On the afternoon of March 23, 1973 Dean and his wife went to Camp David, Maryland. The White House logs indicate that the President spoke by telephone with Dean at Camp David from 3:28 to 3:44 p.m. Dean has testified that after the operator said that the President was calling Haldeman came on the line and said that while Dean was at Camp David he should spend some time writing a report on everything he knew about Watergate. Dean has testified that when he asked whether the report was for internal or public use Haldeman said that would be decided later. Haldeman has testified that Dean had been told to write a report prior to the time he left for Camp David.

8.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1002-03.
8.2 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2901.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 25 AND 26, 1973
Book 3

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

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Senator Baker's staff was very desirous of a meeting to get guidance. It was at this point that the President called the Attorney General and told him that he should get up to meet with Senator Baker as soon as possible and get some of these problems regarding executive privilege and the turning of documents over resolved with the committee immediately. After the conversation with the Attorney General, there was a continued discussion of how to deal with the Erwin committee. I asked the President to excuse me from the meeting for a moment because I was working with Ziegler on a response to a statement that Gray had made. The President asked me what that was about and I then explained to him about Gray's statement. I told him what Gray had said and I also told him what the facts were. He excused me to use the telephone in his office and said that I should get that resolved as quickly as possible.

When I returned to the conversation with the President, Mitchell, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman, they were still talking about dealing with the Ervin committee. The President told me that the White House should start directly dealing with the committee and that I should go up and commence discussions with Senator Ervin as to the parameters of executive privilege.

I told the President that I did not think this would be wise because I was very much the party in issue with regard to the Judiciary Committee hearings and that it would be unwise for me to go to the Hill and negotiate my own situation. The President agreed and Ehrlichman said that he would commence discussions.

The meeting was almost exclusively on the subject of how the White House should posture itself vis-a-vis the Ervin committee hearings. There was absolutely no indication of any changed attitude and it was like one of many, many meetings I had been in before, in which the talk was of strategies for dealing with the hearings rather than any effort to get the truth out as to what had happened both before June 17 and after June 17.

Following this meeting with the President, it was apparent to me that I had failed in turning the President around on this subject, but Ehrlichman and Haldeman began taking over with regard to dealing with a new problem, which had become John Dean, as they were aware of the fact that I was very unhappy about the situation.

**Trip to Camp David**

On Friday morning, March 23, my house was surrounded by camera crews as a result of Gray's statement the day before that I had "probably lied." Accordingly, I decided to wait until the camera crews departed before going to the office. It was midmorning when Paul O'Brien called to tell me about Judge Sirica's reading McCord's letter in open court. O'Brien gave me the high points of the letter as they had been reported to him by someone from the courthouse. He also told me that McCord had only hearsay knowledge. I then called Ehrlichman to tell him about it. He said he had a copy of the letter and read it to me. I asked him how he received a copy so quickly.

He responded: "It just came floating into my office." He asked me what I thought about it and I told him I was not surprised at all and repeated to him what O'Brien had told me that McCord probably had only hearsay knowledge. He asked me if I was in my office and
I informed him that I was a prisoner of the press and would be in shortly.

After my conversation with Ehrlichman, the President called. Referring to our meeting on March 21 and McCord's letter, he said: "Well, John, you were right in your prediction." He then suggested I go up to Camp David and analyze the situation. He did not instruct me to write a report, rather he said to go to Camp David, "take your wife, and get some relaxation." He then alluded to the fact that I had been under—

Senator Ervin. I will have to depart because I have less than 5 minutes to get over there. This is good training for running in the Olympics.

[Recess.]

Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, we are not trying to hurry along but I stayed on the floor of the Senate until this rollcall began because in the last short rollcall vote Senator Weicker and I missed the vote and one or two others did, and so we are going to interchange in the interest of time. If you do not mind you might continue now.

Mr. Dean. Thank you, Senator.

He then alluded to the fact that I had been under some rather intense pressure lately, but he had been through this all his life and you cannot let it get to you. He said that he was able to do his best thinking at Camp David, and I should get some rest and then assess where we are and where we go from here and report back to him. I told him I would go.

My wife and I arrived at Camp David in the midafternoon. As we entered the cabin in which we were staying, the phone was ringing. The operator said it was the President calling but Haldeman came on the phone. Haldeman said that while I was there I should spend some time writing a report on everything I know about Watergate. I said I would do so. I asked him if it was for internal use or public use. He said that would be decided later.

I spent the rest of the day and the next day thinking about this entire matter. I reached the conclusion, based on earlier conversations I had with Ehrlichman, that he would never admit to his involvement in the coverup. I did not know about Haldeman, but I assumed that he would not because he would believe it a higher duty to protect the President. The more I thought about it the more I realized that I should step forward because there was no way the situation was going to get better—rather, it could only get worse. My most difficult problem was how I could end this mess without mortally wounding the President. I had no answer, because I felt once I came forward the matter would be for the American people to decide, and not for me to decide. I finally concluded that I would have to think of some way for the President to get out in front of the matter, despite what happened to everybody else.

I called Mr. Moore and talked with him about it. We talked about a Presidential speech, where the President would really lay the facts out; we talked about immunity for everyone involved; we talked about a special Warren-type commission that would put the facts out; we talked about some half measures that might satisfy the public interest; but we both realized that nothing less than the truth would sell. As I mentioned earlier, Moore and I had talked about some of these con-
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over the following week, regarding the White House staff going to the Senate committee without executive privilege; but more importantly, regarding the assignment to John Dean to prepare a full and complete report on all of the facts of the matter. After the March 22 meeting in the afternoon, the President left for Key Biscayne. The rest of us remained in Washington. I went to Key Biscayne the next morning to join the President for the weekend. John Dean went home to write his report, but found that he was besieged by reporters as a result of the Pat Gray allegation that he had lied, and so the President, in talking to him on the phone the next day, suggested that he go to Camp David where he would be free from the press and would have an uninterrupted opportunity to get his report prepared. I am convinced that there was a discussion of Dean writing a report, and that when we left the meeting on the afternoon of the 22d it was clear in all of our minds that that was Dean's assignment and that he was expected to do so over the next couple of days.

**Camp David**

Over the weekend that Dean was at Camp David I had several phone conversations with him. There was a story that Dean and Magruder knew about the bugging and that was a matter of concern to Dean with which he was dealing. He had obviously been working on the report he was supposed to be preparing and perhaps talking to people. He seemed now to feel that Magruder was definitely involved. He gave that indication, which he had given before, on the phone. He was not at all sure about whether or not Mitchell was involved.

On the 26th, I had a long phone call with Dean. It is interesting because he said there was no communication on that day of any significance.

I had called Dean—this is on the 26th—to ask if he would have any problem if the President announced that day that he was requesting that Dean be called to the grand jury without immunity, and I specified that because in the earlier discussions Dean had made the point of immunity. Dean said, "No, I would have no problem with that." Then he said, "I have been working on this whole thing and trying to analyze what our problems are."

He said there is a problem with Magruder regarding the planning meetings, because apparently he has testified as to the number of meetings and the content of the meetings and his testimony was different than what mine would be if I went to the grand jury now. He said there was only one meeting, and it was for the purpose of discussing campaign spending laws; while, in fact, there were two meetings and they were for the purpose of discussing intelligence presentations by Liddy.

He said, "In looking over this whole thing, there are several areas of concern. One is the blackmail area. Blackmail started way back." This was the first time he spelled this out to me. Mitchell was hit by Parkinson or O'Brien, who were hit by Bittman, who was hit by Hunt, who had been hit by the defendants saying that they needed money and if they did not get it they were going to cause trouble. It was not spelled out much more than that, I do not think.
Between March 23 and March 28, 1973 John Dean stayed at Camp David and attempted to prepare a report on matters relating to the break-in at the DNC headquarters and the investigation of the break-in. A draft of portions of a report was prepared by Dean, and partially typed. It related certain events before and after the Watergate break-in. The draft report made no reference to Dean's meetings with the President or to any statements or actions by the President. Dean has testified that during his stay at Camp David he decided that he would have to think of some way for the President to get out in front of the matter and that he discussed with Haldeman the creation of an independent Warren-type commission. On March 28, 1973 Haldeman called Dean and requested that he return to Washington to meet with Mitchell and Magruder.

9.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1003-06.


9.3 John Dean Camp David report, SSC Exhibit No. 34-43, 3 SSC 1263-93.
I informed him that I was a prisoner of the press and would be in shortly.

After my conversation with Ehrlichman, the President called. Referring to our meeting on March 21 and McCord's letter, he said: "Well, John, you were right in your prediction." He then suggested I go up to Camp David and analyze the situation. He did not instruct me to write a report, rather he said to go to Camp David, "take your wife, and get some relaxation." He then alluded to the fact that I had been under-

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Mr. Dean. Thank you, Senator.

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My wife and I arrived at Camp David in the midafternoon. As we entered the cabin in which we were staying, the phone was ringing.
The operator said it was the President calling but Haldeman came on the phone. Haldeman said that while I was there I should spend some time writing a report on everything I knew about the Watergate. I said I would do so. I asked him if it was for internal use or public use. He said that would be decided later.

I spent the rest of the day and the next day thinking about this entire matter. I reached the conclusion, based on earlier conversations I had with Ehrlichman, that he would never admit to his involvement in the coverup. I did not know about Haldeman, but I assumed that he would not because he would believe it a higher duty to protect the President. The more I thought about it the more I realized that I should step forward because there was no way the situation was going to get better—rather, it could only get worse. My most difficult problem was how I could end this mess without mortally wounding the President. I had no answer, because I felt once I came forward the matter would be for the American people to decide, and not for me to decide. I finally concluded that I would have to think of some way for the President to get out in front of the matter, despite what happened to everybody else.

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cepts on previous occasions, but we still did not have an answer that would bring the full truth out because of the criminal implications of the behavior of those involved.

On Saturday, I began reconstructing all I knew and began writing a report. I spent Saturday afternoon and evening, Sunday, and Monday reconstructing and writing. On Monday I asked my secretary to come to Camp David, bring certain documents that I had requested, and commence typing. I did not realize how difficult it would be to reconstruct my knowledge from memory. I had not kept a diary or even a calendar of all my activities, thus, I have been reconstructing my knowledge of this matter since March 23 to this day.

On Sunday evening, March 25, I was informed that the Los Angeles Times and the Washington Post were going to print a story that Magruder and I had prior knowledge of the June 17 bugging of the Democratic National Committee. I considered the story libelous then, as I do today. Upon learning that the story was going to be printed, I contacted an attorney, Mr. Tom Hogan, who was familiar with libel law. We discussed the matter. He then decided to put the newspapers on notice to preserve a libel suit in the event they printed the story. I also told Mr. Hogan that when I returned from Camp David that I wanted to talk with him about this entire matter and asked him to think about someone who was a good criminal lawyer because I was planning to take certain steps in the near future. I might add that it was my thinking at that time that I would explain all the facts to a knowledgeable criminal lawyer to determine the potential problems of everyone involved—from the President on down—to get independent advice on what I should do.

On Monday morning, March 26, I had a conversation with Haldeman about the story in the Los Angeles Times. I told him I was prepared to file a libel suit and had retained a lawyer to put the newspapers on notice. I told him that he knew that I had not known of the June 17 Watergate break-in in advance, that my knowledge of the entire matter ended with the second meeting in Mitchell's office. I told Haldeman that Magruder knew that I had no prior knowledge, but I did not know if he would admit it publicly. Haldeman concurred in the fact that I had no prior knowledge and suggested I call Magruder and tape his conversation.

I did call Magruder and by using a dictaphone held to the receiver. I recorded the call. I have submitted a transcript of this conversation to the committee; the long and short of this conversation was that Magruder acknowledged that the newspaper accounts were a “rum rap” for me because I had not had prior knowledge of the break-in.

[The transcript was marked exhibit No. 34-10.]*

Mr. Dean. My secretary arrived at Camp David on Monday afternoon and began typing the report. On Monday night, I had given additional thought to how the President might get out in front of this matter and how we could get everyone involved to speak the truth. I called Moore, who is fairly conservative in his solutions to problems, and told him of my idea, which I said was so far out that I thought it might solve the awful problem. I have submitted to the committee a copy of my notes outlining my concept.

[The document was marked exhibit No. 34-11.**]

*See p. 1255.
**See p. 1261.
Mr. Dean. In brief, the President would create an independent panel—that would be investigator, prosecutor, and judge and jury for everyone involved. It would have the power to remove officials from office, levy fines, and impose criminal sanctions. It was designed to give every man a fair and full hearing, and proceed in a manner where people would not be tried publicly.

Finally, after all the facts were in, the panel would render its judgments on the individuals involved and report to the public. I might note that if the special prosecutor and this committee were merged, made independent, and proceeded in camera, it would be very close to the concept I had proposed back on March 28.

Moore liked the idea and suggested I call Haldeman, which I did. He was intrigued, but not overwhelmed. It was becoming increasingly clear that no one involved was willing to stand up and account for themselves.

After I had read in the newspaper on Tuesday, March 27, that the President had called me on Monday morning, March 26—which he had not—and expressed great confidence in me and the fact that I had not had prior knowledge of the break-in at the Democratic National Committee, I decided to attempt to contact Mr. Liddy, who was the one man who could document the fact that we never had talked about his plans following the February 4 meeting in Mitchell’s office. I called Paul O’Brien and asked him how I could get in contact with Mr. Maroulis, Mr. Liddy’s attorney. O’Brien gave me Maroulis’ phone number, but told me I could not reach him until late in the afternoon.

I called Mr. Maroulis about 3:30 and asked him if I might get some sort of sworn statement from Liddy regarding my lack of prior knowledge of the break-in at the Democratic National Committee. I told him of the two meetings in Mitchell’s office, and that Mr. Liddy and I never talked about his plans after the second meeting. To this day, I am convinced that if and when Mr. Liddy ever talks, he will tell the truth as he knows it. I was hopeful that he would give me some sort of an affidavit attesting to the facts, but his lawyer was concerned about his fifth amendment problems.

Mr. Maroulis called me back on March 29 after I had returned from Camp David, after he had talked with Mr. Liddy. I requested O’Brien to make a memorandum of the call, as he was with Mr. Maroulis when he made the call. I have submitted to the committee a copy of this document which Maroulis advised me his client could not make such a statement because it might result in a waiver of his fifth amendment privileges, that to give such a statement could be detrimental to others, but Liddy did wish to convey that his reasons for not providing such a statement was not because he disagreed with the facts, but because of the advice of counsel.

[The document was marked exhibit No. 34-42.]

Mr. Dean. It was the day before I received this call, March 28, that Haldeman had called me at Camp David and requested that I return to Washington. He told me that he was meeting with Mitchell and Magruder and that they wished to meet with me. I told Haldeman that I really did not wish to meet with Mitchell and Magruder, but he was insistent that I return and meet with them. I returned from Camp David about 3:30 and went directly to Haldeman’s office. He told me

*See p. 1202.
that Mitchell and Magruder were waiting in another office for me. I asked him why they wanted to talk to me and he said that they wanted to talk to me about my knowledge of the meetings in Mitchell's office. I told Haldeman that they were both aware of the situation and I was not going to lie if asked about those meetings. Haldeman said that he did not want to get into it, but I should go in and work it out with Mitchell and Magruder.

Before discussing the meetings with Mitchell and Magruder, I feel I should comment on my reaction to the discussion I had just had with Mr. Haldeman. Knowing how freely and openly he had discussed matters in the past, I could tell that he was back-peddling fast. That he was now in the process of uninvolving himself, but keeping others involved. This was a clear sign to me that Mr. Haldeman was not going to come forward and help end this problem, rather, he was beginning to protect his flanks. It was my reaction to this meeting with Mr. Haldeman and his evident changed attitude, and my earlier dealings with Ehrlichman where he had told me how I should handle various areas of my testimony should I be called before the grand jury, that made me decide not to turn over to them the report I had written at Camp David. I have submitted to the committee a copy of the Camp David report, part of which was typed by my secretary at Camp David and the remainder in longhand, which I had not put in final narrative form before I was called back to Washington.

[The document was marked exhibit No. 34-43.]

**Meeting With Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder**

Mr. Dean. After departing Mr. Haldeman's office, I went to meet with Mitchell and Magruder. After an exchange of pleasantries, they told me they wished to talk to me about how I would handle any testimonial appearances regarding the January 27 and February 4 meetings which had occurred in Mitchell's office. I told them that we had been through this before and they knew well my understanding of the facts as they had occurred at that time. Mitchell indicated that if I so testified, it could cause problems. Magruder then raised the fact that I had previously agreed, in an earlier meeting, that I would follow the testimonial approach they had taken before the grand jury.

I told them I recalled the meeting. Magruder then said that it had been I who had suggested that the meetings be treated as dealing exclusively with the election law and that explained my presence. At this point in time, I decided I did not wish to get into a debate regarding that meeting. They both repeated to me that if I testified other than they had it would only cause problems. I said I understood that. I told them that there was no certainty that I would be called before the grand jury or the Senate committee and that if I were called, I might invoke executive privilege, so the question of my testimony was still moot. I did not want to discuss the subject further so I tried to move them off of it. They were obviously both disappointed that I was being reluctant in agreeing to continue to perpetuate their earlier testimony.

The only other matter of any substance that came up during that meeting was when I made the point that I had never asked Mitchell

*See p. 1263.*
The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

SENATE RESOLUTION 60 -- GENERAL INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Saturday, June 16, 1973

WASHINGTON, D.C.

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Simmel, S. F.
2/8/74
I asked him, "What does that mean", that is when I was asked to write this written Dean Report. And I said that at this time I would suspect that the Grand Jury would reopen, and the whole situation would change.

Mr. Dash. After the election?
Mr. Dean. After the election.

Mr. Dash. Before the trial?
Mr. Dean. Before the trial. I said it was very likely that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Strachan, Mitchell, Dean, and the like, would be fighting indictments.

Mr. Thompson. Who did you tell this to?
Mr. Dean. To Haldeman. He said, "That doesn't seem like a very viable option, does it", and I said, "Well, I'm ready to stand up at any time, and it's an option that we ought to continue to presume.

Mr. Shaffer. Can we go off the record?
(Discussion off the record)

Mr. Thompson. If we can go to the 23rd, that is when you went to Camp David?
Mr. Dean. Right.

Mr. Thompson. Can you tell us how that came about?

Mr. Dean. Well, as I said, the President called me shortly after I talked to Ehrlichman that morning -- first of all, let me go back and tell you what happened that morning. That morning I received a call from Paul O'Brien and he said, "Are you aware
of what McCord did down in the Court Room", and I said, "No".
He said, "Well, I got a report from the Court House, and he wrote a letter", and he gave me the highlights of the letter.
I then called Ehrlichman and asked if he was aware of what McCord had done down in the Courthouse, and he said, "Yes".
I said, "As a matter of fact, I've got a copy of the letter, and how did it get here so quickly", and he said, "Well, it just sort of floated in here", and I didn't pursue it.

He said, "Well, what does it mean to you", and I said, "Well, I don't know"; from my conversation with O'Brien, he said that he felt that McCord had a lot of hearsay knowledge, and that would be all, and I reported that back to Ehrlichman.
That was about the sum and substance of the conversation.

Then, I was still surrounded by the press, and he asked me if I was in my office, and I said, "No, I'm still surrounded by the press", I would wait until they departed.

Then I had a call from the President, and he said to me - he had said that on several other occasions - that I ought to come up to Camp David and take a break; he said nothing about a report, or anything like that.

So, I called back and asked Higby how you arrange to go to Camp David, Higby or someone else, I'm not sure who it was; the President had suggested that I go up there, and I wanted to find out how the arrangements were made.

It was late afternoon when I got up there, and just as I
walked in the cabin that I was staying in, I had a call. The phone was ringing, and they said it was the President talking. Well, it wasn't the President, it was Bob Haldeman on the line. The operator had said it was the President, but it was a call from the President's office, but it was Bob Haldeman on the line. He said, "While you are up there, what you ought to do is sit down and write a report of all your knowledge of this whole thing".

I said, "Fine, I'll be happy to", so I spent the next couple of days reconstructing, and making some notes; and thinking about the whole situation.

Mr. Thompson. Did he say what the purpose was for which the report was going to be prepared?

Mr. Dean. I think at one point I said, "Is this an internal document, or a public document", and he said, "we haven't decided yet.

Mr. Thompson. Did it depend how it turned out?

Mr. Dean. Well, he didn't say that to me. He said, "Just rough this out, and then we'll see." So, I started — first of all I started to reconstruct what happened over the period of a year, and I began writing sort of a "soft" document that didn't cause anybody any problems. When I got to Haldeman and Strachan I didn't write anything, exactly as I had planned because I was only speculating, I left that blank. I knew something had happened.

Retyped from indistinct original.
I wrote about the fund-raising by Kalmbach, and the use of the 350, and the executive clemency, and those sorts of things. I tried to reconstruct the whole picture, the highlights of everything I could remember by doing it.

While I was up at Camp David I also had several discussions with Dick Moore about, you know, how do we and this thing; and at one point in time came up with an idea how a special panel might be appointed by the President, whereby anybody involved in any way would go before that panel.

Mr. Thompson. Sort of a Warren Commission type of thing?

Mr. Dean. Sort of a Warren Commission type thing, but giving them the power of prosecutor, judge, jury, executioner, sort of a special prosecutor in a Senate Committee, as a matter of fact; and everybody that was in any way involved would go before this panel, and do it in an in camera manner so that the rights of the individuals would be protected, and they would get a fair hearing, and everybody would come forward, subject to this panel. I had notes on this, that I'll submit also. Moore liked it, and he said, "Why don't you run that by Haldeman".

Mr. Thompson. Notes on this proposal, or notes on the report?

Mr. Dean. I've got both. In fact, on Monday I had my secretary come up and start typing; she came up and started typing it. I was still writing. I hadn't gotten everything

Retyped from indistinct original.
I asked him, "Then what about the rest?" Then he told me what he was about
to write this mission back. But I said that at this
time I would expect that the Grand Jury would return, and the
whole situation would change.

Dr. Nash. After the election?
Mr. Nash. After the election.
Mr. Nash. Before the trial?
Mr. Nash. Before the trial. I said it was very likely
that Lechman, Willingham, Steadman, Mitchell, Bean, and the
like, would be fighting Lechman's.

Mr. Thompson. Who did you tell this to?
Mr. Nash. To Lechman. He said, "That doesn't seem like
a very viable opinion, does it?" and I said, "Well, I'm ready
to stand up at any time, and it's an opinion that we ought to
continue to pursue.

Mr. Nash. Can we go off the record?
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Thompson. If we can go to the 33rd, that is what you
want to keep down?
Mr. Nash. Right.

Mr. Thompson. Can you tell us how that came about?
Mr. Nash. Well, as I said, the Grand Jury called an arrest
order to keep to watch over that meeting -- first of all, the
arrest order was called -- until the Grand Jury could also meet.
Then came

I mentioned it. All these facts O'John. I'd like to say, 'Then you come

DR
of what Rockefeller did down in the Court House, and I said, "No".

He said, "Well, I got a report from the Court House, and he
wrote a letter", and he gave me the highlights of the letter.

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Rockefeller had done down in the Court House, and he said, "Yes".

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to Camp David, Bigby or someone else, I'm not sure who it was,
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discuss how the arrangements were made.

It was late afternoon when I got up there, and that was it
walked in the cabin that I was staying in, I had a call. The phone was ringing, and they said it was the President talking. Well, it wasn't the President, it was Bob Haldeman on the line. The operator had said it was the President, but it was a call from the President's office, but it was Bob Haldeman on the line. He said, "While you are up there, what you ought to do is sit down and write a report of all your knowledge of this whole thing".

I said, "Fine, I'll be happy to", so I spent the next couple of days reconstructing, and making some notes; and thinking about the whole situation.

Mr. Thompson. Did he say what the purpose was for which the report was going to be prepared?

Mr. Dean. I think at one point I said, "Is this an internal document, or a public document", and he said, "We haven't decided yet.

Mr. Thompson. Did it depend how it turned out?

Mr. Dean. Well, he didn't say that to me. He said, "Just rough this out, and then we'll see." So, I started -- first of all, I started to reconstruct what happened over the period of a year, and I began writing sort of a "soft" document that didn't cause anybody any problems. When I got to Haldeman and Strachan I didn't write anything, exactly as I had planned because I was only speculating, I left that blank. I knew something had happened.
I wrote about the fund-raising by Kalmbach, and the use of the 350, and the executive clemency, and those sorts of things. I tried to reconstruct the whole picture, the highlights of everything I could remember by doing it.

While I was up at Camp David I also had several discussions with Dick Moore about, you know, how do we and this thing; and at one point in time came up with an idea how a special panel might be appointed by the President, whereby anybody involved in any way would go before that panel.

Mr. Thompson. Sort of a Warren Commission type of thing?

Mr. Dean. Sort of a Warren Commission type of thing, but giving them the power of prosecutor, judge, jury, executioner, sort of a special prosecutor in a Senate Committee, as a matter of fact; and everybody that was in any way involved would go before this panel, and do it in an in camera manner so that the rights of the individuals would be protected, and they would get a fair hearing, and everybody would come forward, subject to this panel. I had notes on this, that I'll submit also. Moore liked it, and he said, "Why don't you run that by Haldeman".

Mr. Thompson. Notes on this proposal, or notes on the report?

Mr. Dean. I've got both. In fact, on Monday I had my secretary come up and start typing; she came up and started typing it, I was still writing, I hadn't gotten everything
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 25 AND 26, 1973
Book 3

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

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Stock Number 0270-01063
No. 34-42—(1003) Memorandum for the file re: Maroulis conversation with Dean on March 29, 1973, concerning Maroulis' client, G. Gordon Liddy

No. 34-43—(1006) John Dean's Camp David report with attached handwritten notes

No. 34-44—(1010) Submission of Segretti involvement in Watergate

No. 34-45—(1011) Memorandum by John Dean re: Meeting with John Mitchell, April 10, 1973

No. 34-46—(1012) Memorandum by John Dean re: Meeting with John Mitchell, April 10, 1973

No. 34-47—(1013) List of names denoting "Pre, post, and potential off"

No. 34-48—(1015) Message from John Dean to the President, April 15, 1973

No. 34-49—(1017) Two letters to the President on White House stationery, dated April 16, 1973. (Letter of resignation and letter requesting indefinite leave of absence.)

No. 34-50—(1015) Letter from John Dean to the President, April 16, 1973

No. 34-51—(1018) Draft statement re: Grand jury's investigation into Watergate and leave-of-absence requests from H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and John Dean

No. 35—(1062) Document concerning operational restraints on intelligence collection

No. 36—(1062) Memorandum for Mr. Huston from H. R. Haldeman re: Domestic intelligence review, dated July 14, 1970

No. 37—(1062) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from Tom Huston re: Domestic intelligence, dated August 5, 1970

No. 38—(1062) Memorandum from Tom Huston to H. R. Haldeman, dated August 7, 1970. Subject: Domestic Intelligence Watergate Case


No. 40—(1062) Memorandum dated September 10, 1970, for H. R. Haldeman from Tom Huston re: Future air hijackings and use of increased intelligence information

No. 41—(1062) Note from Sol Lindenbaum to John Dean with attached memorandums regarding procedures to commence domestic intelligence operation

No. 42—(1062) Memorandum dated September 21, 1970, to H. R. Haldeman from Tom Huston. Subject: IRS and Ideological Organizations, with attachments

No. 43—(1062) Submitted for identification only, not for publication, and will be retained in the files of the committee

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record.
EXHIBIT No. 34-43

Pre June 17th

(1) White House involvement and Knowledge of Liddy's Intelligence Operation at CREP.

During the entire first four years of the administration the President had been subjected to mass demonstrations relating to the war in Vietnam. I do not remember exactly when, but believe it was in June or July of 1971, that HRH asked me to make a recommendation as to how the Re-Election Committee should handle the problem of demonstrators. HRH raised this with me, because one of my White House responsibilities has been to keep informed regarding potential demonstrations that might affect the President. I had been involved in this area while at the DOJ and when I went to the White House my office served as a liaison office for metropolitan police/FBI/DOJ and SS intelligence regarding demonstrations.

Haldeman and Ehrlichman have always been critical of the insufficiency and weakness in the intelligence that has been provided to the White House by various federal agencies regarding demonstration activities. The intelligence always seemed to be too little and too late. While the evidence would appear that the demonstrations were well orchestrated and well financed, no one could every [sic] find hard information as to who was behind it and what motivation might exist other than the obvious anti-war theme.

The demonstrations were having a dual impact on the President. First, it made the atmosphere of public opinion much more difficult for the President to negotiate an honorable peace in Vietnam and secondly, when the government dealt firmly with the demonstrators we would be charged with oppressive tactics even though the demonstrators were seeking to tie the government into knots.

There were several efforts to improve the government's ability to gather intelligence regarding demonstrations, but these efforts really never accomplished much. For example, before I came to the White House, a study group headed by Tom Huston had re-examined the entire structure of the domestic intelligence security operation, but the plan that was ultimately developed by the study group was vetoed by Hoover because of the fact that it would have involved the FBI assuming less than a dominant position in the intelligence community. A compromise arrangement was worked out with Hoover to establish within the Department of Justice a coordinating team of all the domestic intelligence agencies but the product was less than satisfactory and often the newspapers appeared to have more information than the intelligence gatherers.

When Haldeman would read the reports regarding demonstrations he would—and rightly so—express continual dissatisfaction. I assume it was because of the weaknesses of the government system that Haldeman urged that consideration be given to the campaign committee developing its own capability to deal with demonstrators in the forthcoming Presidential campaign. Not only did we expect problems for Presidential appearances, but it was also felt that the demonstrators would seek to cause extremely serious problems for the Republican 1972 Convention with the aim of creating a similar situation as that which occurred at the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago.

It was suggested that the person who head up this operation be a lawyer who could also serve as general counsel to the Committee and it was not anticipated that the intelligence operation would be a particularly consuming activity. Jeb Magruder indicated to me that he would like to have my Deputy Counsel, Mr. Fred Fielding, assume the position of General Counsel and the man to be concerned with demonstrations and security. I discussed the matter with Fielding, but we agreed that it would handicap my office's operations greatly if he were to leave the office during the chaos of a campaign year. I informed Magruder that I could not let Fielding go, because I couldn't get along without him. Magruder then asked if I would recommend some other lawyer who could fill the function.

I next discussed this with Bud Krogh because Bud is a lawyer and had had responsibility for demonstrations prior to my arrival at the White House. I suggested that David Young, who worked for Bud, might make an excellent

(1263)
man for the job, but Krogh informed me that it was not feasible because Young was too busy on the declassification project. Krogh did, however, suggest Gordon Liddy as a man who could do the job. He told me that Liddy was a fine lawyer who had prepared some excellent legal documents for him and that he was a fast study on the law, and he was quite confident that he would quickly grasp the campaign laws. Krogh also told me that Liddy had an FBI background and assumed that his background with the FBI would qualify him for dealing with the demonstration problems during the campaign. Krogh informed me that he would have to check with Ehrlichman before he signed off on his recommendation which he did and after that I informed Mitchell [sic] and Magruder that I had a recommendation.

I frankly do not recall if I explained the job to Liddy or if Bud Krogh explained the job to Liddy. However, I do recall that I informed Liddy that one phase of the position would involve his tracking of domestic intelligence regarding demonstrations and the threat of demonstrators to the Republican Convention. I informed him that I was not an expert in intelligence and did not have any idea how such operations were conducted, but he assured me that he was familiar with intelligence gathering and would be able to handle the post. I arranged for John Mitchell to meet with Gordon Liddy on November 24, 1971, for a job interview. I attended the meeting and attached is a agenda that Liddy had prepared for the meeting and passed out at the meeting. As I recall the meeting, it was a normal job interview type meeting in which Mitchell asked Liddy about his background and his knowledge of the election laws. I had already informed Liddy that I would do everything possible to assist him in becoming familiar with the election laws, including the new election law, the passage of which was imminent.

Liddy thought I could be very helpful to him in getting geared up with regard to the laws, that they were complex, that they must be followed to the letter. I do not recall any discussion of intelligence operations at this meeting other than the fact that Liddy said he would put together the plan for Mr. Mitchell's approval. The interview also involved discussions in some detail regarding salary and title, which were agreed upon but I am unable to recall the specific salary although I do recall Mitchell agreed that Liddy should be called the General Counsel.

After this meeting, I recall that Magruder requested that I bring Liddy over for an interview with him in that Mitchell had said to him that he would have the final say as to whether or not Liddy was acceptable to him because he was the person who would have the working relationship with Liddy. I explained this to Liddy and Magruder asked that we come over on Friday, December 8, 1972 (?) at which time Magruder interviewed Liddy also. Again, there was no discussion of Liddy's intelligence responsibilities other than Jeb's expressed concern regarding the demonstration threat to the Convention. Liddy indicated that he thought it would be helpful in getting information regarding demonstrators for Magruder and that he would draw up a plan. At that meeting Magruder agreed to hire Liddy and asked him to start as quickly as possible.

The next contact that I had with Liddy was through a man in my office, David Wilson, who I had instructed to provide Liddy with all background material on the election laws and to tell Liddy some of the areas that he should have particular concern with.

On January — 1972, Magruder requested that I attend a meeting in Mitchell's office with Gordon Liddy. At the time I went to the meeting, I had no idea of the subject matter to be discussed, but when we were going over to the meeting together, I learned that Gordon was going to present his proposal for an intelligence operation. Liddy had prepared a series of charts to explain his plan but I frankly had some trouble following it as Mitchell later told me he did, because all of the operations were in unusual code names. However, I do recall some of the items that were in the plan. I recall that it called for a $1 million budget, and included such recommended capacities as the ability to kidnap demonstration leaders in an effort to throw the demonstrators into disarray, strong arm teams, teams to infiltrate operations with demonstrators, and the ability to conduct, what Liddy called the most sophisticated electronic surveillance in the world. The plan also set forth how convention security could be handled, and general security for other aspects of the campaign to deal with demonstrators.

As the plan was unfolded I felt sorry for Liddy because he thought he was providing the answers for the intelligence needs, but I knew that John Mitchell would never agree to any such proposal or plan. I didn't know how Mitchell would turn it off, but knowing John Mitchell, I knew he would not blast Liddy.
out of the room, rather would subtly tell him that this was not what he had in
mind. In fact, the meeting terminated with Mitchell telling Liddy that this is
not what he had in mind, that it was a little exorbitant, and more extensive
than anything that would be needed. Liddy said that he understood and would
provide another plan.
After the meeting, I talked with both Mitchell and Haldeman and Magruder
and informed them that such a plan was disaster. I advised Jeb that he had
better guide Liddy before the matter goes further.
On January — 1972, Jeb requested I attend another meeting with Mitchell and
Liddy and himself. I had not at any time discussed this plan further with him,
although I do recall him telling me that he was going to totally revise it. I
arrived at this second meeting very late and Liddy was in the process of present-
ing his revised plan.
After sitting in the meeting for approximately 15 or so minutes and hearing
the same sort of things starting to come out again, as have been contained in the
earlier plan, I could see that Mitchell was very upset, but trying to maintain his
composure. I must also say that I was frankly quite upset and decided that I had
best interject myself into the matter in an effort to cut it off from any further
discussion. I told Liddy and the others that the things that were being discussed
here could not be discussed with a man who is the Attorney General in the
United States and if there was going to be any intelligence operation, it would
have to be taken up at another time. I felt that I got Mitchell off the spot without
embarrassing Liddy who agreed that this would be discussed sometime after
Mitchell had come over to the Re-Election Committee. Again, I felt sorry for
Liddy, and I felt no one had given him any guidance as to what was or was not
expected of him, but I did not believe it was my role to get any further involved
other than to attempt to stop what it saw developing.
After the meeting, I informed Liddy that I could never discuss his intelligence
operation with him further, and that he should not look for me for any guidance
on the matter. I informed him that our dealings would have to be limited strictly
to matters of election law and Liddy said he would honor that request. I never
discussed the subject with Gordon Liddy again.
Also, after that meeting, I informed Haldeman of what had transpired in
Mitchell’s office and the fact that I had interjected myself into the meeting in an
effort to cut it off. I told Haldeman that I had informed Liddy that I would not
discuss this subject with him further, and that if anything like this was develop-
ing in the White House, I had to stay totally out of it. Haldeman fully agreed
and told me that I should not become involved in any way with the Re-Election
Committee intelligence operation and I never did.
I never received any intelligence from the Re-Election Committee and I cannot
recall ever providing the government intelligence regarding demonstrations to
the Re-Election Committee, rather, I provided all such information directly to
Haldeman via Strachan. I have no knowledge before the incident which occurred
on June 17th as to what was or was not done regarding Liddy’s intelligence
gathering functions. And I never discussed this subject with any other person
at the Re-Election Committee before June 17th.

POST June 17th

(1) The Dean Investigation

I landed in San Francisco on June 15th, having been out of the country to
give a speech on drug law enforcement. I called Fred Fielding of my office
to check in and he informed me of the news story regarding the break in at the
DNC headquarters.
I arrived in Washington, D. C. late in the afternoon of June 15th and Fielding
informed me that one of the men arrested had a letter with a check signed by
Howard Hunt in his possession. I realized at that point that I would be asked
to assemble all of the facts so that the White House could be fully informed as
to what had transpired and how it might affect the President. Having been on
an airplane for approximately 25 hours, I did nothing further than evening.
On Monday morning, after reading all the news accounts of the incident, I
spoke with John E. who instructed me to get the facts together and report to
him. I called the A.G. to ask him what facts he knew and he said that both the
metropolitan police and the FBI were investigating. He also told me that Gordon
Liddy and Powell Moore had tracked him down on Sunday, June 15th, at Burning
Tree CC and Liddy had said he must talk with him about the man who had been
arrested at the DNC. The A.G. said he refused to talk with Liddy about the
matter.
I then called Liddy and requested he come to my office. When he came over I suggested we take a walk. I asked him what he knew about the incident which had occurred at the DNC and he told me that this was his operation that had gone bad. He told me that he had been pushed into doing it, when he did not want to do it. He said that they had been in the DNC before and the bug they had placed in the DNC was not transmitting properly, so they were seeking to correct it. He also said that they had observed what appeared to be stolen classified documents in the DNC and had been instructed to make copies of them.

I asked Liddy if anyone at the White House was involved and he told me no. I did not ask him who pushed him to do this, but he intimated it was Magruder. I did not question him further about the incident.

Liddy also expressed concern for those who had been apprehended and I told him there was nothing I could do. He said he understood. He told me that he deeply regretted that the matter had occurred and he planned to remain totally silent. As we parted I remember he said you can count on me to be a soldier. I told him that I was trying to ascertain the seriousness of the problem—in that it was obviously a political bombshell—and that I would not have any further contact with him. He said he understood and we parted.

During the days and weeks that followed I discussed the incident with everyone who I thought might have any knowledge or involvement. Set forth below are the findings from these conversations.

Chuck Colson

Because of Colson’s relationship with Hunt, I thought he may have either knowledge or involvement in the matter, but Colson assured and reassured me that he had no involvement whatsoever.

Colson told me that he was aware of the fact that Hunt was working with Liddy. He said that in late January—early February (?), 1972, Hunt and Liddy came by his office late one afternoon to visit him. He said that it was a casual “stop-by” type visit and during the course of their conversation Hunt and Liddy mentioned to Colson that they had an intelligence operation plan, but they could not get anyone at CREP to focus on it and sign off. Colson says that they explored upon him to call CREP to see if he could get some action. Colson stated that he called Magruder and told Magruder that he did know what Hunt and Liddy had for a plan, but they should not be left hanging. Someone should focus on it and make a decision one way or the other.

Colson told me that the only time he requested Hunt to do anything for him after that was during the ITT hearings, when he requested Hunt to go to Denver to interview Dita Beard. Colson states that he wanted to know if Beard had really written the famous memo and decided to send Hunt to find out. When Hunt was in Colson’s office, Colson asked him how he was going to pay for the trip. Hunt then telephoned someone and said he needed $1,000 and solved the problem.

Magruder has intimated to me that Colson had more involvement than Colson says. Magruder says that they let Liddy and Hunt proceed with their intelligence operation because Magruder was concerned that Colson might try to take over the operation himself and they did not want Colson involved. However, Magruder feels that Colson was aware of everything Hunt and Liddy did and that Colson, in fact, gave Hunt assignments from time to time. Magruder says that the Brigham Young student—Gregory—was working for Hunt to get scheduling information for Colson. Magruder says he had no use for such information, but Colson did.

Magruder also says that he received more than one call from Colson telling him to approve the Hunt and Liddy intelligence operation, and it was Colson who was pushing to get something done. Colson denies this.

Colson received a letter from Howard Hunt on [Attachment ___]. This letter would appear to indicate that Hunt is saying that Colson was not involved in the incident at the DNC headquarters.

Colson received a telephone call from Howard Hunt on [Attachment ___]. During the course of that conversation Hunt states that Colson had nothing to do with the incident at the DNC headquarters. Colson recorded the conversation. (Attachment ___)

Colson has stated under oath on two occasions that he was not involved in the incident. These statements were contained in depositions—one for the federal grand jury investigation and the other (Attachment ___) in connection with the civil lawsuit filed by the DNC.
I found that E had absolutely no knowledge regarding the intelligence operations at the CREP. Bud Krogh had discussed with E that he was recommending Liddy to serve as General Counsel at the CREP and the fact that Liddy might also be given responsibilities for intelligence regarding demonstrations that would affect the campaign. However, E had, to the best of my inquiries, no knowledge of anything Liddy was engaged in after his departure from the Domestic Council staff. I also found that E had only incidental dealings with Liddy while he was on the Domestic Counsel staff and knew of his work in the area of gun control, narcotics, and that he worked for David Young and Bud Krogh on the problem of leaks and matters relating to national security.

E only recalls one occasion meeting with Howard Hunt, in connection with an interview Hunt had conducted with a former CIA operative and relating to a matter of national security. E was aware of the fact that Hunt had been placed on the White House staff as a consultant. Colson had recommended retaining Hunt in connection with the Pentagon Papers matter and E—according to Colson—told Colson to place him on his (Colson's) staff.

Bud Krogh

Krogh has testified twice under oath regarding his relationship with Liddy and Hunt. Once before the federal grand jury investigating the incident at the DNC headquarters, and once at his confirmation hearings (Attachment ________). My independent inquiry confirmed that Krogh had absolutely no knowledge regarding any activities of Hunt or Liddy once they departed from the White House. When Krogh recommended Liddy to me as a person who would make an excellent General Counsel and as a person who could assist the CREP in keeping abreast of the problems that demonstrations might cause, the campaign, he told me that Liddy has an outstanding legal mind. He cited several examples of legal briefs Liddy had prepared and told me that he was confident that Liddy could quickly and thoroughly grasp the campaign laws.
Post June 17th

- (b) official reaction at WH to commission recommendation
- (c) formal knowledge at UN's activities at CEP

Post June 17th

- (e) IDC decision
- (d) working with CEP
- (c) formal action problem
- (b) IDC reports
- (a) turning over to CEP informal from papers office
- (d) relationship between UN & IDC

- Gary
- A.J.
- Person
- Sub

- Laying claim to knowledge
- SHCC lenis letter to CEP/109

The Plan

The line

The line
1269

To Jurr

Instant of 200 in Einstein's 1898 annuity.

If $100 was $180 in 1998, $200 was $280 in 1998.

There were regular wire taps going on. They were not tapped.

Mussolini was in every major demonstration.

well, around all sorts of demonstrations,

During the war, and of course, of course, and of course,

Staff: Firing locations.

We will always control of insufficient intelligence,

The demonstration activities, what they were planning,

who was behind them, financially, and because of the lack of intelligence, the ability of

The government to deal effectively until the

solution.

The demonstration were having a real impact

on the US, making it difficult, from time to

time, to maintain a semblance of order.

US had not been as aggressive in dealing

with those who fought for the US in the

name of better conditions.

They were making efforts to appease the outpour. Lincoln

understood - but they were not acknowledging that.

Of course, I want to help, they were always willing.

They were really doing it to make sure the

.agreement.

1 was,

and

[2802]
In conclusion, he had arrived at the view that all would likely agree, but the problem of the press was not one where the newspaper was the sole issue.

When one would read the novel and quickly re-express continued dissatisfaction because it was apparent that the press was not the prime dasworth to some political problem.

In July 1972, he had advanced the understanding that the demonstration would probably cause the press to become a serious problem during his calculus campaign. He suggested that the campaign committee decline it was capacity to deal with demonstrators had only not been sought for a campaign, but this felt sufficient that the demonstrators would seek to cause the press to become the same problem that would follow the demonstration committee. He told me that we could push the idea politically again to keep it up, but he wanted to do something that would not be difficult. After an interview, I was advised to quit the demonstration, and to press on itself for repeated efforts elsewhere.
I discussed this matter with Mr. Burs—— and he agreed that we
would have a problem, that the FDR would
come but that the sending committee
should develop it and expect to gain
such results. He offered to provide
some of his staff and I must be of
assistance, but I never asked him for such
rooms.

I opened both my and Mr. Burs room
also, because he continued to asked me for
my recommendations.

I stated having no background on appetites,
in the alchemy field, that there been
on the warming hood of meteor— and
in disposal for years with Fred Bailey.

He referred me that he had already given
this matter some light and had been through
many plans, to form a purely voluntary
along Old Lade of Winter. I asked him to
make his recommendations for consideration.

[Underscoring and Scratches]
I fully agreed that the action should be
wholly & entirely by a lawyer with a
knowledge & skill in that kind of business, as the
influence of the law & the authorities would
be strong.

I was right asked to recommend such a lawyer.

The reply came from the
May 1924 he had gone in 1926.

It's art. St. 1926 etc. and I
suggested that Mr. C. E. Kendall said
all lawyers were willing but said he
would not be selected. He said I
would not be selected. It passed this resolution on 1

Mr. C. E. Kendall on the 24th

Typical witness's statement only long that given
in was but G.B. would not alter the resolution

29. Mr. B. said on... from our discussion

was not to.

as it would.

in the matter & the

as it would be in the matter & the
I plan exception to 7 of 1899. I have no knowledge of what she did or he planned.

We engaged a job to save 7 of 1899. The 7 of 1899 were to save 7 of 1899. What 7 of 1899 to save 7 of 1899. For 7 of 1899, she saved 7 of 1899. For 7 of 1899.
I presented his condition with my best. I was
began to explore his stomach; if the patient
feel but if I could not here any further
intestine with him. He said he experinced the
and that it would have to be that way.
It is not clear to a reader.

(Handwritten notes:
Called to medical in J.E.'s office with column
columns and E.M. possibly had file of the info
which could be obtained somehow.
Single I have learned about that may have called
Column to hold me to like the J.E. for file.
As this ended I was in bed—died—threw
people to call Larry and told him to call
and get out of the room when I died
later and be sure—call always to
understand if first call—J.E. was advised
of call before 9—call one more that call
and kept [illegible]
Column received. I found that this could be
a problem, since he had taken one call and
is to determine what to offer was
rational, and that the patient would be obtained
be referred back to have the file opened,
but not once. An opinion from his office would
be possible to the patient.
I had learned the file for hours by the
and the files were required to go to a
was until the called friends to remove}
3d June 1905

I landed at San F. on the 3d called Mrs...

The agent met me at first said they were taking a

bidding effort.

Dismounted D.C. Sunday 16th and returned around 3pm

that is I was back with him. I stayed at first point that the I would have to keep riding I called for more

more again called badly requested her
come to an area to make sure suggested we
could take Dr. Boddle. He told me that the

bus in question had been sold and the
take about point at getting it where we

would want to do it and that both drivers
had been at it. He said that if a part where he

told to take great care to handle it right.

He said I looked for if anyone from the

tell him anything in case and he said

as if it did not matter. Other person about

the center. He agreed with me for three

person who had been good will said I

tell him two men nothing I could do.

He said I told him today the point

from down the block that he

planted in gay and I can make other

points. I told him but asked that he was

good bond sign and said the Po

agents will want to put the bond as the

left. He agreed and I told him that.
(ii) Recording results of negotiations

(iii) Lasts, efflorescences
suggested the idea to me, and I told him that the plan was not what he had in mind. I told him that he did not tell him what he did not want to know, but told him what he was concerned about. He said he was concerned about what would happen if the agreement was not renewed. He also said that he could not remain in the company'snelly unless we would allow him to leave. I told him that I would not allow him to leave the company and he must return to work.

He then asked if I could talk to him. I told him that I had a meeting with the president and that he was to be present in the meeting. I told him that he must attend the meeting and that he must attend another meeting before the end of the month.

On the 10th of the month, I met with the president and he told me that I had to go to the meeting. He also told me that I had to go to the meeting with the president and that I had to attend the meeting. He told me that I had to attend the meeting and that I had to attend another meeting before the end of the month.
I had seen so much of the quiet, firm, I could say, in his own way, but firm. A certain manner, a certain tone, I who was there, and so on. I was
pressed to until the last in the case of some. I told
I told him that the thing that he was
drawing would not be drawn with a
pen, but with a flat of the U.S. pattern
out of there and that it was not actually
possible, it would have to be drawn
elsewhere, but that if the U.S. cannot be
asked to come another the situation is the
only one.

I left the room for only a moment. I felt
so odd, I felt that something. I did not
believe it was not. If you asked him about
the man, the U.S. would not believe it was
the only one to say, what it seems.

I told him that we could be
asked to assume a certain form and fully
responsive that respect. I ran outside
and said, with John today.
Also, of the first week I informed Mr. G.
what he had learned about me, and
that I had attempted to persuade him
that if such things were going on that no
one in the world could龋 persuade them that I
would not have been joined with him and
I felt to that end, could agree,
it seemed that both of that fell against
and fell as to should not become
wounded in any way in the 1781
ultimately qualified and I never did.

It happened as whether—then 1701 and
it can not recall being present any
information on whatsoever the 1701

When I practiced all after I learned
of 1701 via Simon.

It hope no不存在 handbook (pre-Promise III)
if it what or we in any other again
likely already going further.

It was several times subjected with eunice at
1691, the will exist on the adobe of bene
before the 1691.
I just found out this morning I was out of coffee, but it was a causal decision made.

His line after I gave him back to the
coffee roaster was, "I hope you're doing well with him at your

I know now if he ever

I can have and I am the lord, but I can

I recall, he told me I had made a

told me to make a calm to praises.

I called the police to tell

I told him I had heard about it, and it didn't

how easy it would have been, but I thought

I should keep an eye on him.

I told me, "This is over, but

give me one more chance to be in

[2813]
April 1971

... some involvement and knowledge of Nixon's management plans occurred in 1971.

During the entire first four years of the Administration, the President had been subjected to these denunciations relating to his role in U.N. Partly as I can recall, the press would spring up daily. In 1971, the actual电视 program had become quite strong on the subject. As a result, I had urged the President on the subject of receiving the secret codes. The President would exposure itself ability to

... I can't remember who, but believe it was in June or July of 1971, that I was asked me to be a recommendation of how the actual committee should handle the problem of demonstrating. It occurred, this with me, because one of my words was responsible for the first formal report to the President. It first been involved on the code. At the end of the O.S. I was where I used to the words. And, my office served as a leader in the code of 1971 and 55 intelligence agencies regarding demonstrations.

...
I became aware, shortly after the incident, that
John Mitchell and others were being blackmailed by the
individuals who had been involved in the incident at the
new location. It is impossible for me to recall
specific dates and situations, as I found this a distressing
situation and sought to forget it or ignore it as fast
possible. Nevertheless, I can remember with perfect
clarity what occurred that I was made aware of and chose
to set forth below to the best of my
recollection.

The first I became aware of the situation was
when Mitchell was seen for the first time that the men
who had been involved were looking for assistance to
make their bombs. I believe these devices for commerce
came from Mrs. Brown. But when Mitchell arrived and
so did Johnson, Johnson passed them on to Mitchell
and Fred La Rocque. The requests for money
were accompanied with the threat that individuals involved
in the incident would cause great harm if they
were not helped.

It is impossible for me to catalogue the
trials, but they were the reason and cause for
being... An example of the problem at the site
was that Mitchell was a frequent visitor to the
location and ultimately from 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.
The next time I became aware of the continued nature of the blackmail situation was when another threat came to the United States, but there was no money available to meet the demand. Stann, Mitchell, Lahey, and others became aware of the fact that before April 26, 1942, $350,000 in cash had been sent to the White House for private political reasons. They were also aware of the fact that the White House had not spent the money and, in fact, the White House wanted to report the sender.

There were two problems in returning the money. The money had been depleted by Stann and Lahey to fund Sherman. Sherman had made arrangements for its safe keeping, and only he, with his approval, couldarkin. He claimed that the United States could return the money if it came from the same source as before. It was realized that there had been an expansion of some 20,000—on what purpose I do not know. This expansion was not in line with the previous arrangements, and Stann said he could provide the money necessary to make the fund whole. This was done. The second problem was how to get the funds out of the White House without making them look out of place. If the funds were returned as the Speaker said they would never be accepted by the House. It was a White House—well, a White House—mission that had to be carried out. We were faced with a similar situation in the House. It was the best I could do.
while we tried to determine how to get rid of him in a manner that was legal, but Mitchell informed us

Mitchell insisted that I asked him for funds from his $350,000, part of which I needed. Mitchell and I agreed that it would be replenished later. I assured him to that, told him that it was a bad situation growing worse, but I could not offer any alternative suggestion. I recall that we delayed for some time making any decision and finally I told

the two men that my advice was that I was able to act at the court stage. I prepared him and he said yes that I should have. The man said him for money, but one could eat it back as soon as I saw Mr. 

This same legal situation repeated itself again and again. Finally he said let's sit down, the (old) man, and let's try to work out an agreement. They settled all the money on his last agreement, but was never given a receipt.

While it am not a true story of the full series of the threats made against George of CREEP, I am aware of two instances. Died back and threats were made to people at the White House.
Mr. Deneau Hunt calledCreatedBy1286  
Colonel and Mr. Colman, secretary, Dow Hill, expressed  
the call at her home. This was a valued insight  
that Colonel should do something to resolve the  
many demands. Colonel, to the end of my knowledge  
had no idea what this was all about, and he  
resolved the matter to me. I told him to  
continue my search, just to receive any further  
calls from Dow Hill. I advised Deneau of  
the matter and told him I planned to do  
nothing to get in touch with Miss Colman and  
was to push to get anyone at the White House  
...
On March 1973 Paul O'Brien came to my office and reported that Hunt had received an offer to sell his shares for $20,000. He also reported that Hunt had sent a message directly to me—"to tell me that if I wanted $40,000. (full price) or reimbursement plus $50,000 for attorney's fees. If I did not accept the offer he would "be interested in options" and also he would disclose "some of the facts" things he had done for JE and BFD. I said, "I asked O'Brien why Hunt had sent that message to me and O'Brien said he asked that be some reason to which Hunt said I just want you to pass that message to Dean."

I called Hunt and JE of his first and JE asked if I had covered his stock with Mitchell another. I told him I had not and he requested that I do so—and I did with Mitchell but not with others. Later on on the second of March, 1973 Mitchell and Hunt came up for a meeting with Mitchell, JE, Bell, and myself on Thursday March 1973. Mitchell asked if the old firm was still in a problem. I am purposely not aware of what was done in this instance and how it was resolved.
I have never been in a position to fully
understand the fact that we were being threatened by
blackmail. Before we decided to get involved in the
affair, we were concerned that this would result in some
demand if we didn't come through. It seems that the
writer was trying to get us involved in something
dangerous, but we were able to diffuse the situation
and prevent any further complications.

The next move was to approach

At some time shortly before the brawl, O'Brien informed
me that Bill was very anxious to meet with you to discuss
the possibility of setting up a plan. Bill was very
anxious to come to terms, but he was not
willing to make any concessions. He planned to separate a
place but only if he could have

The second move was to

I called him on to JE and Colon. JE insisted
that Colon should meet with me and Bill and
only Colon did not really know his own position in
the office. After the meeting he reported that JE
and I met with him. Colin was reported that he believed it was essential that he 
be assured of the situation. E. agreed and told Colin to give him a careful answer—i.e. an 
assurance of something but no hard or definite 

Colin talked with Hunt and agar on total

how that he would give a hand and frank 
consultation but that it was hard to be said 
do anything he could to do not intend on getting 
 consulted him approximately a year (Colin notes) 
the advice but (unethical) I don't know for 
bulk of the consulting actions are taken. 
let go and make the decision to others 
indicated that. An schuyell that.
1290

I was at the office and the contents of the box were there. The box was opened and the contents were taken out to the office. I was then in the office for some time. The box was then closed and left in the office. I was not present.

Did the box contain the evidence? There were three boxes and I opened the one.

1. The box was opened.
2. The contents were then opened.
3. The box was not from my own.

I am not sure what was found in the box. It was a small box. It was suggested that it was opened.

The box was opened, but I said it was not opened. I opened the box. I opened the box.

I should not have opened the box because the box was not from my own.

The box was opened, but I should not have opened it.

I am not sure what was found in the box. It was a small box. It was suggested that it was opened.

I opened the box, but I should not have opened it.

I am not sure what was found in the box. It was a small box. It was suggested that it was opened.
2. On June 20, 1972, the FBI returned to the

[Handwritten notes and text not legible]
It was her last one. God! how was a thing

in every man's mouth to the rest and you

some wretched love. She. If she was

very kind, which I don't believe, she was

just sorry. You're not nearly dead

for the report from the office, but I

hold her from the office, and I

would punish her with her posting, and

in the office, they are, or maintained the

poster for the past two years to last.

experienced. I don't know what to say.

possibly, the second step, and there's

been looking over it all the time. I

don't think the second step is the best.

and told her that it has. She could be called

and come to hand, to generally, it

called them, who come over and are given

the stand. I mean seriously wanted

her to have that were. She went to pray.

this, and only had seen them. She

used to say, and said again, it was

also a most peculiar fact, and supposed

that it was not meant, partly because

to be with her, and only, but, I meant

to be slightly6 otherwise. I am told

that the said fact, she said, and it

wanted to have been held, and it

wonderful, that if he liked to. God bless you, sir.
10. On March 26, 1973 the Los Angeles Times reported that James McCord had told investigators for the Senate Select Committee that both John Dean and Jeb Magruder had prior knowledge of the break-in at the DNC headquarters. On this same morning, H. R. Haldeman, who was with the President in Key Biscayne, Florida called Dean at Camp David. They discussed Dean's recollection of facts relating to the authorization of the Liddy Plan. Haldeman has testified that he asked Dean if he would have any problems if the President announced that day that he was requesting that Dean go to the grand jury without immunity; Dean replied that he would have no problem with appearing before the grand jury, but that his testimony concerning the number and purpose of the meetings among Dean, John Mitchell, Gordon Liddy and Magruder would conflict with the testimony previously given by Magruder; Dean stated that there were other areas of concern, such as payments to the defendants by Kalmbach, the $350,000, the Hunt threat, and Colson's talk about helping Hunt. Following his telephone call with Dean, Haldeman met with the President. Haldeman has testified that the President decided to drop his plan to announce that Dean would be requesting an appearance immediately before the grand jury. Haldeman has testified that the problem was that Dean had not really sorted out the facts at that point and it was not appropriate for him to go to the grand jury.

10.1 Los Angeles Times, March 26, 1973, 1, 12.

10.2 Meetings and conversations between the President and H. R. Haldeman, March 26, 1973 (received from White House).

10.3 H. R. Haldeman calendar, March 23, 1973 (received from SSC).

10.4 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2901-2902.
Claims Political Pressure, Lying on Watergate

BY ROBERT L. JACKSON
and RONALD J. OSTROW
(Times Staff Writers)

WASHINGTON — Completed Watergate conspirator James W. McCord Jr. has told Senate investigators that White House counsel John W. Dean III and former presidential aide Jeb Stuart Magruder had prior knowledge of the bugging of Democratic National Committee headquarters last year, The Times learned Sunday.

McCord's accusations were made during private sessions Friday and Saturday with Samuel Dash, chief counsel for the special Senate committee investigating the Watergate case and related matters.

Dean was the man named by President Nixon last summer to conduct a separate Watergate investigation for the White House to learn if any Administration officials were involved.

During the FBI's investigation of the case, Dean also sat in on the questioning of White House personnel, according to testimony of L. Patrick Gray III, acting FBI director.

Will Give 'Documentation'

Dash said Sunday in a news conference that McCord told him he would give the committee "documentation and other information that will corroborate his testimony."

McCord, elaborating on a letter made public in court Friday in which he charged that political pressure had, during January's Watergate trial, told Dash that Magruder purged himself during the trial according to a source familiar with the interviews.

McCord said Magruder was not telling the truth when he denied advance knowledge of the break-in at Democratic Headquarters in the Watergate complex last June 17, the source said. McCord said Magruder also should have named Dean as another having prior knowledge, the source said.

Magruder, who was deputy director of President Nixon's reelection campaign, denied McCord's charges concerning him Sunday night.

Claims No 'Prior Knowledge'

"As I have stated before, and as has been stated by Mr. (John W.) Mitchell, former attorney general and Nixon campaign director, we did not have prior knowledge of the bugging," Magruder said.

"I have no idea about anyone outside our committee. I cannot speak for John (Dean)."

Magruder is presently director of policy development for the Commerce Department.

Dean could not be reached for comment. However, at the Florida White House, Gerald Warren, deputy press secretary, said: "We categorically deny that Dean had any prior knowledge."

McCord told Dash that Dean had knowledge of and was involved in preparations for the bugging. The

[2830]
McCord Says Pair Knew of Watergate

Continued from First Page- Times' source said.

But McCord refused to provide the committee with further details pending
his private meeting this week with Chief U.S.
Deputy Judge John J. Sirica,
who delayed his sentencing
last Friday and urged
McCord and other defend-
ants to cooperate with the Senate committee and the
federal grand jury.

McCord faces a maximum sentence of 45 years
in prison and a $50,000
fine.

Charges Others

McCord, the source said,
charged that others be-
side Dean and Magruder
had advance knowledge of
the Watergate operation
but told Dash he would
supply their names later.

Dash also said at Sun-
day's press conference that
he and another committee
investigator had met with
McCord and McCord had
named other persons not
yet prosecuted and added
that he "will continue to."

Although Dash declined
to disclose any informa-
tion that McCord had sup-
pelled during their week-
end sessions, he described
the former GOP security
director as "a very valu-
able witness."

Dash, a law professor
with considerable expe-
rince as a prosecutor and
defense attorney, told
newsmen he was "thor-
oughly impressed with
Mr. McCord's sincerity in
giving us a full and honest
disclosure."

'Documentation' Fable

McCord, it was learned,
also told Dash that former
White House consultant
Edward "Ted" Moore
had denied guilt and
charged against him in
the Watergate case.

One of the coordinators
of the Watergate
operation was Edward
Moore, who was also the
'fifth' member of the
White House staff.

Moore, it was said, was
told by Mr. Nixon that
he had gained advance
knowledge of the bug-
ing of the Watergate
operation and was given a
package of information
about the burglary.

Moore, it was said, also
told Dash that Mr. Nixon
had promised him ex-
ecutive clemency and
monthly pay-
ments to him, the source
said. McCoard also claimed
he was pressured himself
to plead guilty but did not
give further details. It was
reported.

Only McCord and G.
Folden Liddy, the Nixon
campaign's former con-
tact, stood trial and
were convicted.

McCord's allegations that
Dean had advance
knowledge of the bugg-
ing are likely to further com-
plicate Senate confirma-
tion of Gray as FBI director.

Gray has testified at
Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee hearings on his em-
bassy nomination that he
sent Dean 82 FBI inter-
view reports in the Water-
gate investigation without
telling Atty. Gen. Richard
G. Kleindienst or anyone in
the FBI. Gray also told
the committee that Dean
sat in on the FBI's ques-
tioning of White House
personnel.

Gray said he took those
actions because Dean re-
quested them in line with
his assignment from Pre-
sident Nixon to ascertain
whether any White House
employees were involved in
the Watergate affair.

Testimony Invited

The Judiciary Com-
mitee invited Dean to testi-
y, but the President's coun-
seled declined to appear, cit-
ing executive privilege.

He offered instead to an-
swer written questions,
but committee Demo-
crats condemned the offer and
said no vote has been taken an-

President Nixon

And Liddy cooperated
with the committee and
with the FBI.

"It is a regrettable situ-

ation," he said. "We have
learned the names of some
persons mentioned in news reports
on the case as well as to
implicate others.

McCord, in his inte-
views with Dash and com-
mitee investigator Harold
Lipton, clarified the state-
ment in his letter to Judge
Sirica that he did not feel
confident in taking with
the FBI.

"He said he made that
statement only because of
the revelations at the Ju-
diciary Committee hear-
ings on the confusion of
Mr. Gray—that informa-
tion obtained by the FBI in the Watergate in-
vestigation was given to
White House officials," Dash
said.

McCord also told Dash
that he feared any infor-
mation might give the
grand jury in the presence of
Justice Department
prosecutors "would be
made immediately avail-
able to White House offi-
cials," Dash said.

Dash said he would try
to contact lawyers for the
other six defendants to-
day. He said it was "un-
derstandable," that they
had not contacted him yet,
because "some soul-
searching has to take
place."

Dash's sessions with McCo-nd, which each ran
three hours and were tape-
recorded, were conducted
in the office of Hen-
rrn Feinsilver, who was
acting as substitute counsel for McCord. His
regular lawyer, Gerald
Ash, was out of town over
the weekend.

[2831]
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<td>PM 12:15</td>
<td>President met with Haldeman</td>
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<td>10:15</td>
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<td>President placed local call to Haldeman</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8:50</td>
<td>President received local call from Haldeman</td>
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1973

For a full year of daily
quarter-hour appointments,
memoranda and diary
Monday, March 26

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Evening
over the following week, regarding the White House staff going to the Senate committee without executive privilege; but more importantly, regarding the assignment to John Dean to prepare a full and complete report on all of the facts of the matter. After the March 22 meeting in the afternoon, the President left for Key Biscayne. The rest of us remained in Washington. I went to Key Biscayne the next morning to join the President for the weekend. John Dean went home to write his report, but found that he was besieged by reporters as a result of the Pat Gray allegation that he had lied, and so the President, talking to him on the phone the next day, suggested that he go to Camp David where he would be free from the press and would have an uninterrupted opportunity to get his report prepared. I am convinced that there was a discussion of Dean writing a report, and that when we left the meeting on the afternoon of the 22d it was clear in all of our minds that that was Dean’s assignment and that he was expected to do so over the next couple of days.

CAMP DAVID

Over the weekend that Dean was at Camp David I had several phone conversations with him. There was a story that Dean and Magruder knew about the bugging and that was a matter of concern to Dean with which he was dealing. He had obviously been working on the report he was supposed to be preparing and perhaps talking to people. He seemed now to feel that Magruder was definitely involved. He gave that indication, which he had given before, on the phone. He was not at all sure about whether or not Mitchell was involved.

On the 26th, I had a long phone call with Dean. It is interesting because he said there was no communication on that day of any significance.

I had called Dean—this is on the 26th—to ask if he would have any problem if the President announced that day that he was requesting that Dean be called to the grand jury without immunity, and I specified that because in the earlier discussions Dean had made the point of immunity. Dean said, “No, I would have no problem with that.” Then he said, “I have been working on this whole thing and trying to analyze what our problems are.”

He said there is a problem with Magruder regarding the planning meetings, because apparently he has testified as to the number of meetings and the content of the meetings and his testimony was different than what mine would be if I went to the grand jury now. He said there was only one meeting, and it was for the purpose of discussing campaign spending laws; while, in fact, there were two meetings and they were for the purpose of discussing intelligence presentations by Liddy.

He said, “In looking over this whole thing, there are several areas of concern. One is the blackmail area. Blackmail started way back.” This was the first time he spelled this out to me. Mitchell was hit by Parkinson or O’Brien, who were hit by Bittman, who was hit by Hunt, who had been hit by the defendants saying that they needed money and if they did not get it they were going to cause trouble. It was not spelled out much more than that, I do not think.
Mitchell told Dean—this is Dean now recounting to me what his report apparently was showing—to tell Haldeman and Ehrlichman to get Kalmbach to raise the money and Dean did. Kalmbach raised some $70,000, which he gave to LaRue.

Then, we got to the question of the $350,000 and there was a problem there because the $22,000 was spent out of that and there was a problem of how to return it and account for the missing $22,000.

Then there was the problem of blackmail to the White House directly. He said there were two instances of that, one—Mrs. Hunt called Colson's secretary and said something about a demand for money. The other was Hunt's the preceding week.

Regarding clemency, he said Colson talked to Bittman. He did not make any commitment but told him he would help.

He referred to a letter McCord had written to Caulfield requesting a meeting. Mitchell told Dean to have him see him and find out what he was up to.

Another problem area was Dean's delay in turning over the evidence in Hunt's safe to the FBI. Another was a call Liddy had made to Krogh. Apparently, he had been given a brushoff by Krogh and that had made Liddy mad.

Following that phone call, the President dropped his plan to announce that Mr. Dean would be requesting an appearance immediately before the grand jury in order to lay out all the facts as he knew them. The problem was that Dean had not really sorted out the facts at that point and it was not appropriate for him to go to the grand jury.

Dean has said in his testimony that there was no discussion in the March 26 phone call of his going to the grand jury—yet, that was the reason for the call.

In one of the phone calls from Camp David, I believe on the 27th, Dean told me that he had talked with Paul O'Brien who had told him Magruder had said that he had gone ahead with the Watergate operation on orders from Strachan, who said Haldeman had ordered it because the President wanted it done. This is the same report that Dean testified he had given to me in early February. Another confusion in dates—but an important one.

By the 30th, Dean had not delivered any report and he said he had not been able to write one; and the President stopped dealing with Dean. In effect, he had stopped dealing with him after the 23rd.

I do not believe my attitude toward Dean had changed at that point. I was puzzled and maybe Dean was reading some puzzlement; but I had been in frequent communication with him in quite lengthy phone conversations while he was at Camp David—contrary to the implication he has created that he was practically incommunicado while he was up there. I had the feeling that he was telling me quite openly what the problems were and what he was trying to work out.

On March 30, the President made the announcement that nobody in the White House would go to the Senate hearings but that all members of the White House staff would, of course, appear before the grand jury, if called, and would cooperate fully.

Also on the 30th, the President put Mr. Ehrlichman officially on the Watergate investigation and told him to develop the facts in the case and try again to get to a final conclusion.
On March 26, 1973 the President, in the presence of H. R. Haldeman, instructed Ronald Ziegler, his press secretary, to express the President's confidence in John Dean. Ziegler announced publicly on that day that the President had "absolute and total" confidence in Dean.


11.3 Copies of UPI and AP wire clips for March 26, 1973 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
The testimony of RONALD ZIEGLER was presented to a full quorum of the Grand Jury.

BEFORE:

RICHARD BEN-VENISTE, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

JILL VOLNER
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

GERALD GOLDMAN, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

GEORGE T. FRAMPTON, JR., ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice
recall that?

A Yes, I can.

Q That was on the 23rd. Do you recall making a statement personally to the press on the 26th indicating that the
President had called Mr. Dean to discuss the Los Angeles Times story with him?

A I recall making the statement on the 26th, yes.

Q What statement do you recall making?

A I recall making a statement on the 26th that the
President had confidence in Mr. Dean.

Q Did you make that statement as well?

A Yes, I did. I made the statement. The President didn't. I made the statement.

Q Do you recall the statement being the President has complete confidence in Mr. Dean?

A Yes, I do.

Q Do you recall further stating that the President wanted you, Mr. Ziegler, to express his absolute and total
certainty in Mr. Dean?

A Yes, I do.

Q And did you discuss that with the President prior to making it?

A Yes, I did.

Q And what do you recall your discussion being?

A I recall, primarily, that we were having some proble
with the -- I'm recalling this conversation -- with the pris-
oners of war, at that point, and the major part of my con-
versation with the President related to the prisoner of war
problem.

During the course of that conversation, I briefly
raised the point of the McCord letter and I was told to ex-
press confidence in Mr. Dean and I did.

BY MR. GOLDMAN:

Q Was anyone present?
A Mr. Haldeman was present.

BY MR. BEN-VENISTE:

Q Well, did Mr. Haldeman anything?
A I don't remember specifically what Mr. Haldeman said
or specifically what the President said, but I do remember
that the discussion along the lines that we've talked about.
We were talking about the North Vietnamese had had
a problem or it caused a problem in relation to P0W's.

Q Did the President tell you he had spoken to Mr.
Dean that morning?
A No, and I subsequently had cleared that up in a
press briefing. I surmized or embellished, in that particular
press conference, that it was my understanding that he had.

Q Where did you get that?
A Just an assumption that I drew.

Q That he'd spoken to him that morning?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q And who told you he hadn't?
A Well, later on, the story broke that Mr. Dean -- that the President had not spoken to Mr. Dean that day at Camp David and I checked and publicly stated that, indeed, Haldeman had talked to Mr. Dean on that occasion, and I so stated in the briefing.
Q So it wasn't until the press story came out that you corrected your error?
A That's right. It wasn't really until the press statement came out that I realized my assumption was incorrect.
Q No one from the White House corrected you?
A No, they did not.
Q After the statement was made?
A Because that did not, as I remember, play that dominant part in the story.
Q Well, for any reason, no one corrected you?
A No, they did not.
Q No one corrected you in terms of expressing the President's completely and absolute total confidence in Mr. Dean?
A No. And I must say that the embellishment in the statement itself was partially mine. I was not given the precise language from the President.
Q Generally, you better vouch for Mr. Dean as far as
we're concerned, then?

A No. It was express confidence in John --

Q Express confidence.

A That's right.

Q And that's the way you did it?

A That's right.

Q And it didn't strike you as an unusual way to do it at the time, I take it?

A No, it didn't, because I had confidence in John Dean.

Q Now, did the President or anyone else ever explain to you why he made that statement in view of what the President had been told by John Dean as of the 21st?

A No, they did not.

Q Did you ever ask?

A No.

Q Do you have any understanding?

A I can only give you my understanding in my mind on supposition.

Q What is that?

A Could I do that?

Q What is it?

A Well, my impression, during that period, is that the President was trying to -- this is not based on what I knew then, but it's based on what I've been able, in my own mind,
WASHINGTON - President Nixon Monday expressed "absolute, total confidence" in his counsel, John W. Dean III, after conferring with him on the Watergate case by telephone from the Florida White House.

Their conversation, announced by presidential Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler, followed disclosure by The Times that convicted Watergate conspirator James W. McCord Jr. had accused Dean of having advance knowledge of the bugging of Democratic national headquarters.

McCord made the charges to Samuel Dash, chief counsel of the select Senate committee probing the Watergate incident, in two tape-recorded interviews last weekend. McCord also said that former presidential aide Jeb Stuart Magruder had prior knowledge of the bugging and that he had perjured himself at the trial.

"The President... had an interest in calling his counsel and talking to him about it," Ziegler said. "As a result of that discussion, I again specifically deny as absolutely false the fact that Mr. Dean had prior knowledge."

Magruder too has denied the accusations.

Meanwhile, there were these developments:

- Sen. Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.) a member of the select committee, told newsmen he believed additional White House aides would be implicated in the Watergate case. Weicker declined to say whether he was referring to Dean or Magruder.
- G. Gordon Liddy, another convicted Watergate conspirator, invoked the Fifth Amendment against possible self-incrimination 20 times in refusing to tell a federal grand jury if any other Nixon Administration officials knew of the bugging beforehand. Liddy also would not say whether he had divulged information from bugged Democratic phone conversations to anyone else.

Ziegler confirmed a report that Dean had called Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III minutes after Gray told a Senate hearing last week that Dean "probably" lied to the FBI in the Watergate investigation. Gray refused Dean's request that he "correct" his remark, Ziegler said. He said the President still supported Gray's nomination.

-McCord, encountered on the street by Washington newspaper columnist Mary McGrory, told her he had made the charges to Dash as reported by The Times. He declined to elaborate, Miss McGrory said.

COMMITTEE CRITICIZED

Ziegler, in discussing the allegations against Dean, criticized the select committee's handling of its Watergate investigation. He said that Dash, in his "hastily called" Sunday press conference to announce that the committee had interviewed McCord, was not proceeding in the orderly and judicious way promised by committee Chairman Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.)
Liddy, appearing before a new session of the federal grand jury that indicted the seven Watergate defendants last September, declined to answer such questions as:

"Do you know directly or indirectly of any advance knowledge of the Watergate break-in by others?"

"Did you discuss the break-in with anyone at the Committee to Reelect the President after last June 17?

"Do you know anyone who had information derived from logs of bugged telephone conversations?"

**ANOTHER REFUSAL**

Liddy also declined to say whether he had discussed the results of the bugging with anyone other than the other defendants.

A former White House and Treasury official and ex-financial counsel to the Nixon campaign, Liddy looked pale and thin. He had a bloodied left ear, the result of a fight with a cellmate over possession of Liddy's hair brush.

To some of the questions, Liddy asserted his Fifth Amendment protection along with claims that he had an attorney-client relationship with E. Howard Hunt, Jr., a former White House consultant who pleaded guilty to bugging and conspiracy charges early in the trial. Liddy is a lawyer.

After 80 minutes of fruitless questioning, government prosecutors went into court to ask Sirica to grant Liddy immunity from further prosecution so that he might testify.

Sirica granted a motion by Liddy's attorney to delay a decision on this matter until Friday.

The grand jury may call other witnesses, including more convicted Watergate figures, to question them about the possible involvement of others.

Emerging from a closed-door meeting of the select committee, Weicker, Ervin and Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) declined to comment on a briefing from Dash about McCord's statements.

Baker did say he was certain that news reports of McCord's statements "will in no way prejudice our objective evaluation" of the Watergate case.

Asked about Mr. Nixon's expression of total confidence in Dean, Weicker said: "The President is entitled to his opinion. The committee is entitled to pursue its objective, and the American people are entitled to the truth."

Weicker made clear that his criticism of the White House did not extend to the President.

"I have complete faith in the President, in the fact that he personally has nothing to hide." Weicker said. "I restrict my comments to the President of the United States."

The President returned to the White House Monday evening after a five-day stay in Florida.
Nixon Voices 'Total Confidence' in Dean After Telephone Talk

McCoil's Charge That Attorney Knew of Watergate in Advance Denied; Senator Hints Others Will Be Implicated

BY ROBERT L. JACKSON and RONALD J. OSTROW

WASHINGTON—President Nixon Monday expressed "total confidence" in his counsel, John W. Dean III, after conferring with him on the Watergate case by telephone from the Florida White House.

Their conversation, announced by presidential Press Secretary Daniel Ziegler, followed disclosure by the Times that convicted Watergate coconspirator James W. McCord Jr. had accused Dean of having advance knowledge of the breaking of Democratic national headquarters.

McCord made the charges in Samuel Dash, chief counsel of the select Senate committee probing the Watergate incident, in two taped interviews last weekend. McCord also said that former presidential aide Jeb Stuart Magruder had prior knowledge of the burgling and that he had perjured himself at the trial.

"The President . . . had an interest in calling his counsel and talking to him about it," Ziegler said. "As a result of that discussion, I got specific answers on how we could deal with the fact that Mr. Dean had personal knowledge."

McCord too has denied the accusations.

Meanwhile, there were these developments:

Dean, Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.), a member of the select committee, said news had been leaked to him that additional White House aides would be implicated in the Watergate case. Weicker decided to say whether he was referring to Dean or McCord.

Sen. Gordon Liddy, another convicted Watergate conspirator, invoked the Fifth Amendment against prior knowledge.

Please Turn to Page 11, Col. 1

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Another Refusal

Liddy also declined to say whether he had discussed the results of the burgling with anyone other than the other defendants.

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The President returned to the White House Monday evening after a five-day stay in Florida.
KEY BISCAYNE (UPI) -- PRESIDENT NIXON MONDAY EXPRESSED "ABSOLUTE AND TOTAL CONFIDENCE" IN WHITE COUNSEL JOHN W. DEAN III, WHO [unreadable] LOS ANGELES TIMES SAID HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED BY CONVICTED WATERGATE CONSPIRATOR JAMES MCCORD AS HAVING BEEN INVOLVED IN THE BUGGING OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE.

PRESS SECRETARY RONALD ZIEGLER SAID NIXON CALLED DEAN IN WASHINGTON TO "DISCUSS THE STORY WITH HIM."

FOLLOWING THAT CONVERSATION, AND BASED ON THAT CONVERSATION, I [unreadable] AGAIN FLATLY DENY ANY PRIOR KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF MR. DEAN REGARDING THE WATERGATE MATTER, " ZIEGLER SAID.

[unreadable] THE PRESIDENT HAS COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN MR. DEAN. HE WANTED ME TO EXPRESS HIS ABSOLUTE AND TOAL CONFIDENCE IN MR. DEAN."

ZIEGLER SAID DEAN'S PRIVATE ATTORNEY CALLED NEWS ORGANIZATIONS TO [unreadable] POSSIBLE LIBEL ACTIONS PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENT'S CONVERSATION [unreadable]. BUT HE ADDED, "OF COURSE THAT'S MR. DEAN'S PEROGATIVE (sic) AS A [unreadable] TO PROCEED AFTER HE HAS BEEN FALSELY MALICED."

ZIEGLER SAID THE PRESIDENT DID NOT SPEAK BY TELEPHONE WITH JEB STUART MAGRUDER, NIXON'S FORMER ASSISTANT CAMPAIGN MANAGER, WHO WAS [unreadable] IN THE LOS ANGELES TIMES REPORT.

MR. ZIEGLER SAID MAGRUDER HAS DENIED ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE CASE. ZIEGLER ALSO CRITICIZED SAMUEL DASH, COUNSEL TO THE SPECIAL SENATE [unreadable] COMMITTEE, FOR CONDUCTING A "HASTILY CALLED SUNDAY AFTERNOON PRESS CONFERENCE" TO REVEAL THAT HE HAD QUESTIONED MCCORD. "THIS DOES NOT SEEM TO ME TO BE AN ORDERLY AND JUDICIOUS [unreadable]." ZIEGLER SAID.

UPI 03-26 03:09 PES
(Diane)

BECHE (UPI) -- PRESIDENT NIXON MONDAY EXPRESSED "ABSOLUTE...

12:15 ANGELES TIMES SAID HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED BY CONVICTED WATERGATE...".

SECRETARY RONALD ZIEGLER SAID NIXON CALLED DEAN IN...".

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DV

[2856]
WASHINGTON AP - The White House Monday denied that presidential counsel John W. Dean III had prior knowledge of the Watergate bugging incident and quoted President Nixon as voicing "absolute and total confidence" in Dean.

The statement was issued at Key Biscayne, Fla., where Nixon was staying.

At the Capitol, the Senate's special Watergate investigating committee was urged by Republican Leader Hugh Scott to hold public hearings as quickly as possible.

"We should have the full story," Scott told newsmen. He said last week Nixon had authorized him to say that the White House had nothing to conceal.

Scott's comments were made shortly before a closed meeting of the committee set up by the Senate to investigate the bugging of Democratic headquarters in the Watergate complex and other alleged political espionage and sabotage in last year's presidential campaign.

White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said the President telephoned Dean in Washington during the morning because of what Ziegler called very extraordinary and serious charges leveled against Dean.

He was referring to a report by the Los Angeles Times that James W. McCord, jr., (sic) one of the convicted Watergate defendants, had told a Senate investigator that Dean and Jeb Stuart Magruder, a former presidential assistant and campaign official, had prior knowledge of the Watergate incident last June.

Ziegler said that, based on Nixon's conversation, "I will again deny any prior knowledge on the part of Mr. Dean."

Then asked about Magruder, Ziegler said "I'm not prepared to speak for those who are not on the White House staff." He noted that Magruder has denied having any advance knowledge of the affair.

McCord met Friday and Saturday with Samuel Dash, chief counsel of the Senate panel. Dash told a news conference Sunday that McCord had named others who were involved, but Dash declined to say who they were.

McCord, encountered on a Washington street Monday by a Star-News reporter said that published accounts of what he had told the Senate aides were correct. He would not elaborate.

McCord apparently was referring to the Los Angeles Times reports. Dash said that McCord, an ex-FBI and CIA agent who was security director of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, has agreed to continue to meet with him and tell all he knows about the Watergate affair.
Scott said anything made available to the investigating committee's Democratic majority should be made equally available to the Republican minority "so we can make a judgment" on the fairness of the probe.

Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield, asked by newsmen about the Watergate bugging, said "my personal feeling is that the President very likely didn't know what was going on."
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chy
12. On March 26, 1973 John Dean telephoned Jeb Magruder and Dean made a recording of the conversation. Dean has testified that he telephoned Magruder and taped this conversation at Haldeman's suggestion. Magruder acknowledged that the Los Angeles Times story stating that Dean had prior knowledge of the break-in was a "bum rap" for Dean. There was also discussion about the number and purpose of meetings among John Mitchell, Gordon Liddy, Magruder and Dean. Magruder told Dean that Magruder had testified that there had been "one meeting, not two," and that the purpose of the meeting was to go over the general framework of the job of CRP general counsel.

12.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1004.

12.2 Taped conversation between Dean and Magruder, SSC Exhibit No. 34-40, 3 SSC 1258-59.
cepts on previous occasions, but we still did not have an answer that would bring the full truth out because of the criminal implications of the behavior of those involved.

On Saturday, I began reconstructing all I knew and began writing a report. I spent Saturday afternoon and evening, Sunday, and Monday reconstructing and writing. On Monday I asked my secretary to come to Camp David, bring certain documents that I had requested, and commence typing. I did not realize how difficult it would be to reconstruct my knowledge from memory. I had not kept a diary or even a calendar of all my activities, thus, I have been reconstructing my knowledge of this matter since March 23 to this day.

On Sunday evening, March 25, I was informed that the Los Angeles Times and the Washington Post were going to print a story that Magruder and I had prior knowledge of the June 17 bugging of the Democratic National Committee. I considered the story libelous then, as I do today. Upon learning that the story was going to be printed, I contacted an attorney, Mr. Tom Hogan, who was familiar with libel law. We discussed the matter. He then decided to put the newspapers on notice to preserve a libel suit in the event they printed the story. I also told Mr. Hogan that when I returned from Camp David that I wanted to talk with him about this entire matter and asked him to think about someone who was a good criminal lawyer because I was planning to take certain steps in the near future. I might add that it was my thinking at that time that I would explain all the facts to a knowledgeable criminal lawyer to determine the potential problems of everyone involved—from the President on down—to get independent advice on what I should do.

On Monday morning, March 26, I had a conversation with Haldeman about the story in the Los Angeles Times. I told him I was prepared to file a libel suit and had retained a lawyer to put the newspapers on notice. I told him that he knew that I had not known of the June 17 Watergate break-in in advance, that my knowledge of the entire matter ended with the second meeting in Mitchell’s office. I told Haldeman that Magruder knew that I had no prior knowledge, but I did not know if he would admit it publicly. Haldeman concurred in the fact that I had no prior knowledge and suggested I call Magruder and tape his conversation.

I did call Magruder and by using a dictaphone held to the receiver, I recorded the call. I have submitted a transcript of this conversation to the committee; the long and short of this conversation was that Magruder acknowledged that the newspaper accounts were a “hunch” for me because I had not had prior knowledge of the break-in.

[The transcript was marked exhibit No. 34–40.*]

Mr. Dean, My secretary arrived at Camp David on Monday afternoon and began typing the report. On Monday night, I had given additional thought to how the President might get out in front of this matter and how we could get everyone involved to speak the truth. I called Moore, who is fairly conservative in his solutions to problems, and told him of my idea, which I said was so far out that I thought it might solve the awful problem. I have submitted to the committee a copy of my notes outlining my concept.

[The document was marked exhibit No. 34–41.**]
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 25 AND 26, 1973
Book 3

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973
No. 34-13—(925) Copy of agenda prepared by Gordon Liddy for meeting of November 24, 1971, with Attorney General Mitchell and John Dean

No. 34-14—(931) Memorandum for Larry Highy from John Dean with attachments

No. 34-15—(935) White House memorandum for John Dean from Charles Colson concerning Howard Hunt, with attachments

No. 34-16—(939) FBI interview of Charles Colson

No. 34-17—(943) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman from John Dean re: O'Brien letter concerning special prosecutor

No. 34-18—(951) Memorandum for John Dean from Charles Colson re: Chronology of Howard Hunt’s activities

No. 34-19—(957) Memorandums re: Counteractions (Watergate) by Kenneth Parkinson and John Dean

No. 34-20—(959) Letter from Congressman Brown to Attorney General re: Banking and Currency Committee investigation into Watergate activities

No. 34-21—(961) Memorandum to John Dean from Kenneth Parkinson re: 1972 political filings

No. 34-22—(961) Banking and Currency Committee notice of meeting change and subpoena list, with attachments

No. 34-23—(961) Letter to Congressman Patman from Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen re: Extensive public hearings into financial aspects of Watergate “Bugging” incident

No. 34-24—(963) Question and answer conversation between Ziegler, Ehrlichman, Chapin, and Moore. Statement by Dwight Chapin

No. 34-25—(967) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from John Dean re: Watergate and Segretti, with attachments

No. 34-26—(968) Information on campaign spending—HRH and Dean, dated May 18, 1971

No. 34-27—(968) Memorandum for Herb Kalmbach from John Dean re: Bill from Jack Gleason’s lawyer on Common Cause law suit

No. 34-28—(968) White House note to John Dean from Charles Colson “Now what the hell do I do?” with attachment

No. 34-29—(974) Handwritten note to Mr. John Caulfield re: CIA taking the blame

No. 34-30—(976) Document entitled “Relevancy of Intercepted Communications”

No. 34-31—(977) Message given by Saundra Greene to Mr. Gordon Liddy

No. 34-32—(978) Memorandum for the President from John Dean re: Congressional hearings regarding Watergate

No. 34-33—(982) Memorandum from H. R. Haldeman for John Dean re: Appointment of minority counsel to “Ervin Committee,” with additional memos

No. 34-34—(988) Agenda—Matters to be discussed and resolved

No. 34-35—(988) Potential matters for discussion with Senator Baker (Meeting to be totally off the record)

No. 34-36—(989) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from John Dean, with attachment entitled “Talking Points for Meeting with the Attorney General”

No. 34-37—(990) Memorandum for Larry Highy and John Dean from Jerry Jones. Subject: Options for Jeb Magruder

No. 34-38—(991) Memorandum for the files from John Dean. Subject: Call from Secretary Dent re: Jeb Magruder

No. 34-39—(992) Draft letter addressed “Dear Mr. Chairman” from John Dean with oath attached to bottom of letter

No. 34-40—(1001) Taped conversation between Dean and Magruder with attached Camp David envelope

No. 34-41—(1004) Statement of charges against White House and Committee To Re-Elect the President officials

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record.
DEAN: Is he in, John Dean calling.
MAGRUDER: Hello.
DEAN: Hi, Jeb.
MAGRUDER: Hello.
DEAN: How are you doing?
MAGRUDER: I’m doing fine; how are you doing?
DEAN: Pretty well, incredible.
MAGRUDER: Is it?
DEAN: Just incredible.
MAGRUDER: Well the L.A. Times, God, we got splashed all over that one, let me tell you.
DEAN: Is that right?
MAGRUDER: I haven’t seen it yet but my friend called me, said Christ you take up the whole front page.
DEAN: Is that right?
MAGRUDER: Yes, you and I, pictures, the whole works.
DEAN: I’m taking a bum rap, Jeb.
MAGRUDER: Well I know that.
DEAN: That’s the incredible thing.
MAGRUDER: We’ve got to figure—John, I think we gotta just figure out how we can handle this. I don’t know what we—I mean I don’t know what we can do right now. I don’t know if there is anything we can do right now.
DEAN: We’ll just have to take the heat right now until the thing sorts itself out.
I can’t conceive of how McCord could have that impression.
MAGRUDER: Now I’ll tell you what—John, can we talk here?
DEAN: Yea.
MAGRUDER: Okay. Here’s what I figure has happened. And I’m positive of this. One, John, there is absolutely no substantive evidence that McCord could possibly have in any way, shape or form that could connect anyone other than the seven of us. Okay.
DEAN: Yes.
MAGRUDER: I’m positive of that. Now I’ve gone right—you know I just went back through the process, was there anything at all that even could remotely imply any connection. Okay.
DEAN: Yes.
MAGRUDER: So there is no evidence of what I call documentation. Now what he probably may have, John, is that when Liddy probably was working up numbers for his own benefit and doing that kind of work, he probably used McCord to do that, because McCord bought all his equipment according to Silberts.
DEAN: But Liddy knows damn good and well that the last time that I for example, had any conversation with him on that thing was when we walked out of that office and I told him I could not talk to him about it any further and he never—he never once ever raised it.
MAGRUDER: I’m sure he must have raised—I’m sure thought when he talked to his friend McCord—
DEAN: He was a name dropper.
MAGRUDER: He’s a name dropper. And I’m sure he said that well you know I don’t really trust this idiot Magruder but Mitchell and Dean and Haldeman are all behind it and Gordon Strachan. I’m sure that obviously Mitchell’s name will come up and I would take a guess if he still said “others” if you noticed, which is pure—
DEAN: That’s right, that’s right.
MAGRUDER: So he is going to be talking probably about Mitchell and I would take a guess either Gordon Strachan or Colson. That would be my guess.
DEAN: Just incredible.
MAGRUDER: So, one, he had no substantive evidence, I’m positive of that; two, what he is probably referring to is simply discussions that Liddy had with him as they sat around drinking at the Watergate. You know—and only that. McCord never met with either myself or anyone else at our committee.
DEAN: Yes.
MAGRUDER: Never, so there is no personal discussion he would have of any kind.
DEAN: Well I thought maybe I was losing my mind. But I know—I know what I know and I know that one, I tried to turn the damn thing off.
MAGRUDER: Right.
DEAN: I know that I'd told Haldeman after that meeting that it had to be turned off. Now what happened in the interim I don't have any idea, I don't want to know, I can only opine and speculate.
MAGRUDER: I would hope so, John, of course on that meeting that I have testified that that meeting that we've had with Liddy and Mitchell was simply on the general counsel's job and so on.
DEAN: I understand.
MAGRUDER: I mean that's important I think, you know for Mitchell's and my—
DEAN: Well I don't plan to go out and talk in any forum.
MAGRUDER: You know, if we ever get to the grand jury stage, I think they—I have testified that that meeting that you and I had was one meeting, not two, and that we had a meeting with Mitchell that just went over—since you had been helping us as a counsel—that we just went over the general framework of the job and the new law and those kind of problems, the typical cursory sort of post-employment meeting. That that was the extent of it.
DEAN: Well I was just trying to get straight in my own mind, you know, in case a guy like Liddy goes and starts giving his side of the story and—
MAGRUDER: What? If he did, of course what he would say is — You know that's one thing I would hope we'd be working on and that part is Liddy.
DEAN: Yea.
MAGRUDER: But McCord's information would only be hearsay, it would only have been from Liddy.
DEAN: Okay, Jeb, well all we can do is sit tight right now.
MAGRUDER: A couple of other points, John, let me ask you. Parkinson wants to sit down with me and is going to represent me and as far as I'm concerned that's appropriate.
DEAN: I think that that's a personal decision of yours, by yourself, and that you know he's knowledgeable and I think that's quite a good idea.
MAGRUDER: Well I mean, you know, from my standpoint, it would seem that somebody who is well aware of the situation and it would look funny it would seem to me if I changed attorneys.
DEAN: I agree, I think that's a good idea for you.
MAGRUDER: And he is certainly qualified.
DEAN: And I do think you ought to have counsel too.
MAGRUDER: What? If I want to have a lawyer who's representing you per se.
MAGRUDER: Well that would be what he would—you mean another one?
DEAN: Well I mean no—I mean like Parkinson.
MAGRUDER: Right, well that what I thought because I think for sure we're going to have to—I'm going to have to rely on you or whatever when we have to go down to the grand jury.
DEAN: I would imagine that day is coming.
MAGRUDER: That's right. Of course, I think we have a hell of a case on the bond and who placed the bond for him and the written statement, how well it was done and why he waited until the last day. To me that makes it very clear.
DEAN: I don't, I'm not aware of what you are talking about.
MAGRUDER: McCord. In other words, where did McCord get his bond. You know, he got it from a Democratic lawyer. He's got a new lawyer. He's obviously made a deal and a person in that position obviously is panicked facing 8 years or whatever he is facing. And he'll throw out names all over the place, John.
DEAN: I suspect that's true.
MAGRUDER: Just because he knows that's what they want to hear. If you read his letter, his letter is a perfect letter obviously not written by an individual but by a lawyer.
DEAN: I wonder if he drafted it?
MAGRUDER: And he's talking about fifth amendment, sixth amendments rights, all sorts of things that—
DEAN: Yea, okay, just hang in.
MAGRUDER: Yea, well that's what I planned on doing and I just wanted to check with you from your standpoint. But I'm positive there's no substantive evidence of any kind.
DEAN: Okay.
13. On March 26, 1973 the United States Attorney's office filed in open court a motion for an order compelling Gordon Liddy to testify under a grant of immunity before the grand jury investigating the Watergate break-in. As of March 27, 1973 Judge Sirica granted leave to proceed forthwith with grand jury interrogation of Howard Hunt and other of the convicted Watergate defendants. From March 28, 1973 through April 5, 1973 hearings were held in open court and orders were entered compelling Howard Hunt, Gordon Liddy and the remaining Watergate defendants to testify before the grand jury under grant of immunity.

**MISCELLANEOUS DOCKET** — 13.1 In re Grand Jury docket

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

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<tr>
<td>47-73</td>
<td>IN RE - GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS</td>
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<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Mar 26</td>
<td>Letter dated 3-15-73 from Henry E. Petersen, Asst. Atty. Gen. to Harold H. Titus, US Atty., advising that request for authority to apply to USDC for an order requiring George Gordon Liddy to give testimony before grand jury with a grant of immunity pursuant to 18 USC 6003 and 28 CFR 0.175 is approved.</td>
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<td>Mar 26</td>
<td>Motion by US Atty. for D.C. for an order compelling George Gordon Liddy to give testimony before grand jury with a grant of immunity pursuant to 18 USC 6001 et seq., filed in open court, heard in part and continued for further hearing until March 30, 1973; counsel for respondent Liddy to file opp. to motion not later than 10:00 A.M., March 29, 1973; deft. Liddy present and remanded to D.C. Jail. (Rep: N. Sokal) Sirica, C.J.</td>
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<td>Mar 27</td>
<td>AS OF MARCH 27, 1973</td>
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<td>Mar 28</td>
<td>Letter dated 3-15-73 from Henry E. Petersen, Asst. Atty. General, to Harold H. Titus, Jr. U.S. Atty, Granting request for authority to apply to USDC for an order requiring Everett Howard Hunt, Jr., to give testimony with a grant of immunity pursuant to 18 USC 6001 et seq. Filed. (Rep: N. Sokal) Sirica, C.J.</td>
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<td>Mar 28</td>
<td>Motion by U.S. Atty for an order compelling Everett Howard Hunt, Jr. to give testimony before grand jury with a grant of immunity pur to 18 USC 6001 et seq, Filed in Open Court, Heard &amp; GRANTED. (Rep-N. Sokal) Sirica, C.J.</td>
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<td>Mar 28</td>
<td>Order directing Everett Howard Hunt, Jr., to give testimony before grand jury with a grant of immunity pur to 18 USC 6001 et seq, (N) Sirica, C.J.</td>
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<td>Mar 29</td>
<td>Deft. Liddy's response to Govt motion under Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 6001, et al; c/s 3-29-73, Filed. Sirica, C.J.</td>
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<td>Mar 29</td>
<td>Transcript of proceedings of 3-26-73, pages 1-26, incl; Court's copy. (Rep-N.Sokal) Sirica, C.J.</td>
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<th>Date</th>
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<td>1973</td>
<td><strong>Further hearing held on motion by U.S. Atty for an order compelling George Gordon Liddy to give testimony before Grand Jury pursuant to 18 USC 6001 et. seq.</strong> Motion by U.S. Atty; Granted. (Rep-N.Sokal) Sirica, C.J.                                                                                                      <em>ERROR.</em></td>
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<td>Mar. 30</td>
<td>Motion by Govt. to adjudicate George Gordon Liddy in contempt for his refusal to answer certain questions before the Grand Jury as he was ordered to on 3-30-73, Filed In Open Court, Heard &amp; Granted. (Rep-N.Sokal) Sirica, C.J.</td>
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<td>Apr. 3</td>
<td>Order finding that George Gordon Liddy has without just cause refused to testify before grand jury as previously ordered &amp; directing that Mr. Liddy be confined until such time as he is willing to testify as ordered, provided, however, that the period of confinement shall not exceed the life of the grand jury, including extensions, &amp; shall in no case exceed 18 months, &amp; further directing that Mr. Liddy be confined in the D.C. Jail for the duration of imprisonment under the contempt statute; counsel for Govt. to prepare proposed findings of fact &amp; conclusions of law to accompany order no later than 4-9-73. (N) Sirica, C.J.</td>
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<td>Apr. 3</td>
<td>Order staying execution of sentence in Cr. 1827-72 as of this date to recommence at the conclusion of his confinement for contempt as ordered. (Original filed in Cr. 1827-72) (N) Sirica, C.J.</td>
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<td>Apr. 4</td>
<td>Motions (4) by US Atty for an order compelling Bernard L. Barker, Eugenio R. Martinez, Frank A. Sturgis &amp; Virgilio R. Gonzalez to give testimony before grand jury with a grant of immunity pur to 18 USC 6001, et. seq. together with letter from Henry E. Petersen, Asst. Atty. General, dated 3-15-73 to Harold H. Titus, Jr., U.S. Atty, Granting request to seek order as to each respondent, Filed in Open Court, Heard &amp; Granted; 4 Orders, one pertaining to each respondent, signed. (Rep-N.Sokal) Sirica, C.J.</td>
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<td>Apr. 5</td>
<td>Copy of Letter dated 3-15-73 from Henry E. Petersen, Asst. Atty. General, to Harold H. Titus, Jr., U.S. Atty, approving request for authority to apply for an order compelling James W. McCord Jr. to testify before grand jury with a grant of immunity pur to 18 USC 6001 et. seq. filed in Open Court. (Rep-N.Sokal) Sirica, C.J.</td>
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<td>Apr. 5</td>
<td>Motion by Asst. U.S. Atty for an order compelling James W. McCord Jr. to testify before grand jury with a grant of immunity pur. to T.18 USC 6001 et. seq, Heard &amp; Granted. (Rep-N.Sokal) Sirica, C.J.</td>
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<td>Apr. 5</td>
<td>Order compelling James W. McCord Jr., testify before grand jury with a grant of immunity pur. to 18 USC 6001 et. seq. (N) (Rep-N.Sokal) Sirica, C.J.</td>
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<td>Apr. 11</td>
<td>Notice of appeal by deft. George Gordon Liddy from the judgment of April 3, 1973; Copy mailed to Earl J. Silbert, Asst. U.S. Atty; Deposit by Maroulis, $5.00.</td>
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<td>Apr. 12</td>
<td>In Re: George Gordon Liddy: Findings of fact &amp; conclusions of law finding George Gordon Liddy, without just cause, has refused to comply with an order of Court that he testify before grand jury. (N) (Rep-N.Sokal) Sirica, C.J.</td>
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14. On March 27, 1973 Jeb Magruder met with John Mitchell in New York City and discussed the potential of Magruder's being brought before the grand jury on a perjury count. Magruder has testified that he received from Mitchell assurances respecting continued salary and that they discussed executive clemency. Mitchell has testified that with respect to support, he told Magruder that he "was a very outstanding young man and I liked and I worked with and to the extent that I could help him in any conceivable way, I would be delighted to do so." Mitchell has testified that he did not make any promises of executive clemency. During the conversation, Magruder asked for a meeting with Haldeman.

14.1 Jeb Magruder testimony, 2 SSC 806-07.
14.3 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1633-34.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, AND 14, 1973
Book 2

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
Washington : 1973
Dean began to indicate some reluctance to discuss those meetings in
the same terms that I had discussed them at the grand jury. I knew the
story would not hold up under a second investigation by your com-
mitee, which, of course, had begun to hold hearings and also the grand
jury.
Mr.Dash. Did you have a meeting with Mr. Haldeman in January
1973?
Mr. Magruder. Yes; I did.
Mr. Dash. Could you briefly tell us what the nature of that meeting
was and what was discussed?
Mr. Magruder. The meeting was for two purposes. I was the director
of the inaugural at that time and was to discuss future employment
regarding myself and also at that time there was a problem regarding
Mr. Porter's employment and I had made certain assurances, Mr.
Mitchell had, about his employment and I wanted to be sure Mr. Hal-
deman was aware of that. And then, third, and I realize now that these
were probably taped conversations. I had some conversations with Mr.
Dean in his office where he indicated a certain lack of memory to
events, and I became rather concerned. He indicated at one point that,
wasn't that surprising how this plan was ever put into operation, and
I said, "Well, John, surely you remember the meetings we attended" and
he didn't seem to remember those meetings, and I said to myself
something is going to happen here if that continues. I think as it turned
out these conversations were taped, so I thought I had better see Mr.
Haldeman and tell him what had actually happened. I thought prob-
ably that this was becoming scapegoat time and maybe I was going to
be the scapegoat, and so I went to Mr. Haldeman and I said I just want
to know that this whole Watergate situation and the other activ-
ities was a concerted effort by a number of people, and so I went
through a literal monologue on what had occurred. That was my first
discussion with Mr. Haldeman where I laid out the true facts.
Mr. Dash. Do you know what day or date approximately in Janu-
ary that occurred?
Mr. Magruder. It would have been before the inaugural because we
were still working on the inaugural but I would have to look in my
diary as to what date specifically.
Mr. Dash. Did there come a time when you met with Mr. Mitchell
sometime after the trial?
Mr. Magruder. Yes. Well, the McCord letter basically activated
great concern in the sense--
Mr. Dash. That letter. I think the record will show, was March 23.
Mr. Magruder. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. That was read out by Judge Sirica in the courtroom on
the sentences on March 23.
Mr. Magruder. That is correct, and that, of course, accelerated the
process of concern on. I think. all of the participant parties. I on Mon-
day, the 25th, went to see the two lawyers for the committee. As you
are aware at this time I did not have my own counsel so I was depend-
ing on counsel basically from our committee and I went over my prob-
lems with them, which I think were more acute at that time than the
other participants and they agreed that I had a serious problem and
suggested that I see, retain my own counsel. I think they then trans-
mited that concern of mine to Mr. Mitchell because on Tuesday he
807

called me in the Commerce Department and asked me to come to New
York. I flew to New York that afternoon, and discussed with him——
Mr. Dash. Do you know, what date that was?
Mr. Magruder. That would be March 27.
Mr. Dash. 27?
Mr. Magruder. A Tuesday.
Mr. Dash. And the year we are talking about 1973?
Mr. Dash. What was your discussion with Mr. Mitchell in New
York?
Mr. Magruder. Well, I went through all of the problems I thought
could occur because of the problems that renewed interest in this case
would bring from your committee and from the grand jury and indicated
what should I do, and he indicated that I should hold, that he
would take care of things, that everything would be taken care of.
Now, at that time I realized that he was no longer directly involved
at the White House, as he had been, and so I asked to see Mr. Haldeman
with him the next day he was going to Washington.
Mr. Dash. But at that meeting, Mr. Magruder, what did you ask
Mr. Mitchell to assure you of?
Mr. Magruder. Again I asked for the same assurances of salary and
being taken care of if I had to go away for any period of time.
Mr. Dash. Did you mention Executive clemency?
Mr. Magruder. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. Then you say you asked for a meeting with Mr.
Haldeman?
Mr. Magruder. Yes, I feel that it would be appropriate since this
was something now that he was more directly involved on a day-to-day
basis.
Mr. Dash. Did you have that meeting with Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. Magruder. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. When?
Mr. Magruder. On the following day, Wednesday, March 28, I think.
Mr. Dash. Who was present?
Mr. Magruder. Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Mitchell, and myself.
Mr. Dash. What was discussed?
Mr. Magruder. Well, we discussed the same things that we had
discussed with Mr. Mitchell, that I discussed with Mr. Mitchell. Mr.
Haldeman was very careful to indicate to me that he would help me
in any way as a friend but could make no commitments for the Pre-
ident; indicated that the real problems were differences of opinion
over meetings, particularly the January and February meetings,
where, of course, my view was that since the three, Mr. Mitchell, Mr.
Dean, and I, had agreed to my testimony that they, therefore, should
stay with that agreement.
Mr. Mitchell indicated, of course, he was willing to do this but
Mr. Dean indicated that he had some question about it.
Mr. Dash. But, Mr. Magruder at this time everybody knew.
Mr. Magruder. Mr. Haldeman——
Mr. Dash. Everybody knew that that agreement was an agreement
based on a false story, was that not true?
Mr. Magruder. Yes, that is correct.
The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

SENATE RESOLUTION 60 -- GENERAL INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, June 12, 1973

Washington, D.C.

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WARD & PAUL
1121 FIFTH STREET, N. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002

[2882]
Mr. Magruder. Earlier than that.

Mr. Dash. -- tell us what happened.

Mr. Magruder. We knew the Grand Jury was reconvening and we knew one mistake the prosecutors made, and the only mistake in defense of the prosecutors, that I think they made is they somehow missed Mr. Reisner. I knew as soon as they got to him the thing would collapse and when they got -- when they all got to Mr. Reisner I was fully aware then much more so than McCord because I knew Mr. McCord's testimony would be hearsay but as soon as they got to Reisner I knew that the case would start collapsing rather quickly. So I went up to New York on a Tuesday and talked to Mr. Mitchell and went through the whole list of things I thought that I would need if I was going to be able to keep up with this story.

Mr. Dash. What was that?

Mr. Magruder. Oh, you know, family, taking care of the family, job, that kind of thing. Executive clemency.

Mr. Dash. What did Mr. Mitchell say?

Mr. Magruder. He was very positive but I knew he was only speaking for himself and he made that quite clear. In fact, I said I can't accept it just now from you because you are here in New York, so he asked me to meet with him and Haldeman the next day which I did. At that meeting -- I think Mr. Haldeman taped it as I understand -- Mr. Haldeman was very careful to say he would do anything he could as a friend to help me but he
couldn't speak for the President. There was a controversy over the meetings.

Mr. Dash. Who was present at that?

Mr. Magruder. Haldeman, Mitchell and myself.

Mr. Dash. When was that?

Mr. Magruder. The Wednesday after the Friday McCord -- the end of the trial. That would be March.

Mr. Dash. March 23 was when Mr. McCord's letter was read.

Mr. Magruder. Tuesday I went to New York, at Mr. Mitchell's request went to New York, discussed the problem. I indicated -- I had already decided that if it got to a Grand Jury place again that I would not be able to personally go through this process again but that I would still try to hold if we could work out some reasonable way we could hold with that story. Then --

Mr. Dash. Then you.

Mr. Magruder. I went through with Mr. Mitchell all the questions.

Mr. Dash. You said that. You weren't satisfied.

Mr. Magruder. I asked to see Mr. Haldeman. We met with Mr. Haldeman next morning.

Mr. Dash. The 29th?

Mr. Magruder. The 29th.

Mr. Dash. Who was present?

Mr. Magruder. Just the three of us.
Mr. Bush — well, in the development,
Mr. MacLean, the head of a local firm, was in a hurry and
in the early stages of the investigation, that I think they made in their
preliminary about Mr. Polk's. I knew as soon as they got to him
the thing would collapse and that they got — when they all got
the Polk's I was fully aware that much more so than MacLean
because I knew Mr. MacLean's testimony would be hazardous but as
soon as they got to Polk's I knew that the case would start
collapsing rather quickly. So I went up to New York on a
Tuesday and talked to Mr. Mitchell and went through the whole
list of things I thought that I would need if I was going to be
able to keep up with this story.

Mr. Bush. That was that?

Mr. Magruder. Oh, you know, family, taking care of the
family, just, that kind of thing. Executing eleemos.

Mr. Bush. What did Mr. Mitchell say?

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speaking for himself and he made that quite clear. In fact, I
said I can't accept it just now from you because you are here
in New York, so he asked me to come with him and Baldwin and

And I went a day or two later. And, you know, — I wish Mr. Bush an
could not speak for the President. There was a controversy on the meetings.

Mr. Dash. Who was present at that?

Mr. Magruder. Baldman, Mitchell and myself.

Mr. Dash. When was that?

Mr. Magruder. The Wednesday after the Friday McCoy --- the end of the trial. That would be March.

Mr. Dash. March 23 was when Mr. McCoy's letter was read.

Mr. Magruder. Tuesday I went to New York, at Mr. Mitchell's request went to New York, discussed the problem. I indicated -- I had already decided that if it got to a Grand Jury place again that I would not be able to personally go through this process again but that I would still try to hold if we could work out some reasonable way we could hold with that story. Then --

Mr. Dash. Then you.

Mr. Magruder. I went through with Mr. Mitchell all the questions.

Mr. Dash. You said that. You weren't satisfied.

Mr. Magruder. I asked to see Mr. Baldman. He met with Mr. Baldman next morning.

Mr. Dash. The 29th?

Mr. Magruder. The 29th.

Mr. Dash. Who was present?

Mr. Magruder. Just the three of us.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am sure it occurred to me and probably on hindsight I probably should have. I do not think there is any doubt about it.

Mr. Dash. Did you not think it was the President’s prerogative to know what to do about these matters?

Mr. Mitchell. The decision had to be made, and it is a tough one, whether or not he is not involved in it but he does not know about them, will this go away. I knew they were going to change the personnel in the White House and hopefully they would be gone and he would not have to deal with it and he could go on to his second term, the second Presidency, without this problem.

Mr. Dash. But you were taking a major risk, were you not, Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. Mitchell. I think you are taking a major risk any time you have to deal with the White House horrors under any circumstances.

Mr. Dash. Now, you spoke to the President quite frequently on the telephone, you met with him. your logs indicate, so you did have plenty of opportunities, and on no occasion, I think it is your testimony, did you speak to the President about these matters?

Mr. Mitchell. Now, which matters are we talking about?

Mr. Dash. Again, the White House—

Mr. Mitchell. About disclosing these matters.

Mr. Dash. Disclosing the matters, the White House horrors, the break-in.

Mr. Mitchell. I did not—well, let us not pass this over to the point where—on the 20th of June when I talked to him I apologized to him for not knowing what the hell had happened and I should have kept a stronger hand on what the people in the committee were doing, et cetera. And then, further on down the road in these political meetings that are shown on the logs, there were discussions about appointing a commission of the type of the Warren commission to investigate this matter, and special prosecutors and things like that. I do not want to leave the impression that it was never touched under any circumstances.

Mr. Dash. I am not talking about when you talked about Watergate as such. I am talking about the so-called coverup, the White House horrors and what your own knowledge, based on information given you, as to who was involved in the break-in of the DNC.

Mr. Mitchell. I answered that I did not talk to him about it.

Mr. Dash. I know, but on the 20th—

Mr. Mitchell. I also answered in hindsight it probably would have been a better idea if I had.

Mr. Dash. Now, also on March 27 did Mr. Magruder come to see you in New York?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, he did.

Mr. Dash. And do you recall that he testified that he came because he began to be aware or concerned that things might unravel and, therefore, wanted assurances from you that he be taken care of. Do you recall that?

Mr. Mitchell. I recall very well, Mr. Dash, because of the fact that there was, based in the McCord letter to Judge Sirica, and Mr. Magruder wanted to talk to me about the potentials of his being brought back before the grand jury on a perjury count.
Mr. Dash. Did you promise him at that time, as he testified, that to the best of your ability, though you no longer were in office, you would help him to either get Executive clemency, support, or rehabilitation, any of the things we have been asking about?

Mr. Mitchell. Let us take Executive clemency. No, I have never promised that to anybody. Obviously, there is no basis upon which I could.

With respect to, you were talking about support and so forth, what I told Jeb Magruder was that I thought he was a very outstanding young man and I liked and I worked with and to the extent that I could help him in any conceivable way, I would be delighted to do so.

And this was exactly the same conversation that we had the next day down at Haldeman's office.

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Magruder then ask for that meeting with Mr. Haldeman?

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes.

Mr. Dash. Did he feel he needed that assurance from somebody still in the White House?

Mr. Mitchell. That is right.

Mr. Dash. And met with Mr. Haldeman on the 28th of March?

Mr. Mitchell. 28th of March, that is correct.

Mr. Dash. What kind of assurances were being sought by Mr. Magruder there and what was being given to him?

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Magruder was again concerned—well, he did not express it too directly—that he thought he might become the fall guy. It seems to me that everybody around this town involved in this all thought they were going to become a fall guy.

Mr. Dash. Did you, Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. Mitchell. Did I? No. Contrary to the story that I have read I did not believe that to be the case. I am quite anxiously waiting to see if there is some possibility of that other than some misguided counsel who wrote a piece of paper from which cross-examination was to be made.

Mr. Dash. Getting back to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Magruder’s meeting with you on March 28—

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, it was the same general discussion. “I may have problems with my perjury. I don’t have any money. Am I going to be deserted, are you people still going to be friends, will I be able to get counsel?” and this type of conversation.

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Haldeman make any kind of promises to Mr. Magruder at that time, in your presence?

Mr. Mitchell. None other than the fact to help him as a friend and I think Mr. Haldeman has testified to that.

Mr. Dash. Now, did you ever have a meeting with Mr. Magruder and Mr. Dean after that meeting with Mr. Haldeman?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes sir.

Mr. Dash. What was that meeting about?

Mr. Mitchell. Well, this was held at Magruder’s request because he again was concerned about this perjury question that he might have, and the meeting was a quick rundown of the recollection of the individuals as to what was discussed prior to Mr. Magruder’s third appearance before the grand jury back in September.