10. At 7:32 a.m. on June 19, 1972 Attorney General Kleindienst telephoned the Acting Director of the FBI L. Patrick Gray in Palm Springs, California, and stated that Kleindienst wished to be briefed on the investigation of the break-in at the DNC headquarters. Kleindienst told Gray that the President wanted to talk to Kleindienst about it that day or possibly the next day.

10.1 L. Patrick Gray notes of telephone conversation (received from L. Patrick Gray).
10.1 NOTE

The notes which follow were furnished to the House Judiciary Committee staff by L. Patrick Gray on April 30, 1974. Mr. Gray identified the bracketed portion as referring to a conversation that Acting Attorney General Kleindienst was expecting to have with the President about Watergate. Mr. Gray stated that he told Mr. Kleindienst that W. Mark Felt, Acting Associate Director of the FBI, would be available later that day to brief the Acting Attorney General on the status of the FBI's Watergate investigation.

Certain words and phrases which are difficult to read in Mr. Gray's handwritten notes were clarified by Mr. Gray and are included in the typed copy.
Frankfort, Ky. June 15

Fri 6/16/72

The proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution guaranteeing equal rights to both sexes reached the halfway point in its progress toward ratification today when Ky. became the 19th state to approve it. A total of 38 states must ratify the amendment before it becomes part of the Constitution. Two states have rejected ratification.

Mon 6/19/72 6:36 AM TCF WMF from Palm Springs

FBI Op connected me with WFO; twice. Finally told him to have WMF call me direct. We called just shortly after I left to go to Mass -

Non 6/19/72 7:32 AM TCF ROK

Sometime today or possibly tomorrow RH is going to want to talk to me. Is there anyone there who can come to brief me today this PM? Yes, WMF.

Mon 6/19/72 7:35 AM TCF Parris Lucas

10:00 AM.
9:00 AM. Opening Ceremony
9:30 AM. AG Younger.
10:00 AM. LPG

Parris Lucas 9:50 AM

10:00 AM. LPG

Break.

Mon 6/19/72 8:00 AM TCF WMF

I have a Memo. to HRH & to AG.

Why?

Read's memo

Approx 12:00 AM 6/17/72 5 arrested in ofc.

(Page two of original three)

Had in their possess. burglary tools & eavesdropping eq.

Viol of D C Code

All charged w/ burglary
6 Held in lieu of $50,000 bail

Mc Cord $30,000

Hunt employed by CIA to 4/70
We conducted an inves. for W.H. in 1971
for a sensitive post some 9 mo ago
Caddie advised FBI he rec'd a

call at 3 AM from a person he refuses to

identify

Open panel

Interception

Disclosure

We may be a consultant at N.H.

Title 18

Retyped from indistinct original

[430]
ARE WE IN
IT SOLIDLY
YES

identify Chap 119
Chap 119
Title 18 [unreadable]
Title 18 Interception of Communication:

No. Do not send.

What do you think of our conducting a sweep of
Demo Hq for other devices. Not yet; can h d for 24 or 48
hrs but it is a normal investigation technique.

On the front page there this AM.

A Collateral piece on page 7 "Experts Heap Scorn
on Bungled Caper at Demo. Nat'l. Hq."

Our Lab says this is sophisticated equipment

Recovered bullet from Wallace; can make no positive
ident. on this bullet - probably from

(Page three of original three)

Carol just handed

Plarmon Case.

S. Ct. outlawed wiretap of Domestic Subversives.

(1) Prior jud approval required for
type of surveillance
(2) Where Govt illegally eavesdrops, it must
turn over Evi to def
(3) Indiv rt. of privacy need no longer
yield to Govt's rt. to present itself
(4) In '67 S Ct found Electronic Eavesdropping
w/o ct per
violated 4th A but said permissible
in for.threats - NM took position that
this was applicable to domestic threats -

written instructions

Gave WM instructions as to how to handle the addressing
of the memo; meet let with RGK & brief him on facts;
then give him my views re the overall approach to
Inves. WM case - no holds barred.
WM not sure of exact no.

Chap 119 Tit 18 USC

2511 Interception & Disclosure Prohibited
12 Mr. Distrb & Possession of these devices
13 Confiscation -
14 Immunity -
15 Prohibition of Use as Evi
16 Authorization of Use of Wiretap
17 " of Disclose
Frankfort, Ky. June 15

The progress amendment to the U.S. Constitution granting equal rights to both sexes reached the halfway point in its progress toward ratification today when Ky. became the 38th state to approve it. A total of 38 states must ratify the amendment before it becomes part of the Constitution. Two states have rejected ratification.

7:32 AM TCF WMTF from Bill Gray.

6-17-77

Bill called me with WMTF station.

Finally told him to have a call back later. He called just shortly after I left to go to Mass.

7:32 AM TCF BSK

Someone today or possibly tomorrow also going to want to talk to me. So there anyone think who can come to lip read today this AM? Yes, WMTF.

7:33 AM TCF FM

FRIDAY

10:00 AM

9:00 AM Coming out

9:30 AM KS Tren

10:00 AM LBF

10:30 AM Bank

8:00 AM TCF WMTF

We do not have too much time

I have a Dr. to see at 10 AM.

Trent means

Approx 12:00 PM 6/17/77 5:42 PM
11. In the morning or early afternoon of June 19, 1972 Ehrlichman
told John Dean to look into the question of White House involvement in
the break-in at the DNC and to determine Howard Hunt's White House
employment status. Dean has testified that he then spoke to Charles
Colson regarding Colson's knowledge of the break-in and Hunt's status
and that Colson denied knowledge of the event, but expressed concern
over contents of Hunt's safe. Dean has also testified that he spoke
to Gordon Liddy, who advised of his and Magruder's involvement in the
planning and execution of the break-in. Thereafter Ehrlichman
received a report from Dean that Dean had spoken to Liddy and to law
enforcement officials, that law enforcement officials were aware that
the matter went beyond the five persons who were apprehended, that
Liddy was involved, and that there was a further direct involvement
of the CRP.

11.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 932-34.
11.2 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury,
November 19, 1973, 48-50 (received from
Watergate Grand Jury).
11.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2821-22.
11.4 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2582-83.
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 25 AND 26, 1973
Book 3

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C., 20402 — Price $1
Stock Number 0570-01-033

[437]
I returned from this 4-day trip to the Far East on the morning of June 15. When I landed in San Francisco, after 20 hours of flying, I called my assistant, Fred Fielding, to check in and tell him that I was going to spend an additional day in San Francisco to get some sleep before I returned to Washington and, accordingly, I would not be in the office until Tuesday. It was at this time that I first learned from Mr. Fielding of the break-in at the DNC headquarters. Mr. Fielding told me that he thought I should return home immediately as there might be a problem and that he would fill me in when I got home. I recall that at first I resisted, but Mr. Fielding, who was not explicit at that time, told me I should come back so that he could fill me in.

Accordingly, I flew back to Washington and arrived on Sunday evening. I had a brief conversation with Mr. Fielding and he informed me that he had learned from Jack Caulfield that Mr. McCord from the reelection committee was among those arrested in the Democratic National Committee headquarters on Saturday and also that one of the Cubans arrested had a check that was made out by Howard Hunt to some country club. I recall that my immediate reaction was that Chuck Colson was probably involved. I was truly exhausted at this point so I told Mr. Fielding that I couldn't do anything at that time and I went to bed without doing a thing.

On Monday morning, June 19, I arrived at my office about 9:15, my normal arrival time at the office. While reading the news accounts of the incident, I received a call from Jack Caulfield who repeated that I was going to spend an additional day on Sunday evening. Mr. Caulfield informed me that he had received the information from Mr. Boggs of the Secret Service. I next received a call from Mr. Magruder and, as best I can recall, Magruder said something to the effect that this might create some problems and I should look into it. He also stated that this was all Liddy's fault and he volunteered a few harsh epithets regarding Liddy. I also recall Magruder mentioning something about how the committee was going to handle the matter publicly but I cannot remember specifically what he stated regarding this. I told Magruder that I had just arrived back in the country and did not know any of the facts surrounding the incident, but I would look into it.

I next received a call from Ehrlichman, who instructed me to find out what I could and report back to him. I advised Ehrlichman of my call from Magruder and told him I probably should talk to Liddy—he agreed. I recall that Ehrlichman told me to find out what Colson's involvement was in the matter and he also suggested I speak with Mr. Kleindienst to see what the Justice Department knew about it. I told him I would report back to him after I talked with Liddy. I next received a call from Gordon Strachan who said he wanted to meet with me. I informed him that I would not be able to meet with him until early in the afternoon. He said he would drop by my office after lunch.

I next talked with Chuck Colson on the phone. I asked him what he knew about the incident and he vehemently protested that he knew nothing and had no involvement in the matter whatsoever. Colson advised me that Ehrlichman had spoken with him earlier regarding Mr. Hunt, earlier during that weekend, and Colson said that we should get together with Ehrlichman as soon as possible. I recall asking Colson if Hunt still worked for him and again he became very de-
fensive and stated that he was merely on his payroll as a consultant because Ehrlichman had so requested. He asked me to determine if Hunt was still on his payroll and I said I would check. Colson also expressed concern over the contents of Hunt’s safe. Several weeks later—probably 4 or 5—I learned from Paul O’Brien, who was representing the reelection committee, that he had learned from Mr. Hunt’s attorney, Mr. William Bittman, that Hunt and Colson spoke on the telephone over the weekend of June 17-18, and that Hunt had told Colson to get the materials out of his—Hunt’s—office safe.

Mr. Hugh Sloan called me to tell me he was worried. At that time I knew of no reason why Mr. Sloan should be worried so I told him not to worry. He told me that he would like to meet with me and I told him that I was trying to find out what had happened and requested we meet in a few days. I do not recall the precise date we did meet.

I next contacted Liddy and asked him to meet with me. He said he would come to my office. As he came into the office I was on my way out. I suggested we take a walk. It was shortly before noon and we walked down 17th Street toward the Corcoran Gallery.

I will try to reconstruct the conversation to the best of my memory. While I cannot recall every detail, I do recall the major items we discussed.

Mr. Liddy told me that the men who had been arrested in the DNC were his men and he expressed concern about them. I asked him why he had men in the DNC and he told me that Magruder had pushed him into doing it. He told me that he had not wanted to do it, but Magruder had complained about the fact that they were not getting good information from a bug they had placed in the DNC sometime earlier. He then explained something about the steel structure of the Watergate Office Building that was inhibiting transmission of the bug and that they had gone into the building to correct this problem. He said that he had reported to Magruder that during the earlier entry of the DNC offices they had seen documents—which I believe he told me were either Government documents or classified documents—and Magruder had told him to make copies of these documents.

Liddy was very apologetic for the fact that they had been caught and that Mr. McCord was involved. He told me that he had used Mr. McCord only because Magruder had cut his budget so badly. I asked him why one of these men had a check from Mr. Howard Hunt and he told me that these men were friends of Hunt and Hunt had put him in touch with them. I do not recall Liddy discussing any further involvement of Hunt, other than Hunt’s putting him in touch with the Cubans. I asked him if anyone from the White House was involved and he told me no.

As the conversation ended he again expressed his apology and his concern about the men in jail. I told him I couldn’t help him and he said he understood. He also told me that he was a soldier and would never talk. He said if anyone wished to shoot him on the street, he was ready. As we parted I said I would be unable to discuss this with him further.

He said he understood and I returned to my office.

After returning to my office I arranged a meeting with Ehrlichman in his office for mid-afternoon. Gordon Strachan came to my office shortly after I had met with Liddy. Strachan told me that he had been
instructed by Haldeman to go through all of Mr. Haldeman's files over the weekend and remove and destroy damaging materials. He told me that this material included such matters as memorandums from the reelection committee, documents relating to wiretap information from the DNC, notes of meetings with Haldeman, and a document which reflected that Haldeman had instructed Magruder to transfer his intelligence gathering from Senator Muskie to Senator McGovern. Strachan told me his files were completely clean.

I spoke with Mr. Kleindienst and he told me that both the FBI and the D.C. Metropolitan Police were investigating, and he assumed that the FBI would take full jurisdiction of the case shortly. He also alluded to his encounter with Liddy at Burning Tree Country Club, but did not explain this in full until I later met with him. I do not recall in what order, but I met with Mr. Kleindienst, Mr. Colson, and others on Monday, the 19th, or the next day. I will describe that meeting shortly.

I met with Ehrlichman in the mid-afternoon and reported in full my conversation with Liddy. I also told Ehrlichman about the earlier meetings I had attended in Mitchell's office in late January and early February and my subsequent conversation with Haldeman. He told me he wanted to meet later with Colson and told me to attend. Ehrlichman also requested that I keep him advised and find out from the Justice Department on what was going on. I did not mention my conversation with Strachan because I assumed that Ehrlichman was aware of this from Haldeman himself.

Later that afternoon I attended a second meeting in Ehrlichman's office with Colson. I recall Ehrlichman asking where Hunt was. I said I had no idea and Colson made a similar statement. At that point, before the meeting had started, Ehrlichman instructed me to call Liddy to have him tell Hunt to get out of the country. I did this, without even thinking. Shortly after I made the call, however, I realized that no one in the White House should give such an instruction and raised the matter. A brief discussion ensued between Ehrlichman and myself. As I recall, Ehrlichman said that he was not a fugitive from justice, so why not. I said that I did not think it was very wise. At this point, Colson chimed in that he also thought it unwise and Ehrlichman agreed. I immediately called Liddy again to retract the request but he informed me that he had already passed the message and it might be too late to retract.

Following this brief telephone skirmish regarding Hunt's travel plans, the meeting turned to Hunt's status at the White House. I had learned from Fred Fielding, who I had asked to check on it, that Hunt had not drawn a check from his White House consultanship since late March of 1972. But as far as I knew, the records indicated that Hunt was still a White House consultant to Colson. After discussions of this by Colson, who at this point was disowning Hunt as a member of his staff, Ehrlichman called Mr. Bruce Rehlil and requested that he bring Hunt's personnel records up to Ehrlichman's office. Before Rehlil arrived, Colson raised the matter of Hunt's safe. Colson, without getting specific, said it was imperative that someone get the contents of Hunt's safe. Colson suggested, and Ehrlichman concurred, that I take custody of the contents of the safe.
The testimony of JOHN W. DEAN, III, was presented to a full quorum of the Grand Jury.

BEFORE:

RICHARD BEN-VENISTE
Assistant Special Prosecutor
United States Department of Justice

GEORGE T. FRAMPTON, JR.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
United States Department of Justice

JILL VOLNER
Assistant Special Prosecutor
United States Department of Justice
Q And what did you tell Mr. Ehrlichman?

A Well, I reported to Mr. Ehrlichman everything that Liddy had told me and I recall recounting back to him, trying to put all the pieces I had available at that point together, by telling him about the meetings which had occurred in the Attorney General's Office in January and February of '72.

Q Those were the meetings at which Liddy presented his intelligence programs?

A That's correct.

Q Did Mr. Ehrlichman again mention that he was going to meet with Mr. Colson later that afternoon?

A He did. He mentioned that Mr. Colson was seeking a meeting and that he wanted me to be present in that meeting when it took place.

Q Did Mr. Ehrlichman also mention to you, on June 19th at some time, that you ought to contact the Justice Department to find out what was going on in the investigation?

A Yes, he did.

Q And what did you do about that, if anything?

A I called Mr. Kleindienst and had a conversation with Mr. Kleindienst and I later saw Mr. Kleindienst.

Q Now, during these first few conversations with Mr. Ehrlichman, after the Watergate break-in, did he instruct you to conduct an investigation and to determine whether anyone in the White House was responsible or had knowledge of the
Watergate break-in? Give you a specific instruction to conduct a Watergate investigation?

A I wouldn't say it was an instruction to conduct an investigation. He just told me to keep my eyes and ears open and learn what I could.

Q Did Mr. Ehrlichman, or anyone else in the White House, ever give you a specific instruction to conduct an investigation into this matter, telling you that it was your responsibility to make a determination of the facts and determine whether anyone in the White House was involved or responsible?

A Well, I wouldn't say that it was really until late August, when it was reported that I had conducted such an investigation, that there ever became any semblance of such an investigation and, after that, when it had been put on the public record that I had conducted an investigation, I began to pretend like I had conducted an investigation.

But I am unaware of ever being instructed to do an investigation, because I would have proceeded much differently if I was investigating. I was merely sort of catch as catch can.

Q Was this -- did it naturally fall to you, as counsel to the President, as a person who had had formal liaison with the Justice Department, and the informal contacts there, to be the person at the White House most aware of what was going on
in the Watergate investigation?

A Well, with things like this, what would generally happen is that after Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman would either lose interest or get consumed in something else, it would fall to me to be the man to follow up and continue the liaison and keep them abreast of what I was learning.

Q Are you speaking now about legal matters and Justice Department matters, generally?

A No, I can't say that generally, no, because, for example, antitrust areas were something I very seldom got into.

Q I mean you are not speaking simply of Watergate?

A No, I'm not. I'm thinking of other instances where things were rather active for a while and they die off. I'm thinking of the Lithuanian defector problem, where everyone had their hands in it for a while and then, when it fell to the daily job of keeping abreast of what was happening, when it wasn't in the headlines, that was my job.

I'm thinking of the Calley case, where there was a great flurry of activity, and when it got down to, you know, following daily what indeed was happening to Mr. Calley, that was my office. That's the way things generally happened there.

Q Now, on June 19th, did you also have a meeting with Gordon Strachan?

A Yes, I did.
for the action of the President of the United States, that such plans are carefully researched and evaluated. Would that be a fair assumption?

Senator Barks. Mr. Chairman, that is not the way we are going to conserve time. I think what we are going through now is evidence that this committee is in fact tired. But that is—the question of whether it's evidence or not is something that we will pass on, and I frankly am not interested in what this witness thinks about whether it is or is not evidence. I am interested in what he knows or doesn't know. I respectfully recommend that we move on to hard evidence.

Senator Barks. The witness has stated that he knew nothing about these documents, and the documents are in evidence and the committee can draw the conclusions from the documents. I don't believe that the witness ought to be compelled to testify about matters that he said he knew nothing about.

Mr. Dash. But you did testify, Mr. Ehrlichman, that in March of this year you spoke to the President and discussed this particular entry and he said that he knew that it was legal and justified for national security. Did he mention to you that he had received any kind of a contrary advice at any other time?

Mr. EHRICHMAN. Well now, that question makes an assumption not in evidence, Mr. Dash, that the President said he knew it was legal. I don't believe I have ever testified to that. Maybe some other witness has, but I don't know where you got that idea. I could not answer the question with that assumption in it.

Mr. Dash. I thought that was your testimony. I asked you the question earlier whether or not in March you talked to the President and the President said that he believed it was legal and justified for national security and I thought you answered in the affirmative.

Mr. EHRICHMAN. Well, I certainly would not want to give you the impression that the President had given me a legal opinion on this at that time. But what the President said was that he felt that it was important, and it was necessary, that in the context of the massive thefts, the turnover to the Russian Embassy and all the context of that operation that he certainly could not criticize the men who had undertaken this in good faith believing that they were responding to the urgency of the circumstances.

Mr. Dash. All right. The testimony you do leave with the committee is that your own personal evaluation as to its legality was a recent one after advice of counsel?

Mr. EHRICHMAN. Well, I certainly would not want to leave that impression either, Mr. Dash, and I would simply stand on my actual answers.

Mr. Dash. Well, the record will show.

Now, you testified that you met and in effect your log shows that you met twice with Mr. Dean on June 19, 1972, which was 2 days after the break-in at the Watergate, once at noon, alone, and again at 4 p.m. with Mr. Colson, Mr. Clawson, and Mr. Kepler. Now at the noon meeting with Mr. Dean, can you give us your recollection as to what that meeting was about and whether you were discussing the Watergate break-in?

Mr. EHRICHMAN. Yes; I believe we were, and I believe that it was basically to determine between us the inquiries which I felt he ought to make in order to try to determine what had taken place.
Mr. Dash. Did he not at that time report to you that he had spoken to Mr. Liddy?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, I don't believe so.

Mr. Dash. He made no report at that time to you as to any of the investigations he had made during the day of the 19th?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I have the impression that Mr. Dean hadn't been at work very long at that time, and that he was just getting started.

Mr. Dash. All right.

Now, at 4 p.m., what was the purpose of the meeting with Mr. Dean, Mr. Clawson, Mr. Colson, and Mr. Kehrl?

Mr. Ehrlichman. The principal purpose, as I recall, was to be in a position to answer inquiries which, I guess, Mr. Clawson was getting or the press people were getting, about Hunt's White House status, of whether he was still an employee of the White House, if not when he had terminated and under what circumstances, and so forth.

Mr. Dash. And isn't that when Mr. Kehrl was brought up to check the record? Would Mr. Kehrl have the record of that?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Kehrl was the staff secretary and would have to be involved in any discussion of that kind. There was another subject or two discussed at the time but as I recall, that was the precipitating question.

Mr. Dash. Well, aside from Mr. Hunt on the payroll, wasn't the focus at that meeting on the question of Hunt himself? Hunt's status at the White House and also the question that Mr. Hunt had a safe in the White House and that the safe ought to be opened?

Wasn't that part of the discussion?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, it was, as I previously testified.

Mr. Dash. Yes.

And actually that safe was opened at that time on the evening of the 19th?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't know. I think it must have been either that evening or the next morning.

Mr. Dash. Now, what was the concern and who brought up the concern of what the contents of Mr. Hunt's safe would show?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don't recall, Mr. Dash. Somebody at the meeting.

I think the way it came up was not so much a personal concern as it was an inquiry by the investigation—either the Metropolitan Police and/or the FBI, as to whether Hunt had any belongings in the White House.

Mr. Dash. Now, on June 20, 1972, you met at 9 o'clock with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell joined by Mr. Dean at 9:45, joined by Attorney General Kleindienst at 9:55, and then at 10:30 you had a meeting with the President.

Was that also a followup to find out what was going on in terms of Watergate?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think this was the process of trying to get everybody together who might know anything, to try and get a picture of what the investigation was going to be, whether there might be other people involved, just what the—let's try and get the campaign director and the head of the Department of Justice and everybody together in one place to ask questions.
Senator Baker. Did you ask him if it had been brought to his attention of—if the President knew about it?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No; I am quite sure I didn’t. That is not something that I would ordinarily put in that way to Mr. Haldeman.

Senator Baker. Well, did you put it in any way to Mr. Haldeman?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No; I didn’t believe so.

My assumption is that news of that kind gets to the President forthwith.

Senator Baker. Well, did you ask what the President thought about it if you assumed that?

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, no.

Senator Baker. All right, sir; go ahead.

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don’t think I did anything else with relation to that subject matter on that Sunday. At least, I can’t recall anything.

On Monday, I had a meeting with John Dean in midday, and we discussed this, really, in terms of two aspects. One was the White House involvement question, and I asked him to see if he could get that solved in short order—that is, was Hunt a White House employee or not, what was his status, and so forth? Because that was still lingering as an open question.

Second, it was obvious that this was going to be a campaign issue and I was concerned about knowing everything that I could know so that, when Ron Ziegler and the Presidential party got back to town, we would be in shape to sit down and talk about its implications in terms of its being a political issue.

Senator Baker. Mr. Ehrlichman, it occurs to me, and I may be entirely wrong, but it occurs to me that if someone on my staff, even remotely on my staff, were charged with breaking and entering into the Democratic National Committee headquarters or someone was even associated with it in a newspaper column, that I would be determined to find out if that happened.

Now, was there this air of urgency in the White House on your part or Haldeman’s part or Dean’s part? Is it not coming through that way? It sounds like a routine staff operation. But this wasn’t a routine staff operation.

Mr. Ehrlichman. Point 1, he wasn’t on my staff. But that is beside the point.

I think there was a sense of the political implications of this thing. It was a dumb, shocking, unredeemable kind of thing for people connected with the Committee To Re-Elect to have done to the Democrats. There isn’t any way of glossing it.

And certainly, the Democrats were going to exploit this if they possibly could. The fact that there might be a White House connection was really the central problem in this as far as I was concerned.

Senator Baker. When did you first learn that this was orchestrated by people who were connected with the CRP?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, McCord was in it right from the first minute, and I am sure I learned of that connection on the evening news or some way, so that I knew right from the first day that there was a literally a CRP employee involved in this thing.

Senator Baker. When did you find out that it was more than just a CRP employee?
Mr. Ehrlichman. I do not think that I—well, and, of course, Boggs' call said Hunt—Hunt, with a White House designation on the slip or the card or whatever it was. So there was that warning light on right from that moment.

I do not think I knew about Liddy and his involvement until after Dean reported back late on the 19th or early on the 20th, something like that time.

Senator Baker. What did Mr. Dean report to you?

Mr. Ehrlichman. He reported to me that he had—I should go back to what I asked him to do and I guess I pretty well finished with that. I expressed my concern on these two fronts. And when he came back, he said he had talked to Liddy and that he had also talked to the people at the Justice Department or the police department, or somewhere, and had a feel for this thing. And he said, the Justice Department had the two, well, law enforcement people, anyway, were aware that this matter went beyond just the five fellows who were caught and that Liddy was involved and it was just a matter of time before he would be picked up, and that there was a further direct involvement of the CRP in this.

Senator Baker. All right. That was on what, the 19th of June?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe it was either the close of business on the 19th or the next day.

Senator Baker. Stop at that point. Mr. Ehrlichman. Let us explore, as the saying goes in this committee, that point in time. Let us see what you did with that information.

At that point, John Dean, who was counsel to the President, indicated to you that Liddy was involved, that others at the CRP were involved, and it would be just a matter of time before others were picked up and implicated. And broadly implied, based on your testimony just now, that the CRP was deeply involved in this situation.

What did you do with that information? Did you pick up the telephone and call the President, did you call Haldeman? What did you do with it?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think by that time the President and the traveling party were on their way back. I believe that this meeting that was held on Tuesday morning was held at my instance and it involved Mr. Mitchell, the Attorney General, Mr. Haldeman, and me, and John Dean. And this was for the purpose of gathering as much information as possible at the top levels, and seeing what ought to proceed from that, what next step ought to be taken from that point forward.

Senator Baker. Take the one part of my question that I put in several parts. Did any of you call the President or convey to the President the information that Liddy and others involved with the CRP were going to be involved and identified with the break-in to the Democratic national headquarters?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I did not. Senator. I am not sure whether this was imparted to the President by anybody else.

Senator Baker. Well. Mr. Ehrlichman, to pursue that point just one step further, did you then know or have you since learned that as of June 19, 1972, someone did impart that information to the President—that is, that Liddy, McCord, Hunt, and others at the CRP were involved in the break-in?

Mr. Ehrlichman. I do not know that of my own knowledge.
12. On June 19, 1972 the President telephoned Charles Colson from Florida and spoke with him for approximately one hour ending shortly before noon. The break-in at the DNC headquarters was discussed.

12.1 Meetings and conversations between the President and Charles Colson, June 19, 1972 (received from White House).

12.2 Charles Colson draft statement prepared for delivery to the SSC, September, 1973, 6-8 (received from SSC).
MEETINGS AND TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT AND CHARLES W. COlSON
June 16, 1972 - April 30, 1973

June 16, 1972

AM  8:37   10:17  Cabinet Meeting in the Cabinet Room. Mr. Colson attended.

June 18, 1972

PM  3:00   3:31  President placed a long distance call to Mr. Colson (Key Biscayne)

       6:39   6:48  President placed a long distance call to Mr. Colson (Key Biscayne)

June 19, 1972

AM  10:49  11:48  President placed a long distance call to Mr. Colson (Key Biscayne)

June 20, 1972

PM  2:16   2:17  President placed local call to Mr. Colson

       2:20   3:30  President met with Mr. Colson in the President's EOB office

       8:04   8:21  President placed local call to Mr. Colson

       11:33  12:05 AM President placed local call to Mr. Colson

Source: White House

3/9/74
Opening Statement of Charles W. Colson
Before Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, United States Senate

I appreciate the opportunity to present this opening statement to your Committee. I shall first attempt to the best of my recollection to recount my knowledge of the events surrounding the Watergate Affair.

I will also attempt, if I may, to give this Committee some insight into the mood and atmosphere which existed in the White House during the Nixon years. I have followed your proceedings to date; it is clear that you are seeking to determine not only what in fact happened, but why and how these things could have happened.

AS TO THE FACTS:

I first heard that there had been a burglary at the Democratic National Committee headquarters on the radio. It was Saturday, June 17, 1972. I thought it was no more than an ordinary burglary -- one more addition to the D. C. crime
which I believe took place in my office—

John Dean told me that Mr. Hunt had "been ordered out of the country" or words to that effect. I exploded. I said something to the effect that "that is the dumbest thing I have ever heard; that could make the White House a party to a fugitive from justice charge." Mr. Dean then went to a telephone. I do not know who he called nor do I know who issued the original instructions to which Mr. Dean referred. Mr. Dean did tell me later that it was my reaction that caused him to countermand the original order.

5. The President called me from Florida the morning of June 19. As I recall, he asked me what I knew about what was going on. In this and in subsequent conversations, he was quite obviously angered and incredulous that anyone even remotely involved with the Presidential campaign apparatus could have
engaged in such conduct. As I recall my initial conversations with the President, I merely explained that I had no idea what had happened. I do recall several discussions with the President during that and ensuing weeks in which he expressed great annoyance at the way in which the Committee for the Re-election was being managed. He complained bitterly that he had himself not been able to devote any time to campaign matters or organization and that he believed it was overstaffed and overpaid. He expressed his long-held belief that it was inadvisable to staff a campaign organization with people primarily concerned with their salaries; he said people should participate in a campaign because they believe in their cause. He said that the Committee had too much money to spend, that the Watergate was an example of the kind of misguided enterprise that results from too much money. He told me on more than one occasion that he had ordered Mr. Haldeman
to have the staff at the Committee reduced, to insure that no one was being paid more than they had made in prior employment and to get the management of the campaign and the Committee under tight control.

On Tuesday, June 20, 1972, the Washington Star carried a banner headline, "Colson Aide-Barker Tied." It was immediately obvious to me that the press would attempt to tie the Watergate into the White House on the basis of Hunt's former association with me. Accordingly, I immediately dictated a memo for the file detailing all contacts of any kind that I could recall having had with Hunt during the year 1972. A copy of that memo was provided to your staff during our meeting on May 3.

Although I knew that I had had no involvement in the Watergate, I believed that it might become important to have an accurate record.

One of the things mentioned in the memorandum was a
13. On June 19, 1972 Howard Hunt went to the Executive Office Building and reviewed the contents of his safe. He determined that the contents included cables Hunt had fabricated indicating a relationship between the Kennedy Administration and the assassination of Vietnamese President Diem, materials relating to Gemstone, James McCord's electronic equipment, and other material. Hunt thereupon informed Charles Colson's secretary, Joan Hall, that Hunt's safe contained sensitive materials.

13.1 Howard Hunt testimony, 9 SSC 3672, 3689.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., AUGUST 3, 6, 7; SEPTEMBER 24 AND 25, 1973
Book 9

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973
At this early time of your employment at the White House, Mr. Hunt, did you have access to State Department cables covering the period of the Diem assassination?

Mr. Hunt. I did.

Mr. Dash. Why did you have access to them?

Mr. Hunt. Because I had requested such access and it had been granted me.

Mr. Dash. Now, in the review of these cables, did you notice any irregularity of sequence?

Mr. Hunt. I did.

Mr. Dash. In what period did the gap in sequence occur?

Mr. Hunt. The period immediately leading up to the assassination of the Premier of South Vietnam.

Mr. Dash. Did you show the cables to Mr. Colson and offer an interpretation of them?

Mr. Hunt. I showed him copies of those chronological cables, yes, sir.

Mr. Dash. And what interpretation, if any, did you give him concerning the cables?

Mr. Hunt. I told him that the construction I placed upon the absence of certain cables was that they had been abstracted from the files maintained by the Department of State in chronological fashion and that while there was every reason to believe, on the basis of an accumulated evidence of the cable documentation, that the Kennedy administration was implicitly, if not explicitly, responsible for the assassination of Diem and his brother-in-law, that there was no hard evidence such as a cable emanating from the White House or a reply coming from Saigon, the Saigon Embassy.

Mr. Dash. What was Mr. Colson's reaction to your statement and the showing of the cable to him? Did he agree that the cables were sufficient evidence to show any relationship between the Kennedy administration and the assassination of Diem?

Mr. Hunt. He did.

Mr. Dash. Did he ask you to do anything?

Mr. Hunt. He suggested that I might be able to improve upon the record. To create, to fabricate cables that could substitute for the missing chronological cables.

Mr. Dash. Did you in fact fabricate cables for the purpose of indicating the relationship of the Kennedy administration and the assassination of Diem?

Mr. Hunt. I did.

Mr. Dash. Did you show these fabricated cables to Mr. Colson?

Mr. Hunt. I did.

Mr. Dash. What was his response to the fabricated cables?

Mr. Hunt. He indicated to me that he would be probably settling in touch with a member of the media, of the press, to whom he would show the cables.

Mr. Dash. And were you in fact put in touch with a member of the media?

Mr. Hunt. I was.

Mr. Dash. Who was that?

Mr. Hunt. Mr. William Lambert of Life magazine.
Mr. Dash. Did you take any money out of the safe?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. Dash. How much?
Mr. Hunt. I took out $10,000.
Mr. Dash. Where did you get that money?
Mr. Hunt. That was contingency money that had been provided me by Mr. Liddy.
Mr. Dash. Contingency just in case there was this kind of trouble?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir; in case there was a mishap.
Mr. Dash. What did you do with that money?
Mr. Hunt. I took it during the course of the early morning to Mr. Caddy's apartment and gave it to him on behalf of the five men who had been arrested.
Mr. Dash. Did you make an analysis or review of the contents of your safe at that time or a later time?
Mr. Hunt. No, sir; not at that time.
Mr. Dash. When did you, if you did?
Mr. Hunt. Excuse me.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Hunt, this might help you. Do you recall returning to your office at the EOB and looking through the contents of your safe?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And do you recall that that was on or about June 19, 1972?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Just very briefly, can you describe the contents of your safe at that time, what you had in there?
Mr. Hunt. Well, there was a great deal of material, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Just by category.
Mr. Hunt. There were the fabricated Vietnamese cables that I had shown to Mr. Colson, Mr. Conein, and Mr. Lambert. There was material relating to Gemstone; there were transcripts of my conversations with Mr. Clifton Duvote, for example. There was a very substantial amount of material, part of which was shown me at the time of discovery by the U.S. attorney—perhaps I am not being responsive.
Mr. Dash. Yes, you are being responsive. Did it also include the briefcase which included Mr. McCord's electronic equipment?
Mr. Hunt. Oh, yes; that was there.
Mr. Dash. Now, did you inform anyone on that day of the contents of your safe?
Mr. Hunt. I did.
Mr. Dash. Who was that?
Mr. Hunt. Mr. Colson's secretary.
Mr. Dash. What is her name?
Mr. Hunt. Her name was Mrs. Joan Hall.
Mr. Dash. Did you characterize or say anything about the contents?
Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir; I did.
Mr. Dash. What did you say?
Mr. Hunt. Before I left the White House for the last time, I stopped by Mr. Colson's office, not to see him but simply to inform Mrs. Hall, whom I knew held the combination to my safe, that it contained sensitive material. I simply said to her, "I just want you to know that that safe is loaded."
14. During the afternoon of June 19, 1972 John Ehrlichman, Charles Colson, John Dean, Bruce A. Kehrli, Staff Assistant to H. R. Haldeman, and Ken Clawson, White House Deputy Director of Communications, met in Ehrlichman's office and discussed Howard Hunt's White House employment status. Colson stated that Hunt should have been terminated as a White House consultant as of March 31, 1972. Kehrli was asked to and did bring Hunt's employment records to Ehrlichman's office. These records did not indicate that Hunt's consultant status had been terminated. By memorandum dated June 19, 1972 Colson transmitted to Dean documents relating to Hunt's status.

(By memorandum dated March 27, 1972 to Charles Colson, Hunt had requested assistance in changing the annuity benefit option he had selected upon retirement from the CIA. By memorandum dated March 30, 1972 to Kehrli, Richard Howard, Staff Assistant to Charles Colson, had inquired respecting Hunt's situation. At the top of the original of the Howard memorandum, there is a handwritten note: "Noble - Please let me know on this w/o giving out any info. on the name of the fellow we're trying to help. B." At the bottom of that memorandum there is a handwritten note "OK - Drop as of April 1, 1972 BAK." On May 5, 1972 Hunt had written a letter on White House stationery to CIA General Counsel Lawrence Houston, renewing his request respecting his benefit option and stating that he had discussed the matter with the White House legal staff.)

14.1 John Ehrlichman log, June 19, 1972 (received from SSC).
14.2 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 934-35.

14.3 Memorandum from Charles Colson to John Dean, June 19, 1972, with attachments: memorandum from Richard Howard to Bruce Kehrl, March 30, 1972; memorandum from Joan Hall to Charles Colson, June 19, 1972, SSC Exhibit No. 34-15, 3 SSC 1157-59.

14.4 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2612.

14.5 Charles Colson draft statement prepared for delivery to the SSC, September 1973, 2-4.

14.6 Memorandum from Howard Hunt to Charles Colson, March 27, 1972, SSC Exhibit No. 63, 9 SSC 578.

14.7 List of Presidential assistants and their staffs (received from White House).

14.8 Copy of memorandum from Richard Howard to Bruce Kehrl, March 30, 1972, with Cox-Buzhardt correspondence regarding the memorandum (received from Watergate Special Prosecution Force).

14.9 Original of memorandum from Richard Howard to Bruce Kehrl, March 30, 1972, with handwritten notations (received from White House).

14.10 Letter from Howard Hunt to Lawrence Houston, May 5, 1972 (received from CIA).

14.11 Jeb Magruder testimony, 2 SSC 791-93.
FRIDAY, JUNE 16, 1972

8:00  HRH office
3:30  Cabinet meeting
10:20  President, Secretaries Richardson, Hodgson (HR 1)
12:20  Dr. Ed David
1:00  President
2:20  Tennis with Cole, Hulin, Harper
4:00  Roosevelt Room - p.r. group
7:00  Black tie dinner with Mrs. Shouse followed by
8:30  Wolf Trap opening

MONDAY, JUNE 19, 1972

8:15  Roosevelt Room
10:30  Dave Young, Walt Minnich
12:00  John Dean
12:45  Lunch in Mess with Dr. William Walsh (HOPE)
1:45  AG Kleindienst
2:10  Ambassador William Middendorf
4:00  Colson, Dean, Kehlgi, Ken Clawson
5:15  Mark Evans, Clarence Arata, Cong. Ken Gray,
     John Statler (Pres., DC Board of Trade), Sallyanne Payton
     (DC Arena)
8:30  Motion Picture Association - "Butterflies are Free"

TUESDAY, JUNE 20, 1972

3:00  HRH office
8:15  Roosevelt Room
9:00  HRH, Mitchell
9:45  Joined by John Dean
9:55  Joined by AG Kleindienst
10:30  President
12:00  William Lane (per John Connally)
1:00  Lunch with Roy Wilkins - JDE office
2:25  Car at west basement
2:35  Senator Griffin, Tom Korologos, Ed Morgan
3:00  Senator Bennett, Tom Korologos
4:00  Social Security - MacGregor, Cook, Korologos, Cole,
     Evans, Weinberger, O'Neill
5:00  Haircut
6:00  Jim Cannon (Wall Street Journal)
instructed by Haldeman to go through all of Mr. Haldeman's files over the weekend and remove and destroy damaging materials. He told me that this material included such matters as memorandums from the re-election committee, documents relating to wiretap information from the DNC, notes of meetings with Haldeman, and a document which reflected that Haldeman had instructed Magruder to transfer his intelligence gathering from Senator Muskie to Senator McGovern. Strachan told me his files were completely clean.

I spoke with Mr. Kleindienst and he told me that both the FBI and the D.C. Metropolitan Police were investigating, and he assumed that the FBI would take full jurisdiction of the case shortly. He also alluded to his encounter with Liddy at Burning Tree Country Club, but did not explain this in full until I later met with him. I do not have a record of when I met with Mr. Kleindienst, but it was either on Monday, the 10th, or the next day. I will describe that meeting shortly.

I met with Ehrlichman in the mid-afternoon and reported in full my conversation with Liddy. I also told Ehrlichman about the earlier meetings I had attended in Mitchell's office in late January and early February and my subsequent conversation with Haldeman. He told me he wanted to meet later with Colson and told me to attend. Ehrlichman also requested that I keep him advised and find out from the Justice Department on what was going on. I did not mention my conversation with Strachan because I assumed that Ehrlichman was aware of this from Haldeman himself.

Later that afternoon I attended a second meeting in Ehrlichman's office with Colson. I recall Ehrlichman asking where Hunt was. I said I had no idea and Colson made a similar statement. At that point, before the meeting had started, Ehrlichman instructed me to call Liddy to have him tell Hunt to get out of the country. I did this, without even thinking. Shortly after I made the call, however, I realized that no one in the White House should give such an instruction and raised the matter. A brief discussion ensued between Ehrlichman and myself. As I recall, Ehrlichman said that he was not a fugitive from justice, so why not. I said that I did not think it was very wise. At this point, Colson chimed in that he also thought it unwise and Ehrlichman agreed. I immediately called Liddy again to retract the request but he informed me that he had already passed the message and it might be too late to retract.

Following this brief telephone skirmish regarding Hunt's travel plans, the meeting turned to Hunt's status at the White House. I had learned from Fred Fielding, who I had asked to check on it, that Hunt had not drawn a check from his White House consultantship since late March of 1972. But as far as I knew, the records indicated that Hunt was still a White House consultant to Colson. After discussions of this by Colson, who at this point was disowning Hunt as a member of his staff, Ehrlichman called Mr. Bruce Kehri and requested that he bring Hunt's personnel records up to Ehrlichman's office. Before Kehri arrived, Colson raised the matter of Hunt's safe. Colson, without getting specific, said it was imperative that someone get the contents of Hunt's safe. Colson suggested, and Ehrlichman concurred, that I take custody of the contents of the safe.
When Kehrli arrived he was quizzed by Ehrlichman and Colson on Hunt's status at the White House. Colson was arguing that Hunt should have been removed from the White House as of March 31, 1972. Mr. Kehrli's records, however, did not so indicate. I have submitted to the committee memorandums that Colson forwarded to me on June 19, presenting his argument. This was later resolved between Colson and Kehrli, pursuant to Colson's argument. I always assumed that this required some alteration of the records, but I do not know this for a fact.

[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 24-13.]

Mr. Dean. Following this discussion, Ehrlichman asked Kehrli where Hunt's office was located and how the contents of his safe could be removed. Kehrli explained that he would have to have GSA open the safe. Colson said it must be done immediately and Ehrlichman instructed Kehrli to have me present when the safe was opened and that I should receive the contents of the safe. Kehrli said he would call me when he had made the arrangements and he then left Ehrlichman's office. Ehrlichman told me to report to him on the contents of Mr. Hunt's safe and the meeting ended.

Kehrli called my office after I had departed. He talked with Fred Fielding and asked him to come with him to open Mr. Hunt's safe. I do not recall mentioning this to Fielding before I departed and I do not know what Kehrli told Fielding, but Kehrli was aware from the earlier meeting with Ehrlichman that I was to receive the contents of the safe.

After departing the office, I believe I went to Mr. Mitchell's apartment. I do not recall who asked me to come to Mitchell's apartment, and it may have been the evening of the 20th, rather than June 19. I recall that when I arrived, Mitchell, Mardian, and Magruder were there and I gather had been discussing matters before I arrived. I recall listening, but can only recall discussions of how to handle the matter from a public relations standpoint. I have no other recollection of the meeting.

It was on June 20 or 21 that Strachan and Mr. Richard Howard came to my office. Strachan informed me that Haldeman had authorized an expenditure by Colson of some funds, but the entire amount had not been expended and he was turning over the remainder to me to hold. I told Mr. Strachan that I would hold the funds and would be accountable for them. I placed the cash, $13,000 in my safe. I informed Mr. Fielding of my office of the fact that the cash was in my safe and where it had come from. I felt I should inform Fielding because I wanted someone to know why the money was in my safe if anything should happen to me.

The cash remained in my safe untouched until October 12, 1972, when I removed a packet of bills amounting to $4,850 and placed my personal check for that amount with the remaining cash. I removed the $4,850 after I had failed to make arrangements to pay for the anticipated expenses of my wedding and my honeymoon. I subsequently expended the cash over a several month period of time as my honeymoon was cut short and the full amount I had anticipated was not necessary; thus, I used part of the cash for normal daily expendi-

*See p. 1107.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase 1: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 25 AND 26, 1972
Book 3

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 10
Stock Number 550-01281
No. 34-13—(939) Copy of agenda prepared by Gordon Liddy for meeting of
November 23, 1971, with Attorney General Mitchell and
John Dean...

No. 34-14—(931) Memorandum for Larry Higby from John Dean with
attachments...

No. 34-15—(933) White House memorandum for John Dean from Charles
Colson concerning Howard Hunt, with attachment

No. 34-16—(939) FBI interview of Charles Colson

No. 34-17—(933) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from John Dean re: O'Brien letter concerning special
prosecutor

No. 34-18—(934) Memorandum for John Dean from Charles Colson re:
Chronology of Howard Hunt's activities.

No. 34-19—(937) Memoranda re: Counteractions (Watergate) by
Kenneth Parkinson and John Dean

No. 34-20—(939) Letter from Congressman Brown to Attorney General
re: Banking and Currency Committee investigation into
Watergate activities

No. 34-21—(931) Memorandum to John Dean from Kenneth Parkinson
re: 1972 political filings

No. 34-22—(931) Banking and Currency Committee notice of meeting
change and subpoena list, with attachments

No. 34-23—(931) Letter to Congressman Patman from Assistant Attorney
General Henry Peterson re: Extensive public hearings into
financial aspects of Watergate "Bugging" incident

No. 34-24—(938) Question and answer conversation between Ziegler,
Ehrlichman, Chapin, and Moore. Statement by Dwight
Chapin.

No. 34-25—(967) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from John Dean
re: Watergate and Segretti, with attachments

No. 34-26—(939) Information on campaign spending—H.R. and John
dated May 18, 1971

No. 34-27—(938) Memorandum for Herb Kalmbach from John Dean
re: Bill from Jack Glenson's lawyer on Common Cause law

No. 34-28—(932) White House note to John Dean from Charles Colson

No. 34-29—(974) Handwritten note to Mr. John Ehrlich re: CIA taking
the blame

No. 34-30—(930) Document entitled "Relevancy of Intercepted
Communications"

No. 34-31—(937) Message given by Sandra Liddy.

No. 34-32—(930) Memorandum for the President from John Dean re:
Congressional hearings regarding Watergate.

No. 34-33—(939) Memorandum from H. R. Haldeman for John Dean re:
Appointment of minority counsel to "Ervin Committee,"
with additional names.

No. 34-34—(938) Agenda—Matters to be discussed and resolved.

No. 34-35—(938) Potential matters for discussion with Senator Baker
(Meeting to be totally off the record)

No. 34-36—(939) Memorandum for H. R. Haldeman from John Dean,
with attachment entitled "Talking Points for Meeting with
the Attorney General"

No. 34-37—(939) Memorandum for Larry Higby and John Dean from
Jerry Jones. Subject: Options for Jeb Magruder.

No. 34-38—(931) Memorandum for the likes from John Dean. Subject:
Call from Secretary D true to Jeb Magruder

No. 34-39—(937) Draft letter addressed "Dear Mr. Chairman" from
John Dean with 30 attached to bottom of letter.

No. 34-40—(934) Tape record conversation between Dean and Magruder with
attached Camp David envelope

No. 34-41—(934) Statement of charges against White House and Commit-
mittee To Re-Elect the President officials

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the
record.

[468]
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 19, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN DEAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT: Howard Hunt

Dick Howard just discovered the attached in his chron file; this is a copy and Bruce Kehrli is looking for the original. I think it can be flatly and clearly said that his services here terminated on March 31, 1972. There is also attached a report of a conversation which John Hall had with Howard Hunt approximately 6 or 8 weeks ago.
MEMORANDUM FOR BRUCE KEHRLE

March 30, 1972

We would like to accommodate Howard Hunt on the attached and would like to do it right away and then totally drop him as a consultant so that 1701 can pick him up and use him.

Howard has been very effective for us, but his most logical place now is consulting 1701. The attached could be a major problem and we would like to do everything we can to accomplish this and help him in this way. Please let me know.

W. Richard Hoover

A TRUE COPY
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 19, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHARLES COLSON
FROM: JOAN HALL
SUBJECT: Discussion with Howard Hunt

For the record, approximately 6 or 8 weeks ago in a casual conversation, I asked Howard Hunt why he had not turned in any time sheets. He replied, "That is being taken care of elsewhere." I did not inquire any further and the subject was dropped. (Note: I had initialed his time sheets each month and was merely curious why I had not received one.)
Mr. Emilechman. I take it, Senator, and here I am speculating, frankly speculating. Here's an episode with Mr. McCord, which comes out through Mr. McCord back through Caulfield to Dean. Now, how does John Dean justify having sent Mr. Caulfield to talk to McCord? I don't know whether that is the explanation or not, but it certainly was suggested to me as I watched Mr. Dean at this table spinning this tale.

Senator Gurney. Let us go to another area which involved you and Mr. Dean and that is the papers that were taken from Hunt's safe after it was opened by Dean's people. Some of these papers, as you know, were very sensitive. Some were contained in a briefcase of Mr. Hunt's. The testimony, of course, here is that Dean had a conversation with you about this and you made some suggestions about disposing of the papers that were in the briefcase. My recollection is that you advised Mr. Dean to deep-six these papers. Would you care to tell us about this meeting?

Mr. Emilechman. That was a meeting, if I heard the testimony correctly, which was also attended by other people and should be susceptible of determination from independent witnesses. To correct an assumption in your question, Senator, I did not know the contents of Mr. Hunt's safe except in the most general terms. I was told, and I can't say who told me—probably Mr. Dean—that there was a pistol and a tape recorder and a number of documents, some of which had nothing to do with Watergate but were very politically sensitive. Now, that was the general description. I had no occasion to look at them. I never saw them except as a few of them were sealed in an envelope and handed to Pat Gray.

The conversation has to be weighed, the probability of such a conversation where I said, run out and throw this in the river, has to be weighed against what I actually did, which I think the witnesses who were in the meeting on the 19th will tell you that I did.

We had had a meeting for two purposes on the 19th, which included Mr. Colson, Mr. Kehrl, staff secretary, and Ken Clavson on the White House staff. The meeting was for, as I say, two purposes—one, to try to determine what the facts were about Howard Hunt's employment status, which was very murky at that point in time, because of some lack of documents or some confusion of documents, and things of that sort.

The other purpose was to talk about what to do about this safe which had been found on the premises, and apparently had things in it that related to Howard Hunt, who was then, if not arrested, at least a prime suspect.

The instructions which we agreed upon at that meeting were that a number of people should be present at the opening of that safe. We knew we had to have something from the GSA because they had to open the safe. But in addition to that, I specified to Mr. Kehrl, being present, that Mr. Dean be present and take custody. Then I think Mr. Kehrl suggested that a Secret Service agent be present under the circumstances, because we were breaking into a safe in the White House. And that was the arrangement that was agreed upon when we broke up on the 19th.

My purpose in doing that was twofold. One, this was a kind of extraordinary procedure and I thought there ought to be people who
I appreciate the opportunity to present this opening statement to your Committee. I shall first attempt to the best of my recollection to recount my knowledge of the events surrounding the Watergate Affair.

I will also attempt, if I may, to give this Committee some insight into the mood and atmosphere which existed in the White House during the Nixon years. I have followed your proceedings to date; it is clear that you are seeking to determine not only what in fact happened, but why and how these things could have happened.

AS TO THE FACTS:

I first heard that there had been a burglary at the Democratic National Committee headquarters on the radio. It was Saturday, June 17, 1972. I thought it was no more than an ordinary burglary — one more addition to the D.C. crime
statistics. It was not until late that afternoon that I learned that more might be involved. John Ehrlichman called to inquire as to Howard Hunt's whereabouts. I explained that I had not seen Hunt in a couple of months, but that I believed that he was working at the Committee for the Re-election of the President. Ehrlichman informed me that one of those arrested had had something in his possession with Howard Hunt's name on it. He also asked me if I knew Douglas Caddy. I told him I knew only the name.

Ehrlichman explained that he was simply trying to determine the facts.

On Monday, June 19, I attended various meetings with Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. John Dean. We were endeavoring to determine what Mr. Hunt's status was and when his service at the White House had been terminated. I do not recall the exact sequence of the meetings or the persons in attendance that day. I do recall specifically the following points:

1. We determined that my assistant, Richard Howard, had on March 30, 1972, advised the Staff Secretary to terminate Hunt's
consultant relationship with the White House. A copy of Mr. Howard's memo was provided to your staff when I met with them for a preliminary interview on May 3 of this year.

2. We determined that Hunt's termination had not been handled routinely. At the time that he left the White House in March, Hunt asked whether he could change the survivors benefit election which he had made upon his retirement from the CIA a year earlier. Hunt's memo requesting the change had been submitted as an enclosure to the termination memo of March 30. This request was apparently sent by the Staff Secretary to the White House personnel or Civil Service office. When the decision was made on the request the file was apparently returned to the Staff Secretary. The Staff Secretary apparently failed to
take steps to formally process Hunt's termination, such as the cancellation of his White House pass, the surrender of documents, etc.

3. We learned -- to my surprise -- that Mr. Hunt still maintained a safe in an office in the Executive Office Building. I suggested to Dean that he take custody of the safe. I was certain in my own mind that there would be an investigation if the facts established that Hunt had had any connection with the Watergate break-in. It was my view that the White House counsel had a responsibility to secure the safe and any other evidence. Contrary to Mr. Dean's testimony (TR 2169), I had had no communications from Hunt over that weekend; no one suggested that I remove anything from the safe. I never saw the safe nor was I aware of the contents of the safe. As a matter of fact, it was not until late June, after publication of a Scripps-Howard
March 27, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:  CHARLES COLSON
FROM:  HOWARD HUNT
SUBJECT:  Securing Survivorship Benefits

When I retired from CIA on May 1, 1970, I was given the usual option of receiving full annuity without post mortem benefits to my survivors, or a reduced annuity with survivorship benefits. I elected the former, unaware that the choice would later be held irrevocable.

About a year later I requested the CIA General Counsel to assist me in changing to the survivorship provision. His negative response is attached.

Now that I have acquired a duodenal ulcer for the third time, I am close to uninsurable -- or at prohibitively high-risk rates -- with consequent prejudice to my family's future. As an alternative, it occurs to me that I might be re-hired, briefly, by the Executive Branch, to retire again in a few days so that I could elect reduced annuity with survivorship benefits.

To effect this will entail a certain amount of paperwork. However, I am requesting White House assistance in restoring the opportunity to provide for my family beyond the limitations of my private insurance coverage.

Retyped from indistinct original
MEMORANDUM FOR: CHARLES COLSON
FROM: HOWARD HUNT
SUBJECT: Securing Survivorship Benefits

When I retired from CIA on May 1, 1972, I was given the usual option of receiving full annuity without post mortem benefits to my survivors, or a reduced annuity with survivorship benefits. I elected the former, unaware that the choice would later be held irrevocable.

About a year later I requested the CIA General Counsel to assist me in changing to the survivorship provision. His negative response is attached.

Now that I have acquired a duodenal ulcer for the third time, I am close to unassurable -- or at prohibitively high-risk rates -- with consequent prejudice to my family's future. As an alternative, it occurs to me that I might be re-hired, briefly, by the Executive Branch, to retire again in a few days so that I could elect reduced annuity with survivorship benefits.

To effect this will entail a certain amount of paperwork. However, I am requesting White House assistance in restoring the opportunity to provide for my family beyond the limitations of my private insurance coverage.
### Office of Charles W. Colson

#### Charles W. Colson
Commissioned: Special Counsel to the President  
11/3/69 - 3/10/73

#### STAFF ASSISTANTS

- **W. Richard Howard**
  Commissioned: Special Assistant to the President  
  1/21/73 - 3/10/73
  Other Service:
  3/11/73 - Present  
  (Mr. Baroody)

- **Patrick E. O'Donnell**
  6/1/71 - 2/10/73

- **William F. Rhatigan**
  Other Service:
  2/1/71 - 5/5/71  
  (Mr. Klein)
  5/6/71 - 2/3/73  
  (Mr. Colson)
  2/4/73 - Present  
  (Mr. Ziegler)

- **S. Steven Karalekas**
  Other Service:
  6/7/71 - 3/10/73
  3/11/73 - 4/27/73  
  (Mr. Baroody)

- **John G. Carlson**
  Other Service:
  3/13/72 - 12/16/72
  3/18/73 - Present  
  (Mr. Ziegler)

- **Howard A. Cohen**
  3/18/72 - 9/16/72

- **James M. Schurz**
  6/19/72 - 11/11/72

- **Michael P. Balzano**
  Other Service:
  5/28/72 - 2/10/73
  3/11/73 - 4/9/73  
  (Mr. Baroody)

- **Kathleen W. Balsdon**
  Other Service:
  7/1/72 - 3/10/73
  3/11/73 - Present  
  (Mr. Baroody)

- **Llewellyn Evans**
  6/15/70 - 8/11/70
  8/9/71 - 1/4/73

#### SECRETARIES

- **Joan Hall**
  11/1/69 - 1/27/73

- **Kathleen W. Balsdon**
  5/30/71 - 6/30/72

- **Holly Holm**
  5/3/71 - 3/10/73
May 3, 1974

Mr. John Doar  
Special Counsel  
Committee on the Judiciary  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C.  

Dear Mr. Doar:

At your request, and with the approval of Mr. Jaworski, I am enclosing the following materials with the understanding that you would feel obligated otherwise to seek a subpoena from the Committee:

1. All correspondence between Mr. Cox and White House Counsel from May 30, 1973 through October 19, 1973.

2. Memoranda by Mr. Cox and Mr. Vorenberg reflecting conversations with Mr. Buzhardt, Attorney General Richardson and the Secret Service.

These are memoranda dated May 30, June 7 and 14, July 3, 19, 19, 23, 25 and 26, and August 2 -- all of 1973.

Sincerely,

Henry S. Ruth, Jr.  
Deputy Special Prosecutor
March 30, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR BRUCE KERRELL

We would like to accommodate Howard Hunt on the attached and would like to do it right away and then totally drop him as a consultant so that I can pick him up and use him.

Howard has been very effective for us, but his most logical place now is consulting. The attached could be a major problem and we would like to do everything we can to accomplish this and help him in this way. Please let me know.

W. Richard Howard
Dear Mr. Cox:

This is in response to your letter of August 27 requesting the copy of a W. Richard Howard memorandum of March 30, 1972 to Bruce Kehrl and of August 29 requesting the pass approval form for E. Howard Hunt.

As I mentioned to you in a recent telephone conversation, the fact that a particular document is in the physical custody of a current employee of the White House does not alter the fact that such documents are Presidential Papers, of which the authority to control is exclusively a matter for Presidential decision. Accordingly, requests for such documents, whether originating with the office of the Special Prosecutor or the Grand Jury, should be addressed to me in order that the request may be considered by the President.

Both documents you requested are enclosed.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Fred Buzhardt
Special Counsel to the President

Honorable Archibald Cox
Special Prosecutor
Watergate Special Prosecution Force
1425-K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

Enclosures
August 27, 1973

J. Fred Buzhardt, Esq.
Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Re: Memorandum from W. Richard
Howard to Bruce Kehrli -
3/30/72

Dear Mr. Buzhardt:

During the course of W. Richard Howard's appearance before the grand jury on August 14, 1973, he was directed by the grand jury foreman to produce the original carbon copy of a March 30, 1973 memorandum which he wrote to Bruce Kehrli concerning E. Howard Hunt. I am informed that Mr. Howard's attorney, John Jude O'Donnell, has been advised by you that you are prepared to furnish this document to the grand jury on receipt of a letter from this Office confirming that the grand jury did in fact make such a request of Mr. Howard. As you will recall, the ribbon original of this document was furnished to the grand jury by you on July 19, 1973.

Please advise us if you desire any further information.

Very truly yours,

Archibald Cox
Special Prosecutor
MEMORANDUM FOR BRUCE KEHRLI

We would like to accommodate Howard Hunt on the attached and would like to do it right away and then totally drop him as a consultant so that 1701 can pick him up and use him.

Howard has been very effective for us, but his most logical place now is consulting 1701. The attached could be a major problem and we would like to do everything we can to accomplish this and help him in this way. Please let me know.

W. Richard Howard

OK - DROP AS APRIL 1, 1972

BAK
CIA Material Furnished To

Mr. Fred D. Thompson, Minority Counsel
Senate Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities
for
Vice Chairman, Howard H. Baker

100169
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

May 5, 1972

Dear Larry:

With reference to your letter to me of May 6, 1971 concerning change in my annuity survivorship benefits, the White House legal staff has examined the C.I.A. Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees, with particular reference to Sections 233 and 271(b) of that Act. In their opinion, the Director has the authority to recall me to duty, then permit me to revert to retired status at which time I could elect reduced annuity with survivorship benefits.

In short, it would appear that were the Director willing, he could recall me for, say, a day or a week, after which I could opt for survivorship benefits.

May I ask that you re-examine my situation in light of the foregoing, and if it squares with your own interpretation of the pertinent Sections of the Act, lay the matter before Mr. Helms for his decision?

Sincerely,

Howard Hunt
Consultant to the President

Mr. Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, AND 14, 1973
Book 2

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 43
Stock Number 520-00002
Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, I think that is correct.
Mr. DASH. Now, after this meeting, Mr. Magruder, did you report to anyone about the meeting?
Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, I sent the documents that Mr. Liddy had given us at the meeting to Mr. Strachan.
Mr. DASH. And again, was this in your normal course of using Mr. Strachan to the White House staff people such as Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, I automatically sent all documents to Mr. Strachan.
Mr. DASH. And did those documents contain all of what Mr. Liddy had presented at that meeting?
Mr. MAGRUDER. Certainly, all of the specific discussion. They did not contain, as an example, the discussion on targets, because that was a discussion, and that was not in the documents.
Mr. DASH. Did you have a telephone conversation with Mr. Strachan concerning that meeting?
Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, I indicated the general context of that meeting.
Mr. DASH. And did that include Mr. Mitchell's suggestions concerning the Las Vegas mission?
Mr. MAGRUDER. I cannot recall specifically that point, but I would assume that I probably discussed the key targets that we had discussed.
Mr. DASH. And that would include the Democratic National Committee headquarters and Mr. O'Brien?
Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes.
Mr. DASH. Did you discuss the meeting with anybody else, either at the committee or the White House?
Mr. MAGRUDER. I cannot recall discussing it with anyone else.
Mr. DASH. Was there any special role that Mr. LaRue played in the Committee for the Re-Election of the President?
Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. LaRue was an adviser of Mr. Mitchell's. He was a close friend of Mr. Mitchell's. He had become a close friend of mine. He was someone who worked with all of us. We all felt he had an astute political judgment, and we worked very closely with Mr. LaRue on literally all matters that concerned the committee.
Mr. DASH. Did there come a time after the second meeting that you had some difficulty with Mr. Liddy, and Mr. LaRue played some role in that?
Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes.
Mr. DASH. Will you tell us about that?
Mr. MAGRUDER. In approximately mid-March, I had requested certain things from Mr. Liddy, I think relating to his legal work as general counsel, and they had not been forthcoming. I met him, ran into him on the third floor of our building, and asked him would he be more cooperative in producing the work that we needed quickly? He indicated some disturbance with me at that time.
I went upstairs and was somewhat agitated, and asked him to come upstairs and discuss this matter with me; and at that time, Mr. LaRue sat in on part of the meeting. At that time, we agreed that Mr. LaRue—Mr. Liddy would terminate from our committee completely at first and——
Mr. MacRuer. Well, I simply put my hand on Mr. Liddy's shoulder, and he asked me to remove it and indicated that if I did not, serious consequences could occur.

Mr. Dash. Was he more specific than serious consequences?

Mr. MacRuer. Well, he indicated that he would kill me. But I want to make it clear that I did not, I do not regard that and I do not now regard that as a specific threat. It was simply Mr. Liddy's mannerism. I think he was indicating to me that he did not care for his relationship with me. That was all.

Mr. Dash. Where, actually, did this particular meeting with you and Mr. Liddy occur?

Mr. MacRuer. The altercation or the meeting?

Mr. Dash. The altercation.

Mr. MacRuer. In the lobby of the third floor, the reception area of the committee.

Mr. Dash. And thereafter, there was a meeting with Mr. Liddy, and Mr. LaRue came up?

Mr. MacRuer. Yes.

Mr. Dash. Where did that happen?

Mr. MacRuer. In my office.

Mr. Dash. What happened at that time?

Mr. MacRuer. Well, at first we agreed, Mr. Liddy and I, that he would terminate from the committee all activities. Then we discussed the intelligence gathering, and he indicated at one point that possibly Mr. Hunt could become involved directly in this area, or that we could cease any consideration of that. At that time, as I recall, Mr. LaRue indicated that it would be best if we retained Mr. Liddy, at least in that area. But he was not overly specific. He just thought it was best that we keep things cool and not get too excited about the situation.

What we then agreed to was to terminate him from our committee as general counsel, but retain him in the area of intelligence gathering.

Mr. Dash. Well, now, at the time Mr. LaRue was anxious to have you keep Mr. Liddy in the intelligence gathering, did Mr. LaRue know what Mr. Liddy was planning to do?

Mr. MacRuer. I think in—again, Mr. LaRue sat in on many of our meetings, and he and I had and are still very close friends, and we discussed, I am sure, in general terms, Mr. Liddy's proposal. I could not recall a specific time, sitting down with Mr. LaRue, though, telling him exactly what Mr. Liddy's proposal were.

Mr. Dash. By the way, did you know at that time that Mr. Hunt was working with Mr. Liddy?

Mr. MacRuer. At that time—I think by that time, I had been encouraged by certain staff members at the White House to be sure that Mr. Hunt was not employed by us directly, but employed by Mr. Liddy. So I think I was aware at that time that he was.

Mr. Dash. What staff members at the White House made such encouragement?

Mr. MacRuer. Mr. Howard, Richard Howard.

Mr. Dash. Who is Mr. Richard Howard?

Mr. MacRuer. He was Mr. Colson's assistant.

Mr. Dash. Wait, if anything, did he say to you? What kind of encouragement did he give you?
Mr. Macomber. He indicated that Mr. Hunt had completed his assignments at the White House, and since we were now engaged in intelligence activities, he thought I would find Mr. Hunt very valuable. I only met Mr. Hunt once, so I was not really quite sure in what terms he would be valuable. So I indicated to Mr. Howard that he should refer Mr. Hunt to Mr. Liddy, and that Mr. Liddy would employ him. I did not know at that time that he and Mr. Liddy had worked together before.

Mr. Dash. Now, also concerning this altercation you had with Mr. Liddy and your decision to terminate his employment, did you receive any communication from any other person from the White House concerning Mr. Liddy?

Mr. Macomber. Yes, evidently Mr. Liddy, after he left my office, went and saw Mr. Dean and then Mr. Strachan. I received a call from Mr. Dean encouraging me not to become personally concerned about Mr. Liddy, that I should not let my personal animosity and his get in the way of the project. And then I went over to the White House and was working with Mr. Strachan on normal campaign matters, and he brought up the same subject and, as we walked back to the committee—it was a Friday afternoon, I recall, and it was raining—he indicated that although he had the same personal difficulties with Mr. Liddy, that probably Mr. Liddy was quite professional in this intelligence gathering, and we should retain him in this area.

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Egil Krogh ever talk to you concerning either Mr. Liddy or Mr. Hunt?

Mr. Macomber. Mr. Krogh did talk to me about Mr. Liddy, and mentioned to me a number of times we should keep tight control over him but he was very effective.

Mr. Dash. Did you know at any time of Mr. McCord’s participation in Mr. Liddy’s plan?

Mr. Macomber. No.

Mr. Dash. After the February 4 meeting in Mr. Mitchell’s office, when the plan was not still approved, did there come a time when anyone else at the White House urged you to get the Liddy plan approved?

Mr. Macomber. Yes. Mr. Charles Colson called me one evening and asked me, in a sense, would we get off the stick and get the budget approved for Mr. Liddy’s plans, that we needed information, particularly on Mr. O’Brien. He did not mention, I want to make clear, anything relating to wiretapping or espionage at that time.

Mr. Dash. But in that discussion, did you get the impression yourself that he knew what the Liddy plan was?

Mr. Macomber. Again I want to be careful. I knew Mr. Hunt was a close friend of Mr. Colson’s, he had been referred to me earlier by Mr. Colson. I did make the assumption that he did know but he did not say that he did know but he did not say that he was aware of the specifics and never did say that to me at any time.

Mr. Dash. Would Mr. Colson be one of those persons who would be in line of communication to whatever Mr. Strachan was communicating to the White House?

Mr. Macomber. I think Mr. Strachan worked closely with Mr. Colson, but his line of command was through Mr. Haldeman.