had not been able to get him because Dean was in transit. The President said he would report to Petersen after he saw Dean. (p. 1)

The President told Petersen that he did not know Liddy or have control over him, but Petersen was to tell Liddy that the President wanted everybody involved to tell everything they knew. The President suggested that Petersen contact Liddy's lawyer that night, saying "I don't want to stall around." (p. 1)

Petersen told the President that Liddy was taking orders from higher authority and "since you are the highest authority he will stand in line if we handle it discretly." (p. 2) The President said that Petersen was to tell everyone that he wished them to talk and to tell the truth; "You just say those are your orders." (p. 2)
The President talked with Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

The President talked with television writer and producer Paul W. Keyes.

The President telephoned his Press Secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler. The call was not completed.

The President talked with his Assistant, Henry A. Kissinger.

The President talked with Mr. Ziegler.

The President was telephoned by Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst. The President's Special Assistant, Stephen B. Bull, took the call.

The President had breakfast.

The President was telephoned by Mr. Kissinger. Mr. Bull took the call.

The President talked with Attorney General Kleindienst.

The President talked with Mr. Kissinger.

The President went to the Oval Office.

The President met with his Assistant, John D. Ehrlichman.

The President returned to the second floor Residence.

The President and the First Lady went to the Yellow Oval Room.

The President and the First Lady had coffee with:

Rev. Edward V. Hill, pastor of the Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church, Los Angeles, California

Mrs. Edward V. Hill

The Presidential party went to the East Room.

The President and the First Lady hosted a worship service conducted by Rev. Mr. Hill. The Rochester Male Chorus of Rochester, Minnesota also participated in the service. For a list of guests, see APPENDIX "A."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12:11</td>
<td>The President and the First Lady, accompanied by Rev. Mr. and Mrs. Hill, went to the State Dining Room. En route, they participated in a photo opportunity at the foot of the Grand Staircase. White House photographer, in/out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:11</td>
<td>The President and the First Lady received their guests. Members of the press, in/out White House photographer, in/out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:05</td>
<td>The President and the First Lady went to the Grand Hall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:05</td>
<td>The President and the First Lady participated in a photo opportunity with the Rochester Male Chorus. White House photographer, in/out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:11</td>
<td>The President went to his office in the EOB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:12</td>
<td>The President met with Attorney General Kleindienst.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:22</td>
<td>The President met with Mr. Ehrlichman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:30</td>
<td>The President talked with his Assistant, H. R. Haldeman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:27</td>
<td>The President was telephoned by Attorney General Kleindienst. The call was not completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:36</td>
<td>The President talked with Attorney General Kleindienst.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:48</td>
<td>The President telephoned Mr. Rebozo. The call was not completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:50</td>
<td>The President met with: Attorney General Kleindienst Henry E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:00</td>
<td>The President telephoned Mr. Ehrlichman. The call was not completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:17</td>
<td>The President went to West Executive Avenue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:25</td>
<td>The President and Mr. Rebozo motored from the EOB to Pier One of the Washington Navy Yard. En route, the President greeted members of the crowd assembled at the north exit of West Executive Avenue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:32</td>
<td>The President and Mr. Rebozo boarded the Sequoia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The President and Mr. Rebozo were greeted by Lt. Cdr. Andrew J. Combe, Captain of the Sequoia.

The President went boating on the Sequoia. He was accompanied by:
- Mr. Rebozo
- Lt. Col. William L. Golden, Military Aide
- Manolo Sanchez, valet

The Sequoia docked at Pier One of the Washington Navy Yard.

The President and Mr. Rebozo motored from the Washington Navy Yard to West Executive Avenue.

The President returned to his office in the EOB.

The President met with:
- Mr. Ehrlichman
- Mr. Haldeman

The President talked with Mr. Petersen.

The President talked with Mr. Petersen.

The President met with his Counsel, John W. Dean III.

The President talked with Mr. Petersen.

The President met with:
- Mr. Haldeman
- Mr. Ehrlichman

The President returned to the second floor Residence.

The President talked with Mr. Petersen.
On April 15, 1973 from 9:17 to 10:12 p.m., the President met with John Dean in the President's EOB office. Dean has testified that he reported to the President that he had been to the prosecutors; that the President asked him about Haldeman's knowledge of the Liddy plans; that the President stated he had been joking when he said it would be easy to raise $1 million to pay for maintaining the silence of the Watergate defendants; and that the President said in a nearly inaudible tone that he had been foolish to discuss Hunt's clemency with Colson. Dean also has testified that he told the President he had not discussed with the prosecutors his conversations with the President and that the President told him that he could not tell the prosecutors about national security matters or about any of the conversations between the President and Dean. Dean has testified that the nature of the President's questions led him to think that the President was taping the conversation. The President's notes of this meeting indicate that the President asked Dean what he had told Kalmbach about the purpose of the money and that Dean said he had briefed Haldeman and Ehrlichman every inch of the way. During this meeting the President telephoned Petersen from 9:39 to 9:41 p.m. and instructed Petersen to contact Liddy's attorney and tell him that the President wanted Liddy to tell everything he knows.

The President has stated that the tape on the recorder for his EOB office ran out on the afternoon of April 15, 1973. In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording and other evidence of his
telephone conversation with Petersen, the President has produced an edited transcript of that recording. A summary of that transcript has been prepared.

56.1 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, February 14, 1974, 22-24 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
56.2 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1015-17.
56.3 President Nixon notes, April 15, 1973, 1-2 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
56.4 President Nixon daily diary, April 15, 1973, Exhibit 20, In re Grand Jury.
56.5 White House memorandum of substance of Dean's calls and meetings with the President, SSC Exhibit No. 70A, 4 SSC 1800.
56.6 Summary of White House edited transcript of a telephone conversation between the President and Henry Petersen from 9:39 to 9:41 p.m., April 15, 1973, prepared by House Judiciary Committee staff.
56.7 Henry Petersen testimony, 9 SSC 3648.
56.8 President Nixon statement, November 12, 1973, 9 Presidential Documents 1331.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

IN RE: POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF 18 USC 2511 and 2512

The testimony of JOHN W. DEAN, III, was presented to a full quorum of the Grand Jury.

BEFORE:

RICHARD BEN-VENISTE, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

JILL VOLNER
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

GERALD GOLDMAN, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

GEORGE T. FRAMPTON, JR., ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice
And when I got Ehrlichman on the telephone about, oh, quarter of eight, or so, he told me that he just happened to be going back into the office and he would enjoy chatting with me, if I would come by his office. I said, "All right." I really said not much more, and then called my lawyer, Mr. Shaffer, and told him that Ehrlichman wanted to meet with me. I told Mr. Shaffer I didn't want to meet with Ehrlichman but I thought, indeed, I should meet with the President and tell him what I had done. Mr. Shaffer agreed.

I tried to reach Rosemary Woods, thinking that she would take the message directly to the President without having to go through Haldeman and Ehrlichman. She was at a funeral out of the city. So I was left with no alternative but to go through Mr. Haldeman and I called Mr. Higby.

I gave him a message, which I wrote down right after I did it, and I think it's a public document now.

As a result of that call to Mr. Higby, in which I indicated he should inform Haldeman and Ehrlichman and, I assumed, Mr. Haldeman would inform the President, my phone started ringing about thirty minutes later. And it was the White House operator indicating that the President wanted to meet with me about 9:00 o'clock.

I told her I would be in as soon as I could get in, and I don't think I arrived quite at 9:00, but shortly thereafter, and that's what prompted me --
Q What was the substance of the conversation on the 15th?

A Well, the meeting was much different from most meetings I have had with the President. I was uncomfortable -- very uncomfortable -- because I had taken it upon myself to go to the prosecutors, and thought I ought to tell him that.

So I initiated what I had done and why I had done it and then he began asking me a series of rather leading questions and I provided him the answers to the questions as we went along.

One time, during the conversation, the question of Mr. Liddy coming forward came up and he interrupted our meeting to call Mr. Petersen and tell him my suggestion, that he might personally meet with Mr. Maroulis and have Mr. Liddy come forward.

He asked me -- he talked about immunity and I told him I had no deal for immunity with the prosecutors, and he told me, well, there was nothing he would do that would interfere with my discussions with the prosecutors.

At one point in the meeting, he mentioned to me something I had forgotten about. It was the fact that we had discussed that there would be no problem to raise a million dollars to pay these people, the defendants, and he told me I should understand that he was only joking when he raised
that.

He also asked me if I had conversations with the prosecutors about my conversations with him, and I told him, no, I had not -- which I had not. And he told me I could not have such conversations with the prosecutors; that that was Executive Privilege or national security information.

He -- at one point, he got up and went over to the corner of his office and raised the question of his conversation with Mr. Colson regarding clemency for Hunt. He said to me that he was foolish to talk to Mr. Colson, wasn't he, and I don't recall that I responded to his comment.

It was a wide-ranging meeting. He was searching for a date, at one time in the meeting. He asked me if I remembered when I'd given him my counsel on the Presidency speech. He said was that the 21st, and I said I wasn't certain of the date; which I wasn't, at that time. I said I would check, try to figure it out. I just couldn't answer it specifically.

As I say, it was a very wide-ranging conversation. He was doing most of the questioning and trying to lead me along into the answers I presume he wanted.

Q Now, on the 16th, you had conversations with the President, I believe, on two occasions?

A That is correct.

Q And this Grand Jury has also heard tape recordings of those conversations, so it isn't necessary to go into them.
dienst and Petersen and the fact that I had been to the prosecutors had obviously come out. As I have noted earlier, I had not at any time discussed Presidential involvement with the prosecutors so the discussions that Petersen and Kleindienst had with the President obviously focused on the involvement of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean, Mitchell, Magruder, Strachan, and others that I had discussed. After Ehrlichman's call, I called Mr. Shaffer and we discussed the wisdom of the meetings. I told him I did not want to meet with Ehrlichman and he agreed. Subsequently, I tried to reach Ehrlichman to turn the meeting off but I learned that he was already en route to the office.

I called Mr. Shaffer back and told him that I thought I ought to meet with the President and I should call Rosemary Woods and have her give a message to the President. He said that he saw no problem with my talking with the President to tell him why I had gone to the prosecutors. I attempted to reach Rosemary Woods but she was out of the city. I then wrote out a message for the President and phoned Mr. Higby and requested that Higby relate the matter to Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and on to the President. I have submitted a copy to the committee of the message I sent to the President at 8:15 Sunday, April 15.

[The document was marked exhibit No. 34-48.*]

Mr. Dean. In short, I told the President that I hoped he did not interpret my going to the prosecutors as an act of disloyalty, that I did not wish to speak with Ehrlichman at this time, that I would meet with him if he wished to discuss the matter with me, and that I thought that he should get his legal advice from Henry Petersen. Within 45 minutes of sending this message I had a call from the White House operator informing me that the President wished to meet with me at 9 o'clock.

It was shortly after 9 when I arrived at the President's EOB office. As I was driving into the White House I wondered to myself if the meeting was a set-up. By a set-up I mean, was the President going to try to smoke out of me what Ehrlichman and Haldeman obviously had been trying to do and had not been able to do, would not be able to get out of me because they knew very well that I would not play any games with the President. I decided I could not worry about that and I had a duty to explain to the President why I was doing what I had done.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT—APRIL 15

The President was very cordial when we met. I was somewhat shaken when I went in to meet him because I knew I had taken it upon myself to end the coverup and what I had started was going to cause serious problems for the President. I shall attempt to recall the highlights of the conversation that transpired on the meeting which occurred about 9 o'clock on April 15.

I told the President that I had gone to the prosecutors. And, that I did not believe that this was an act of disloyalty but, rather in the end it would be an act of loyalty. I told him I felt this matter had to end. I informed the President that I told the prosecutors of my own involvement and the involvement of others. At one point in the conversation I recall the President asking me about Haldeman's knowledge.

*See p. 1313.
of the Liddy plans. He asked me if I had told him earlier about the fact that I had met with Haldeman after the second meeting in Mitchell's office and told Haldeman what was going on and my reaction to what was going on. I told the President that I had reported this fact to him earlier. The President then made some reference to Henry Petersen asking about why Haldeman had not turned it off at that point and told me to testify that I had told Haldeman about the meeting in Mitchell's office. The President almost from the outset began asking me a number of leading questions, which was somewhat unlike his normal conversational relationships I had had with him, which made me think that the conversation was being taped and that a record was being made to protect himself. Although I became aware of this because of the nature of the conversation, I decided that I did not know it for a fact and that I had to believe that the President would not tape such a conversation.

Some question came up, by the President, as to whether I had immunity. As best as I can recall, I told him my lawyers had discussed this with the prosecutors but certainly I had no deal with the Government. He told me that he did not want to do anything to hurt my negotiations with the Government. I do not recall his comment on his comment regarding that. I also recall that the conversation turned to the matter of Liddy not talking. He said something about Liddy was waiting for a signal and I told him that possibly he was waiting for a signal from the President.

I discussed with him the fact that maybe if Liddy's lawyer met with him that Liddy would begin to open up because I said that I thought that that would be very helpful if Liddy did talk. It was during this part of the conversation that the President picked up the telephone and called Henry Petersen and pretended with Petersen that I was not in the room but that the matter of Liddy's coming forward and talking had arisen during our conversation. The President relayed to Petersen that if Liddy's lawyer wanted to see him to get a signal that the President was willing to do this.

The President also asked me about Petersen and I told him if anyone could give him good advice Henry Petersen could. The President also asked me if I remembered what day it was in March that I had reported to him on some of the details of the Watergate matter. He said that he thought it was the 21st but was not certain. I said that I could not recall for certain without checking.

At another point in the conversation the matter of the degree of discussions that I had had with the prosecutors came up and I informed the President that I had had no discussions with the prosecutors relating to conversations I had had with him or in anything in the area of national security. The President told me that I could not talk about national security areas and that I should not talk about conversations I had had with him because they were privileged conversations.

Toward the end of the conversation the President recalled the fact that at one point we had discussed the difficulty in raising money and that he had said that $1 million was nothing to raise to pay to maintain the silence of the defendants. He said that he had, of course, only been joking when he made that comment. As the conversation went on, and it is impossible for me to recall anything other than the high
points of it, I became more convinced that the President was seeking to elicit testimony from me and put his perspective on the record and get me to agree to it.

The most interesting thing that happened during the conversation was, very near the end, he got up out of his chair, went behind his chair to the corner of the Executive Office Building office and in a nearly inaudible tone said to me he was probably foolish to have discussed Hunt's clemency with Colson. I do not recall that I responded. The conversation ended shortly thereafter.

As I was on my way out of the office after exchanging parting pleasantries, I told the President that I hoped that my going to the prosecutors and telling the truth would not result in the impeachment of the President. He jokingly said, "I certainly hope so also," and he said that it would be handled properly.

**MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT—APRIL 16**

I received word on Monday morning, April 16, that the President had requested I come to the oval office. I arrived at his office about 9:30, and rather than going to the reception entrance normally used by other members of the staff and myself. I went into Mr. Steve Bull's office. Mr. Bull is the one who had informed me that the President wanted to see me, so I went to his office.

Mr. Bull told me I would have to wait a few minutes because the President was in another meeting. A few minutes later Haldeman and Ehrlichman emerged laughing from the President's office and when they saw me in Mr. Bull's office their faces dropped. I said hello, they put on a serious—then they said hello, put on a serious look and departed. I went into the President's office.

The President told me that he had been thinking about this entire matter and thought it might be a good idea if he had in his drawer a letter from me requesting that he accept my resignation or in the alternative an indefinite leave of absence. He said that he had prepared two letters for my signature and he would not do anything with them at this time but thought it would be good if he had them. He then passed me a manila file folder with two letters in them. The President said that he had prepared the letters himself and that no one would know I had signed them. I read the letters and was amazed at what I was being asked to sign. I have submitted to the committee copies of the letters, but since they are very brief, I will read them.

[The letters were marked exhibit No. 34–49.*]

**Mr. Deax.** The first letter, dated April 16, 1973, read:

Dear Mr. President, in view of my increasing involvement in the Watergate matter, my impending appearance before the grand jury and the probability of its action, I request an immediate and indefinite leave of absence from my position on your staff.

The second letter, which was even more incriminating, read:

Dear Mr. President, as a result of my involvement in the Watergate matter, which we discussed last night and today, I tender you my resignation, effective at once.

*See p. 1344.
Dear Recommenda 56.3
be studied carefully.

Jenner — Por — Latia — Pre did not

[3892]
Dean,

Totally preoccupied with CD.

Mr. Grubnik says, "Come on, go to Dean, then Peter may do something."

4/15/73

Problem for E -

- Dear called if C had objection to Rand domination money for inflation.

Howard was Action in this.

What about the 750? What was in the president's letter? What did you tell Rand about your plan? Should I keep E & H on? What about Colon & Hunt?

Eichenberg was Kroll. I think I'll say, "In the interest of the Madison..."

I'm afraid of the M gyrations.
The case was growing.

I [illegible] to tell the facts.

What [illegible] to use it.

Told [illegible] lawyer.

Told [illegible] the whole truth.

H & E involved in obstrucion.

Regarded [illegible] motion.

[illegible] will testify in court.

[illegible] will testify in court.


For to raise $ for defense.

Got 400,000 before election.

[illegible] of 378.

Broad H & E every inch, J. Way.

Obstructed justice as much as imagination of men.

[illegible] by circumstances.

[illegible] at the [illegible].

Return daily report as J. J.

[illegible] - E + Dean - on cleaning.

[illegible] by circumstances.

[illegible] / 000002

[illegible] 19 - [illegible] expected to

Get content of nation.

[illegible]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>IN</th>
<th>OUT</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12:09</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President talked with Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:20</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President talked with television writer and producer Paul W. Keyes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:33</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President telephoned his Press Secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler. The call was not completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:35</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President talked with his Assistant, Henry A. Kissinger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:01</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President talked with Mr. Ziegler.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:41</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President was telephoned by Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst. The President's Special Assistant, Stephen B. Bull, took the call.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:45</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President had breakfast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:02</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President was telephoned by Mr. Kissinger. Mr. Bull took the call.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:13</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President talked with Attorney General Kleindienst.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:16</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President talked with Mr. Kissinger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:35</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President went to the Oval Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:35?</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>11:15</td>
<td>The President met with his Assistant, John D. Ehrlichman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The President returned to the second floor Residence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The President and the First Lady went to the Yellow Oval Room.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:17</td>
<td></td>
<td>11:32</td>
<td>The President and the First Lady had coffee with: Rev. Edward V. Hill, pastor of the Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church, Los Angeles, California Mrs. Edward V. Hill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:32</td>
<td></td>
<td>11:33</td>
<td>The Presidential party went to the East Room.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:33</td>
<td></td>
<td>12:07</td>
<td>The President and the First Lady hosted a worship service conducted by Rev. Mr. Hill. The Rochester Male Chorus of Rochester, Minnesota also participated in the service. For a list of guests, see APPENDIX &quot;A.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**THE WHITE HOUSE**
WASHINGTON, D.C.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>PHONE Pre-Placed R-Received</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12:11</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President and the First Lady, accompanied by Rev. Mr. and Mrs. Hill, went to the State Dining Room. Enroute, they participated in a photo opportunity at the foot of the Grand Staircase. White House photographer, in/out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:11</td>
<td>1:05</td>
<td>The President and the First Lady received their guests. Members of the press, in/out White House photographer, in/out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:05</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President and the First Lady went to the Grand Hall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:05</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President and the First Lady participated in a photo opportunity with the Rochester Male Chorus. White House photographer, in/out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:11</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President went to his office in the EOB.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1:12</td>
<td>2:22</td>
<td>The President met with Attorney General Kleindienst.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:30</td>
<td>3:30</td>
<td>The President met with Mr. Ehrlichman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:27</td>
<td>3:44</td>
<td>The President talked with his Assistant, H. R. Haldeman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:36</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>The President was telephoned by Attorney General Kleindienst. The call was not completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:48</td>
<td>3:49</td>
<td>The President talked with Attorney General Kleindienst.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:50</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>The President telephoned Mr. Rebozo. The call was not completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:00</td>
<td>5:15</td>
<td>The President met with: Attorney General Kleindienst Henry E. Putersen, Assistant Attorney General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:17</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>The President telephoned Mr. Ehrlichman. The call was not completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:25</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President went to West Executive Avenue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:25</td>
<td>5:32</td>
<td>The President and Mr. Rebozo motored from the EOB to Pier One of the Washington Navy Yard. Enroute, the President greeted members of the crowd assembled at the north exit of West Executive Avenue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:32</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President and Mr. Rebozo boarded the Sequoia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME</td>
<td>PHONE P - Placed</td>
<td>ACTIVITY</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:37</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President and Mr. Rebozo were greeted by Lt. Cdr. Andrew J. Combe, Captain of the Sequoia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The President went boating on the Sequoia. He was accompanied by:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Rebozo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. Col. William L. Golden, Military Aide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Manolo Sanchez, valet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:24</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Sequoia docked at Pier One of the Washington Navy Yard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:34</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President and Mr. Rebozo motored from the Washington Navy Yard to West Executive Avenue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:43</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President returned to his office in the EOB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:50</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President met with:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Ehrlichman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Haldeman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:14</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President talked with Mr. Petersen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:25</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President talked with Mr. Petersen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:17</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President met with his Counsel, John W. Dean III.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:39</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President talked with Mr. Petersen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:16</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President met with:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Haldeman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Ehrlichman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:21</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President returned to the second floor Residence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:45</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President talked with Mr. Petersen.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 27, 28, 29, AND JULY 10, 1973
Book 4

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973

[3900]
The following page is an excerpt from "Memorandum of Substance of Dean's Calls and Meetings with the President," a document prepared in June 1973 by Fred D. Thompson, Minority Counsel to the Senate Select Committee, following a conversation with J. Fred Buzhardt, Special Counsel to the President. The entire document, accompanied by Mr. Thompson's affidavit concerning his conversation with Mr. Buzhardt, is reprinted as Exhibit 70A, 4 SSC 1794-1800.
No. 47—(1349) Memorandum for John Dean from Jack Caulfield. Subject: Opposition Activity.

No. 45—(1350) Memorandum prepared by John Dean for members of the White House staff. Subject: Dealing with our Political Enemies.

No. 49—(1350) Memorandum for John Dean from Charles Colson re: Names given top priority on enemies list.

No. 50—(1350) Memorandum for Larry Higby from John Dean concerning names for enemies list.

No. 51—(1350) Section of a news summary from Higby to Dean, indicating that DNC treasurer Robert Strauss should be on the list.

No. 52—(1350) Additions to enemies list sent to John Dean from Gordon Strachan.

No. 53—(1350) Memorandum for John Dean from Gordon Strachan. Subject: Political Enemies. (Re: Chet Huntley.)

No. 54—(1350) Memorandum to John Dean from Gordon Strachan with attached news summary indicating that J. Irwin Miller might be considered for enemies list.

No. 55—(1350) Memorandum from a member of Charles Colson's staff re: People who attended a rally for a "dump Nixon" program.

No. 56—(1350) List of McGovern campaign staff with asterisks beside key names that were to be included in the opponents project.

Nos. 57 and 58—(1358) Marked for identification only and are not for publication.

No. 59—(1353) Bank statement on account of John Wesley [sic] Dean.

No. 60—(1409) Additional document updating the enemies list, entitled "Politicos Continued".

No. 61—(1409) Memorandum from member of Charles Colson's staff re: Opponents Lists.

No. 62—(1409) Memorandum re: Updating of opponents list.

No. 63—(1410) Document entitled "Corporate Executives Committee for Peace, Trip to Washington—June 25, 1970." This document also is an update of the enemies list.

No. 64—(1410) List of Democratic contributors of $25,000 or more in 1968 campaigns (from New York Times Story, June 20, 1971).

No. 65—(1410) Memorandum re: List of Muskie contributors to be added to opponents list.

No. 66—(1412) Letter from J. Fred Buzhardt, special counsel to the President, to Senator Inouye re: Questions and a memorandum previously furnished the committee in questioning Mr. Dean.

No. 67—(1412) Memo and questions pertaining to exhibit No. 68.

No. 68—(1525) Memorandum of Law, Admissibility of Hearsay Statements of a Co-conspirator, Submitted by Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director, Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities.

No. 69—(1557) Letter from Congressman Garry Brown to Senator Ervin re: Statements made by Mr. Dean.

No. 70—(1563) Letter from Senator Strom Thurmond to Senators Baker and Gurney and Mr. Fred Thompson re: Mr. Harry Dent declining to do research against Senator Ervin.

No. 70A—(1569) Detailed notes of Fred D. Thompson, minority counsel, of telephone conversation with J. Fred Buzhardt, special counsel to the President re: Conversation between the President and Mr. Dean.

No. 71—(1573) Letter to Mr. Garnett D. Insee, Suburban Trust Co., from Shaffer, McKeever & Fitzpatrick with enclosures.

No. 72—(1593) Request for transportation dated October 11, 1972.

No. 73—(1393) Request for transportation dated October 19, 1972.


Note.—Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record.
MEMORANDUM OF SUBSTANCE OF DEAN'S CALLS
AND MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT

September 15, 1972
Dean reported on IRS investigation of Larry O'Brien.
Dean reported on Watergate indictments.

February 27, 1973
Discussed executive privilege, minority counsel
for Watergate Committee. Dean suggested White
House aides submit answers to interrogatories.

February 28, 1973
President inquired of Watergate, Dean said no White
House involvement, Stan was victim of circumstances.
Colson was lightning rod because of his reputation.
Discussed wiretappings which had been brought up
in the Gray hearings. Sullivan, Deputy Director,
was friend of Dean and Dean suggested they make
sure that wiretaps of prior years (other Administra-
tions) be made known.

March 1, 1973
Preparation for press conference -- go over question
and answer book. Was decided the question would
come up as to why Dean was sitting in on FBI inter-
views and that the reason was he was conducting an
investigation for the President. President asked
Dean to write a report. Dean was also critical of
Gray.

(March 2 press conference)

March 6, 1973
Discussed executive privilege guidelines, decided
to cover former White House personnel as well as

March 7, 1973
Again discussion executive privilege guidelines.
Dean again told the President the White House was
clear. The President inquired as to how Pat Gray
was doing. Dean informed him E.B. Williams had
dropped out of the civil case.
March 23, 1973

The President called Dean and told him to go to Camp David. Later that afternoon he called Dean at Camp David to check on his progress.

(March 30: After it became obvious Dean would write no report, the President directed Ehrlichman to investigate.

On April 14 Ehrlichman reported possible Mitchell, Magruder and Dean involvement. The President called Kleindienst, who followed up. (Up until now the President had assumed Dean was getting much of his information from the Justice Department.) Kleindienst and Petersen focused in on possible involvement of Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Strachan.

On April 15 Petersen submitted a memo on Ehrlichman, Haldeman and Strachan. They also found out about Gray's destruction of documents.)

Dean along with almost everybody else was called in that day. The President told Dean that he must go before the grand jury without immunity.

The President asks Dean to resign. Had two drafts prepared for Dean's signature. Dean demanded Haldeman and Ehrlichman resign also.

(Petersen asked the President to hold off on firing Dean until they could get him before the grand jury.

On April 17 the President released his statement saying that no White House staffers would receive immunity.

On April 19 Dean said he would not be a scapegoat.

On April 27 Petersen told the President there is no use trying to get Dean to go before the grand jury, that he was demanding immunity.

On April 30 the President made his speech concerning Haldeman's and Ehrlichman's resignations and Dean's firing.)
On April 15, 1973 the President, while conferring with John Dean, telephoned Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. Their conversation lasted from 9:39 to 9:41 p.m. The President said that Dean thought it was important that Liddy's attorney, Maroulis, be told that the President wanted Liddy to tell everything he knew. The President told Petersen, "...if necessary, you haul him [Maroulis] in here and I will tell him." The President told Petersen to tell Maroulis that "I have called you directly tonight and that you have it direct from the President if he needs it from me, I will tell him." (p. 1)

The President asked Petersen about Dean's belief that Maroulis would accept the message from Petersen. Petersen replied that because Maroulis and Liddy were close friends, he thought the message would get to Liddy. The President reiterated that Petersen should first talk to Maroulis, and if necessary, Petersen should accompany him to see the President. The President continued by stating, "I don't want any things where he comes in and makes any motions -- you see what I mean?" The President said that the matter should be handled at Petersen's level, "rather than having me bring some attorney in and give him an order." The President summarized his position by directing Petersen to "do it at my direction. I think that will do the trick. If it doesn't I will see him myself." (pp. 1-2)
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., AUGUST 3, 6, 7; SEPTEMBER 24 AND 25, 1973

Book 9

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $3
The afternoon meeting between the President and Henry Petersen referred to by Senator Gurney in the bracketed portion of page 3648 actually took place on April 15, 1973.
Senator Gurney. Did you know at any time, Mr. Petersen, that Haldeman and Dean were trying to get the CIA to stop the investigation of the FBI as far as the Mexican money was concerned?

Mr. Petersen. Only to the extent of Pat Gray's conversation with me on or around July 5.

Senator Gurney. What did he tell you at that time?

Mr. Petersen. He didn't tell me he had been contacted by the White House. He told me he had been in contact with CIA and that there was some, it was a very guarded conversation type of thing, well, need to know situation, and I simply, well, that may be, but don't accept that unless you accept it in writing, but I had no more information than that on that.

Senator Gurney. You didn't know anything about the White House involvement?

Mr. Petersen. No.

Senator Gurney. Just CIA?

Mr. Petersen. That is right.

Senator Gurney. At any time during this whole sad affair, either last year or this year, until the events that transpired around April did anybody try to pressure you to stop or slow down or soft-pedal this investigation that you were in charge of?

Mr. Petersen. No, sir, the only thing that could possibly cast in that category would be the call from Ehrlichman with respect to Stans' subpoena and, you know, frankly, that didn't bother me too much. As I told Kleindienst, he just made a mistake. But no one else. There was some pressure to get the indictment out, get the indictment, they wanted it out by September 1. We couldn't do that. I frankly promised them September 1, we couldn't do it until September 15. That didn't impair the investigation. We were ready to go to trial in November, but Judge Sirica had a bad back and continued the thing on his own motion.

Senator Gurney. Let me inquire about the contacts you had with the President of the United States. The log here shows a great many phone calls as well as some meetings. Of course, you have covered some of them.

Mr. Petersen. Some of them, yes, sir.

Senator Gurney. What about those four phone calls which the President initiated to you after your afternoon meeting with him on April 5. What were those about?

Mr. Petersen. The first was should I meet with John Dean. Yes. The second was a meeting has been set up. The third was if Liddy is not talking because of any sense of misguided loyalty to me, you had better disabuse him and I am issuing orders to you to that effect. The fourth one, I have had a meeting with Dean, he has given me basically what he has told you and I think it has been helpful.

Senator Gurney. Without going over all of these, because I know you have covered some of them, but I can't identify what you have and what you haven't. Generally, what was the President calling you about during this period of time?

Mr. Petersen. Status reports, immunity, the Ellsberg thing, Strachan's testimony. We had Strachan like this and Magruder on one side and Strachan on the other and we finally decided to put them both
Statement by the President Outlining Procedures To Provide Information Related to the Watergate Investigation to the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. November 12, 1973

As a consequence of the public disclosure, 2 weeks ago, that two conversations of the President were not recorded on the White House recording system, doubts have arisen about just what happened to these conversations and why they were not recorded. The purpose of this statement is to help dispel those doubts and to spell out certain steps I will take to offer information to the court that will help determine the substance of all nine conversations subpoenaed by the court.

First, there are no missing tapes. There are two conversations requested by the courts which were not recorded. The first is a 4-minute conversation with the former Attorney General, John Mitchell, on June 20, 1972. The second is a meeting of 55 minutes with John Dean, late in the evening of Sunday, April 15, 1973.

There is no question in my mind but that the open-court hearing, now being conducted, will demonstrate to the court’s satisfaction the truth of our statements that these two conversations were never recorded. In fact there is no affirmative evidence to the contrary. I believe that when the court concludes its evaluation of the testimony and documentary evidence, public doubt on this issue will be completely and satisfactorily removed.

In the meantime, I believe it important to make a statement about this proceeding so that misconceptions about this matter do not persist, simply because certain basic facts are not presented to the American public.

First, the Senate Select Committee did not subpoena the substance of the two unrecorded conversations. That material was requested only by the Special Prosecutor, and the court, who believed the substance of nine presidential conversations was necessary for completion of the Watergate investigation.

We are complying fully with the Federal court decision. In seven of nine instances, the actual recording of the conversation is being submitted; this includes five conversations in which John Dean participated—September 15, 1972, March 13, 1973, two on March 21, 1973, one on March 22, 1973. For all nine conversations covered by the subpoena, such contemporaneous notes and memoranda as were made of the conversations are being provided in accordance with the court order.

Before discussing these matters, the issue of when and why the recorded conversations were listened to by me, and by others on my behalf, should be placed in chronological perspective.

On June 4, 1973, I listened to the tape recordings of a number of conversations I had with John Dean in order to refresh my memory of those discussions. All of the conversations to which I listened that day had taken place prior to March 21, 1973. My purpose in reviewing the recordings of my conversations with Mr. Dean was to confirm my recollection that he had not reported certain facts to me prior to March 21, 1973. In late April 1973, I asked H. R. Haldeman to listen and report on the conversation of March 21, 1973, in which he had been present for a substantial portion of the time. My primary purpose in having Mr. Haldeman listen to this tape was to confirm my recollection that March 21, 1973, was the date on which John Dean had first reported certain facts to me.

There had been rumors and reports to the contrary—one of them suggesting that John Dean and I had met 30 or 40 times to discuss Watergate—and I wanted to refresh my recollection as to what was the precise and entire truth.

On September 29, 1973, I began a review of the tape recordings subpoenaed by the Special Prosecutor for the grand jury and by the Senate Select Committee. The reason was it had been my deliberate intention to litigate
I have made a diligent search for other evidentiary materials that might shed light on the substance of my conversation with John Dean on the evening of April 15, 1973. Other than my contemporaneous notes of that meeting mentioned above, I have found no such evidence. However, I did meet with John Dean on Monday, April 16, 1973, on two occasions. The first was in the morning in the Oval Office; the second was in the afternoon in the Executive Office Building office. This was my final meeting with Mr. Dean before he left the White House staff. Both of these conversations were recorded on the White House recording system. I recently reviewed the recordings of these conversations. A comparison of my notes of the April 15, 1973, meeting and the recording of the conversation with Mr. Dean on the morning of April 16, 1973, shows both conversations covered much the same subject matter. There are references throughout the conversation on the morning of April 16 to the conversation held the evening before.

I shall voluntarily submit to the court, under the procedures applicable to recordings of conversations already covered by the court order, these recordings of my two conversations with John Dean on April 16, 1973.

In addition, as stated above and consistent with the court order, the court will be provided with:

1. The portion of the dictation belt containing my recollection of the June 20, 1972, conversation with Mr. Mitchell.

2. The portion of the dictation belt of my recollections of the meetings with Mr. Dean on March 21, 1973.

3. Contemporaneous notes from the April 15, 1973, conversation with Mr. Dean.

4. All other materials covered by the court order.

I have also authorized my Counsel to make available to the court certain tape recordings not covered by the court order to assist the court in verifying that the two conversations in question were not recorded. The additional tape recordings to be provided are (a) the full reel of telephone recordings covering the period of June 20, 1972, and (b) the two reels of tape which were on the recorders for my Executive Office Building office on April 15, 1973. This will permit the court to check the sequence of the conversations against my daily logs of meetings and telephone conversations already provided to the court, and thus further demonstrate that the Mitchell and Dean conversations in question were not recorded.

I have also agreed that a group of court-approved independent experts employing the most advanced technological methods shall examine all tapes in question for any evidence of alterations to the tapes.

It is my hope that these steps will clear up this aspect of the Watergate matter once and for all.

National Farm-City Week, 1973

Proclamation 4254. November 12, 1973

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Never before in history has so much of the world looked to the American farmer for its food supply. The ability of less than 3 million farmers to keep Americans the best-fed people in the world, while simultaneously meeting the demands of countless millions overseas, is one of our Nation's greatest success stories. This success has contributed significantly not only to our own economic well-being but also to the peace and progress of all mankind.

A strong bond of interdependence links America's farms to America's cities. We should do everything we can to strengthen that bond. People in rural areas and people in urban areas must become increasingly aware of the needs and aspirations of those who live elsewhere, for neither group can prosper without the other. National Farm-City Week is an excellent vehicle for advancing this purpose.

Now, Therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the period of November 16 through November 22 as National Farm-City Week.

I call on our agricultural organizations, business groups, labor unions, schools, and other interested groups, to participate in this observance. I request the Department of Agriculture, our land-grant educational institutions, and all appropriate organizations and government officials to mark the significance of National Farm-City Week with special events and activities.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this twelfth day of November, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-eighth.

Richard Nixon

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 2:27 p.m., November 12, 1973]

South Pacific Commission

Announcement of Appointment of D. Hebden Porteus as an Alternate United States Commissioner. November 13, 1973

The President today announced the appointment of D. Hebden Porteus, of Honolulu, Hawaii, as an Alternate
On April 15, 1973 from 10:16 to 11:15 p.m. the President met with
H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman in the President's EOB office. During
this meeting Ehrlichman at the President's request telephoned Patrick
Gray and discussed the documents taken from Hunt's White House safe and
given to Gray by Dean in June 1972. Shortly thereafter Ehrlichman tele-
phoned Gray and had a second conversation regarding the contents of Hunt's
safe. Ehrlichman told Gray that Dean had told the prosecutors that he
had delivered two of Hunt's files to Gray. Gray told Ehrlichman that he
had destroyed the documents.

57.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 15, 1973,
Exhibit 20, In re Grand Jury.
57.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2615-16.
57.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2675-79.
57.4 John Ehrlichman testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
May 3, 1973, 177-79 (received from Watergate 
Grand Jury).
57.5 L. Patrick Gray testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
July 20, 1973, 113-18 (received from Watergate 
Grand Jury).
57.6 L. Patrick Gray testimony, 9 SSC 3470.
57.7 H. R. Haldeman deposition, Democratic National 
**The President talked with Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.**

**The President talked with television writer and producer Paul W. Keyes.**

**The President telephoned his Press Secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler. The call was not completed.**

**The President talked with his Assistant, Henry A. Kissinger.**

**The President talked with Mr. Ziegler.**

**The President was telephoned by Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst. The President's Special Assistant, Stephen B. Bull, took the call.**

**The President had breakfast.**

**The President was telephoned by Mr. Kissinger. Mr. Bull took the call.**

**The President talked with Attorney General Kleindienst.**

**The President talked with Mr. Kissinger.**

**The President went to the Oval Office.**

**The President met with his Assistant, John D. Ehrlichman.**

**The President returned to the second floor Residence.**

**The President and the First Lady went to the Yellow Oval Room.**

**The President and the First Lady had coffee with: Rev. Edward V. Hill, pastor of the Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church, Los Angeles, California Mrs. Edward V. Hill**

**The Presidential party went to the East Room.**

**The President and the First Lady hosted a worship service conducted by Rev. Mr. Hill. The Rochester Male Chorus of Rochester, Minnesota also participated in the service. For a list of guests, see APPENDIX "A."**
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<th>ACTIVITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>The President and the First Lady, accompanied by Rev. Mr. and Mrs. Hill, went to the State Dining Room. Enroute, they participated in a photo opportunity at the foot of the Grand Staircase. White House photographer, in/out</td>
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<tr>
<td>The President and the First Lady received their guests. Members of the press, in/out White House photographer, in/out</td>
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<td>The President and the First Lady went to the Grand Hall.</td>
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<td>The President and the First Lady participated in a photo opportunity with the Rochester Male Chorus. White House photographer, in/out</td>
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<td>The President went to his office in the EOB.</td>
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<td>The President met with Attorney General Kleindienst.</td>
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<td>The President met with Mr. Ehrlichman.</td>
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<td>The President talked with his Assistant, H. R. Haldeman.</td>
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<td>The President was telephoned by Attorney General Kleindienst. The call was not completed.</td>
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<td>The President talked with Attorney General Kleindienst.</td>
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<td>The President telephoned Mr. Rebozo. The call was not completed.</td>
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<td>The President met with: Attorney General Kleindienst Henry E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General</td>
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<td>The President telephoned Mr. Ehrlichman. The call was not completed.</td>
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<td>The President went to West Executive Avenue.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The President and Mr. Rebozo motored from the EOB to Pier One of the Washington Navy Yard. Enroute, the President greeted members of the crowd assembled at the north exit of West Executive Avenue.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The President and Mr. Rebozo boarded the Sequoia.</td>
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The President and Mr. Rebozo were greeted by Lt. Cdr. Andrew J. Combe, Captain of the Sequoia.

The President went boating on the Sequoia. He was accompanied by:
- Mr. Rebozo
- Lt. Col. William L. Golden, Military Aide
- Manolo Sanchez, valet

The Sequoia docked at Pier One of the Washington Navy Yard.

The President and Mr. Rebozo motored from the Washington Navy Yard to West Executive Avenue.

The President returned to his office in the EOB.

The President talked with Mr. Petersen.

The President talked with Mr. Petersen.

The President met with his Counsel, John W. Dean III.

The President talked with Mr. Petersen.

The President met with:
- Mr. Haldeman
- Mr. Ehrlichman

The President returned to the second floor Residence.

The President talked with Mr. Petersen.
Mr. EHRlichMAN. I don't think—well, I don't know whether there was testimony about that. That is not a phrase that I have ever testified to. I don't recall that phrase being used.

Senator Gurney. Your recollection then is that it was just made known to Gray that these were very sensitive documents, and he ought to make sure they were kept very sensitive and no one saw them. Is that the gist of it?

Mr. EHRlichMAN. No; I think the word "politically" was in it. I think it was very clear they had political overtones rather than saying sensitive from a national security standpoint or something of that kind.

Senator Gurney. Was there any discussion at that meeting that would give Gray the thought that he ought to destroy them?

Mr. EHRlichMAN. No, sir.

Senator Gurney. You are positive on that score?

Mr. EHRlichMAN. And the reason that I am positive, Senator, is that when I heard that he had in fact destroyed them I was just nonplussed. There was just nothing in the contemplation of the people in that room at the time of the delivery that would have led to that kind of a conclusion.

Senator Gurney. Did you ever have any communication with Mr. Gray about these documents after that meeting?

Mr. EHRlichMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator Gurney. And recount that to the committee.

Mr. EHRlichMAN. That was in April of this year. We had a conversation. The President asked me to telephone Mr. Gray; it was a Sunday night, and it was the 15th of April, at about 10:15 p.m. I was in the President's EOB office, and he had had a meeting that day with Mr. Kleindienst. The subject of these documents came up at that meeting, and the President asked me to call Mr. Gray and find out what the documents were and where they were. So I did that. Mr. Gray was not home. When he got home he called back and we completed the conversation in the President's office.

Do you want the substance of the conversation?

Senator Gurney. Yes.

Mr. EHRlichMAN. I told him at that time that the delivery of the documents to him had been the subject of this conversation between the Attorney General and the President; that Mr. Dean apparently had told the prosecuting attorney about the fact that he had made the delivery. Mr. Gray said, "Well, he can't say that." And I said, "Well, he did say that," and he said, "If he says that, I will deny it," and I said, "Well, Pat, it isn't a subject for denial. Obviously it's not something you can deny. I recall the episode very clearly." Well, he says, "You have got to back me up on this." Then he went on to say "I destroyed the documents."

That totally nonplussed me and I said something rather confused and said goodbye and hung up and reported to the President that he had, in fact, just told me that he had destroyed the documents.

We talked about the implications of that, and I said "I don't think that I completely closed the door with Mr. Gray just now on whether or not I would back him up if he denied receiving the documents."

So I placed a second call right then, and I said, "Pat, I didn't respond clear enough to your suggestion and I just want to tell you, as I have to tell you, that I would have no choice if I were asked but to say
that I was present at the time the documents were delivered to you.”
And he said “I understand. I guess I will have to do what I have to
do” or words to this effect, and that is the end of the second
conversation.

Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Ehrlichman. I think my time has elapsed, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Ervin. Unless there is some objection the committee will take a recess at this time until 2 o’clock.

[Whereupon at 12 noon, the committee recessed to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.]

**Afternoon Session, Wednesday, July 25, 1973**

Senator Ervin. I wish to reiterate the request to the audience to refrain from expressing approval or disapproval of anything said or done. I have to say that probably Senator Baker and myself were quite guilty of a little contributory negligence, we both so interested ourselves and probably laughed and probably set an example for others, but I do ask in the interest of the work of the committee, from the interest of fairness to witnesses, that the audience will refrain from expressing approval or disapproval in any audible manner in respect to any matter or thing. It will certainly facilitate the work of the committee as well as contribute to a proper hearing.

Senator Inouye.

Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ehrlichman, a few days ago Mr. Alexander Butterfield described in great detail the electronic audio recording devices which have been established and installed in the White House, in the Oval Room, in the Executive Office Building, and elsewhere. Yesterday in colloquy with one of my colleagues here when the tapes were mentioned you indicated that you were certain that if these tapes were made public they would support your contention, they would support your innocence. Is my memory correct, sir?

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is my feeling, Senator.

Senator Inouye. The President of the United States, has, by letter, indicated that he has no intention to release these tapes and tomorrow I presume we will know very officially what his decision will be, but it would appear at this point that these tapes will not be made public.

I have heard legal scholars suggest that this fact could serve as a defense for persons who may be indicted for certain criminal activities which may have involved the White House. One may argue that the tapes include indispensable evidence to prove innocence, and this would be sufficient for defense to move for the dismissal of an indictment. What are your thoughts, sir?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, as I tried to indicate yesterday, I have been on the other side of the problem here where I was sitting by the President trying to approach a problem which involved the rights of individuals and also the interest of the country, and they frequently do not coincide.

Senator Inouye. My question—

Mr. Ehrlichman. I understand.

Senator Inouye. My question is “if,” and this is a very “iffy” question, and please forgive me for that, but if the U.S. Prosecutor should
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 26, 27, AND 29, 1973
Book 7

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $3
Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Well, my problem was not with Mr. Gray personally with regard to leaks. Obviously, we would not have turned the documents over to him if we thought he was going to leak them.

The problem was, as you read in the first transcript, was with a staff person high up in the FBI or at least, we suspected it was, we never established it. At the time we had had a number of conversations with Mr. Gray about the problem, and I had had some conversations with Mr. Kleindienst about the problem, and we had conversations about how to solve the problem. When I said we went around Mr. Gray, it was that Mr. Kleindienst, unknown to Mr. Gray, so that he would not even know it was being done, was going to plant a story or a fact, and we were going to see in such a way that the individual under suspicion might be disclosed. It was a long shot but it might have worked.

Now, I had implicit confidence in Mr. Gray as not being the source of the leak because we had had experience with Mr. Gray in the Justice Department and at HEW before that, and he was extraordinarily reliable, and so that was not the problem, and I hope that I did not—

Senator WECKER. Do you go around people when you trust them?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Sometimes, sometimes. and it was Mr. Kleindienst's view that that was a way to proceed and I do not say it was his view or mine, but that we would not bring Mr. Gray into confidence with regard to Mr. Kleindienst's idea for planting a story. That is the only time we went around Mr. Gray, that I can think of.

Senator WECKER. One last series of questions, sir.

Mr. Chairman. I do not mean to—I can see you warming up on that microphone and I just want to make sure I am not—

Senator Enrvin. You just said one last question. I was not wanting you to ask one last question. I was going to get there so I would not fail to recognize Senator Montoya. So far as I am concerned, you can go ahead and ask more than one last question.

Senator WECKER. This will be my last series on this go-around.

You testified yesterday that on April 15 you called Pat Gray and that he told you he had taken the Hunt papers to Connecticut and destroyed them. Is that correct?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I do not recall his telling me that he took them to Connecticut.

Senator WECKER. All right. Did he tell you that he destroyed them?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator WECKER. Now, let me read your testimony at that point.

That was—and this was in response to Senator Gurney—

That was in April of this year, we had a conversation. The President asked me to telephone Mr. Gray. It was Sunday night and it was the 15th of April at about 10:35 p.m. I was in the President's EOB Office and he had a meeting that day with Mr. Kleindienst. The subject of these documents came up at that meet-
Now, let me ask you this. After you received the word from Mr. Gray, which I believe was on April the 15th, did you transmit that information to the President?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir.

Senator Weicker. On what day was that?

Mr. Ehrlichman. He was sitting right there. I transmitted it instantly.

Senator Weicker. He was sitting with you when you made this call to Pat Gray?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir.

Senator Weicker. And this was on April 15? Is that correct?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir.

Senator Weicker. Was any action taken by the President, any action recommended by you, when you received word that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had gone along and, in fact, burned or destroyed, rather, Department files?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. The President took the action that was taken, and his first action was to contact either Mr. Kleindienst or Mr. Petersen. I am not sure which of the two it was, and he was asked to do nothing further until they had an opportunity to check into it and report back.

Senator Weicker. In other words, he asked for a report.

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, he asked for an investigation and a corroboration of this, and circumstances surrounding it so that he would know how to take the next step.

Senator Weicker. Gray admitted to you that he had destroyed the files?

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is correct.

Senator Weicker. What is there to investigate in this matter?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, you have a situation that obviously is considerably more than just an employment problem here, and the President felt—you see he had spent the major portion of that day or a good portion of that day with the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General on the whole case, and he was desirous of making sure that any step that he took was in coordination with those gentlemen, and he, as a matter of fact, forbore to take a number of steps on his own motion in order to work in concert with the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Petersen.

Senator Weicker. So on April 15 you and the President learned that files had been destroyed, and the reaction of the President is “We are going to get a report.”

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, he was obviously very concerned and upset by this, and—

Senator Weicker. Well, let me recount to you a personal experience because I had the identical experience that you and the President had on April 25. I was called by the Director, who was still the Acting Director, even though he had miffed the President of the United States and the head of the Domestic Council, that is, had burned the record. I was called by the Acting FBI Director in his office and I sat in the chair and the Acting Director turned to me and in essence said
this had to be done in an orderly fashion by the law enforcement people who were responsible for the prosecution of the case. As it turned out it was well that he did because Mr. Petersen, in pursuing the investigation with Mr. Gray, was able to develop other facts as a result of being able to do so without the cameras on, so to speak, which are as I am sure you recognize both a positive and a negative aspect of a matter of this kind in terms of adducing the facts.

Now, I think that in hindsight, while it may sound very self-serving for me to say so, the President took precisely the right steps in immediately informing Mr. Petersen as he did, so that the prosecutors and the law enforcement people could do their work in making the scales before it was all over the newspapers. Now the identical same consideration applied in John Dean’s situation where the President forbore to discharge Mr. Dean at Henry Petersen’s request, to give Mr. Petersen and his people an opportunity to complete their work before that relationship was severed.

Now, I think that we don't always have the luxury of gratifying our first instincts about a matter of this kind when we have the responsibility for the orderly discussion of the laws in a prosecution of this kind.

Senator Weicker. What was the purpose of your phone call on April 15 to Mr. Gray, incidentally?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I explained it was the result of the President’s conversation that day with the Attorney General and Mr. Petersen, in which the question of these documents came up, and the question that he put to me, was whether I had any information with regard to the whereabouts of the documents, and I said “yes, I did.” I was there at the time when an envelope was delivered by Mr. Dean to Mr. Gray, and that he said, “yes, that they were aware of this,” and he said, “Has Gray ever given them back?”

And I said, “I don’t know.”

And he said, “Get on the phone and get ahold of Gray and tell him what we know about this and find out where those documents are and what is in them.”

Senator Weicker. In other words, the enforcement agencies, the enforcement agencies had been working prior to April 15.

Mr. Ehrlichman. Oh, sure.

Senator Weicker. The information had been given before the grand jury by Mr. Dean?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't think Dean had been to the grand jury. I think Dean had talked with the prosecutors and had given them some of this information, if not all of it, but we were operating with what the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General had told the President, which the President recalled of the conversation and was imparting to me.

Senator Weicker. Well, I would just conclude by again asking you why Mr. Gray was left in place when this information was known to you and to the President and other members of the executive branch.

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I believe I have answered that question. Senator Weicker. It was in aid of the Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Petersen, and the Attorney General, Mr. Kleindienst. I recall hearing later that Mr. Petersen had, in fact, interviewed Mr. Gray following this, and had received conflicting stories. This would have been prior, I guess, to your interview with Mr. Gray, and finally that the
matter had been resolved. They wanted to get a written statement, they wanted to get the kind of evidence that they could use in court, apparently, and so the President was giving them an opportunity to do that kind of thing.

Senator Weicker. This wasn't the first time that you left Mr. Gray in place, was it?

Mr. Ehrlichman. The first time that I left Mr. Gray in place?

Senator Weicker. This wasn't the first time, in other words, that in an adverse situation to Mr. Gray he had been left in place, is that correct?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am sorry, I don't understand your question.

Senator Weicker. Well, for instance, during his confirmation hearings, when he ran into some heavy weather, did you have any comments to make at that time?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Did I?

Senator Weicker. Yes, about Mr. Gray.

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, indeed.

Senator Weicker. Can you remember what you said about him in the confirmation hearings at that time?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think you probably are referring to my saying that he was hanging in the wind and should be left to spin slowly.

Senator Weicker. Yes. Let him hang there. "Well, I think we ought to let him hang there, let him twist slowly, slowly in the wind."

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is my metaphor, yes.

Senator Weicker. And he was twisting slowly, slowly in the wind on April 15?

Mr. Ehrlichman. He was being investigated, investigated, and investigated on April 15.

Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Montoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I know we have been on this burglary for quite some time, but I want to clear one point. Mr. Ehrlichman.

At what point did you feel that the FBI really got into the investigation of the Ellsberg case in a manner that was satisfactory to White House expectations?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I cannot fix that date, Senator, except to say that it was sometime prior to September 20, because I do recall a meeting either that day or very close to it.

Senator Montoya. Is that September 20, 1971?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir.

Senator Montoya. And the burglary occurred on or about September 3 or 4 of 1971?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Around that time.

Senator Montoya. Yes.

And I believe your testimony indicated that you were notified by Mr. Krogh and Mr. Liddy or either of them while you were at Cape Cod what, 2 or 3 days later?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir.

Senator Montoya. When were you notified?

Mr. Ehrlichman. To the best of my recollection I was notified after I returned to the city having been——

Senator Montoya. When?
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

IN RE: POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS

18 USC 2511 and
18 USC 2512

Grand Jury Room Number 3
United States District Courthouse
3rd & Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Thursday, May 3, 1973

The testimony of JOHN EHRLICHMAN was taken in
the presence of a full quorum of the Grand Jury.

BEFORE:

EARL J. SILBERT, ESQ.
Principal Assistant United States Attorney

SEYMOUR GLANZER, ESQ.
Assistant United States Attorney

DONALD E. CAMPELL, ESQ.
Assistant United States Attorney
a report like that from Gray, I would pass it along to Dean.
I am quite sure I did.

Then the next conversation I had with Gray about this was the night of the 15th of April of this year when I finally reached him after he had arrived back from Connecticut where he had been for the weekend. That must have been at ten or ten-thirty in the evening.

I advised him at that time that John Dean had discussed with you gentlemen the delivery of a portion of the Hunt safe contents to Gray.

Do you want me to recount the conversation?

Q Please do.

A All right. He said substantially, "John Dean can't say that." I said, "Well, Pat, he already has."

Then he said, "Well, you can't let him say that. If he says that, I'll deny I ever got the papers."

I said, "I don't see how you can do that." He said, "I have destroyed them."

I said something of surprise in response to that, and he said, "You've got to back me up on this, that I never got those papers."

I said, "Well, Pat, I certainly don't want to do anything to hurt you, but at the same time I don't hardly see how I can do something of that sort."

I was probably more equivocal on that. I was
vaguer than that in my response, but that was the substance of the conversation.

The reason that I recall that I was somewhat equivocal on that was that after a few minutes I called him back, feeling that I had not been sufficiently definite with him.

I said, "Pat, I've been thinking about what we just said, and I wouldn't want to leave it with you that I had in any way agreed to the suggestion that you made that I should go along with you on this. I just can't."

I said, "If I am asked, I would have to say that I saw you take delivery on this, the contents."

He said, "Well, I just don't know what I'm going to do", and that was substantially the end of the conversation.

Q Sir, let me ask you this. Between the first and the second call that you made, how much time had transpired?

A Ten minutes, perhaps.

Q Had you discussed your first call to him with anyone?

A Yes.

Q With who was that, sir?

A The President and Mr. Haldeman.

Q It was decided that you should call back and made it unequivocal?

A No. I did that on my own motion. I expressed a lack of ease about the way I had left it with him, and I just
felt that I had to get that cleared up right then.

Q What was your purpose in calling in the first place?

A I had been asked to do that.

Q Can you tell the Grand Jury as to who?

A Well, the President asked me to do that based on

information that he had that I did not have.

He wanted me to tell Mr. Gray this information which
the President asked me to pass along to him.

Q Had you ever heard from anyone, prior to that re-
quest from the President, or from your conversation with Mr.
Gray, that the materials had been destroyed?

A No. That day was the first day that I had heard
that.

Q Apart from that one oblique reference that you in-
dicated took place in a conversation with Mr. Gray, and that
you passed on to Mr. Dean, had the subject matter of those
materials ever been discussed anywhere, at any time, with
anyone else by you or in your presence?

A Other than Dean or Gray, I would say not.

Q All right. Let's go back to after the transfer took
place, which you have described to the ladies and gentlemen
of the Grand Jury, and prior to your conversation with Mr.
Gray on the telephone inquiring about this, you already men-
tioned that there was one oblique reference, you indicated by

Mr. Gray, to the papers, and that you made kind of an oblique
United States District Courthouse
3rd & Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

July
June 20, 1973

The testimony of L. PATRICK GRAY was taken in the presence of a full quorum of the Grand Jury.

BEFORE:

GERALD GOLDMAN, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
United States Department of Justice

MRS. JILL W. VOLNER,
Assistant Special Prosecutor
United States Department of Justice
office, right out in front of my desk, like this (indicating),
catercornered, right out in front of it, and I was sitting in
my chair, back here (indicating).

Q Did he, in any way, indicate surprise at your ad-
mission, shock?

A Oh, I think he was sick. I could gather that from
him, but, you know, he didn't say to me, "Pat, I'm sorry for
you," or, you know, anything like that. There weren't any
words to that effect.

I mean, he could see me. He knew how badly I felt.
He didn't have to say anything about it, I don't think.

BY MR. GOLDMAN:

Q Is there anything that you gave you the impression
as to whether he knew previous to your admission the true
facts?

A No, not at all.

Q Nothing said about that?

A Not at all, no.

Q Now, you mentioned some phone calls on the evening
of Sunday, I guess it was, the 15th of April?

A That is correct, Mr. Goldman.

Q Could you tell us about those, please?

A Yes, I'll tell you about those to the best of my
memory.

My wife and I had driven back from Connecticut that
night and we got to our apartment about 8:45, and got our things upstairs at about 9:00 o'clock. And as I walked into the apartment, I saw, on a little telephone table, the white light was on on my Bureau telephone. This is a special telephone I had directly to the Bureau switchboard, and when that white light's on, it indicates that the Bureau had a call for me.

So, as I came in, I picked up the telephone and I asked the operator, I said, "Operator, do you have a call for me?" And she said, "Yes. Mr. Ehrlichman called." And I said, "Did he indicate whether or not he wanted me to call him back?" And she said, "No. He did not indicate that."

So I hung up the phone, and then we sat around the table and had some tea, and then my wife put our things away and I began to go to work on some of the Bureau papers that I had in the briefcase, and about, oh, I guess almost 45 minutes to an hour went by. And I picked up the phone again and I asked the Bureau operator again, and said, "Operator, are you sure that Mr. Ehrlichman didn't want me to return his call?" And she said, "Yes, I'm sure."

So then I put my papers together and my wife, in the meantime, had opened up the sofa fold-a-way bed type thing we had and gotten in bed, and then I got in bed, and I guess I got in bed about 10:00 or ten minutes after 10:00, and it was about 10:30 when the Bureau phone rang and the operator
said, "Mr. Ehrlichman wants to speak to you." And my best memory of that conversation is that -- gee, I guess I got to say, "Hi, John," but he started right in talking and said, "We just want you to know that John Dean has been talking to the prosecutors for quite some time now."

And I could have asked him, although I don't remember -- I could have asked him, "Do you know whether or not he's told the prosecutors about the two files?" And this is all I remember about that conversation. It was a very short conversation, in my memory.

And then I went back to bed and it was after 11:00 o'clock -- shortly after 11:00 o'clock -- that the phone next rang and my remembrance of it is that John Ehrlichman said to me that, he said, "Dean has told the prosecutors of the two files." And I said, "John, I destroyed those long ago."

Now, that's my best recollection of those two telephone calls.

Q Was that all?

A I don't recall, because those two conversations were really short conversations. There may have been.

BY MRS. VOLNER:

Q Well, did he yell at you and say, "My God, what have you done?"

A No, he did not.

BY MR. GOLDMAN:
Q Well, would you recall if he had done that?
A Oh, yes, I would have recalled if he'd stormed or ranted or raved. Oh, I know, I forgot the one thing that I should tell you. He said, "John Dean has told the prosecutors about those two files. Check your hole card." That's what I remember.

BY MRS. VOLMER:
Q What is a hold card?
A Check your hole card. That comes from playing poker when you're sitting there and you've got to check your hole card before you bet. That's h-o-l-e card.

He said, "Check your hole card." And, at the time, you know, it didn't mean anything to me but, you know, thinking back on it now, I think what Mr. Ehrlichman was saying to me was, "Check your hole card," and I translated it right away to mean the files. And I said, "John, you know those were destroyed long ago," or "John, I have destroyed them long ago."

BY MR. GOLDMAN:
Q You just said that sometime afterwards you got an impression of what he really meant by that expression. What was that impression?
A To check your hole card, and were you still holding those files, you know, to use as a lever.

BY MRS. VOLNER:
Q That means he thought that you perhaps still had
those files?

A That's right.

Q And after that comment, you said, "I have destroyed them"?

A That's right.

Q Did he indicate surprise that you'd destroyed them and that you were no longer holding them?

A No. He didn't indicate, as I remember, surprise or horror or anything else.

Q Did he say, "I never said that"?

A No, I don't recall him saying that.

Q Did he say, "Where did you get the idea to destroy those documents"?

A I don't remember that at all, because these were very short telephone conversations.

Q Did he say, "Well, that's a good thing to do. I'm glad you destroyed them. That's following my orders"?

A No. No.

Q Did he give you any response?

A Not, that I remember, Mrs. Volner. I set down, on yellow tablet paper, on the following morning, my recollection of that telephone call and then I only added one thing to it, later on, and I think I made that addition when he made his statement, as I saw it in the New York Times, I think, or it was after I had resigned on Friday, April the 27th.
In think on that Sunday, in the New York Times, he made a statement to the effect that he had not known that the files were destroyed until I told him that in the conversation of April 15, and then I added that to my notes.

BY MR. GOLDMAN:

Q Do you have that note with you?
A I think I do, yes.
Q May we see it, please?
A Yes. I think I have it. If not, I'd be happy to produce it for you, deliver it to you.

Q When he said, "Check your hole card," did he mean see whether you still had it because you might need it as a lever, or did he mean, "Well, perhaps you better destroy it now," or what did he mean?
A All of these are possibilities, Mr. Goldman, you know, but I don't know what Mr. Ehrlichman really meant by that except, you know, you can conclude, "Look to your defenses."

That's what, you know, you could conclude, and I really don't know, because I didn't ask him. This was the, you know, the kind of Ehrlichman conversation that you had with John Ehrlichman. They're short, they're to the point, and they're brittle, and these are the kinds that I've had with him.

Q Did you have any other conversations that you haven't related to us with Mr. Dean, Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Petersen
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., AUGUST 3, 6, 7; SEPTEMBER 24 AND 25, 1973

Book 9

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 83
committee would, as it subsequently did, inquire into the circumstances of the turnover to the FBI of the contents of Hunt's safe. Because of the instructions I had received from Messrs. Dean and Ehrlichman when the two files were given to me and my absolute conviction that these files, tinged with political and national security implications, had nothing whatsoever to do with Watergate, I had no intention of volunteering to the committee my receipt and destruction of these files and did not do so. I would not and did not make any false statements under oath but I acknowledge that I purposely did not volunteer this information to the committee.

I justified my reticence not only because I then believed in the rectitude of the administration whose nominee I was and in the integrity of the men who gave me the files and instructions, but because my brief look at the file of State Department cables had confirmed for me what I thought were overwhelming considerations of national security. I had no way of knowing then, of course, that the cables were fabricated nor, I might add, did I know then what I have since learned—that I was being left, in Mr. Ehrlichman's elegant phrase, to "hang there and twist slowly in the wind."

It was in this context, and knowing that Mr. Dean had already told Mr. Petersen about the files, that I had my conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman on March 6. There is no doubt that the message I intended to give to Mr. Ehrlichman was that he should tell Mr. Dean that he should not disclose the delivery to me of those two files.

At about 10:30 p.m. on the evening of April 15, 1973, I received a call from Mr. Ehrlichman. His remarks were very short, terse, and to the point. He simply told me that Dean had been talking to the prosecutors for some time and "we think you ought to know about it." It was obvious from his tone and the manner in which he spoke that no questions were invited and none were asked. I merely said thanks as he was hanging up the phone. I may have said, "Good evening, John" or "Hello, John" when I picked up the phone and it is my firm recollection that he started talking right away and made no response.

At shortly after 11 p.m. Ehrlichman called me again. This time his remarks were just as short, terse, and to the point. He said, "Dean has been talking about the files he gave you and you better check your hole card."

I said, "John, those papers were destroyed long ago."

Again it was plain and obvious from his tone and the manner in which he spoke that no questions were invited and none were asked.

Both of these calls were of extremely short duration, less than 15 seconds each. His manner was fast talking and he seemed tense.

I know that Mr. Ehrlichman has testified that in these conversations I told him I would deny receiving the files and asked him to support me in that denial. I have absolutely no recollection of such an exchange and believe that both conversations were substantially as I have described them. I realize that the conversations may have been recorded without my knowledge.

On Monday, April 16, 1973, at 10:54 a.m., Assistant Attorney General Petersen came to see me. He said that Mr. Dean told the prosecutors he had turned over two of Hunt's files to me. I denied that I had received them. Mr. Petersen went on to say that Mr. Dean had said these two files had nothing to do with Watergate. He also said that
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

JAMES W. McCORD, et al.,

Defendants.

FRANCIS L. DALE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

LAURENCE F. O'BRIEN,

Defendant.

MAURICE H. STANS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LAURENCE F. O'BRIEN,

Defendant.

Civil Action
No. 1233-72

Civil Action
No. 1847-72

Civil Action
No. 1854-72

Washington, D. C.,
Deposition of

H. R. HALDEMAN,

a witness, called for examination by counsel for the plaintiffs Democratic National Committee and Strauss, pursuant to notice, a copy of which is attached to the court copy of this deposition, and subpoena, at the offices of Cohen and Uretz, 1730 M Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., beginning at 10:00 o'clock a.m., before Hilmar K. Klamans, Jr., a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, when were present on behalf of the respective parties:

In Civil Action No. 1233-72:

For the Plaintiffs Democratic National Committee and Strauss:

BULMAN, GOLDSTEIN, FELD & DUNIE
BY: MAURICE R. DUNIE, ESQ.

COHEN AND URETZ
BY: SHELDON S. COHEN, ESQ.
ROBERT E. WEISS, ESQ.

For the Plaintiff O'Brien:

WELCH & MORGAN
BY: CHARLES A. MCNELIS, ESQ.
THOMAS M. P. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ.
EDWARD J. STEGEMANN, ESQ.

For the Defendants Committee for the Re-Election of the President, Finance Committee to Re-Elect the President and Francis L. Dale:

JACKSON, LASKEY & PARKINSON
BY: H. DONALD KISTLER, ESQ.
to such evidence, I believe that we all know, as does Mr. Haldeman, I am sure, that the testimony of Mr. Gray as to what disposition has been made of the documents has been of public record for at least many weeks. Without waiving any rights that we otherwise have, I will let the witness answer this question, but I do emphasize that we are getting, in my judgment, well beyond the pre-June 17th matters.

MR. DUNIE: I appreciate that.

MR. STRICKLER: You may answer.

THE WITNESS: Ask the question.

BY MR. DUNIE:

Q Other than from what you may have read in the press, do you have any knowledge as to what Mr. Gray did with the package of documents?

A I have no knowledge other than what I have read in the press. I have hearsay knowledge that confirms what I have read in the press.

Q From whom did you obtain that hearsay knowledge?

A I was present in the President's office on the evening of April 15th when John Ehrlichman called Acting Director Gray and inquired as to the disposition of this. It was told by Acting Director Gray, according to Mr. Ehrlichman, that he had destroyed the material.
Q: Do you know whether he told Mr. Ehrlichman when that material had been destroyed?
A: No, I don't believe he did. I don't believe he told him when he destroyed it. Mr. Ehrlichman's shock at receiving that original information I think precluded his pursuing it further.

Q: Do you know whether Mr. Gray told Mr. Ehrlichman or anyone else, to the best of your knowledge or from information you may have gathered, whether he read or made synopses of the documents prior to destroying them?
A: I don't know. I have no knowledge.

Q: Have you ever had any conversations with Mr. Gray relative to these documents?
A: No.

Q: To the best of your recollection, Mr. Haldeman, when you first learned that there were, to use Dean's phrase, "sensitive political documents" found in the Hunt safe, did you ever direct anyone to find out for you what those documents were?
A: No.

Q: Do you know whether anyone issued any direction to Dean or to anyone else to find out the nature of those documents?
A: No, I don't.

Q: Do you know whether the President was ever informed
58. On April 15, 1973 from 11:45 to 11:53 p.m., the President had a telephone conversation with Henry Petersen. The President told Petersen that he had met with Dean. There was also discussion of whether the President should ask Dean, Haldeman and Ehrlichman to resign. Petersen has testified that the President told him that Dean had given the President basically the same information which Dean had previously given to the prosecutors.

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording and other evidence of that conversation, the President has produced an edited transcript of the recording. A summary of that transcript has been prepared.

58.1 Henry Petersen testimony, 9 SSC 3648.

58.2 President Nixon daily diary, April 15, 1973, Exhibit 20, In re Grand Jury.

58.3 Summary of White House edited transcript of a telephone conversation between the President and Henry Petersen from 11:45 to 11:53 p.m., April 15, 1973, prepared by House Judiciary Committee staff.
NOTE 58.1

The afternoon meeting between the President and Henry Petersen referred to by Senator Gurney in the bracketed portion of page 3648 actually took place on April 15, 1973.
Senator Gurney. Did you know at any time, Mr. Petersen, that Hal- deman and Dean were trying to get the CIA to stop the investigation of the FBI as far as the Mexican money was concerned?

Mr. Petersen. Only to the extent of Pat Gray’s conversation with me on or around July 5.

Senator Gurney. What did he tell you at that time?

Mr. Petersen. He didn’t tell me he had been contacted by the White House. He told me he had been in contact with CIA and that there was some, it was a very guarded conversation type of thing, well, need to know situation, and I simply, well, that may be, but don’t accept that unless you accept it in writing, but I had no more information than that on that.

Senator Gurney. You didn’t know anything about the White House involvement?

Mr. Petersen. No.

Senator Gurney. Just CIA?

Mr. Petersen. That is right.

Senator Gurney. At any time during this whole sad affair, either last year or this year, until the events that transpired around April did anybody try to pressure you to stop or slow down or soft-pedal this investigation that you were in charge of?

Mr. Petersen. No, sir, the only thing that could possibly cast in that category would be the call from Ehrlichman with respect to Stans’ subpoena and, you know, frankly, that didn’t bother me too much. As I told Kleindienst, he just made a mistake. But no one else. There was some pressure to get the indictment out, get the indictment, they wanted it out by September 1. We couldn’t do that. I frankly promised them September 15, we couldn’t do it until September 15. That didn’t impair the investigation. We were ready to go to trial in November, but Judge Sirica had a bad back and continued the thing on his own motion.

Senator Gurney. Let me inquire about the contacts you had with the President of the United States. The log here shows a great many phone calls as well as some meetings. Of course, you have covered some of them.

Mr. Petersen. Some of them, yes, sir.

Senator Gurney. What about those four phone calls which the President initiated to you after your afternoon meeting with him on April 5. What were those about?

Mr. Petersen. The first was should I meet with John Dean. Yes. The second was a meeting has been set up. The third was if Liddy is not talking because of any sense of misguided loyalty to me, you had better disabuse him and I am issuing orders to you to that effect. The fourth one, I have had a meeting with Dean, he has given me basically what he has told you and I think it has been helpful.

Senator Gurney. Without going over all of these, because I know you have covered some of them, but I can’t identify what you have and what you haven’t. Generally, what was the President calling you about during this period of time?

Mr. Petersen. Status reports, immunity, the Ellsberg thing, Strachan’s testimony. We had Strachan like this and Magruder on one side and Strachan on the other and we finally decided to put them both
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12:09</td>
<td>The President talked with Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:20</td>
<td>The President talked with television writer and producer Paul W. Keyes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:33</td>
<td>The President telephoned his Press Secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler. The call was not completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:35</td>
<td>The President talked with his Assistant, Henry A. Kissinger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:01</td>
<td>The President talked with Mr. Ziegler.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:41</td>
<td>The President was telephoned by Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst. The President's Special Assistant, Stephen B. Bull, took the call.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:45</td>
<td>The President had breakfast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:02</td>
<td>The President was telephoned by Mr. Kissinger. Mr. Bull took the call.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:13</td>
<td>The President talked with Attorney General Kleindienst.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:16</td>
<td>The President talked with Mr. Kissinger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:35</td>
<td>The President went to the Oval Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:15</td>
<td>The President returned to the second floor Residence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:17</td>
<td>The President and the First Lady went to the Yellow Oval Room.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:17</td>
<td>The President and the First Lady had coffee with:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rev. Edward V. Hill, pastor of the Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church, Los Angeles, California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mrs. Edward V. Hill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:32</td>
<td>The Presidential party went to the East Room.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 11:33 | The President and the First Lady hosted a worship service conducted by Rev. Mr. Hill. The Rochester Male Chorus of Rochester, Minnesota also participated in the service. For a list of guests, see APPENDIX "A."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>PHONE</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12:11</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President and the First Lady, accompanied by Rev. Mr. and Mrs. Hill, went to the State Dining Room. Enroute, they participated in a photo opportunity at the foot of the Grand Staircase. White House photographer, in/out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:11</td>
<td>1:05</td>
<td>The President and the First Lady received their guests. Members of the press, in/out. White House photographer, in/out. The President and the First Lady went to the Grand Hall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:05</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President and the First Lady participated in a photo opportunity with the Rochester Male Chorus. White House photographer, in/out. The President went to his office in the EOB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:11</td>
<td>2:22</td>
<td>The President met with Attorney General Kleindienst. The President met with Mr. Ehrlichman. The President talked with his Assistant, H. R. Haldeman. The President was telephoned by Attorney General Kleindienst. The call was not completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:36</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President talked with his Assistant, H. R. Haldeman. The President was telephoned by Attorney General Kleindienst. The call was not completed. The President talked with Attorney General Kleindienst. The President telephoned Mr. Rebozo. The call was not completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:00</td>
<td>5:15</td>
<td>The President met with: Attorney General Kleindienst Henry E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General The President telephoned Mr. Ehrlichman. The call was not completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:17</td>
<td></td>
<td>The President telephoned Mr. Ehrlichman. The call was not completed. The President went to West Executive Avenue. The President and Mr. Rebozo motored from the EOB to Pier One of the Washington Navy Yard. Enroute, the President greeted members of the crowd assembled at the north exit of West Executive Avenue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:25</td>
<td>5:32</td>
<td>The President and Mr. Rebozo boarded the Sequoia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME</td>
<td>ACTIVITY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:37</td>
<td>The President and Mr. Rebozo were greeted by Lt. Cdr. Andrew J. Combe, Captain of the Sequoia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:24</td>
<td>The Sequoia docked at Pier One of the Washington Navy Yard.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:34</td>
<td>The President and Mr. Rebozo motored from the Washington Navy Yard to West Executive Avenue.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:43</td>
<td>The President returned to his office in the EOB.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:50</td>
<td>The President met with: Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:14</td>
<td>The President talked with Mr. Petersen.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:25</td>
<td>The President talked with Mr. Petersen.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:17</td>
<td>The President met with his Counsel, John W. Dean III.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:39</td>
<td>The President talked with Mr. Petersen.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:16</td>
<td>The President met with: Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:21</td>
<td>The President returned to the second floor Residence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:45</td>
<td>The President talked with Mr. Petersen.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On April 15, 1973 the President spoke with Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen by telephone between 11:45 and 11:53 p.m. The President told Petersen that he had asked Dean when he wanted to resign, and Dean said he preferred to wait until he had testified. The President said, "But, what do you want me to do? I don't want to interfere with your process?" Petersen said that he didn't think they ought to, not yet, because he [Dean] was the first one to "really come in." The President replied that, "The main thing Henry we must not have any question, now, on this, you know I am in charge of this thing. You are and I am. Above everything else and I am following it every inch of the way and I don't want any question, that's of the fact that I am a way ahead of the game. You know, I want to stay one step ahead of the curve." Petersen reiterated that they should "hold the line." The President said that when Petersen let him know he would call Dean "in and naturally he will have to resign." (pp. 1-2)

The President asked Petersen about Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Petersen said he thought they would ultimately have to resign, but that he would like to wait until they testified. Petersen said they wanted to fashion all the things into a pattern. The President asked Petersen how soon he thought that would be done. Petersen told the President it
would take two weeks or more. The President asked Petersen to give him "a little sheet of paper on both [Haldeman and Ehrlichman] as to what you feel their vulnerabilities are so that I -- could you do that?"
Petersen said he would try. (p. 4) The President said that Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean would resign at "a moment's notice because they put the office first. But the only thing I am concerned about is in the prosecution of a case like this, it may be that if you have them move it may have an effect on some of the others you are trying to get to testify." Petersen said, "That is certainly true with Dean." (pp. 3-'5)

Petersen asked for more time to think about Ehrlichman and Haldeman and "weave all of the facts with respect to them into a pattern." He said it was "not going to come out neat and clean" with respect to either of them. The President said that the case appeared to him to be basically an obstruction of justice case, with the possibility of knowledge by Haldeman. Petersen said it was easy for him to see how they "fell into" the obstruction of justice thing. The President replied, "Yeah. Uh, huh. Rather than being directly conspirators?" Petersen said, "That's right. That's right." The President said he supposed there was a difference in that respect. and Petersen said at least "in moral culpability." They discussed the possibility of "ultimate embarrassment" necessitating the need for Haldeman's and Ehrlichman's resignations, while they might not be subject to legal liability. The President said he would wait until he heard from Petersen before moving on Dean. Petersen said it was not going to be in the next few days because they had Strachan, LaRue and O'Brien. The President asked Petersen about Magruder, and Petersen said they were negotiating with Magruder's attorneys. The President said
that Petersen's idea of getting Magruder to plead guilty and "beating the
damn press and the Ervin Committee to it is a very good one." Petersen
said that negotiations were under way but that Magruder's counsel were
afraid Sirica would clap him in jail immediately. The President said
that "Sirica's got to see the point of this. My goodness because the point
is Sirica's got to realize he is getting bigger fish." To which Petersen
replied, "That's right." (pp. 5-8)
On April 16, 1973 from 8:18 to 8:22 a.m. the President had a telephone conversation with John Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman has testified that the President stated he was going to ask Dean to resign or take a leave of absence because Dean apparently continued to have access to White House files and because the President and Dean then had basically an adversary relationship. From 9:50 to 9:59 a.m. the President met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. There was a discussion of what the President would say to Dean and of what statement might be released to the press.

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording and other evidence of the conversation between the President, Haldeman and Ehrlichman, the President has produced an edited transcript of the recording. A summary of that transcript has been prepared.

59.1 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2807-08.
59.3 Summary of White House edited transcript of a conversation among the President, H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman from 9:50 to 9:59 a.m., April 16, 1973, prepared by House Judiciary Committee staff.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 26, 27, AND 30, 1973
Book 7

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96-296 O
WASHINGTON : 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $3
Senator Ervin. And I have legal misgivings as well. Notwithstanding the fact my experience has been, in the long years of practicing law, that I can find a Federal decision in one of the circuits that will sustain any point on any side of the question.

Senator Baker. It has been my experience practicing law too, when the Supreme Court denies certiorari I am out of business.

Senator Ervin. Yes; and so is the Supreme Court.

Senator Baker. That is up to them to decide. I have argued long and hard with them and sometimes I won and sometimes I lost, and I like it better winning but that is not always the way it goes.

Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney.

Senator Gurney. Mr. Ehrlichman, on April 14 you gave your report to the President on Watergate. On April 30 you resigned from the White House staff. Now, in the 2 weeks in between you had several meetings with the President of the United States. I presume some of these were on Watergate and conversations that led up to your resignation.

Will you tell the committee what you said to the President and what the President said to you at these meetings?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator, notwithstanding Watergate, the business at the White House went on during those 2 weeks and quite a few of these meetings were with regard to the business at hand, and I will----

Senator Gurney. I am not interested in that, only Watergate matters.

Mr. Ehrlichman. Right. Quite a bit of the conversation during this period of time had to do with John Dean's status in the White House. Henry Petersen became the President's confidant and right-hand man on Watergate, following April 15. The President decided that he would work with Mr. Petersen personally. He did. He had a number of meetings with Mr. Petersen who gave him a good deal of additional information which I did not have and to which I am not privy.

One of the first things that Mr. Petersen apparently asked the President to do was fire Mr. Haldeman and me.

Senator Gurney. When was that, do you know?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, it must have been very early in the game, shortly—on or shortly after the 15th.

The President pressed him for the basis of this request. Mr. Petersen acknowledged that there probably was no legal liability but that he felt that as a matter of appearances that this is the step that the President should take.

At the same time Mr. Petersen was urging the President not to fire Mr. Dean until such time as the prosecutors had had an opportunity to perfect their negotiations and their interrogation of Mr. Dean. And so there was a lot of conversation between us over this period of time both as to what our status should be in the White House and what Mr. Dean's status should be.

On Monday, the 16th, I believe it was, the President telephoned me and said that he was going to see Mr. Dean that morning. He had decided that Mr. Petersen's desires to the contrary notwithstanding, he was going to request that Dean either take a leave or resign.

He asked that letters be prepared that would be appropriate to both of these alternatives and he more or less dictated what should be in
those letters. I say more or less. He literally did dictate what he wanted in them. I had my secretary type them basically from the notes that I took from that conversation of the President and I understand that later on he did present them to Mr. Dean and Mr. Dean refused to sign either one. So he reported that to me later on in the day.

There were those kind of—those kind of questions that were going on in discussion. At a point in time he asked Mr. Petersen—

Senator Grueney. Stop right there. Did the President tell you why he wanted to fire Mr. Dean or have him resign?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, he felt that since Mr. Dean was continuing to come to the—come to the White House and apparently had access to his files and to other files presumably, in the central files of the White House, that it was— they had then basically an adversary relationship and that it was an unhealthy situation, there ought to be a clean termination.

This obviously did not take place. Mr. Petersen, I gather from talking with the President, Mr. Petersen strongly urged the President following that, to make no move where Mr. Dean was concerned and the President acquiesced in that.

We became—that is, Mr. Haldeman and I—became the targets of newspaper and other media attention about the 22d, about Easter, and from then on through the 30th. very vigorous newspaper attack. is the only thing I can say. The Los Angeles Times printed a totally dishonest and false story about my intervention in some Middle East activity. We were continually finding—I was continually finding myself laying aside the work of the day to prepare press statements or to research documents, things of this kind.

What I am leading to, Senator, is—

Senator Grueney. Just a moment. At that point I think we should strike from the record—Mr. Chairman, I think we should strike from the record mention of this Vesco case.

Senator Ervin. Yes.

Senator Grueney. We are trying to keep this—

Senator Ervin. Yes; it can be stricken from the record.

Mr. Hendley. Mr. Chairman, I just want to state for the record, you know, the witness is being responsive and he has mentioned this case twice this morning. It just does not suffice for Mr. Mitchell's purposes every time it happens to strike it from the record.

Senator Ervin. Well, we are glad to have the interjection about the Vesco matter stricken but I believe that is as far as we can go at this time.

Mr. Ehrlichman. In any event—

Senator Ervin. And I will ask the witness to—

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am sorry. That—

Senator Ervin [continuing]. Any refrain from further reference—

Mr. Ehrlichman. I had a personal interest in that one. I am afraid. Mr. Chairman, and this was the instance, however, that directly led to my realization that I simply could not do my job there and continue with the denials and harassment and all that that was going on.

We began discussing very seriously with the President the need for—and this was separate—I began discussing and I understand Mr. Halde-
The President talked with his Assistant, H. R. Haldeman.

The President talked with his Assistant, John D. Ehrlichman.

The President talked with his Special Assistant, Stephen B. Bull.

The President telephoned Staff Assistant Thomas Hart. The call was not completed.

The President went to the first floor private dining room.

The President held a breakfast meeting with Speaker of the House Carl B. Albert (D-Oklahoma).

The President went to the Oval Office.

The President met with:
Mr. Ehrlichman
Mr. Haldeman

The President met with his Counsel, John W. Dean III.

The President met with:
Mr. Haldeman
Mr. Ehrlichman

The President, accompanied by Secretary of Labor Peter J. Brennan, went to the South Grounds of the White House.

The President and Secretary Brennan motored from the South Grounds of the White House to the Washington Hilton Hotel.

The President was greeted by Robert A. Georgine, Secretary-Treasurer of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO.

The President went to the Cabinet Room in the Washington Hilton. He was accompanied by:
Secretary Brennan
Mr. Georgine

The President greeted general presidents of union affiliates comprising the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO. For a list of attendees, see APPENDIX "A."
**President Richard Nixon's Daily Diary**

**Place and Day Began**

**White House**

**Washington, D.C.**

**President**

**April 16, 1973**

**Time**

11:11 a.m.

**Activity**

The President addressed delegates attending the National Legislative and Safety Conference of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO. For a list of head table guests, see Appendix "B."

Members of the press, in/out

White House photographer, in/out

The President returned to his limousine. He was accompanied by:

- Secretary Brennan
- Mr. Georgine
- White House photographer, in/out

The President motored from the Washington Hilton Hotel to the South Grounds of the White House.

The President returned to the Oval Office.

The President met with Mr. Haldeman.

The President met with:

- Dr. John Norris, retired Associate Medical Director of Eastman-Kodak and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA)
- Robert Hitchins, General Manager of AA General Service Office
- Tom Pike, member of the National Advisory Council on Alcoholism
- Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of H.E.W.
- James H. Cavanaugh, Staff Assistant
- White House photographer, in/out

The President received the one millionth copy of the "Alcoholics Anonymous" book.

The President met with:

- Roy D. Hickman, President of Rotary International
- W. Richard Howard, Special Assistant
- White House photographer, in/out

Mr. Hickman presented the President with the Paul Harris Fellow Award in recognition of the President's efforts to promote world understanding.

The President met with his Press Secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler.

The President went to his office in the EOB.

The President met with:

- Henry L. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General
- Mr. Ziegler
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2:19</td>
<td>The President requested that Mr. Ziegler join him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:25</td>
<td>The President talked with Mr. Ziegler.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:27</td>
<td>The President met with:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:35</td>
<td>Mr. Ehrlichman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:04</td>
<td>The President talked with his Counsel, John W. Dean III.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:07</td>
<td>The President met with Mr. Dean.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:42</td>
<td>The President talked with his daughter, Julie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:55</td>
<td>The President met with:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:45</td>
<td>William P. Rogers, Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:01</td>
<td>The President and Secretary Rogers went to West Executive Avenue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:01</td>
<td>The President and Secretary Rogers motored from West Executive Avenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:15</td>
<td>The President went boating on the Sequoia with Secretary Rogers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:20</td>
<td>The President and Secretary Rogers had dinner on board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:28</td>
<td>The Sequoia docked at Pier One of the Washington Navy Yard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:32</td>
<td>The President motored from the Washington Navy Yard to the South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:42</td>
<td>The President returned to his office in the EOB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:45</td>
<td>The President telephoned Mr. Ehrlichman. The call was not completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:58</td>
<td>The President talked with Mr. Petersen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:24</td>
<td>The President returned to the second floor Residence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:27</td>
<td>The President talked with Mr. Ehrlichman.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED TRANSCRIPT
April 16, 1973, 9:50 a.m. to 9:59 a.m.

On April 16, 1973, the President met with H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman in the Oval Office from 9:50 to 9:59 a.m. Ehrlichman asked the President, "Did you get those --" and the President said, "I'm going to ask him which one he wants to sign." The President said it seemed to him that he did not want to pressure him. He asked Ehrlichman's advice, saying "[w]e've got plenty of time." Ehrlichman advised the President that Dean ought to sign both of them, so the President could use either or none, depending on how circumstances unfolded. If he wouldn't, Ehrlichman said, "you know what to do at that point." Haldeman added, "You go to Petersen and ask him not to (unintelligible)." The President said that was why he wanted "to nail down what Dean said about other bugs on the White House and so forth, and so on. I assume that is the Plumbers operation."

Ehrlichman replied, "No, no. What he is referring to is the FBI's bugs on the journalists in the first year he was nominated." (p. 1)

The President asked for advice about telling Dean "that anything in that area is National Security (unintelligible)." Ehrlichman replied that he thought the President should and that it should "cover not only that but Plumbing operation and anything else of which he has knowledge that I am (unintelligible) that with Executive Privilege right now." Ehrlichman said the "whole operation" was, because the President was afraid there were leaks at the NSC and was trying to find them. The President replied, "I thought they were due to the
Ehrlichman replied, "Well, all the (unintelligible) were but there was one in Georgetown at somebody's house that actually was never put on. It was (unintelligible) but it was explored and how Dean knows about that, I don't know. The FBI files --" The President said, "(Unintelligible)," and Ehrlichman said, "I can't say. I doubt it. I think it was before his time." (pp. 2-3)

The President referred to his phone call to Petersen the previous evening during which he discussed Liddy's silence. The President said he made the call in Dean's presence because Dean "said Liddy was saying how he knows Liddy had told (unintelligible) or something like that." (p. 3)

The President said that he "would like also a scenario with regard to the President's role, in other words, the President --" Ehrlichman said that he had just talked with Ziegler, who felt that they had no more than 12 hours to take an initiative. Ehrlichman suggested that Ziegler set a meeting with Petersen and have the President persuade Petersen that "the announcement has come from the White House." The President responded, "I'll tell them." Ehrlichman continued, "Otherwise the Justice Department will, of course, crack this whole thing." (pp. 3-4)

Ehrlichman asked about Dean's statement the night before "that Petersen had told you [the President] that Liddy has not talked. They can't get Liddy to talk." Ehrlichman said, "Dean told us that Liddy had told him everything. Told the U.S. Attorney." The President said he knew that. Ehrlichman said, "Petersen lying to you or
(unintelligible)"; and the President said, "Well, maybe a little both." The President said, "A snow job" and Ehrlichman replied "Either that, or Dean is (unintelligible) cover-up in case anything starts to seep out." (p. 5)

Ehrlichman discussed Ziegler's proposal "to get out the fact that Dean (unintelligible) you that the Dean report was inadequate (unintelligible) that several weeks ago you reinstituted an examination of the personal investigation and that this culminated in a whole series of actions over the weekend." (p. 5-6)

Ehrlichman said if he was "going to be splashed on this thing," the President was "better off now having another scrap with Dean." The President replied, "Well, somebody is going to be." The President asked Ehrlichman to talk to Moore to see Gray and said, "Time is of the essence right now." Ehrlichman said he was "going to get Moore to talk to Fielding also, and find out what was in there because I don't want to know." (pp. 6-7)

Ehrlichman said the use and announcement of the letters of resignation that were to be signed by Dean would be at the President's discretion. Ehrlichman concluded the conversation by suggesting that the President should ask Dean if he intended to plead guilty. Ehrlichman said, "And that will weigh in your own (unintelligible)." To which the President replied, "That's right. That's right. (Unintelligible)" (p. 8)

The transcript is followed by the notation "Material unrelated to Presidential actions deleted." (p. 8)