1-1-1974

11. Book III, Vol. 5: Events following the Watergate break-in, June 20, 1972 - March 22, 1973 (allegations concerning payments of "hush" money to Watergate defendants to insure their silence, offers of leniency and executive clemency, and the making or causing to be, of false statements to persons connected with an official investigation of Watergate; chronology of events between February 9 and March 22, 1973)

Don Edwards

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On March 20, 1973 Dean had a conversation with Richard Moore, Special Counsel to the President. Dean told Moore that Hunt was demanding a large sum of money before his sentencing on March 23, and that if this payment were not made, Hunt was threatening to say things that would be very serious for the White House. After this conversation, Dean and Moore met with the President from 1:42 to 2:31 p.m. According to information furnished to the Senate Select Committee by Special Counsel Buzhardt, the President and Moore agreed that a statement should be released immediately after the sentencing of the defendants. According to Moore, following this meeting he told Dean that Dean should tell the President what he knew. According to Dean, Dean told Moore that Dean did not think the President understood all of the facts involved in the Watergate and particularly the implication of those facts and that Dean felt he had to lay those facts and implications out for the President.

65.1 Richard Moore testimony, 5 SSC 1944-45.

65.2 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 997.

65.3 Meetings and conversations between the President and John Dean, March 20, 1973 (received from White House).

65.4 Memorandum of substance of Dean's calls and meetings with the President, March 20, 1973, SSC Exhibit No. 70A, 4 SSC 1798.
On March 20, 1973 John Dean had an evening telephone conversation with the President during which he arranged a meeting with the President for the next morning. According to the edited transcript of this conversation made public by the White House, Dean requested a meeting with the President to go over soft spots and potential problem areas. Dean said that his prior conversation with the President had been "sort of bits and pieces" and that he wanted to paint the whole picture for the President. The President agreed to such a meeting, and the President also instructed Dean to try to write a general statement like one that would state categorically that based on Dean's investigation Haldeman, Colson and others were not involved in the Watergate matter.

66.1 White House edited transcript of tape recorded telephone conversation between the President and John Dean, March 20, 1973.
On March 21, 1973 the President met with John Dean from 10:12 to 11:55 a.m. H.R. Haldeman joined the meeting at approximately 11:15 a.m. The following is an index to certain of the subjects discussed in the course of the March 21, 1973 morning meeting:

| Possible involvement of Haldeman, Dean, Mitchell, Magruder, Colson, Strachan and Porter in Watergate matter | 5-28 |
| Clemency and Watergate defendants | 61-62 |
| Whether money should be paid to E. Howard Hunt | 40-42, 105-06 |

67.1 Tape recording of meeting between the President and John Dean, joined later by H.R. Haldeman, March 21, 1973, 10:12 - 11:55 a.m., and House Judiciary Committee transcript thereof.
68. On March 21, 1973 at 12:30 p.m. H.R. Haldeman spoke by telephone to John Mitchell, who was in New York City. In addition to reflecting the 12:30 p.m. call, Haldeman's telephone log for that day also shows a conversation with John Mitchell's office at 4:06 p.m. with a marginal notation "car - 9:30 a.m. (word illegible) Nat'l -- Amer 520." Haldeman has testified that he does not recall asking Mitchell on March 21 whether Mitchell was going to take care of Hunt's demand for money.

68.1 H.R. Haldeman telephone log, March 21, 1973 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).

68.2 H.R. Haldeman testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, January 30, 1974, 4-16 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).

68.3 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, February 14, 1974, 16 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
On the afternoon of March 21, 1973 Dean met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman and Dean have testified that the participants at the meeting speculated about John Mitchell's role in the Watergate affair, and wondered whether Mitchell's not coming forward was the cause of the beating everyone was taking on the subject of Watergate. Dean and Haldeman have testified that in the late afternoon of March 21, just before their second meeting with the President on that day, Dean told Haldeman that perhaps the solution to the whole thing was to draw the wagons around the White House. According to Haldeman, Dean also said that they should let all the chips fall where they may, because that would not hurt anybody at the White House since no one there had a problem.

69.1 John Ehrlichman log, March 21, 1973 (received from SSC).
69.2 H.R. Haldeman calendar, March 21, 1973 (received from SSC).
69.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2756, 2741-43.
69.4 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, February 14, 1974, 17 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
69.5 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1000, 1092.
69.6 H.R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2899.
70. On the afternoon of March 21, 1973 from 5:20 to 6:01 p.m. the President met with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean. The following is an index to certain of the subjects discussed in the course of the March 21, 1973 afternoon meeting:

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70.1 Tape recording of conversation among the President, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman and John Dean, March 21, 1973, 5:00 - 6:01 p.m., and House Judiciary Committee transcript thereof.
On the evening of March 21, 1973 Fred LaRue caused approximately $75,000 in cash to be delivered to William Bittman, attorney for E. Howard Hunt. Earlier that day LaRue had called Mitchell when Dean refused to authorize the payment to Hunt, and Mitchell had approved the payment to Hunt.

71.1 Fred LaRue testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, February 13, 1974, 1-10A (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
71.2 Manyon Millican testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, February 13, 1974, 2-7 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
71.3 Sherman Unger testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, February 19, 1974, 1-14 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
71.4 Watergate Grand Jury Exhibits SU-1 through SU-7, February 19, 1974 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
71.5 William Bittman testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, August 3, 1974, 189-91, 194-96 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
71.6 E. Howard Hunt testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, July 17, 1973, 95, 111-12 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
71.7 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, February 14, 1974, 16 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
71.8 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1630-31.
On April 17, 1973 the President issued the following public statement:

On March 21, as a result of serious charges which came to my attention, some of which were publicly reported, I began intensive new inquiries into this whole matter.

In his address to the nation of April 30, 1973 the President stated that in March 1973 he received new information regarding the involvement of members of the White House staff in the Watergate affair, and that:

As a result, on March 21, I personally assumed the responsibility for coordinating intensive new inquiries into the matter, and I personally ordered those conducting the investigations to get all the facts and to report them directly to me, right here in this office.

71A.1 President Nixon remarks, April 17, 1973, 9 Presidential Documents 387.

71A.2 President Nixon address to the nation, April 30, 1973. 9 Presidential Documents 433-34.
On the evening of March 21, 1973 the President dictated his recollections of the events that had occurred on that day.

72.1 Dictabelt recording of the President's recollections of March 21, 1973, and House Judiciary Committee transcript thereof.
On the morning of March 22, 1973 at 11:00 a.m. H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, John Mitchell and John Dean met in Haldeman's office. Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean have testified that at this time Mitchell indicated that E. Howard Hunt was not a "problem any longer." Mitchell has denied making such a statement. At this meeting, according to Ehrlichman and Haldeman, Mitchell stated that the Administration's rigid executive privilege policy was untenable, both from a legal and from a political standpoint, because it appeared to the public to be a cover-up on the part of the President. Haldeman testified that most of the discussion at the meeting concerned approaches to dealing with the situation, rather than a review of the facts.

73.1 H.R. Haldeman calendar, March 22, 1973 (received from SSC).
73.2 John Ehrlichman log, March 22, 1973 (received from SSC).
73.3 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, February 14, 1974, 17-18 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
73.4 H.R. Haldeman testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, January 30, 1974, 36-38 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
73.5 John Ehrlichman testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, September 13, 1973, 67-73 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
73.6 H.R. Haldeman notes of March 22, 1973 afternoon meeting (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
73.7 H.R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2899.
73. (continued)

73.8 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2745, 2853.

73.9 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1000-01.

73.10 John Dean testimony, SSC Executive Session, June 16, 1973, 129-431.

73.11 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1663.
On or about March 22, 1973 John Ehrlichman met with Egil Krogh at the White House. Ehrlichman assured Krogh that Howard Hunt was stable or more stable, that his recommendation was just to hang tough, and that Hunt was not going to disclose all.

74.1 Egil Krogh testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, January 29, 1974, 10-11 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).

74.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2550-51.
On March 20, 1973 Dean had a conversation with Richard Moore, Special Counsel to the President. Dean told Moore that Hunt was demanding a large sum of money before his sentencing on March 23, and that if this payment were not made, Hunt was threatening to say things that would be very serious for the White House. After this conversation, Dean and Moore met with the President from 1:42 to 2:31 p.m. According to information furnished to the Senate Select Committee by Special Counsel Buzhardt, the President and Moore agreed that a statement should be released immediately after the sentencing of the defendants. According to Moore, following this meeting he told Dean that Dean should tell the President what he knew. According to Dean, Dean told Moore that Dean did not think the President understood all of the facts involved in the Watergate and particularly the implication of those facts and that Dean felt he had to lay those facts and implications out for the President.

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PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON,
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 11, 12, 13, 16, AND 17, 1973
Book 5

Printed for the use of the
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On March 19, I was called to meet with the President and Mr. Dean in the President's Executive Office Building office. The President reiterated his desire to get out a general statement in advance of the hearings. He asked us to be thinking about ways that this could be done. This would include or could include issuing a full statement or "White Paper"; he was also interested in our thoughts about ways to present our story to the Senate in terms of possible depositions, affidavits, or possible conferences or meetings which would give the Senate all the information it wished but which would not cut across the separation of powers. He asked Dean and me to consider ways to do this.

Now, late on March 19, 1973, or possibly on March 20—before we met later that day with the President—Mr. Dean told me that Howard Hunt was demanding that a large sum of money be given to him before his sentencing on March 23, and that he wanted the money by Wednesday, the 21st. If the payment were not made, Dean said, Hunt had threatened to say things that would be very serious for the White House. I replied that this was pure blackmail, and that Dean should turn it off and have nothing to do with it. I could not imagine, I said, that anything that Hunt could say would be as bad as entering into a blackmail arrangement. I don't recall Mr. Dean's exact words, but he expressed agreement.

This revelation was the culmination of several other guarded comments Mr. Dean had made to me in the immediately preceding days. He had said that he had been present at two meetings attended by Messrs. Mitchell, Magruder, and Liddy before the bugging arrests, during which Liddy had proposed wild schemes that had been turned down—specifically espionage, electronics surveillance, and even kid­napping. He said that the Watergate location had not been mentioned, and that he had "turned off the wild schemes." I believed then and believe today that Mr. Dean had no advance knowledge of the Watergate bugging and break-in. In addition, he said that if he ever had to testify before the grand jury, his testimony would conflict with Mr. Magruder's, and that he had heard that if Magruder faced a perjury charge he would take others with him.

Mr. Dean had also mentioned to me in these days in March that earlier activities of Messrs. Hunt and Liddy—not directly related to Watergate—could be seriously embarrassing to the administration if they ever came to light. He had also implied to me that he knew of payments being made to the defendants for litigation expenses, and Hunt's explicit blackmail demand raised serious questions in my mind as to the purpose of these payments.

This brings me to the afternoon of March 20, when Mr. Dean and I met with the President in the Oval Office. The meeting lasted about half an hour. The President again stated his hope that we could put out a full statement in advance of the hearings. and again he expressed his desire that we be forthcoming, as he put it. He made some comparisons as to our attitude and the attitude of previous administrations, and he wanted us to make sure that we were the most forthcoming of all.

As I sat through the meeting of March 20 with the President and Mr. Dean in the Oval Office, I came to the conclusion in my own mind that the President could not be aware of the things that Dean was worried about or had been hinting at to me, let alone Howard Hunt's
blackmail demand. Indeed, as the President talked about getting the whole story out—as he had done repeatedly in the recent meetings—it seemed crystal clear to me that he knew of nothing that was inconsistent with the previously stated conclusion that the White House was uninvolved in the Watergate affair, before or after the event.

As we closed the door of the Oval Office and turned into the hall, I decided to raise the issue directly with Mr. Dean. I said that I had the feeling that the President had no knowledge of the things that were worrying Dean. I asked Dean whether he had ever told the President about them. Dean replied that he had not, and I asked whether anyone else had. Dean said he didn’t think so. I said, and I use quotation marks to indicate the substance, and I think these are almost my precise words—I said, “Then the President isn’t being served, he is reaching a point where he is going to have to make critical decisions and he simply has to know all the facts. I think you should go in and tell him what you know, you will feel better, it will be right for him, and it will be good for the country.”

I do not recall whether Dean told me he would take action or not, but I certainly had the impression that he was receptive. In any event, the question was resolved that very evening when I received a call at home sometime after dinner and it was Mr. Dean, who said that the President had just phoned him and that he had decided that this was the moment to speak up. He said that he told the President that things had been going on that the President should know about and it was important that Dean see him alone and tell him. Dean said that the President readily agreed and told Dean to come in the following morning. I congratulated Mr. Dean and wished him well.

The next day, March 21, Mr. Dean told me that he had indeed met with the President at 10 o’clock and had talked with him for 2 hours and had in his words, “Let it all out.” I said, “Did you tell him about the Howard Hunt business?” Dean replied that he had told the President everything. I asked him if the President had been surprised and he said yes. I say he said yes in terms of his response; whether yes is the exact words, but it was an affirmative statement.

Following this critical meeting on March 21, I had several subsequent meetings and telephone conversations with Mr. Dean alone, as well as several meetings with the President which Mr. Dean did not attend. I do not dispute Mr. Dean’s account of the meetings between us as to any substantive point, and I have no direct knowledge of what transpired in Mr. Dean’s subsequent meetings with the President. But nothing said in my meetings or conversations with Mr. Dean or my meetings with the President suggests in any way that before March 21 the President had known—or that Mr. Dean believed he had known—of any involvement of White House personnel in the bugging or the coverup. Indeed, Mr. Dean’s own account that he and I agreed on the importance of persuading the President to make a prompt disclosure of all that the President had just learned is hardly compatible with a belief on Mr. Dean’s part that the President himself had known the critical facts all along. In one of my talks with the President, the President said he had kept asking himself whether there had been any sign or clue which should have led him to discover the true facts earlier. I told him that I wished that I had been more skeptical and inquisitive so that I could have served the Presidency better.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 25 AND 26, 1973
Book 3

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As I best recall this meeting, it was a rather rambling discussion regarding media problems in connection with the Gray hearings. As the discussion proceeded, I suggested that Mr. Moore might like to engage in this conversation with us. There was some discussion of Senator Ervin’s appearance the preceding Sunday on “Face the Nation,” and whether or not it would be appropriate for me to respond to some of the points that were being made regarding my requested appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee. I told the President that I would work with Dick Moore in preparing a draft response.

**MEETINGS OF MARCH 20**

The President had called me earlier that morning to tell me that I should work up a draft letter of response as a result of the discussions that we had had the preceding evening with Moore. I told him I was drafting a letter and he told me as soon as I had the letter prepared that I should arrange to meet with him. Shortly after lunch, I took over a draft copy of the letter which I had developed with Mr. Moore and I have submitted a copy of that draft letter to the committee.

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34–39.*]

Mr. Dean. The President read the draft and we discussed it. There was no resolution of the problem. He told me to talk with Ziegler. I told him that if I did this as a sworn statement, that I was going to obviously redraft it very carefully before I signed any affidavit on the letter.

It was during the afternoon of March 20 that I talked again with Dick Moore about the entire coverup. I told Moore that there were new and more threatening demands for support money. I told him that Hunt had sent a message to me—through Paul O’Brien—that he wanted $72,000 for living expenses and $50,000 for attorney’s fees and if he did not receive it that week, he would reconsider his options and have a lot to say about the seamy things he had done for Ehrlichman while at the White House. I told Moore that I had about reached the end of the line, and was now in a position to deal with the President to end the coverup. I did not discuss with Moore the fact that I had discussed money and clemency with the President earlier, but I told him that I really didn’t think the President understood all of the facts involved in the Watergate and particularly the implications of those facts. I told him that the matter was continually compounding itself and I felt that I had to lay the facts out for the President as well as the implication of those facts. Moore encouraged me to do so.

**PHONE CONVERSATION OF MARCH 20**

When the President called and we had a rather rambling discussion, I told him at the conclusion of the conversation that evening that I wanted to talk with him as soon as possible about the Watergate matter.

*See p. 1232.
No contact between the President and John W. Dean, III, during January, February, and March 1972.

April 13, 1972

PM 4:31 4:34 President met with Frank DeMarco, Jr., and John Dean to sign 1971 income tax returns.

May 1, 1972

PM 3:02 3:07 President had photo opportunity in Rose Garden for National Secretaries Week. Mr. Dean attended

No contact between the President and John W. Dean, III, during June and July 1972.

August 14, 1972

PM 12:45 1:11 The President met to sign personal legal documents with:
12:49 1:09 The First Lady
12:49 1:11 John J. Ratchford
12:49 1:11 Mr. Butterfield
12:49 1:11 Mr. Haldeman
12:49 1:12 Mr. Ehrlichman
12:49 1:12 John W. Dean, III
12:49 1:12 John H. Alexander
12:49 1:12 Richard S. Ritzel

No other contact during August 1972.
September 15, 1972

PM

The President met with:

3:15 6:17 Mr. Haldeman
5:27 6:17 Mr. Dean

(The President talked with Mr. MacGregor by phone from 5:36 to 5:38)

No other contact during September 1972

October 9, 1972

PM 3:10 3:34 The President met with Samuel Newhouse, President of Newhouse Newspapers and Newhouse Broadcasting and Herb Klein.
3:23 3:34 John Dean joined the meeting.

November 8, 1972

The President attended a senior staff meeting in the Roosevelt Room. Mr. John Dean was in attendance.

November 12, 1972

8:40 8:44 The President met aboard "Spirit of '76" with Rose Mary Woods and Mr. and Mrs. John Dean

No contact between the President and John W. Dean, III, during November and December 1972.
January 21, 1973

AM 11:05 12:04  President and First Lady hosted Worship Service. 
John Dean attended.

February 27, 1973

PM 3:55 4:20  President met with John Dean alone in Oval Office.

February 28, 1973

AM 9:12 10:23  President met with John Dean in Oval Office.

March 1, 1973

AM 9:18 9:46  President met with his Counsel, John W. Dean, III, 
in the Oval Office. 
  \(\text{At 9:36 the President rec'd a call from AG Kleindienst. Dean}\)
10:36 10:44  President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office.  too the call.\)
PM 1:06 1:14  President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office

March 6, 1973

AM 11:49 12:00  President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office.

March 7, 1973

AM 8:53 9:16  President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office.

March 8, 1973

AM 9:51 9:54  President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office.
March 10, 1973

AM 9:20 9:44 President talked long distance with Mr. Dean. President initiated the call from Camp David to Mr. Dean who was in Washington, D.C.

March 13, 1973

PM 12:42 2:00 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office.
(Mr. Haldeman was present from 12:43-12:55)

March 14, 1973

AM 8:36 President telephoned Mr. Dean. The call was not completed.
8:55 8:59 Mr. Dean returned the call and talked with the President.
9:43 10:50 President met with Mr. Dean in the P's EOB Office.
Also present were:
  Mr. Kissinger (departed at 9:50)
  Ronald L. Ziegler
  Richard A. Moore (9:55-10:50)

PM 12:27 12:28 President telephoned Mr. Dean.
12:47 1:30 President met with Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean.
4:25 4:26 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President initiated the call.)
4:34 4:36 President talked with Mr. Dean. (Mr. Dean initiated the call.)

March 15, 1973

PM 5:36 6:24 President met with Mr. Dean and Mr. Moore in the Oval Office.
March 16, 1973

AM 10:34 11:06 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. Mr. Ziegler was present from 10:58-11:10.

PM 8:14 8:23 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President initiated the call.)

March 17, 1973

PM 1:25 2:10 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office.

March 19, 1973

PM 4:59 President requested that Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean join him in his EOB Office.

5:03 5:41 President met with Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean in his EOB Office.

March 20, 1973

AM 10:46 10:47 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President initiated the call.)

PM 12:59 1:00 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President initiated the call.)

1:42 2:31 President met with Mr. Dean and Mr. Moore.

7:29 7:43 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President initiated the call.)
March 21, 1973

AM 10:12 11:55 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. Mr. Haldeman was also present for at least part of the time.

PM 5:20 6:01 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's EOB office. Also present were:
- Mr. Ziegler (departed at 5:25)
- Mr. Haldeman
- Mr. Ehrlichman (5:25-6:01)
- Gen. Scowcroft (5:27-6:05)

March 22, 1973

PM 1:57 3:43 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's EOB Office. Also present were:
- Mr. Ehrlichman (2:00-3:40)
- Mr. Haldeman (2:01-3:40)
- Mr. Mitchell (2:01-3:43)

March 23, 1973

PM 12:44 1:02 President talked long distance with Mr. Dean. (The President initiated the call from Florida to Mr. Dean who was in Washington, D.C.)

3:28 3:44 President talked long distance with Mr. Dean. (The President initiated the call from Florida to Mr. Dean who was in Camp David, Md.)

No contact during the period April 1-14

April 15, 1973

PM 9:17 10:12 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's EOB Office.

March 22: Deleted -- (Mr. Dean was scheduled to attend the President's staff briefing in the EOB Briefing Room which the President attended from 8:44-9:03. Attendance was not confirmed on this briefing.)
April 16, 1973

AM 10:00 10:40 President met with Mr. Dean in Oval Office.

PM 4:07 4:35 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's EOB Office.

4:04 4:05 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President initiated the call.)

April 17, 1973

AM 9:19 9:25 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President initiated the call.)

April 22, 1973

AM 8:24 8:39 President phoned Mr. Dean from Key Biscayne.
NOTE

The following page is an excerpt from "Memorandum of Substance of Dean's Calls and Meetings with the President," a document prepared in June 1973 by Fred D. Thompson, Minority Counsel to the Senate Select Committee, following a conversation with J. Fred Buzhardt, Special Counsel to the President. The entire document, accompanied by Mr. Thompson's affidavit concerning his conversation with Mr. Buzhardt, is reprinted as Exhibit 70A, 4 SSC 1794-1800.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
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UNITED STATES SENATE
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Book 4

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IV

No. 47—(1349) Memorandum for John Dean from Jack Caulfield. Subject: Opposition Activity. .......................... 1688
No. 48—(1350) Memorandum prepared by John Dean for members of the White House staff. Subject: Dealing with our Political Enemies. ..................... 1689
No. 49—(1350) Memorandum for John Dean from Charles Colson re: Names given top priority on enemies list. .......................... 1692
No. 50—(1350) Memorandum for Larry Higby from John Dean concerning names for enemies list. .......................... 1697
No. 51—(1350) Section of a news summary from Higby to Dean, indicating that DNC treasurer Robert Strauss should be on the list. .......................... 1699
No. 52—(1350) Additions to enemies list sent to John Dean from Gordon Strachan. .......................... 1700
No. 53—(1350) Memorandum for John Dean from Gordon Strachan. Subject: Political Enemies. (Re: Chet Huntley.) .......................... 1701
No. 54—(1350) Memorandum to John Dean from Gordon Strachan with attached news summary indicating that J. Irwin Miller might be considered for enemies list. .......................... 1703
No. 55—(1350) Memorandum from a member of Charles Colson's staff re: People who attended a rally for a "dump Nixon" program. .......................... 1705
No. 56—(1350) List of McGovern campaign staff with asterisks beside key names that were to be included in the opponents project. .......................... 1707
Nos. 57 and 58—(1988) Marked for identification only and are not for publication.
No. 59—(1353) Bank statement on account of John Welsey [sic] Dean, III. .......................... 1712
No. 60—(1409) Additional document updating the enemies list, entitled "Politics Continued." .......................... 1713
No. 61—(1409) Memorandum from member of Charles Colson's staff. Subject: Opponents Lists. .......................... 1723
No. 62—(1409) Memorandum re: Updating of opponents list. .......................... 1728
No. 63—(1410) Document entitled 'Corporate Executives Committee for Peace, Trip to Washington-June 25, 1970.' This document also is an update of the enemies list. .......................... 1730
No. 64—(1410) List of Democratic contributors of $25,000 or more in 1968 campaigns (from New York Times Story, June 20, 1971). .......................... 1733
No. 65—(1410) Memorandum re: List of Muskie contributors to be added to opponents list. .......................... 1734
No. 66—(1412) Letter from J. Fred Buzhardt, special counsel to the President, to Senator Inouye re: Questions and a memorandum previously furnished the committee in questioning Mr. Dean. .......................... 1734
No. 67—(1412) Memo and questions pertaining to exhibit No. 66. .......................... 1735
No. 68—(1325) Memorandum of Law. Admissibility of Injuries Statements of a Co-conspirator. Submitted by Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director, Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. .......................... 1738
No. 69—(1557) Letter from Congressman Garry Brown to Senator Ervin re: Certain statements made by Mr. Dean. .......................... 1791
No. 70—(1563) Letter from Senator Strom Thurmond to Senators Baker and Gurney and Mr. Fred Thompson re: Mr. Harry Dent declining to do research against Senator Ervin. .......................... 1793
No. 70A—(1569) Detailed notes of Fred D. Thompson, minority counsel, of telephone conversation with J. Fred Buzhardt, special counsel to the President re: Conversation between the President and Mr. Dean. .......................... 1794
No. 71—(1373) Letter to Mr. Garnett D. Inceen, Suburban Trust Co., from Shaffer, McKeever & Fitzpatrick with enclosures. .......................... 1801
No. 72—(1593) Request for transportation dated October 11, 1972. .......................... 1808
No. 73—(1593) Request for transportation dated October 19, 1972. .......................... 1809
No. 74—(1653) Memorandum for the Attorney General from Jeb S. Magruder, dated December 3, 1971. .......................... 1810
No. 75—(1656) Memorandum for the Attorney General from Jeb S. Magruder, dated January 14, 1972. Subject: Telephone Plan for the Florida Primary, with attachment. .......................... 1811

Note.—Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was initially made part of the record.
March 17, 1973

Dean to interview Haldeman and Ehrlichman. The President suggested Dean should possibly go to Camp David to write his report.

President had made a note on a press survey containing an article alleging White House involvement for follow-up (Dean possibly has copy of this). Dean again suggested they bring out 1968 bugging and President said Kleindienst had advised against it. Several names were discussed as possibly subject to attack: Colson, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell and Dean himself. The President asked Dean point-blank if he knew about the planned break-in in advance. Dean said no, there was no actual White House involvement regardless of appearances except possibly Strachan. Dean told President Magruder pushed Liddy hard but that Haldeman was not involved. The President wanted Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean to talk to the Committee and Dean resisted. Dean told the President of the Ellsberg break-in but that it had nothing to do with Watergate.

March 19, 1973

It was decided Dean would send a letter or sworn statement to the Judiciary Committee answering certain questions.

March 20, 1973

(Republican leadership had been in that day.) Dean discussed Mitchell's problems with the grand jury, Vesco and the Gurney press conference. The President and Moore agreed that the whole investigation should be made public and that a statement should be released immediately after the sentencing of the defendants. Dean suggested that each member of the Ervin Committee be challenged to invite an FBI investigation of his own Senate campaign. The President called Dean that night and Dean said that there was "not a scintilla of evidence" to indicate White House involvement and Dean suggested he give the President a more in-depth briefing on what had transpired.
66. On March 20, 1973 John Dean had an evening telephone conversation with the President during which he arranged a meeting with the President for the next morning. According to the edited transcript of this conversation made public by the White House, Dean requested a meeting with the President to go over soft spots and potential problem areas. Dean said that his prior conversation with the President had been "sort of bits and pieces" and that he wanted to paint the whole picture for the President. The President agreed to such a meeting, and the President also instructed Dean to try to write a general statement like one that would state categorically that based on Dean's investigation Haldeman, Colson and others were not involved in the Watergate matter.

66.1 White House edited transcript of tape recorded telephone conversation between the President and John Dean, March 20, 1973.
SUBMISSION OF

RECORDED PRESIDENTIAL CONVERSATIONS

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

OF THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

BY

PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON

APRIL 30, 1974
MARCH 20, 1973, (7:29-7:43 PM) - TELEPHONE CONVERSATION -
THE PRESIDENT/DEAN

P John Dean, please.

Opr Yes, Mr. President.

P Hello.

D Yes, Sir.

P You are having rather long days these days, aren't you? I guess we all have.

D I think they will continue to be longer.

(Material unrelated to Presidential actions deleted)

D The other witness they have now subpoenaed - there are two other witnesses - there is a Hoback girl from the Re-Election Committee - she was interrogated by Committee staff and counsel as a result of her confidential interviews with the FBI.

P Hmph.

D Alleging that that had been leaked by me to them and then, of course, that was not true.

P That's not true.

D And the other fellow they are calling is a fellow by the name of Thomas Lombard who is trying to establish a link between Dean on that one. Lombard did volunteer work for me in my office and did volunteer work for Liddy and at one time he saw Liddy in my office. Big deal. It was purely campaign, you know.
Well, is that what Lombard will testify to, or will he testify to -

Well he has written a very lengthy letter to the Committee declining to testify originally and saying this is all I would have to say and it is probably not relevant. I know nothing of Dean and Liddy's connection.

Right.

Other than the fact that they --

That's not bad then - maybe he will make a pretty good witness.

He might. He might.

What about the Hoback girl?

The Hoback girl should be broken down. She should come out in tears as a result of the fact that she is virtually lying about one thing and our people will be on the --

You mean -- do our people know what to ask her?

Yes they do. Yes they do.

Uh, huh. Why is she doing it? Do we know?

She - ah --

Disgruntled? Somebody -

Disgruntled. She has been fairly disgruntled all along. She is a Democrat that worked over there in
D Finance Committee. She professes a personal loyalty to Maury Stans but that is about the extent of it, any, of her loyalty.

P Yeah.

D I never have figured out how she got in there.

(Material unrelated to Presidential action deleted)

P They didn't bite the bullet with regard to subpoenaing you?

D No. I don't think there is any chance they are going to do that.

P That's rather interesting isn't it? Something ought to be made of that.

D Unless they get -- they are taking more evidence on me. Obviously with these other two witnesses, not that I think anything will come out of this. It will just be more -- I had a conversation with John Ehrlichman this afternoon before he came down to visit you. I think that one thing that we have to continue to do, and particularly right now, is to examine the broadest, broadest implications of this whole thing, and, you know, maybe about 30 minutes of just my recitation to you of facts so that you operate from the same facts that everybody else has.

P Right.
D I don't think -- We have never really done that. It has been sort of bits and pieces. Just paint the whole picture for you, the soft spots, the potential problem areas.

P Uh, huh.

D and the like so that when you make judgments you will have all that information.

P Would you like to do that -- when?

D I would think, if its not inconvenient for you, sir, I would like to sort of draw all my thoughts together and have a -- just make some notes to myself so I didn't --

P Could you do it tomorrow?

D Yes, Sir. Yes, Sir.

P Uh, huh. Well, then we could probably do it, say, around ten o'clock.

D That would be fine, sir.

P Do you just want to do it alone? Want anybody else there?

D I think just --

P It is better with nobody else there, isn't it?

D Absolutely.

P Anybody else they are all partisan interest virtually.

D That's right.
Right. Fine. The other thing I was going to say just is this -- just for your own thinking -- I still want to see, though I guess you and Dick are still working on your letter and all that sort of thing?

C We are and we are coming to -- the more we work on it the more questions we see --

P That you don't want to answer, huh?

D That bring problems by answering.

P And so you are coming up, then, with the idea of just a stonewall then? Is that --

D That's right.

P Is that what you come down with?

D Stonewall, with lots of noises that we are always willing to cooperate, but no one is asking us for anything.

P And they never will, huh? There is no way that you could make even a general statement that I could put out? You understand what I --

D I think we could.

P See, for example, I was even thinking if you could even talk to Cabinet, the leaders, you know, just orally and say, "I have looked into this, and this is that," so that people get sort of a feeling that --
P your own people have got to be reassured.
D Uh, huh.
P Could you do that?
D Well, I think I can but I don't think you would want to make that decision until we have about a --
P No, I want to know. I want to know where all the bodies are first.
D And then, once you decide after that, we can program it anyway you want to do it.
P Yeah. Because I think, for example, you could do it orally, even if you don't want to make the written statement. You could do it orally before the Cabinet, the leaders and the rest. Lay it all out. You see, I would not be present. You just lay it all out and I just -- See what I mean?
D Uh, huh.
P Now that is one thing. The other thing is that I do think there is something to be said for not maybe this complete answer to this fellow, but maybe just a statement to me. My versions are these: bing, bing, bing. That is a possibility.
D Uh, huh.
P What I mean is we need something to answer somebody, answer things, you know they say, "What are you basing this on", I can say, "Well, my counsel has
P advised me that" -- Is that possible or not, or are --
D Well, you know there is that -- and there is always
the FBI report which we have probably not relied upon
enough. There is not one scintilla of evidence.
P I know. But I mean, can't you say that? Or do you
want to put it out?
D Ah, it could be said, and it is something we haven't
really emphasized. Pat Gray is the only person who
has said it and it has really never gotten picked up.
P How would you do it then? What I meant, isn't that
something that you could say? Do you want to publish
the FBI report?
D Oh, no, because at our own strictures we are trying
to place an up - right --
P But you could say, "I have this and this is that."
Fine. See what I am getting at is that, if apart
from a statement to the Committee or anything else,
if you could just make a statement to me that we
can use. You know, for internal purposes and to
answer questions, etc.
D As we did when you, back in August, made the state-
ment that --
P That's right.
D And all the things --
P You've got to have something where it doesn't appear that I am doing this in, you know, just in a -- saying to hell with the Congress and to hell with the people, we are not going to tell you anything because of Executive Privilege. That, they don't understand. But if you say, "No, we are willing to cooperate," and you've made a complete statement, but make it very incomplete. See, that is what I mean. I don't want a, too much in chapter and verse as you did in your letter, I just want just a general --

D An all around statement.

P That's right. Try just something general. Like "I have checked into this matter; I can categorically, based on my investigation, the following: Haldeman is not involved in this, that and the other thing. Mr. Colson did not do this; Mr. so and so did not do this. Mr. Blank did not do this." Right down the line, taking the most glaring things. If there are any further questions, please let me know. See?

D Uh, huh. I think we can do that.

P That is one possibility, and then you could say that such things -- and then use the FBI report to the Cabinet and to the leaders. It might just be
On March 21, 1973 the President met with John Dean from 10:12 to 11:55 a.m. H.R. Haldeman joined the meeting at approximately 11:15 a.m. The following is an index to certain of the subjects discussed in the course of the March 21, 1973 morning meeting:

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<td>Clemency and Watergate defendants</td>
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<td>Whether money should be paid to E. Howard Hunt</td>
<td>40-42, 105-06</td>
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</tbody>
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67.1 Tape recording of meeting between the President and John Dean, joined later by H.R. Haldeman, March 21, 1973, 10:12 - 11:55 a.m., and House Judiciary Committee transcript thereof.
See "Transcript Prepared by the Impeachment Inquiry Staff for the House Judiciary Committee of a Recording of a Meeting Among the President, John Dean and H. R. Haldeman on March 21, 1973 from 10:12 to 11:55 a.m."
68. On March 21, 1973 at 12:30 p.m. H.R. Haldeman spoke by telephone to John Mitchell, who was in New York City. In addition to reflecting the 12:30 p.m. call, Haldeman's telephone log for that day also shows a conversation with John Mitchell's office at 4:06 p.m. with a marginal notation "car - 9:30 a.m. (word illegible) Nat'1 -- Amer 520." Haldeman has testified that he does not recall asking Mitchell on March 21 whether Mitchell was going to take care of Hunt's demand for money.

---

68.1 H.R. Haldeman telephone log, March 21, 1973 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).

68.2 H.R. Haldeman testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, January 30, 1974, 4-16 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).

68.3 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, February 14, 1974, 16 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
<table>
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<td>Mrs. Haldeman</td>
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<td>OUT 840 AM</td>
<td>INC</td>
<td>John Dean</td>
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<td>OUT 920 PM</td>
<td>INC</td>
<td>Dave Parker</td>
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<td>OUT 940 PM</td>
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<td>Barn Woodson</td>
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<td>Steve Buec</td>
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<td>OUT 1050 AM</td>
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<td>Gen. Scowcroft</td>
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<td>OUT 1104 PM</td>
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<td>Ron Reagan</td>
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<td>OUT 1150 AM</td>
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<td>John Ulrich</td>
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<td>OUT 1230 PM</td>
<td>INC</td>
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<td>OUT 1250 PM</td>
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<td>John Dean</td>
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<td>OUT 1:00 AM</td>
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<td>Del Smith</td>
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*WASHINGTON*

TELEPHONE MEMORANDUM

**A.R. Haldeman**

**March 21, 1973**

ACTION

*Faxer 0.10-9:20 AM*
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

IN RE: POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS

18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2512

United States District Courthouse
3rd & Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

January 30, 1974

The testimony of HARRY R. HALDEMAN was taken in the presence of a full quorum of the Grand Jury.

BEFORE:

RICHARD BEN-VENISTE, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
United States Department of Justice

JILL VOLNER
Assistant Special Prosecutor
United States Department of Justice

GERALD GOLDMAN, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
United States Department of Justice

GEORGE T. FRAMPTON, JR., ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
United States Department of Justice
A: I understand.

Q: Do you understand that while the Grand Jury rules do not permit you to have an attorney present in this room, you may be excused to consult with an attorney outside of this room at any time upon request to the Foreman of the Grand Jury.

A: I understand.

Q: For the record, you are represented today by counsel in the presence of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Strickler who are outside, is that correct?

A: That is correct.

Q: So that anything you do say should be said freely and voluntarily. Do you understand that?

A: Yes.

Q: And you understand further, as in the past, the fact that you have been advised that you are a potential target of this Grand Jury's investigation which means that you may well be considered as a defendant for purposes of indictment by this Grand Jury.

A: I understand.

Q: Now understanding all of those facts and rights which you possess, are you prepared to testify this morning?

A: I am.

Q: Mr. Haldeman, may I direct your attention to the 21st day of March, 1973 and ask whether you recall meeting on that day with the President and John Dean who was at that time...
A Yes, I do.

Q And you recall entering a meeting which was then in progress?

A That's correct, yes.

Q Now following that meeting did there come a time when you had a conversation with John Mitchell who was then in New York City on the telephone?

A Yes, I am sure there did. Let's see -- March 21st?

Q Can you give us the best of your recollection of the time of the telephone conversation and the substance of it?

A I don't have -- I should qualify my previous answer. I am sure that there was a telephone conversation because one of the results or one of the outcomes of the March 21st meeting with Mr. Dean and the President was a request by the President that Mr. Dean, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Mitchell and I meet that day or the following day to discuss some of these questions and then to report back to the President.

I feel sure that I called Mr. Mitchell to request his coming down for such a meeting.

Q What do you recall of the conversation between yourself and Mr. Mitchell?

A That's about all I recall. I am really assuming that there was such a call. I think I called him. It is
possible that someone else called him. My general recollection now would be that I had called him and said that the President wanted us to meet and asked him to come down.

Q Is it not the case that you discussed with more particularity the problems about which the President suggested you meet in your conversation with Mr. Mitchell?

A Not that I recall, no.

Q Is it your testimony that you do not recall saying to Mr. Mitchell in substance that the President requested that you meet as to how to deal with Mr. Hunt's demand for substantial cash payments?

A Yes. I have no recollection of that being discussed.

Q Is it your testimony that in the telephone conversation with Mr. Mitchell you did not allude in any way to the subject matter about which you would be meeting the following day?

A My recollection is that the subject matter about which we would be meeting was the general subject of how to deal with the overall -- what has now become called the Watergate situation, as it stood at that time.

I don't recall the point that you raised as being the specific subject for the meeting.

Q I'm sorry but your answer is not responsive to my question, most respectfully. I asked whether you did not recall alluding to the subject matter in your telephone
conversation with Mr. Mitchell.

A I don't recall alluding to the subject matter. My recollection would be that if I discussed the subject matter it would be in the context that I have just described. The purpose of the meeting was, as I recall it, to review the Watergate situation.

Q Is it not a fact, Mr. Haldeman, that in your telephone conversation with Mr. Mitchell you stated to him in substance, or you asked him in substance, whether he was going to take care of Mr. Hunt's problem?

A I don't recall any such discussion, no.

Q When you say you do not recall any such discussion, that would be something you would recall, would it not, if you had such a discussion?

A I would think so but I don't see that as having been the major point of discussion either at the time of the phone call to set up the meeting or at the meeting which took place on the 22nd.

Q You're talking now again about Mr. Hunt's specific request, is that correct?

A Yes.

Q When were you first advised that Hunt was making such a request or demand?

A To the best of my recollection, the first I knew of that was when it was raised in the March 21st meeting when it
was reported to the President in my presence.

It is my belief that it had been discussed prior to my coming in to that meeting and then was reraised as a point of information when I came in.

Q Did you not have a conversation with John Ehrlichman prior to the meeting about which you are making reference concerning Mr. Hunt's most recent demand for funds?

A I have a general recollection of a very brief discussion of that topic with Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't think it was before the meeting with Mr. Dean and the President that morning.

I am not sure when that -- I think it was discussed or raised in the course of the conversation, but my recollection now is the first I heard of that was in the meeting in the President's office.

Q You say you recall some conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman and you think it was after Mr. Dean raised it in your presence with the President or discussed it with the President in your presence.

I ask you whether, more specifically, you did not have a conversation on the 20th of March, the day before the meeting between Mr. Dean and the President to which you have alluded, with Mr. Ehrlichman at which time the discussion about Mr. Hunt's most recent demand was discussed.

A That is not my recollection at this time. It is
awfully hard to put these things into time position. My
feeling now is the first I heard of that was in the March
21st morning meeting in the President's office. I can't dis-
count the possibility of the other.

I am trying to give you my best recollection.

Q  You think you may well have had a discussion with
Mr. Ehrlichman on the 20th about Mr. Hunt?

A  I don't recall any such. That's really all I can
say. I have no recollection of such a discussion preceeding
the other.

I have a recollection of that point coming up in
conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman at some time. My feeling is
that that was after the 21st.

Q  Well, what do you recall about the substance of it
coming up with Mr. Ehrlichman which would be something which
might put it in a better chronological frame.

A  This account is only a very general recollection.
Let's see if I can reconstruct this. What I would recall in
a general sense is that there was some reference to the fact
or to the report that Hunt had made some kind of a threat that
he was going to reveal the seamy things he had done for
Ehrlichman, or something to that effect, and that was discus-
as a point of information.

Mr. Ehrlichman expressed the view that that was a
matter of no concern to him because there was nothing, as far
as he was concerned, that fit that kind of a description that
he would have any concern about Mr. Hunt revealing.

In other words, his view was -- and this is the
general sense -- I'm not trying to put words into it because
I can't -- it was that there was no basis for a Hunt threat
in that respect.

Q That's what Mr. Ehrlichman told you at the time of
your conversation?

A That's my recollection.

Q As part of the threat, didn't Mr. Ehrlichman tell
you that Mr. Hunt was asking for a lot of money and that the
threat to reveal these things about Mr. Ehrlichman and others
was contingent on his demand not being met?

A It is not my recollection that Mr. Ehrlichman told
me that. It is my recollection that I had heard that, the
substance of the threat, prior to the conversation or the
raising of this point in conversation with Ehrlichman.

Q Well, if we break that down there should be something
which should trigger your recollection as to whether you heard
about a threat from Mr. Ehrlichman for the first time or you
heard it from Mr. Dean, and when you discussed it with Mr.
Ehrlichman, whether Mr. Ehrlichman told you that the threat
was a flat or unconditional threat to reveal things, or whether
it was conditioned on a circumstance not being met; that is
the payment of money to Mr. Hunt.
A  Okay. As I thought I had said, my belief is that
I was told or that I heard of the threat in the terms that
Mr. Hunt had said he had to receive -- I think it was a hundred
and twenty thousand dollars, or something like that -- or he
would reveal the seamy things that he had done for Ehrlichman.
That sort of phraseology is how I recall it.

In other words, it was a threat that he had to be
given this amount of money or he would do the other thing.
But my recollection is that where I heard that was from John
Dean and in the President's office, not from John Ehrlichman.

Q That wasn't the only thing that Mr. Dean had indica-
ted that Mr. Hunt would talk about, is it?
A That's the only thing I recall.

Q Isn't it a fact that the Hunt threat was in the con-
text not only of telling these seamy things about Ehrlichman,
but that he would tell what he knew about Watergate, it's
break-in and its aftermath.
A No, that's not how I remember it at all.

Q It's not?
A No, sir.

Q Your recollection of being so advised by Mr. Dean
was that Hunt would only tell about Ehrlichman?
A There may have been another name. It may have been
Ehrlichman and someone, but my recollection very specifically
in that regard is that the threat related to what was described
as the seamy things he had done for Ehrlichman. It may have been for Ehrlichman and someone else, but it was not, as I would reconstruct it now -- my impression is not that it was a threat to disclose anything other than the apparent projects that he claimed he had done for Ehrlichman.

Q Wasn't the fear expressed that in terms of Hunt "blowing"?

A It may have been, and if it was, my recollection again would be that it was in that context.

Q Now what was Mr. Mitchell's response to you on the telephone, to your invitation?

A Again, it would have to be basically speculation. I think that I transmitted to him the request to attend the meeting, and he said that he would be down the first thing in the morning and a meeting was therefore set up.

Q And later on is it not a fact that Mr. Mitchell's travel plans were confirmed and you were apprised of his time of arrival?

A That's probably true, yes.

Q Do you recall that?

A No, I don't now but I imagine that would be the case. I don't know whether it was later on or he confirmed it at the time. I'm not sure of that.

Q Now Mr. Haldeman, you recall -- do you recall providing to the United States Attorney's Office, and specifically
to Mr. Silbert, copies of the various telephone logs of yours?

A Yes.

Q Where are the originals of those logs?

A I don't know. I'm not sure. We may have turned over the originals. They may be in my attorneys' possession. They may still be in the White House files.

Q Would you like to confer with counsel with respect to the answer to that question?

A Fine.

(Whereupon, the witness left the Grand Jury room to confer with counsel.)

(Whereupon, the witness re-entered the Grand Jury room.)

BY MR. BEN-VENISTE:

Q Mr. Haldeman, have you had the opportunity to consult with counsel?

A I have.

Q Are you able to answer the question with respect to your logs?

A It is my counsel's belief that they were provided with several Xerox copies of those logs, but they do not have, and did not have the originals at any time.

On the basis of that, I can only assume, and this would be my best belief, that the originals are still in the White House files. Prior to my leaving the White House, and
for the purpose of turning over copies to the U. S. Attorney's Office, copies were made of those logs. A Xerox copy was held in my attorney's file and copies were turned over to the U. S. Attorney's Office.

Q So that you requested that the White House Xerox various of your documents which were in the presidential files?
A There was a specific request for these logs apparently, and the copies were made and they were turned over. That is my understanding.

Q Were you provided a copy of whatever was turned over to the U. S. Attorney's Office?
A Yes. My recollection is that these were not in the White House files at the time. They were held by my secretary in my office.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: May we mark this as Exhibit HRH-1 of this date?

(Whereupon, Grand Jury Exhibit HRH-1 was marked for identification.)

BY MR. BEN-VENISTE:

Q I'll show this to you, Mr. Haldeman, and ask if this does not appear to be one of the logs turned over to you -- turned over by you to the U. S. Attorney's Office.
A It appears to be, yes.

Q Now if you will notice, this is a telephone memorandum log dated March 21, 1973, Wednesday, H. R. Haldeman, and

[2487]
it begins at 2:50 p.m. DV

A Right.

Q With the first entry.

A Right.

Q Do you know where the first page of that log is, as I will advise you that it has never been turned over to the Government.

A Is this identified as the second page? Yes, it is page 2. No, I have no idea.

Q Have you ever seen page 1?

A I have not made any attempt to review these logs so I probably haven't. As I have indicated in earlier appearance: this log was not kept by me. It was kept by my secretary. I am not familiar. I didn't even know it existed, as a matter of fact, until the request was made and we got it.

Q Have you ever seen page 1?

A Not that I recall. I have no reason to believe that I have. Let me volunteer that if there is a page 1, and I would like to ask that we ask my attorneys, and we can do it right now if you want to, to check, they do have -- Mr. Strick said they have a copy in their file. They can search that and see if there is a page 1 for that date which is quite possible that it is just left out.

THE FOREMAN: Would you please do so?

THE WITNESS: Sure.
(Whereupon, the witness left
the Grand Jury room to confer
with counsel.)

(Whereupon, the witness re-
entered the Grand Jury room.)

BY MR. BEN-VENISTE:

Q Mr. Haldeman, have you checked the copy that you have
or that your attorneys have of the March 21 telephone logs?

A I have not. I have talked with Mr. Strickler and
he is calling his office. It is in the file in his office and
he is calling to have it checked right now. As soon as he
has an answer he will notify the Marshal.

Q Do you have any knowledge as to any deliberate with-
holding of this document?

A No.

Q Either by your attorneys or by anyone at the White
House?

A No, I don't. It was our intent and thought that
we had turned over the complete file; both the telephone logs
and the date and appointment files.

Q Now with respect to the tape recording of the con-
versation about which you have testified between the President
and Mr. Dean, and then later yourself, on the 21st of March,
1973, did you ever make a duplicate of this tape or of any
portion of the tape?

A No. My answer is no, but I want to be sure I
IN RE: POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF 18 USC 2511 and 2512

68.3  John Dean testimony

Grand Jury Room No. 3
United States District Courthouse
3rd & Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Thursday, February 14, 1974

The testimony of JOHN W. DEAN, III, was presented
to a full quorum of the Grand Jury.

BEFORE:

RICHARD BEN-VENISTE, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

JILL VOLNER
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

GERALD GOLDMAN, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

GEORGE T. FRAMPTON, JR., ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice
Q Now, did Mr. Mitchell, at that time, indicate to you, one way or another, whether Mr. Hunt would be paid?

A No, he did not.

Q Thereafter, did you have a conversation with Mr. LaRue?

A Yes, I did.

Q And what was the substance of that conversation?

A Mr. LaRue wanted to know what I was going to do about the problem that had raised, and I told him, nothing; that I was out of that business.

He then asked me what I thought he should do and I told him I thought he ought to talk to Mitchell about it.

Q Now, after the meeting on the 21st with the President and, for a portion, Mr. Haldeman, did you learn from anyone whether Mr. Mitchell had been contacted with respect to coming down to Washington and meeting with you and Mr. Haldeman and the President and Mr. Ehrlichman?

A Yes, I did.

Q And when did you learn that?

A Sometime on the 21st, I learned it from Mr. Haldeman. Originally, it had been hoped that Mr. Mitchell could come down immediately but, for some reason, he couldn't come down until the next morning. So a meeting was scheduled for the next morning.

Q Now, later on in the day, on the 21st, you had a
On the afternoon of March 21, 1973 Dean met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman and Dean have testified that the participants at the meeting speculated about John Mitchell's role in the Watergate affair, and wondered whether Mitchell's not coming forward was the cause of the beating everyone was taking on the subject of Watergate. Dean and Haldeman have testified that in the late afternoon of March 21, just before their second meeting with the President on that day, Dean told Haldeman that perhaps the solution to the whole thing was to draw the wagons around the White House. According to Haldeman, Dean also said that they should let all the chips fall where they may, because that would not hurt anybody at the White House since no one there had a problem.

69.1 John Ehrlichman log, March 21, 1973 (received from SSC).
69.2 H.R. Haldeman calendar, March 21, 1973 (received from SSC).
69.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2756, 2741-43.
69.4 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, February 14, 1974, 17 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
69.5 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1000, 1092.
69.6 H.R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2899.
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 1973

8:15    HRH office
9:00    President
11:00   Albert Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Intelligence
11:45   Car at west basement
12:00   Congressman Jack Kemp
1:00    Lunch in Mess with Cole
2:45    David Young
3:00    Bernard Hildenbrand (NACO), Jim Falk
3:45-6  HRH, John Dean
6:00    Bud Krogh
7:00    Metropolitan Club - Gene Bradley dinner

THURSDAY, MARCH 22, 1973

8:30    Sub-Cabinet briefing - 450 EOB
11:00   HRH office - Dean, Mitchell
11:45   Car at west basement
12:40   Sec. Shultz' plane arrival (Mrs. E on plane) - Andrews
3:15    Secretary Shultz
3:45    President, Shultz

FRIDAY, MARCH 23, 1973

11:45   President
1:00    Depart west basement
1:30    Depart Andrews, Jetstar 4200
        (Mr. and Mrs. E, Hullins, Ziegler, Gladden)
3:00    Arrive Offutt AFB, Omaha (engine trouble)
5:30    Depart Offutt
7:00*   Arrive San Francisco
Stay    Clift Hotel

MONDAY, MARCH 26, 1973

9:00    Depart San Francisco
        (Ehrlichmans (3), Hullins, Gladden)
1:50    Arrive Kansas City (Forbes)
2:20    Depart Kansas City
5:40    Arrive Dulles, Page Airways
HALDEMAN'S \textit{CALSNOAK}

1973

\textit{For a full year of daily quarter-hour appointments, memoranda and diary.}

\textit{Colton's A.T.A. GLANCE Products}

\textit{Resistors P.T. Pat Off}

\textit{Source: SSG 2/12/74}

\textit{107}
### Wednesday, March 21

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PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 26, 27, AND 30, 1973
Book 7

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 1973
So, basically, he thought that was where one threw the line, and he wanted Dean to focus very hard on that. I don’t think, on the 21st, that the President was advised of any implication in this matter of either Mr. Haldeman or me, and in point of fact he continued to be confident through the 30th, I know, and as matter of fact, on through April 16, because he had a report from Mr. Petersen, the Assistant Attorney General, and the Attorney General to the effect that neither Mr. Haldeman nor I were criminally involved in this matter in any respect. So, and that was on the occasion of their meeting on that Sunday which would have been the 15th, wouldn’t it?

So, I don’t think, particularly February 27, but continuing down through the next 3 weeks, that he had any real concern about that.

Senator Gurney. Well, you mentioned meetings with Dean so I guess it is a good time to go to those.

Let’s go to this meeting between you and Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Dean following the March 21 meeting of Dean with the President. That is when the roof sort of started to cave in, and I am curious to know what transpired in that meeting between the three of you after the meeting between Dean and the President, when presumably according to Dean’s testimony, substantiated by Moore in what Dean told Moore, Dean told the President everything he knew about Watergate. Then there was a meeting, as I understand it, between the three of you.

Mr. Ehrlichman. There was a meeting at 3:45 p.m. on the 21st.

Senator Gurney. Yes.

Mr. Ehrlichman. And then that meeting moved to the President’s office after about an hour.

Senator Gurney. Now, could you describe to us what happened in your office—it was in your office, wasn’t it, the first meeting?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am not sure. I don’t recall off-hand.

Senator Gurney. I have in the log here 3:45 to 6 p.m., Dean, Haldeman, that is the only thing it says. It doesn’t say where, although there is another note that day of a meeting. It says Haldeman’s office, so I would assume perhaps this 3:45 p.m. meeting was in your office.

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don’t know. My notes don’t show.

Senator Gurney. It is a minor point.

Mr. Ehrlichman. In any event it was either in Mr. Haldeman’s office or mine. I am sure.

The conversation—

Senator Gurney. Who called the meeting? Do you remember?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. I do not. I do not. The conversation, as I recall it, largely involved the question of testimonial availability of White House staff people. It was this continuing question that was ongoing. Mr. Dean did not report in my hearing what he had told the President that day.

Senator Gurney. He never mentioned anything about his meeting with the President?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir, not that I can recall at all. We were largely, at both that meeting and continuing in the meeting which took place in the President’s office afterward, we were taken up with the question of how to get the story out, No. 1, how to get White House people to testify fully, under what circumstances, whether they should
be made fully available to this committee, waiving all privilege or whether they should be made available fully to the grand jury and not to this committee at all. Whether the attorney-client privilege still existed as to Dean, and he talked to us quite a bit about the law of attorney-client privilege as I recall on that occasion, and so it was that setting.

Now, Mr. Dean and I got into a difference of opinion at that time about the question of immunity, and how that should be handled. As I recall, right around this time, I think——

Senator Gurney. Now what do you mean about immunity?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, his theory was that the President should negotiate blanket immunity for the White House staff with the Attorney General so that the entire White House staff, lock, stock, and barrel, could testify freely before the grand jury as to any and all facts and the air and everybody would be immune from prosecution. That just didn't make any sense to me from either a practical standpoint or a public appearance standpoint, and we got into a difference of opinion on that. That was again—pardon me, Senator.

Senator Gurney. Well now, why did he say that?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, he was looking for formula, he had come up with a concept that there ought to be some kind of a commission, an independent commission that would be set up.

Senator Gurney. But when somebody talks about immunity, obviously they are afraid of ending up in the pokey. Did he say, "Now we are all going to jail so he had better get some immunity here."

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, he said he was concerned that people would not talk freely. Now, Mr. Dean is an immunity expert. Mr. Dean told us early in the game that he was the author of the statute which the Congress eventually adopted granting immunity to people in certain criminal situations so that they would testify against higher-ups or coconspirators or whatnot, and so he gave us quite an accounting of the difference between use immunity and transactional immunity and the various technicalities of this and he explained that immunity was sort of the lubricant that was needed in this thing to get people to come forward and to fully tell their stories.

Senator Gurney. If everybody is innocent of everything and stop with Liddy, why would people worry about immunity?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I don't think at that stage that there was any necessary assumption on our part that everybody was innocent of everything. I think this was implicit in the conversation that there were liabilities. We were thinking in terms of Mr. Magruder, we were thinking in terms of people at the committee, but Mr. Dean was also implying to us that people in the White House would not come forward and testify freely without immunity.

This was a line that picked up, I guess, about this time and then was replayed over and over in his conversations with Mr. Haldeman.

Senator Gurney. Did he mention to you in this discussion who would need immunity in the White House?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No; he did not.

Senator Gurney. No names were mentioned at all?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir; not that I can recall.
Senator Gurney. Who did you think might, because you had some discussion on this?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't think that I thought who might at that point. Bear in mind I had been totally out of touch with this situation for some period of time. My reaction to his proposal was to simply say to him that that was out of the question, that we simply could not expect anybody to grant immunity either on a blanket basis or on an individual basis to anybody in the White House. I said that rather early in the conversation and that may have inhibited any specifics that Mr. Dean otherwise might have been willing to come forward with.

Senator Gurney. What was Mr. Haldeman's reaction?

Mr. Ehrlichman. He didn't express a reaction that I can recall to that. He was concerned, as I recall, with the general subject of executive privilege because he had been hearing from Mr. Mitchell strongly about executive privilege and he conveyed to us Mr. Mitchell's strong feeling that the executive privilege position that the administration was taking was untenable.

Senator Gurney. And he didn't say anything about this conversation he had had, this long conversation earlier in the day with the President of the United States?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir; he did not.

Senator Gurney. Did you know at that time about who may have been knowledgeable about the break-in. You know at some point in time he told you that some people knew about it?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Oh, no.

Senator Gurney. This was later?

Mr. Ehrlichman. That developed as a result of phone calls that Bob Haldeman was getting while we were in San Clemente following—we left, I left.

Senator Gurney. I don't want to get bogged down on that.

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, I left about 5 or 6 days later for California. While we were out there, we began realizing there was a strong conflict between Dean and Mitchell on this whole question of people going to the grand jury or the committee and so on, and could not get a feel of it because I didn't know what was behind it and I began trying to find out what was behind it, and then I talked to Mr. O'Brien and that is the first that I knew about these four meetings back in November and December, January, and February where these plans were laid. Then I began inquiring through Mr. Moore and others as to what Mr. Mitchell might have testified to that was worrying him, and why he didn't think Dean ought to go near the U.S. attorney or the grand jury and what his concerns were.

Senator Gurney. Is it fair to say that up to this March 21 date you had no knowledge of what Dean's activities were in connection with Watergate, and now I am talking about possible illegal activities, other than the Kalmbach business, and this talk you had on Executive clemency? Is that a fair thing to say?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I did not know what he had to do with the Kalmbach business except in the recruiting of Mr. Kalmbach.

Senator Gurney. Well, I am only talking about what has transpired here this week.
Almost surely if John Mitchell is indicted, Kleindienst will resign,” and he said, “I think Joe Sneed ought to be Acting Attorney General.”

Then he said, “The U.S. attorney has assured me that I am not a target, and neither is any other White House person.”

Senator Gurney. Were these notes made at the time of the meeting?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir, as we talked.

Senator Gurney. Did he tell you about all his involvement with Kalmbach, raising of money, and these methods of paying it that Ulasewicz told us about?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. That I hadn’t heard until this testimony here.

Senator Gurney. Or the contacts he was having with LaRue at this particular time?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. You will recall he testified about five different ways, about looks of anguish, disbelief, scorn, whatnot, on my face at the time he said I was indictable. In point of fact at the time he said I was not indictable but that the Kalmbach thing might be a problem for me as being misunderstood, I said, “Well, I just don’t see how it could, John,” and then we discussed just that, the assumptions which I had made that there was nothing improper about it, and so on.

Senator Gurney. At one of these meetings, and I can’t remember which one, it was now because there were several in this time frame, but Dean testified, as I recall, that there was a discussion between you and him, and I think Haldeman, on the fact that the best way to settle Watergate would have Mitchell come forward, I guess that—March 21 counsel tells me. Do you recall anything on that, whether there was a discussion or agreement between you, that that was the best thing to do?

Mr. Ehrlichman. There never was such an agreement.

Senator Gurney. Was there a discussion?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. During that meeting and during subsequent meetings between Mr. Haldeman and me and meetings between Haldeman, Dean and me on the two occasions, I think we had them subsequent to that, there was a lot of speculation about John Mitchell and his place in all of this, and of course he was not saying anything to anybody at that point in time, and none of us really had a feel for this. I can recall at one of these meetings Bob Haldeman saying, “I wonder if we are taking all this anguish just to protect John Mitchell.” It was a question, it was not an assertion, but I think we all shared at various times that question in our minds as to whether the beating everybody was taking on the subject of Watergate was because he was not coming forward. Now that was one of the reasons that the President asked me to meet with Mr. Mitchell on the afternoon of Saturday, April 14, to say to him for the President that if Mr. Mitchell thought his silence was somehow serving the Presidency that was a misapprehension, that the President didn’t want him to sit silent if he knew something unless Mr. Mitchell felt from his own personal point that was an exercise of his own rights, in which case that was up to him. And I delivered that message to him at that time but that was a continuing question all the way through this period of time.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

IN RE: POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF 18 USC 2511 and 2512

Grand Jury Room No. 3
United States District Courthouse
3rd & Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Thursday, February 14, 1974

The testimony of JOHN W. DEAN, III, was presented
to a full quorum of the Grand Jury.

BEFORE:

RICHARD BEN-VENISTE, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

JILL VOLNER
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

GERALD GOLDMAN, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice

GEORGE T. FRAMPTON, JR., ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
U. S. Department of Justice
meeting with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, did you not?
    A Yes, I did.
    Q During the course of that meeting, was there any discussion about what your preference might be as to Mr. Mitchell's future actions?
    A Yes, there was. The nature of that conversation was that it was felt that Mr. Mitchell should be the one to step forward and stand responsible for the entire Watergate matter and that, if he did, the problems that had occurred after June 17th would dissipate themselves and there would be a satisfaction with somebody that was standing accountable for the matter.

    In other words, a big enough fish would have been caught that the problem would have been resolved.

    Q In other words, that would have taken public opinion away from what might have occurred after the break-in, in connection with the so-called cover-up?
    A That is correct.

    Q Now, on the 22nd of March, in the morning, did you attend a meeting with Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Mitchell?
    A Yes, I did attend such a meeting.
    Q Where did that take place?
    A In Mr. Haldeman's office.
    Q Do you recall any reference being made to Mr. Hunt's
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 25 AND 26, 1973
Book 3

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Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

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the President suggested that we have a meeting with Mitchell, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman to discuss how to deal with this situation. What emerged from that discussion after Haldeman came into the office was that John Mitchell should account for himself for the pre-June 17 activities and the President did not seem concerned about the activities which had occurred after June 17.

After I departed the President's office I subsequently went to a meeting with Haldeman and Ehrlichman to discuss the matter further. The sum and substance of that discussion was that the way to handle this now was for Mitchell to step forward and if Mitchell were to step forward we might not be confronted with the activities of those involved in the White House in the coverup.

Accordingly, Haldeman, as I recall, called Mitchell and asked him to come down the next day for a meeting with the President on the Watergate matter.

In the late afternoon of March 21, Haldeman and Ehrlichman and I had a second meeting with the President. Before entering this meeting I had a brief discussion in the President's outer office of the Executive Office Building suite with Haldeman in which I told him that we had two options:

One is that this thing goes all the way and deals with both the pre-activities and the postactivities, or the second alternative: if the coverup was to proceed we would have to draw the wagons in a circle around the White House and that the White House protect itself. I told Haldeman that it had been the White House's assistance to the reelection committee that had gotten us into much of this problem and now the only hope would be to protect ourselves from further involvement.

The meeting with the President that afternoon with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and myself was a tremendous disappointment to me because it was quite clear that the coverup as far as the White House was concerned was going to continue. I recall that while Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and I were sitting at a small table in front of the President in his Executive Office Building office that I for the first time said in front of the President that I thought that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean were all indictable for obstruction of justice and that was the reason I disagreed with all that was being discussed at that point in time.

I could tell that both Haldeman, and particularly Ehrlichman, were very unhappy with my comments. I had let them very clearly know that I was not going to participate in the matter any further and that I thought it was time that everybody start thinking about telling the truth.

I again repeated to them I did not think it was possible to perpetuate the coverup and the important thing now was to get the President out in front.

**Meeting of March 22**

The arrangements had been made to have a meeting after lunch with the President with Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Mitchell, and myself. Mr. Mitchell came to Washington that morning for a meeting in Haldeman's office in which Ehrlichman, Mitchell, Haldeman, and
Senator Montoya. Who devised the shelter of executive privilege as part of the coverup?

Mr. Dean. Well, the— I wouldn't say there was a conscious decision at any point in time to use executive privilege as a part of the coverup. It was always in existence with regard to White House staff because no one, the President's policy was he didn't want the staff coming up. It began to take a very severe focus during the—first of all, during the Patman hearings that if push had gotten to shove in those hearings that privilege would have been declared on Timmons and myself.

Senator Montoya. You mean to tell me that you and Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman didn't discuss the use of executive privilege?

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir; I was getting to that.

Senator Montoya. As a coverup!

Mr. Dean. That was the first time it had occurred when there was some discussion of it that was with regard to the Patman hearings in late September or early October. That was the only congressional problem that arose. It was during the Gray hearings when my name moved to the information front that we began discussing using or litigating with Dean the issue of executive privilege, possibly being the strongest, and these were the discussions I had with the President whereas if we were litigating the matter with Mr. Dean there would be no other witnesses from the White House who would have to appear because he would have the perfect reason that this matter is under litigation.

Senator Ervin. We will take a 5 minute recess to vote.

[Recess.]

Senator Ervin. The committee will resume.

Senator Montoya. Mr. Dean, I only have three or four questions to ask of you. I want to clear this matter up with respect to Mr. Mitchell. On pages 225 and 226 of your statement, you mention that there was a move afoot at the White House to try to get Mr. Mitchell to accept the blame for the entire affair. Now, can you tell me who the prime mover of this attempt was at the White House?

Mr. Dean. It is very difficult for me to say who the prime mover was. At the time this first was discussed, it was after I had reported to the President on the 21st what I thought were the implications of this entire matter and subsequently, I had a meeting with Haldeman and Ehrlichman and then another meeting with the President. It was early discussion—I recall one particular incident that occurred outside of the President's Office before he went into a meeting in which I said that there are two options. One is everything pre and post is going to have to be laid out or, second, the White House is going to have to surround itself with wagons and start protecting itself. It was in subsequent discussions with the President when it was evolving that I was arguing that both pre and post had to be disclosed, but there was evolving the thought at that point in time that if we merely deal with the pre situation, that the post might go away. I did not believe that and it was really when the Presidential party came back from California that early discussions of this concept had evolved into a firm policy.

So I also mentioned that there was a meeting on the 22d where Mr. Mitchell came down. I assumed at that time that Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman were going to do something to try to bring Mr.
Senator Baker. Would you supply us with copies or the original so that we could have copies?

Mr. Haldeman. I believe—

Senator Baker. I understand—has a copy been supplied to the committee?

Mr. Dash. It is being reproduced now.

Senator Baker. Thank you very much.

Senator Ervin. You may proceed with your original statement.

Mr. Haldeman. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Dean, Mr. Ehrlichman, and I met with the President later that afternoon of the 21st. That meeting dealt with the questions of the grand jury, the Senate committee, and executive privilege in connection with gathering the facts and getting them out. I think there was some discussion of Ehrlichman's theory that everybody should go to the grand jury; and Dean's reaction that that would be fine as long as we had immunity. Mr. Ehrlichman, as I recall, very strongly shot down that thought from Dean saying it did not make any sense at all. Dean has testified that he argued that the way to get the truth out would be to send everybody to the grand jury with immunity. That, in itself, is rather indicative of the different attitudes. Mr. Ehrlichman was arguing for going to the grand jury without immunity in order to get the truth out. Mr. Dean was arguing for going to the grand jury with immunity to get the truth out.

I recall an incident after that afternoon meeting that Mr. Dean also recalls, but he says it took place before and he sees it a little bit differently. I remember that Dean and Ehrlichman and I were standing on the top of the steps of the EOB, the Executive Office Building, outside the President's office. Dean said, sort of thoughtfully, that maybe the solution to this whole thing was to draw the wagons around the White House and let all the chips fall where they may, because that would not hurt anyone in the White House, nobody here had a problem—but his question was: What would that do in the way of creating problems for Mitchell and Magruder? The significance of that comment was that it still seemed to be clear in Dean's mind that the problem did not lie in the White House.

The next step was the meeting of Mitchell, Ehrlichman, Dean, and myself the next day with the President.

The four of us met first in the morning in my office and had some discussion of Dean's report to the President, although not in any detail. Most of the discussion was regarding approaches to dealing with the situation rather than a review of the facts of the situation.

Mitchell turned the discussion to the problem of executive privilege, and he argued very strongly that the position the President had taken and was maintaining regarding executive privilege appeared to the public to be a coverup on the part of the President and that it was bad politics, bad public relations, and a bad idea. Dean at that meeting again argued his idea of everybody going to the grand jury with immunity in order to get the facts out.

That was the day the news report was received regarding Pat Gray accusing Dean of having been a liar in some report he had given to the FBI. That interrupted the meeting and there was some discussion about it.
On the afternoon of March 21, 1973 from 5:20 to 6:01 p.m. the President met with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean. The following is an index to certain of the subjects discussed in the course of the March 21, 1973 afternoon meeting:

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Tape recording of conversation among the President, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman and John Dean, March 21, 1973, 5:00 - 6:01 p.m., and House Judiciary Committee transcript thereof.
See "Transcript Prepared by the Impeachment Inquiry Staff for the House Judiciary Committee of a Recording of a Meeting among the President, Dean, Ehrlichman and Haldeman on March 21, 1973, from 5:20 to 6:01 p.m."