Vol. VI, Tab 38 - Ex. 26 - Email from Jason Calhoun

Jason Calhoun
Jeff,

I am not sure I have your phone number. Can you provide that to me?

Thanks,
Jason

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Hi Jason

Let's do this at 2 pm PST

On Tue, Mar 3, 2009 at 6:34 AM, Calhoun, Jason <jcalhoun@rosettastone.com> wrote:

I am available before 9am, at 1lam, at 12pm, and after 2pm PST. Please choose the time that is most convenient for you.

Thanks,
Jason

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Will call you tomorrow
what time PST is convenient for you?? I have meetings at 11:30 PST and 3 PST. Otherwise I am free

On Mon, Mar 2, 2009 at 7:44 PM, Calhoun, Jason <jcalhoun@rosettastone.com> wrote:

Hi Jeff,

Purchase made from REDACTED 1/8/2009, amount $100.00

I have requested the rest of the details from the PI and will get them to you asap, most likely tomorrow morning.

Can you tell me what the wrinkle is in case I can help? If not, I understand.

Thanks,
Jason

From: Jeff Wu [mailto:jeffwuw@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, March 02, 2009 9:39 PM
To: Calhoun, Jason
Cc: ian.Elain@ussr.dhs.gov; clouie@gmail.com

Subject: Re: [BULK] FW: USSS case

Hi Jason

- Show quoted text -
Can I have the information from the test buy including the email used, the time of purchase, tracking numbers, order numbers and anything else related. Can you also tell me where you made the purchase (ioffer page??).

There is a wrinkle here that I am trying to figure out and that info will help me out.

Jeff

- Show quoted text -

On Mon, Feb 23, 2009 at 7:18 PM, Calhoun, Jason <jcalhoun@rosettastone.com> wrote:

- Show quoted text -

Jan - thanks for the summary.
Just a couple of clarifications
Ian may mean Jason where he wrote Jim.
Also the buyer pays the seller via Google Checkout or Western Union and the seller gets paid. The seller then places an order with Rosetta Stone using one of these hundreds of stolen credit cards and the same and address of the buyer. Thus the buyer gets product from us and we never actually get paid for the orders as the real card holders file chargebacks with the credit card companies. The cards pass authentication as they are real, but the use by the suspect is fraudulent.
This started on nov 15. Rosetta Stone does not currently accept payment via Google Checkout.

Please let me know if you have questions. I had a PI make a test buy, so I have all of the info from that Google Checkout transaction if you need it.

Thanks,

Jason

Jeff - can you supply

From: IAN BLAIR (BIL)
To: Calhoun, Jason; jeffrey@google.com
cc: clouie@google.com
Subject: RE: [BULK] FW: USSS case

- Show quoted text -

Hey Guys, thanks for the intro - Just a brief synopsis of what we are looking at. I am sure whatever I miss, Jim can fill in... -
Jason had sent me a fraud report on a possible suspect who resides in Billings. Apparently this alleged suspect is perpetrating a scheme in which an innocent buyer purchases Rosetta Stone products from the suspect via the Rosetta Stone website. The alleged suspect pays Rosetta Stone in full via Google Checkout or Western Union utilizing what Calhoun had determined to be an unauthorized transaction and/or fraudulent purchases with a possible fraudulent credit card that is not in the name of the suspect or any of the legitimate buyers. The suspect uses the screen name the offer website. From what I understand similar to E-Bay.

According to Jason, some of the legitimate buyers noticed that the package came from Rosetta Stone rather than contacted Rosetta Stone. Apparently Rosetta Stone cannot collect the money on the orders because the charges were unauthorized. Currently Rosetta Stone is currently over $100,000 loss from the activity that has taken place between 12/1/2008 - present. Calhoun provided me a list of the approximate 170 credit card numbers that were utilized in this scheme during the above mentioned time period. While reviewing the list I have noticed that 143 of the approximate 170 numbers began with According to the USSS database those numbers were issued to Chase Bank.

Subsequently, I contacted her the 143 credit card numbers. After conducting an analysis on approximately 10 cards, Gordon determined that the numbers were fraudulently acquired by utilizing a program called CREDITMASTER which is apparently a computer program that creates credit card numbers using an algorithm. In this case, the algorithm made a match of the first 12 numbers to the Chase Business Credit card accounts and the perpetrator is now using those numbers for the Rosetta Stone purchases.

The results of the inquiries revealed that has a degree in computer science and has worked in multiple occupations in IT support. In addition, Scan is associated with a website and blog called The CEO of offered the registration information of also appears on the website and blog. I have conducted the same inquiries and confirmed all the results.

Jim was able to provide me with a list of credit cards along with IP addresses, time and date of the purchases. The IP addresses came back from multiple international countries. However, I am hoping that Google-checkout would be able to provide information on the accounts where the money from these transactions are being deposited. Of course a subpoena can be provided upon request. I can also fax you the information that Jim has assembled (which includes the credit card number, IP address and date and time of the transaction.
In addition, I have consulted with the members of the Seattle Field Office Electronic Crimes Task Force regarding these facts. They have told me that there is a possibility that this particular activity could be consistent to E::<? Elster Europe and/or Russian where they recruit a "male" in the US (in this case) and then sends it to the purchaser. However, the information and details in blogs and websites indicate that he may be doing this himself, but without getting the information from the IP addresses, I will not know for sure.

However, in past cases, the middleman (such as) can be just as culpable and knowledgeable of the conspiracy, but without getting into the computer - we will not know for sure. Therefore, it is necessary to obtain all information regarding IP addresses from the retailer. I have been in communication with their attorney Due to the fact that this is now a federal investigation, he requested a federal grand jury before providing the information. At this time, we are between grand juries and will be delayed until next week to get one. (That is the bad news). The good news is that I have provided the facts to an Assistant United States Attorney and he is excited about this case. Once I get the subpoena and send it over to the attorney, we should be on our way. Hopefully, the IP addresses from Google will go to the residence which according to the united states attorney's office will be enough probable cause for a search warrant for the computer.

Thanks again, let me know where I can fax the chart that Jim provided me.

Ian Blair
US Secret Service
Billings Resident Agency
401 N 31st Street #600
Billings, MT 59101
(406)245-8585
(406)245-9706 (direct)
(406)245-2123 (fax)

From: Calhoun, Jason <mailto:icalhoun@rosettastone.com>
Sent: Mon 2/23/2009 5:02 PM
To: IAN BLAIR (BILL) [mailto:IPUSSS case

- Show quoted text -

Ian,

Here is the contact info for the Google Trust and Safety team members (Google Checkout) that will assist us with this.
Apparently, you already know Cory (see below)!

Please either send them an email and introduce yourself, or give me the OK to share your info with them and I will introduce you.

Thanks,

Jason

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From: Cory Louie (mailto:clouie@google.com)
Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 4:39 PM
To: Calhoun, Jason
Cc: Jeff Wu
Subject: Re: USSS case

Hey Jason,

I know Ian, he should remember me from old USSS days.

Feel free to give Ian our contact info. Jeff will be your main POC for this one.

Can you tell us in a nutshell what is going on or direct us to a URL of this merchant?

-Cory
Hi Cory and Jeff,

It is very nice to meet you. I look forward to working with you on this.

Ian Blair is the Secret Service Agent working with us on this fraud case involving Google Checkout. I do have at least one account, but I will let Ian supply you with them so he can tell you if we should leave them running for now in case he needs to make a test purchase.

Jeff – I met you recently at the MarkMonitor Forum last November. Your business card is on my desk! It is nice to meet up again.

I will send Ian's info momentarily once I get an ok from him to do so. May I also share your contact info with him?

Thanks,

Jason

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Jason T. Calhoun
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Enforcement Manager, Legal Department
T (540) 432-6166 [ext. 5146]
F (540) 236-0953
(800) 788-9822
RosettaStone.com
Hi Jason,

Thanks for reaching out through Brian.

Can you provide the contact details of the USSS Agent working the case?

Do you have any additional information that you can share to help us identify and Google Checkout accounts that may be associated?

-Cory

Cory Louie | Google Inc. | Trust & Safety Manager | 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043 | 650.253.0774 direct | 650.644.0433 fax | clouie@google.com

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