6. Prior to March 30, 1972 Charles Colson, Special Counsel to the President, met with Gordon Liddy and Howard Hunt, a White House consultant who had served with Liddy in the "Plumbers" unit. During the meeting Colson telephoned Jeb Magruder. Colson has stated that he urged Magruder "to resolve whatever it was Hunt and Liddy wanted to do and to be sure he had an opportunity to listen to their plans."

6.2 Charles Colson, memorandum for the file, June 20, 1972 (received from SSC).
6.3 E. Howard Hunt testimony, 9 SSC 3683-84.
6.4 Fred LaRue testimony, 6 SSC 2284.
6.5 Jeb Magruder testimony, 2 SSC 793-94.
Kunzig, who is now an associate judge of the U.S. Court of Claims.

Mr. Sampson has been Acting Administrator of General Services since June 2, 1972. He joined the General Services Administration in 1969 as Commissioner of the Federal Supply Service. From 1970 to 1972 he was Commissioner of the Public Buildings Service in GSA and the first Deputy Administrator of GSA for Special Projects.

He came to the General Services Administration after 6 years in Pennsylvania State government, where he was secretary of administration and budget secretary under Gov. Raymond P. Shafer, and deputy secretary for procurement, department of property and supplies, under Gov. William W. Scranton. Prior to entering government service, he was employed by the General Electric Co. for 12 years.

Mr. Sampson was born on October 8, 1926, in Warren, R.I. He received his B.S. degree in business administration from the University of Rhode Island in 1951 and has done graduate work at the George Washington University.

Active in several professional organizations, Mr. Sampson was presented the Synergy III Award for outstanding contributions toward the advancement of architecture by the Society of American Registered Architects in 1972. In 1973 he was selected as one of the Top Ten Public Works Men of the Year, and he was named an honorary member of the American Institute of Architects.

He and his wife, Blanche, have four children and reside in Washington, D.C.

NOTE: For the President's statement upon announcing his intention to nominate Mr. Sampson, see the preceding item.

The Watergate Investigation

Statements by the President. May 22, 1973

Recent news accounts growing out of testimony in the Watergate investigations have given grossly misleading impressions of many of the facts, as they relate both to my own role and to certain unrelated activities involving national security.

Already, on the basis of second- and third-hand hearsay testimony by persons either convicted or themselves under investigation in the case, I have found myself accused of involvement in activities I never heard of until I read about them in news accounts.

These impressions could also lead to a serious misunderstanding of those national security activities which, though totally unrelated to Watergate, have become entangled in the case. They could lead to further compromise of sensitive national security information.

I will not abandon my responsibilities. I will continue to do the job I was elected to do.

In the accompanying statement, I have set forth the facts as I know them as they relate to my own role.

With regard to the specific allegations that have been made, I can and do state categorically:

1. I had no prior knowledge of the Watergate operation.
2. I took no part in, nor was I aware of, any subsequent efforts that may have been made to cover up Watergate.
3. At no time did I authorize any offer of executive clemency for the Watergate defendants, nor did I know of any such offer.
4. I did not know, until the time of my own investigation, of any effort to provide the Watergate defendants with funds.
5. At no time did I attempt, or did I authorize others to attempt, to implicate the CIA in the Watergate matter.
6. It was not until the time of my own investigation that I learned of the break-in at the office of Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist, and I specifically authorized the furnishing of this information to Judge Byrne.
7. I neither authorized nor encouraged subordinates to engage in illegal or improper campaign tactics.

In the accompanying statement, I have sought to provide the background that may place recent allegations in perspective. I have specifically stated that executive privilege will not be invoked as to any testimony concerning possible criminal conduct or discussions of possible criminal conduct, in matters under investigation. I want the public to learn the truth about Watergate and those guilty of any illegal actions brought to justice.

Allegations surrounding the Watergate affair have so escalated that I feel a further statement from the President is required at this time.

A climate of sensationalism has developed in which even second- or third-hand hearsay charges are headlined as fact and repeated as fact.

Important national security operations which themselves had no connection with Watergate have become entangled in the case.

As a result, some national security information has already been made public through court orders, through the subpoenaing of documents, and through testimony witnesses have given in judicial and Congressional proceedings. Other sensitive documents are now threatened with disclosure. Continued silence about those operations would compromise rather than protect them, and would also serve to perpetuate a grossly distorted view—which recent partial disclosures have given—of the nature and purpose of those operations.
memorandum of the options approved. After reconsideration, however, prompted by the opposition of Director Hoover, the agencies were notified 5 days later, on July 28, that the approval had been rescinded. The options initially approved had included resumption of certain intelligence operations which had been suspended in 1966. These in turn had included authorization for surreptitious entry—breaking and entering, in effect—on specified categories of targets in specified situations related to national security.

Because the approval was withdrawn before it had been implemented, the net result was that the plan for expanded intelligence activities never went into effect.

The documents spelling out this 1970 plan are extremely sensitive. They include—and are based upon—assessments of certain foreign intelligence capabilities and procedures, which of course must remain secret. It was this unused plan and related documents that John Dean removed from the White House and placed in a safe deposit box, giving the keys to Judge Sirica. The same plan, still unused, is being headlined today.

Coordination among our intelligence agencies continued to fall short of our national security needs. In July 1970, having earlier discontinued the FBI’s liaison with the CIA, Director Hoover ended the FBI’s normal liaison with all other agencies except the White House. To help remedy this, an Intelligence Evaluation Committee was created in December 1970. Its members included representatives of the White House, CIA, FBI, NSA, the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Defense, and the Secret Service.

The Intelligence Evaluation Committee and its staff were instructed to improve coordination among the intelligence community and to prepare evaluations and estimates of domestic intelligence. I understand that its activities are now under investigation. I did not authorize nor do I have any knowledge of any illegal activity by this Committee. If it went beyond its charter and did engage in any illegal activities, it was totally without my knowledge or authority.

The Special Investigations Unit

On Sunday, June 13, 1971, The New York Times published the first installment of what came to be known as “The Pentagon Papers.” Not until a few hours before publication did any responsible Government official know that they had been stolen. Most officials did not know they existed. No senior official of the Government had read them or knew with certainty what they contained.

All the Government knew, at first, was that the papers comprised 47 volumes and some 7,000 pages, which had been taken from the most sensitive files of the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA, covering military and diplomatic moves in a war that was still going on.

Moreover, a majority of the documents published with the first three installments in The Times had not been included in the 47-volume study—raising serious questions about what and how much else might have been taken.

There was every reason to believe this was a security leak of unprecedented proportions.

It created a situation in which the ability of the Government to carry on foreign relations even in the best of circumstances could have been severely compromised. Other governments no longer knew whether they could deal with the United States in confidence. Against the background of the delicate negotiations the United States was then involved in on a number of fronts—with regard to Vietnam, China, the Middle East, nuclear arms limitations, U.S.-Soviet relations, and others—in which the utmost degree of confidentiality was vital, it posed a threat so grave as to require extraordinary actions.

Therefore during the week following the Pentagon Papers publication, I approved the creation of a Special Investigations Unit within the White House—which later came to be known as the “plumbers.” This was a small group at the White House whose principal purpose was to stop security leaks and to investigate other sensitive security matters. I looked to John Ehrlichman for the supervision of this group.

Eugene J. Krogh, Mr. Ehrlichman’s assistant, was put in charge. David Young was added to this unit, as were E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy.

The unit operated under extremely tight security rules. Its existence and functions were known only to a very few persons at the White House. These included Messrs. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean.

At about the time the unit was created, Daniel Ellsberg was identified as the person who had given the Pent­agon Papers to The New York Times. I told Mr. Krogh that as a matter of first priority, the unit should find out all it could about Mr. Ellsberg’s associates and his motives.

Because of the extreme gravity of the situation, and not then knowing what additional national secrets Mr. Ellsberg might disclose, I did impress upon Mr. Krogh the vital importance to the national security of his assignment. I did not authorize and had no knowledge of any illegal means to be used to achieve this goal.

However, because of the emphasis I put on the crucial importance of protecting the national security, I can understand how highly motivated individuals could have felt justified in engaging in specific activities that I would have disapproved had they been brought to my attention.

Consequently, as President, I must and do assume responsibility for such actions despite the fact that I at no time approved or had knowledge of them.

I also assigned the unit a number of other investigatory matters, dealing in part with compiling an accurate record of events related to the Vietnam war, on which the Government’s records were inadequate (many previous
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Howard Hunt

The last time that I recall meeting with Howard Hunt was mid-March. According to my office records, the date was March 15. At that time I was under the impression that Hunt had left the White House and was working at the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

I may have seen Hunt once or even possibly twice subsequent to that time. These were (or this was), however, a chance encounter. I do recall seeing him outside of my office during a day this Spring; I recall inquiring about his health since he had told me in March he had bleeding ulcers. During the brief conversation in the corridor, nothing was discussed of any of Hunt's work or his areas of responsibility. As I recall, he merely told me that he had been very busy and that after getting some rest, his health had been restored.

I also talked to him on the telephone the night Governor Wallace was shot simply to ask him for his reactions on what he thought might have been the cause of the attempted assassination. (Hunt was known of something of an expert of psychological warfare and motivations when in the CIA.)

The only other communication I can recall subsequent to March 15 was a memo I sent to Howard in connection with what I thought his duties were at 1701, i.e. security at the Republican Convention. Steve Bull told me he had a friend in Miami who had been stationed in the White House but was now in the Miami office of the Secret Service who wanted to be of help to whoever was handling security for the convention. I merely sent Hunt a note suggesting that he get in touch with Bull's friend.

Retyped from indistinct original
Colson memo re Hunt 6/20/72

To the best of my recollection, Hunt came to me during the month of January and said he had no work to do here and no one was giving him any assignments and that this was the only campaign year he would ever probably have a chance to participate in, that he cared only about one thing, the re-election of the President, and that he wanted to be of help in any way he could, for pay or not for pay. I told him I had nothing in my office, but that I thought once the Committee was organized and Mitchell was in charge, there would be work for him to do at the Committee. I told him that I would be sure the Committee was aware of his desire to help. I did nothing further.

A few weeks later Hunt dropped by my office with Gordon Liddy, from the Committee. I believe this was in February, possibly early in the month, although my office records do not show the visit. Hunt said he was in the building and just wanted to talk briefly. Both he and Liddy said that they had some elaborate proposals prepared for security activities for the Committee, but they had been unable to get approval from the Attorney General. I explained that Mitchell would soon be at the Committee and that they should be persistent and see him because he was the only one who could authorize work they would be doing. I have a vague recollection that Liddy said, "We [referring to Hunt and himself] are now over at the Committee working and we are anxious to get started but can't find anyone who can make a decision or give us the green light" or words to that effect. While Liddy and Hunt were in my office, I called Jeb Magruder, and urged them to resolve whatever it was that Hunt and Liddy wanted to do and to be sure he had an opportunity to listen to their plans. At one point, Hunt said he wanted to fill me in and I said it wasn't necessary because it was of no concern to me, but that I would be glad to urge that their proposals, whatever they were, be considered. There was no discussion that I can recall of what it was that they were planning to do other than the fact that I have the distinct impression that it involved security at the convention and/or gathering intelligence during the Democratic National Convention.

In March, Hunt sent me a memo explaining that when he retired from the CIA he had failed to designate survivor benefits for his wife and in view of the fact that he had had severe ulcer attacks, he wondered if this could be changed in view of his present government service. I told him to take the matter up with Dick Howard, which he did. Dick's memo to Kehrli, copy attached, was the result. I assume Dick Howard discovered at this time that Hunt was still on the rolls even though not working for us.
Colson memo re Hunt, 6/20/72

I had assumed throughout Hunt's tenure in the White House that he was charged to someone else's budget. I signed the original request for him to be a consultant because everyone else was in California at the time it was decided to bring him in. Shortly after he came on board, however, he was assigned to David Young and Bud Krogh and I didn't consider at any time after that that Hunt was under my supervision or responsibility.

From time to time after Hunt had come on board, he did talk to me, normally to express his frustrations in being unable to get things through the David Young operation. Of course, on occasion also we talked socially and about politics, something Howard and I had done from time to time over the years.

Charles W. Colson

Retyped from indistinct original
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

June 20, 1972

6.2 Charles Colson memorandum

SUBJECT: Howard Hunt

The last time I recall meeting with Howard Hunt was mid-March. According to my own records, this was on March 15. At that time, I was under the impression that I had walked into the White House and was walking in the Comptroller's Office when I met Howard Hunt. He was the Comptroller for the Republican National Committee. He had been in town since the beginning of March and had been staying in a hotel in the city. He was being considered for the job of C. I. C. (Chief of Staff), and I had been in town since the beginning of March.

I also talked to him on the telephone the night that Governor Wallace was shot. During the brief conversation, he told me that he had been very busy and that he was getting some rest. He also mentioned that he had spent some time in the hospital and that he was planning to return to work the next day. He also mentioned that he was going to be in town for the next few days and that he would be available for further discussions.

The only other communication I recall subsequent to March 15 was a memo I sent Howard in connection with a task I assigned him. It was a request for information on the activities of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President (CREEP).

Sincerely,

Charles Colson
To the best of my recollection, Hunt came to me during the month of January and said he had no work to do here and no one was giving him any assignments and that this was the only campaign year he would ever probably have a chance to participate in, that he cared only about one thing, the re-election of the President, and that he wanted to be of help in any way he could, for pay or not for pay. I told him I had nothing in my office, but that I thought once the Committee was organized and Mitchell was in charge, there would be work for him to do at the Committee. I told him that I would be sure the Committee was aware of his desire to help. I did nothing further.

A few weeks later Hunt dropped by my office with Gordon Liddy, from the Committee. I believe this was in February, possibly early in the month, although my office records do not show the visit. Hunt said he was in the building and just wanted to talk briefly. Both he and Liddy said that they had some elaborate proposals prepared for security activities for the Committee, but they had been unable to get approval from the Attorney General. I explained that Mitchell would soon be at the Committee and that they should be persistent and see him because he was the only one who could authorize work they would be doing. I have a vague recollection that Liddy said, "We [referring to Hunt and himself] are now over at the Committee working and we are anxious to get started but can't find anyone who can make a decision or give us the green light or words to that effect." While Liddy and Hunt were in my office, I called Jeb Magruder and urged them to resolve whatever it was that Hunt and Liddy wanted to do and to be sure he had an opportunity to listen to their plans. At one point, Hunt said he wanted to fill me in and I said it wasn't necessary because it was of no concern to me, but that I would be glad to urge that their proposals, whatever they were, be considered. There was no discussion that I can recall of what it was that they were planning to do other than the fact that I have the distinct impression that it involved security at the convention and/or gathering intelligence during the Democratic National Convention.

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I had assumed throughout Hunt's tenure in the White House that he was charged to someone else's budget. I signed the original request for him to be a consultant because everyone else was in California at the time it was decided to bring him in. Shortly after he came on board, however, he was assigned to David Young and Bud Krogh and I didn't consider at any time after that that Hunt was under my supervision or responsibility.

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Charles W. Colson
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 69

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., AUGUST 3, 6, 7; SEPTEMBER 24 AND 25, 1973
Book 9

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the overall plan, has any relevance to your recent testimony before the
executive session or before this committee?

Mr. Sachs. I am a little troubled, Mr. Dash, by your use of the word
“relevance.”

Mr. Dash. Why?

Mr. Sachs. You might want to ask me that.

Mr. Dash. I will put the question more directly, Mr. Hunt.

Are you now giving us your best recollection of what truthfully
transpired in January as opposed to what you were telling us earlier
during the period of interrogation?

Mr. Hunt. Yes.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I am not clear. I got lost about 10
minutes ago.

Is the burden of the query that Mr. Hunt is now giving us informa-
tion for the first time and only recently gave it to us in executive ses-
sion as distinguished from his earlier appearances in executive session
by reason of or connected with the fact that he is attempting to change
his plea from guilty to not guilty?

Mr. Dash. Yes.

Senator Baker. Is there any implication in counsel’s question that
the two are not inconsistent, but rather that this is additional informa-
tion that may have bearing on the application of Mr. Hunt to change
his plea?

Mr. Dash. The last question I put to Mr. Hunt, and perhaps he can
answer it is: Is there any motivation on your part to give us this more
recent testimony concerning Mr. Colson’s awareness of the plan con-
ected in any way to your motion to withdraw your plea of guilty?

Mr. Hunt. No, sir; and if I may consult with counsel, there is an-
other point I would like to make pertinent to this.

I would like to add, Mr. Dash, that my legal position vis-a-vis the
motion does not depend upon Mr. Colson’s knowledge or nonknowl-
edge at that time.

Mr. Dash. All right. Now, Mr. Hunt, after the February 4 meeting
that Mr. Liddy had with the former Attorney General in which there
was another turn down on the so-called Liddy plan, did Mr. Liddy ask
you to introduce him to Mr. Colson?

Mr. Hunt. He did.

Mr. Dash. What reasons did he give you for this?

Mr. Hunt. He indicated to me that, first of all, he admired Chuck
Colson as a man who got things done. He expressed his own desire for
a substantial position in the forthcoming administration. He indicated
to me that as much as John Mitchell would be leaving the adminis-
tration and he, Liddy, was known and identified as a Mitchell man
that Mr. Liddy would like to touch base with Mr. Colson, who would
be staying on in the administration at least through the election, and
so have another power base, as it were, on which he could depend at
such time as——

Mr. Dash. Did you arrange such a meeting?

Mr. Hunt. I did.

Mr. Dash. And do you know when that, approximately, took place?

Mr. Hunt. No, sir.

Mr. Dash. But do you recall it was in the month of February?

Mr. Hunt. May I consult my notes, Mr. Dash?
I would relate it to the phone call concerning which Mr. Magruder has already given testimony.

Mr. Dash. All right, now, did you introduce Mr. Liddy to Mr. Colson?

Mr. Hunt. I did.

Mr. Dash. After you did, what did you do?

Mr. Hunt. I withdrew to the back of the room and sat, smoked my pipe, leafed through a magazine while Mr. Liddy conversed with Mr. Colson.

Mr. Dash. Why did you withdraw to the back of the room?

Mr. Hunt. Mr. Liddy having given me the preamble, the reasons for his desire to meet Mr. Colson, I felt that it was a personal matter and did not want to involve myself or interpose myself in any way.

Mr. Dash. How long did the meeting take place?

Mr. Hunt. Approximately 10 or 12 minutes.

Mr. Dash. Did you observe Mr. Colson use the telephone during that meeting?

Mr. Hunt. On several occasions.

Mr. Dash. After the meeting, did you have a conversation with Mr. Liddy?

Mr. Hunt. I did.

Mr. Dash. What did Mr. Liddy tell you?

Mr. Hunt. He said, "I think I may have done us some good."

Mr. Dash. At that time what was your interpretation of that message?

Mr. Hunt. I realized that he had been speaking with Mr. Colson about the Gemstone operation.

Mr. Dash. Why did you draw that interpretation from the statement, "I think I may have done us some good."

Mr. Hunt. Because that was the only common subject concerning which he could have done us any good.

Mr. Dash. All right.

Now, the committee has already heard testimony from Mr. Magruder that while you were in Mr. Colson's office Mr. Colson telephoned Mr. Magruder and urged him, "to get off the stick and get the budget approved for Mr. Liddy's plans."

Now, what plans of Mr. Liddy could Mr. Colson have been referring to at that time?

Mr. Hunt. It could only have been the Gemstone concept.

Mr. Dash. Why do you say that?

Mr. Hunt. That was the only one that was under consideration.

Mr. Dash. During part of this period, Mr. Hunt, when you were working for Mr. Magruder between December 1971 and March 1972, did you receive any other assignments from Mr. Liddy for political espionage against Democratic candidates for the Presidency? Specifically did you have a dealing with a person known to you as Fat Jack?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dash. Could you describe how these dealings took place and what the assignment was?

Mr. Hunt. There came a time when Mr. Liddy asked me as an accommodation to meet with a gentleman who was handling an agent inside Muskie headquarters. He described the gentleman's physical
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MR. LARUE. Yes, sir, I raised the question and speculated with Mr. Magruder on several occasions as to how this came about.

MR. DASH. Well, then, it is not true that you did not talk to him until March or April but that you discussed this actually during the months of June, July, or August 1972?

MR. LARUE. After the break-in, yes, sir.

MR. DASH. And what did Mr. Magruder say to you when you discussed this with him about his role or his participation in the break-in?

MR. LARUE. Mr. Magruder's conversations with me were reflected in his testimony up here. He told me virtually—told me the same thing that he testified to before this committee as to his role in the break-in.

MR. DASH. In other words, he made a complete confession to you?

MR. LARUE. Yes, sir.

MR. DASH. Do you know when was the first time he did that? Approximately? I do not want to push you to a date.

MR. LARUE. I have no specific recollection of dates, Mr. Dash, but I would say in the period of a week or 10 days after the break-in.

MR. DASH. And did he not, Mr. LaRue, tell you about a phone call that he received from Mr. Colson concerning the so-called Liddy plan?

MR. LARUE. Yes, sir.

MR. DASH. Could you tell us what he told you about that phone call?

MR. LARUE. As I recall, Mr. Dash, this conversation occurred as a result of speculation that Magruder and I were having on who may have been involved or who may have had knowledge of the Watergate break-in.

He told me that he had had a call from Mr. Colson, I think sometime in the period of March or April, in which Mr. Colson had asked Mr. Magruder why they could not get an approval on the Liddy budget.

MR. DASH. Did he tell you then or remind you that he understood that you were present at his side, in the room, when he received the phone call from Mr. Colson?

MR. LARUE. I do not recall any such discussion, no, sir.

MR. DASH. You know of his testimony before this committee, in which he has testified that you were in the room?

MR. LARUE. Yes, sir, I am aware of that. My recollection is as I have just stated.

MR. DASH. Now, when you state that Mr. Magruder told you everything, it was about a week or so after the break-in. Was anybody else present when he said that to you or told you about this?

MR. LARUE. Not that I recall. As I recall, it had been a discussion between just Mr. Magruder and I.

MR. DASH. Now, Mr. LaRue, when and where did you actually first hear about the June 17 break-in matter?

MR. LARUE. At the Beverly Hills Hotel in Los Angeles, Calif.

MR. DASH. Were you with anybody else at that time?

MR. LARUE. Yes, sir, we were on a trip. Present were Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Magruder, Mr. Marland, Mr. Porter, I think Mr. Caldera from the committee. I mean these were the people who were present from the reelection committee.

MR. DASH. Now, can you tell the committee as clearly as you can recall, how that news came to you, who first learned about it and how you learned about it, and what was done?

MR. LARUE. As I recall, Mr. Dash, we were having breakfast on—I think Saturday morning—I guess that would be June 17. Mr. Magruder was paged, went to the telephone. He came back to the table
Mr. Magruder. He indicated that Mr. Hunt had completed his assignments at the White House, and since we were now engaged in intelligence activities, he thought I would find Mr. Hunt very valuable. I only met Mr. Hunt once, so I was not really quite sure in what terms he would be valuable. So I indicated to Mr. Howard that he should refer Mr. Hunt to Mr. Liddy and that Mr. Liddy would employ him. I did not know at that time that he and Mr. Liddy had worked together before.

Mr. DASH. Now, also concerning this altercation you had with Mr. Liddy and your decision to terminate his employment, did you receive any communication from any other person from the White House concerning Mr. Liddy?

Mr. Magruder. Yes, evidently Mr. Liddy, after he left my office, went and saw Mr. Dean and then Mr. Strachan. I received a call from Mr. Dean encouraging me not to become personally concerned about Mr. Liddy, that I should not let my personal animosity and his get in the way of the project. And then I went over to the White House and was working with Mr. Strachan on normal campaign matters, and he brought up the same subject and, as we walked back to the committee—it was a Friday afternoon, I recall, and it was raining—he indicated that although he had the same personal difficulties with Mr. Liddy, that probably Mr. Liddy was quite professional in this intelligence gathering, and we should retain him in this area.

Mr. DASH. Did Mr. Egil Krogh ever talk to you concerning either Mr. Liddy or Mr. Hunt?

Mr. Magruder. Mr. Krogh did talk to me about Mr. Liddy, and mentioned to me a number of times we should keep tight control over him but he was very effective.

Mr. DASH. Did you know at any time of Mr. McCord's participation in Mr. Liddy's plan?

Mr. Magruder. No.

Mr. DASH. After the February 4 meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office, when the plan was not still approved, did there come a time when anyone else at the White House urged you to get the Liddy plan approved?

Mr. Magruder. Yes. Mr. Charles Colson called me one evening and asked me, in a sense, would we get off the stick and get the budget approved for Mr. Liddy's plans, that we needed information, particularly on Mr. O'Brien. He did not mention, I want to make clear, anything relating to wiretapping or espionage at that time.

Mr. DASH. But in that discussion, did you get the impression yourself that he knew what the Liddy plan was?

Mr. Magruder. Again I want to be careful. I knew Mr. Hunt was a close friend of Mr. Colson's, he had been referred to me earlier by Mr. Colson. I did make the assumption that he did know but he did not say that he did know but he did not say that he was aware of the specifics and never did say that to me at any time.

Mr. DASH. Would Mr. Colson be one of those persons who would be in line of communication to whatever Mr. Strachan was communicating to the White House?

Mr. Magruder. I think Mr. Strachan worked closely with Mr. Colson, but his line of command was through Mr. Haldeman.
Mr. Dash. Was anybody present when you received that telephone call from Mr. Colson?

Mr. McGruder. Mr. LaRue was.

Mr. Dash. Were there any further contacts that you had with Mr. Colson's assistant, concerning the call that Mr. Colson made to you?

Mr. McGruder. Mr. Howard and I were fairly good friends. He had worked for me at the White House, and a number of times we discussed the general intelligence-gathering situation, and he did indicate what he thought was the professionalism, particularly of Mr. Hunt, and the need to gather this information. But I would like to make it clear there was a general, I think, atmosphere in the White House and the committee of the need to gather information. This was not necessarily information that would be gathered illegally.

Mr. Dash. Were Mr. Howard's discussions with you also urging you to try to pursue the Liddy plan?

Mr. McGruder. Yes.

Mr. Dash. Now, did there come a time when you had a third and final meeting with Mr. Mitchell on the Liddy plan, on or about March 30, 1972?

Mr. McGruder. Yes, we had. There had been a delay in the decision-making process at the committee because of the ITT hearings. Mr. Mitchell was on vacation at Key Biscayne. I went down to Key Biscayne, Mr. LaRue was there, and we met and went over approximately 30-some decision papers mainly relating to direct mail and advertising, the other parts of the campaign.

The last topic we discussed was the final proposal of Mr. Liddy's which was for approximately $250,000. We discussed it, brought up again the pros and cons. I think I can honestly say that no one was particularly overwhelmed with the project. But I think we felt that the information could be useful, and Mr. Mitchell agreed to approve the project, and I then notified the parties of Mr. Mitchell's approval.

Mr. Dash. What was the form, by the way, of the memorandum or decision paper that was presented to Mr. Mitchell at this meeting?

Mr. McGruder. It was unlike our normal decision process where we had an "approved, disapproved, comment" line at the bottom. It was simply the same 8½ x 11 blank sheets typed up with the basics of the plan, the number of people he would have to hire, the number of electronic surveillance equipment and amounts he would have to purchase, and so on, and I used a system which I think Mr. Reisner has discussed where I made three copies of each document that I would discuss with Mr. Mitchell, one copy went to Mr. Strachan for Mr. Haldeman.

The other two copies I brought with me to Key Biscayne. I gave Mr. Mitchell the one copy; he did some markup on some of it, I cannot recall what he marked on these papers, indicated his approval, did not indicate it in any formal sense by initialing it or writing. Just indicated the project was approved.

Mr. Dash. Now, on the project prior to going down to Key Biscayne you would send over a copy to Mr. Strachan?

Mr. McGruder. My formal position with Mr. Mitchell was we would send over key papers before we discussed it with Mr. Mitchell, so if there was any questions in those papers Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Strachan could get back to us their opinion on a subject.
On March 30, 1972, former Attorney General John Mitchell, who had been officially designated CRP Campaign Director; Jeb Magruder, Mitchell's chief of staff; and Fred LaRue, a special assistant to Mitchell, met at Key Biscayne, Florida to discuss campaign matters.

Liddy's intelligence-gathering plan, now budgeted for $250,000, was again discussed. Magruder has testified that Mitchell approved the plan, and that the plan specifically approved entry into the DNC headquarters and, if funds were available, entry into the headquarters of presidential contenders and Democratic convention headquarters at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami. LaRue has testified that Mitchell stated that they did not have to do anything on the plan at that time. Mitchell has testified that he rejected the plan. After the March 30, 1972 meeting, Magruder asked his assistant, Robert Reisner, to tell Liddy that his proposal had been approved. Reisner telephoned Liddy and conveyed Magruder's message.

7.1 Jeb Magruder testimony, 2 SSC 794-95.
7.2 Fred LaRue testimony, 6 SSC 2280-82, 2344.
7.3 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1613-16.
7.4 Robert Mardian testimony, 6 SSC 2429-30.
7.5 Robert Reisner testimony, 2 SSC 492-93.
7.6 Fred LaRue testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, April 18, 1973, 7-12 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
7.7 Jeb Magruder testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, May 2, 1973, 22-25 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, AND 14, 1973
Book 2

Printed for the use of the
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Stock Number 0570-01952
Mr. Dash. Was anybody present when you received that telephone call from Mr. Colson?

Mr. Magruder. Mr. LaRue was.

Mr. Dash. Were there any further contacts that you had with Mr. Colson's assistant, concerning the call that Mr. Colson made to you?

Mr. Magruder. Mr. Howard and I were fairly good friends. He had worked for me at the White House, and a number of times we discussed the general intelligence-gathering situation, and he did indicate what he thought was the professionalism, particularly of Mr. Hunt, and the need to gather this information. But I would like to make it clear there was a general, I think, atmosphere in the White House and the committee of the need to gather information. This was not necessarily information that would be gathered illegally.

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Mr. Magruder. My formal position with Mr. Mitchell was we would send over key papers before we discussed it with Mr. Mitchell, so if there was any questions in these papers Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Strachan could get back to us their opinion on a subject.
Mr. DASH. All right.  
Now, this quarter-million-dollar project you say Mr. Mitchell approved in Key Biscayne, what was that project specifically as you recall?  
Mr. MAGRUDER. It was specifically approved for initial entry into the Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington, and that at a further date if the funds were available we would consider entry into the Presidential contenders' headquarters and also potential at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami.  
Mr. DASH. When you returned to Washington, Mr. Magruder, did you communicate to anyone that the Liddy plan on the quarter million dollar budget was approved?  
Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, I attempted to reach Mr. Liddy while I was at Key Biscayne because he had indicated time problems. I was unable to do so, so when I came back to Washington I indicated to Mr. Reisner that Mr. Liddy's project had been approved and would he notify Mr. Liddy? I called Mr. Strachan and indicated to him that the project had been approved, and I indicated to Mr. Sloan that Mr. Liddy would be authorized to draw $250,000 over the entire period of the campaign but that he probably would need a sizable amount of that initially.  
Mr. DASH. Now, when you say that project as approved included the entry of the Democratic National Committee headquarters and perhaps other entries, did that also include the use of electronic surveillance or bugging?  
Mr. MAGRUDER. I am sorry?  
Mr. DASH. When you said that project that was approved in Key Biscayne—  
Mr. MAGRUDER. With Mr. Strachan I discussed it in detail.  
Mr. DASH. I am not referring to Mr. Strachan but the project Mr. Mitchell approved in Key Biscayne. I think you said the project included an approval of the entry into the Democratic National Committee headquarters. Did it also include use of electronic surveillance and bugging?  
Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes.  
Mr. DASH. Do you recall Mr. Sloan questioning an initial large sum of money, $83,000 which Mr. Liddy requested after the approval of the plan?  
Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes.  
Mr. DASH. Could you tell us what happened and how that was resolved?  
Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, he had called me and said that Mr. Liddy wanted a substantial sum at that time. I did not recall the amount, but Mr. Sloan indicates it is $83,000 and I would assume he is correct. I indicated that Mr. Liddy did have that approval. Mr. Sloan evidently then went to Mr. Stans. Mr. Stans went to Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell came back to me and said why did Gordon need this much money and I explained to him this was in effect front-end money that he needed
Mr. LaRue. No; I did not. It was my understanding that Mr. Liddy was working on some intelligence activities, my understanding was, in connection with the Republican Convention that was to be held in San Diego.

Mr. Dash. Were you aware that Mr. Liddy was receiving sums of money from the Republican campaign?

Mr. LaRue. No, sir.

[Disturbance in audience.]

Mr. Dash. Neither my question nor your answer accomplished that, I am sure.

Now, you were not aware then from your testimony that Mr. Liddy was involved in any intelligence plan or planning that the one you have just testified to with relationship to the convention?

Mr. LaRue. That is correct.

Mr. Dash. What brought you to Key Biscayne at the end of March, I take it, it was around March 29. When did you go to Key Biscayne?

Mr. LaRue. As I recall, March 22 or March 23.

Mr. Dash. What was the reason for your going?

Mr. LaRue. Accompanied the Mitchells on a vacation.

Mr. Dash. You said you arrived around the 22nd?

Mr. LaRue. March 22 or March 23, as I recall.

Mr. Dash. All right; who else was there?

Mr. LaRue. Mr. and Mrs. Mitchell, their daughter, Miss Farzberg, Mrs. Mitchell's secretary, Mr. Caulfield, who was Mr. Mitchell's security man. Later on we were joined by Mr. Tom Wentz, who was another security man and myself.

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Jeb Magruder come down to Key Biscayne around that time?

Mr. LaRue. Yes, sir, it was later, several days later, as I recall, March 29.

Mr. Dash. Do you know what the purpose of Mr. Magruder's visit to Key Biscayne was about?

Mr. LaRue. Yes, sir, I do. Mr. Magruder and Mr. Fleming came down to Key Biscayne to discuss several political problems, and to discuss with Mr. Mitchell several activities that needed decisions made relating to the campaign.

Mr. Dash. Were you present when the so-called agenda items were being discussed between Mr. Magruder, Mr. Mitchell took place?

Mr. LaRue. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dash. How many were there?

Mr. LaRue. I can't recall any specific number. Mr. Dash.

Mr. Dash. Was it a large number?

Mr. LaRue. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dash. Now, prior to the actual meeting in which the agenda items were discussed, were you given a copy of any of these agenda items?

Mr. LaRue. Yes, sir, I was given—I requested a copy of all of them.

Mr. Dash. All right. Was any particular one of interest to you?

Mr. LaRue. Yes, sir. In reviewing the items—prioritizing them for the meeting the next day, I ran across a paper which discussed or outlined a plan of electronic surveillance. There was a budget attached to this.

Mr. Dash. Who gave you that, those agenda items?
Mr. LAHUE. Mr. Magruder.

Mr. DASH. Now, could you describe in as much detail as you can the discussions concerning the political intelligence plan? Did you know it was Mr. Liddy's plan? Did you know that that plan was being proposed by Mr. Liddy?

Mr. LAHUE. As I recall there was no reference to Mr. Liddy.

Mr. DASH. When did actually Mr. Magruder and Mr. Mitchell arrive at the discussion of that plan? Was it at the beginning or the end?

Mr. LAHUE. This was at the end of the meeting because I had placed this paper at the bottom of the list of proposals that would be discussed.

Mr. DASH. Why did you do that?

Mr. LAHUE. Well, there were actually two reasons. Mr. Dash. We did not know if we were going to finish, if we had enough time to finish the discussion on all of these proposals during this meeting. I had, as I indicated, had put them in what I considered priority order and I placed this on the bottom. I discussed this with Mr. Magruder that morning and indicated to him that I would prefer that the discussion of that paper, if we got to it, would be only in the presence of Mr. Mitchell and myself and that we find some way to excuse Mr. Harry Flemming from the meeting.

Mr. DASH. Did you find any way to excuse Mr. Harry Flemming from the meeting?

Mr. LAHUE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. So he left?

Mr. LAHUE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. And there did come a time when you did begin to discuss the so-called intelligence plan?

Mr. LAHUE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Do you recall the budget on that plan?

Mr. LAHUE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Do you recall the amount of that budget?

Mr. LAHUE. No specific amount—to the best of my recollection, it was several hundred thousand.

Mr. DASH. Would a quarter million, $250,000 be the figure?

Mr. LAHUE. I have no specific recollection of that.

Mr. DASH. All right. Could you tell us once that plan was being presented what took place? What did Mr. Mitchell say, what did you say, what did Mr. Magruder say?

Mr. LAHUE. As I recall, Mr. DASH. Mr. Magruder, as in the previous proposals, handed this paper to Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell read it. He asked me if I had read it and I told him I had. The Magruder asked me what I thought of it and I told him I did not think it was worth the risk.

Mr. DASH. What did Mr. Mitchell say to that?

Mr. LAHUE. Mr. Mitchell, to the best of my recollection, said something to the effect that, "Well, this is not something that will have to be decided at this meeting."

Mr. DASH. All right. To your recollection then, Mr. Mitchell did not reject that plan out of hand at that time, did he?

Mr. LAHUE. Not to my recollection; no sir.
Mr. Dash. Now, do you know when Mr. Magruder left Key Biscayne?

Mr. LaRue. As I recall this meeting was on March 30, and to the best of my recollection, he left the following day.

Mr. Dash. And therefore there was ample opportunity for Mr. Magruder and Mr. Mitchell to meet together, was there not, between the time that this plan was being discussed in your presence and the time Mr. Magruder left?

Mr. LaRue. Well, I can't state that there was ample opportunity, no sir. That would not be a correct statement, Mr. Dash, because Mr. Magruder left the house in which we were staying, as I recall, you know, sometime shortly after that meeting, and I don't recall Mr. Magruder returning to the house during the time he was in Key Biscayne, and I was at the house all during this time.

Mr. Dash. Do you recall Mr. Mitchell leaving the house?

Mr. LaRue. I do not; no, sir.

Mr. Dash. Would it be possible that he did?

Mr. LaRue. It would certainly be possible, I guess, Mr. Dash, but I have no recollection.

Mr. Dash. Now, during the time that they were in the house together and with you during the meeting, were you in the room at all times?

Mr. LaRue. I could not state definitely that I was in the room at all times, no, sir.

Mr. Dash. You could not state it. As a matter of fact it is quite possible that you were out of the room at certain times.

Mr. LaRue. That is a possibility. I have no recollection of that.

Mr. Dash. It is also possible, is it not, that you were on the telephone a number of times?

Mr. LaRue. Pardon me.

Mr. Dash. It is also possible, is it not, that you were on the telephone a number of times?

Mr. LaRue. Yes, sir. However, I would like to state now that there were telephones in the room in which we were holding the meeting.

Mr. Dash. And, therefore, Mr. LaRue, would it be fair to say that you could not state to this committee that at no time while Mr. Magruder was meeting with Mr. Mitchell in Key Biscayne he did not get some indication of approval from Mr. Mitchell concerning this plan?

Mr. LaRue. Mr. Dash, I am sorry, I didn't hear your question.

Mr. Dash. Would it be fair, Mr. LaRue to state that you cannot, from your own recollection, tell this committee that at no time while Mr. Magruder was meeting with Mr. Mitchell in Key Biscayne, that Mr. Mitchell did not approve the so-called Liddy plan or this intelligence plan?

Mr. LaRue. Mr. Dash, I am very sorry, I still don't know if I understand your question.

Mr. Dash. Let me try to simplify that question. I am just trying to have you state to the committee whether you, of your own knowledge, can state to the committee that at no time during the time when Mr. Magruder was down at Key Biscayne that Mr. Mitchell approved or disapproved that intelligence plan.

Mr. LaRue. That is correct.
you come from a State like the State of Mississippi, where they have
great faith in the fact that the laws of God are embodied in the King
James version of the Bible, and I think that those who participated in
this effort to nullify the laws of man and the laws of God overlooked
one of the laws of God which is set forth in the seventh verse of the
sixth chapter of Galatians:

Be not deceived, God is not mocked; for whatsoever a man sowed, that shall
be also reap.

[Applause.]

Mr. DASH. Mr. Chairman, whatever few mundane questions I might
have to follow up I don't believe I really need to ask, and I think the
record is complete. I have no further questions.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I can't resist the temptation.

[Laughter.]

I have already been cautioned that my analogy to the revised stan-
dard version instead of the King James version may be controversial, so
I will refrain from that.

But I might just say, Mr. Chairman, that, as we have with other wit-
nesses, I want to thank Mr. LaRue for his testimony. I think it is
unique. I think it is useful. I think it is important. I think that it is
in conflict and in corroboration with other testimony that we have
received. At some point, the committee will have to turn its attention,
presumably, to the matter of weighing the evidence, if we can't re-
concile those conflicts, in deciding where the truth lies. We will turn
to whatever sources of information we can receive or gain access to in
that respect.

But I think we ought to conclude with this witness as we have with
others, by saying, you have made a valuable contribution to the record,
and for my part, we are grateful for it.

Thank you.

Mr. LaRue. Thank you, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. I would like to order at this time, if there is no ob-
jection on the part of any member of the committee, that xeroxed
copies of the correspondence which Mr. Vinson has furnished the
committee be printed at the appropriate point in the record.

[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 38.*]

Senator ERVIN. Mr. Vinson, do you have a statement?

Mr. VINSON. Yes, sir, if the committee will indulge me for about 3
minutes, Mr. Chairman, we have the transcript of yesterday's hearing
and there is one matter I should straighten out before Mr. LaRue
departs.

On page 4579, Mr. Dash asked a question:

As a matter of fact, it is quite possible that you were out of the room at cer-
tain times?

This refers to the March 30 Key Biscayne meeting, which we have
heard so much about.

Mr. LaRue. That is a possibility. I have no recollection of that.

Mr. LaRue told me this morning that he was replying to the time
frame of the discussion of the memorandum about the Liddy plan. In
fact, as Mr. LaRue had told the staff previously, he has a specific recol-
lection of being in and out of the room several other times, may have
been out of the room, has no specific recollection at this time.

*See p. 2635.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

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[137]
Mr. Dash. He did not indicate any responsibility to you at least, in the presentation of the two plans that he gave you on January 27 and February 4, did he?

Mr. Mitchell. I am not sure I understand your question, Mr. Dash.

Mr. Dash. Certainly, from your point of view, he did not exercise or did not demonstrate any responsibility?

Mr. Mitchell. He did not exercise any responsiveness to my desires in the matter, if that is your question; no.

Mr. Dash. Did you report to anybody the January 27 meeting or the February 4 meeting?

Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection, no; Mr. Dash.

Mr. Dash. Did you ever take it up with Mr. Haldeman or anybody in the White House?

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir.

Mr. Dash. Were you aware that Mr. Liddy left the February 4 meeting believing that his plan was not objectionable in itself but only that the price tag was too high and that he reported that to Mr. McCord and Mr. Hunt?

Mr. Mitchell. I cannot conceive of anybody leaving that meeting with such an understanding.

Mr. Dash. Were you aware, by the way, that Mr. McCord and Mr. Hunt were involved in the planning operation?

Mr. Mitchell. In no way. I have never met Mr. Hunt. I do not know Mr. Hunt and, of course, Mr. McCord was the security officer of the Committee To Re-Elect the President and one of the last people I would have believed would have been involved in such activity.

Mr. Dash. Now, after the February 4 meeting, did you receive any urging or pressures from anybody in the White House with regard to approving the Liddy plan?

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir.

Mr. Dash. Well, now, once again, Mr. Mitchell, and for a third time, on March 30, 1972, and this time in Key Biscayne, Mr. Magruder himself, not Mr. Liddy, presented a decision paper on the so-called Liddy wiretapping political intelligence plan scaled down now to a price tag of $250,000.

Do you recall the meeting with Mr. Magruder and yourself down at Key Biscayne on March 30?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I do, Mr. Dash.

I was on a vacation and it gave an opportunity to catch up on some of the things that were happening in the Committee To Re-Elect the President that I was to be associated with shortly. There were 2 days of meetings. Mr. Harry Flemming was down there for a day with his side of the campaign activities that had to do more with the political organizations and States and Mr. Magruder was down there in connection with the operational program, programmatic side of the campaign.

Mr. Dash. I understand—I am sorry, continue.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. LaRue had come down with us and was living in the house with us and he sat in on all of those meetings that we had while we were down there.

Mr. Dash. Now, I understand Mr. Magruder came down not only with this so-called Liddy plan proposal but he had a number of other items on the agenda.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes; he had a substantial number of items on the agenda because I had been otherwise engaged and had for weeks, I had not had an opportunity to meet with these people. I was about to become officially associated with the campaign and he came down with a big stack of documents that were to be considered immediately.

Mr. Dash. Would it be fair to say, Mr. Mitchell, that the so-called quarter million dollar Liddy plan for wiretapping and break-in was actually different in degree and kind than any other agenda item that he was presenting to you?

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, you can rest assured of this. There were no other such plans in the documents that were submitted.

Mr. Dash. What would have given Mr. Magruder the idea that you would even consider this proposal again if you had indeed, as you stated, rejected it so categorically twice before?

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I would have presumed that you would ask Mr. Magruder that question when he was here, Mr. Dash, but in hindsight I presume there were other people interested in the implementation of some type of activity in this area. Because I believe that Mr. Magruder was very clearly aware of the position that I had taken in connection with it.

Mr. Dash. So that it is at least your present feeling that he was acting under some pressure for somebody to represent this plan to you?

Mr. Mitchell. This has been continued to be my feeling but I have no basis for knowing that.

Mr. Dash. Do you know who might have been involved?

Mr. Mitchell. No, I do not.

Mr. Dash. Has anybody ever told you other than any testimony which has appeared before this committee?

Mr. Mitchell. No, the only information I have had has been the testimony that has been before this committee, and, of course, that is pretty wide ranging, you can almost take your pick of quite a number of such influences.

Mr. Dash. Now, what is your recollection of what decision you made in Key Biscayne on the so-called Liddy plan?

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was very simple. This, again, "We don't need this. I am tired of hearing it out. Let's not discuss it any further."

This sort of a concept.

Mr. Dash. It was as clear as that?

Mr. Mitchell. In my opinion, it was just as clear as that.

I believe I recall, Mr. Dash, that this was part of a long agenda that for some unknown reason, they kept this to the last, or the next to the last. Whether somebody thought they were going to sneak it through or whether there would be less resistance or what, I don't know. But this is my recollection.

Mr. Dash. Well, then, could Mr. Magruder have been in any way mistaken as to what your position was?

Mr. Mitchell. I would hope not.

Mr. Dash. Then how do you explain, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Magruder's sworn testimony that you, however reluctantly, approved the quarter million dollar Liddy plan at Key Biscayne?

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, I can't explain anybody's testimony up here except my own.
Mr. Dash. Well, indeed, if you had not approved the plan—
Mr. Mitchell. I really shook him up, didn't I?
Mr. Dash. Well, I will try another question.
You had not approved the plan, but these things occurred according to the testimony of a number of witnesses. Why would Mr. Magruder call Mr. Reisner to have Liddy call him in Key Biscayne and then as soon as Mr. Magruder returned to Washington, he told Mr. Reisner to tell Liddy that his plan had been approved and he told Sloan that you had authorized Liddy to draw a total of a quarter of a million dollars.

Now, Mr. Sloan, Mr. Reisner, and Mr. Magruder have so testified that this occurred just after the March 20 meeting.

Mr. Mitchell. I can't describe or prescribe the activities of other people, Mr. Dash, assuming that that long statement of yours is correct. I can't describe the—

Mr. Dash. Well, perhaps you may not be able to describe the activities, but was Mr. Magruder capable of leaving a meeting in Key Biscayne with you on March 20, in which you rejected for a third time the Liddy plan, and completely on his own, lied to Mr. Reisner, Liddy, and Sloan about your approval of the quarter million dollar plan?

Mr. Mitchell. Is he capable of it?

I wasn't privy to the conversation, but if it happened—

Mr. Dash. Well, we have this testimony under oath before this committee, by all three witnesses.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, with respect to all three people that were involved, if there is a problem there, it is a problem of misunderstanding or a contravention of my orders.

Mr. Dash. I think you testified that he couldn't possibly misunderstand—

Mr. Mitchell. This would certainly have been my recollection upon the basis of the conversation that was involved. Of course, fortunately, there was a third party there and I am sure that he will have some opinion on the subject matter one way or the other.

Mr. Dash. Who is that?

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. LaRue, who was in this meeting with us throughout the activity.

Mr. Dash. Do you know what his testimony is on that subject?

Mr. Mitchell. No, I don't know what his testimony will be, Mr. Dash, but Mr. LaRue was there, and we have talked about it. Obviously, since that event occurred over the months that have intervened since the Watergate event of June 17, and I am quite sure that, for instance, he told Mr. Parkinson and Mr. O'Brien that there was no such approval at this particular time.

Mr. Dash. Well, did you ever have any meeting with Mr. Magruder down at Key Biscayne at which Mr. LaRue was not there?

Mr. Mitchell. I don't see how there could have been. Mr. LaRue was staying in the House with us, we were meeting in what they call the Florida room in the particular house. The meetings went on for quite a number of hours and we went through these documents and to the best of my recollection, Mr. LaRue was there.

Mr. Dash. Do you recall what Mr. LaRue said there?
Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I don't think Mr. LaRue was very enthusiastic about this project and I think he concurred in the fact that it should not be approved.

Mr. DASH. Now, if Mr. Magruder didn't come away with the idea that you had approved it and nevertheless, very shortly after he returned, set it in motion by approving the payment to Mr. Liddy of funds to carry out this plan, do you have any idea who above you could have given him authority to do this?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, Mr. Dash, I don't know whether it would be above me, but there could very well have been pressures that came from collateral areas in which they decided that this was the thing to do. I can't speculate on who they might be. I am sure that there could be such pressures.

Mr. DASH. Generally, though, from your knowledge of Mr. Magruder and the working of Mr. Magruder, would Mr. Magruder on his own undertake to carry out this plan?

Mr. MITCHELL. You are asking for an opinion again.

Mr. DASH. An opinion, yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think it is a matter of degree, Mr. Dash. I think you will find when you get into your additional investigations that there were a lot of activities in the so-called dirty tricks department and so forth that were carried on without my knowledge by the gentlemen who were at the committee. So, it is a matter of degree.

Mr. DASH. Well, a matter of degree. But here, although Mr. Magruder had a continuing authority to approve expenditures, if Mr. Magruder actually knew that you had barred or rejected a particular program, would you expect Mr. Magruder to approve the payment of a quarter of a million dollars to Mr. Liddy for that program?

Mr. MITCHELL. I don't believe that Mr. Magruder paid a quarter of a million dollars to Liddy.

Mr. DASH. Well, approved.

Mr. MITCHELL. What he had done was continue what he had been doing before, made payments along the way to Liddy for Liddy's intelligence-gathering activities.

Mr. DASH. Well, that is not according to Mr. Magruder's testimony. According to Mr. Magruder's testimony, he had given this money not for general intelligence activity, but the so-called Liddy plan.

Mr. MITCHELL. Oh, you are talking about the later date?

Mr. DASH. Yes. Would you expect, taking as a matter of degree, that Mr. Magruder may have acted on his own? Having your rejection to a particular program, would you have expected Mr. Magruder to have approved the expenditures of large sums of money?

Mr. MITCHELL. I certainly would not have expected it, Mr. Dash, no.

Mr. DASH. Now, shortly, and I think again this is a restatement of what occurred, shortly after the March 30 meeting in Key Biscayne, Liddy in April did ask for an initial payment from Mr. Sloan on a quarter million dollar budget. Mr. Sloan has so testified that Liddy asked that the initial payment be $3,000. Were you aware of that request of Mr. Liddy's?

Mr. MITCHELL. I am not aware of the request, Mr. Dash; with respect to the dollar amount, and I am sure that the committee recalls the dialogue from Sloan to Stans to Mitchell to Stans to Sloan with respect
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, AND 25, 1973
Book 6

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Stock Number 3270-0600
Mr. MARDIAN. The Internal Security Division never requested a single wiretap during my tenure.

Senator WEICKER. You then make it a matter of record the Division, during your tenure, never requested a wiretap of Division 5 of the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. MARDIAN. To my knowledge, sir, all those requests had to come from persons designated by the President of the United States and they could only be made to one person and that is to the Director of the FBI.

Senator WEICKER. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ERVING. Counsel.

Mr. MILTON. Mr. Mardian, I have just a few questions, and I would first like you to clarify an apparent conflict in the record from your testimony yesterday so the record will be straight. At page 4794 you said: "Mr. Magruder said to Mr. Mitchell that he had authorized $250,000 and this seemed but a very small part of that sum. That is how the $250,000 budget came up." Let me say in saying that to you there is, what I take it to be, a typographical error: the first three words are "Mr. Magruder lied to Mr. Mitchell." I think that should read "Mr. Magruder said to Mr. Mitchell."

Mr. MARDIAN. Said, yes.

Mr. MILTON. However, at page 4797, this is the testimony, the question was: "And did you subsequently confirm that the budget that had been allocated to Mr. Liddy was actually $250,000?" Your answer was this: "To this day that matter has never been confirmed to me." And it appears there is some conflict here, and I would like for you to clear that up.

Mr. MARDIAN. Read that again, please.

Mr. MILTON. The last quote, Mr. Mardian?

Mr. MARDIAN. Yes.

Mr. MILTON. The question was: "And did you subsequently confirm that the budget that had been allocated to Mr. Liddy was actually $250,000?"

Mr. MARDIAN. To this day that matter has never been confirmed to me. I think I was referring to a question relating to the $100,000 and that is how I understood it. So I would—I must have misunderstood the question or they took the figure down incorrectly.

Mr. MILTON. I would be happy to read the statement. "I was never apprised of the fact there never had been any agreement on the amount of disbursement. I think Mr. Sloan's testimony was that it was $199,000."

Mr. MARDIAN. Yes; that is what I would have been referring to.

Mr. MILTON. I think the question is: Did you ever have confirmation from either Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Magruder that the budget that had been approved for Mr. Liddy's dirty trick operations and black advance operations was $250,000?

Mr. MARDIAN. Yes. I think I testified that I am not sure in what context it arose. whether it arose in California, whether it arose immediately thereafter. My best recollection was that it arose in connection with the confrontation between that I had with Mr. Magruder in Mr. Mitchell's presence when I asked about—when I asked him how much money he had given Mr. Liddy; and he replied "$40,000;" and I said in surprise: "$40,000;" and it was echoed by Mr. Mitchell. "$40,000;"
He then said, "That is a small part" or something "of that—of the $250,000 you authorized." Mr. Mitchell's reply, as I recall, was "Yes, but the campaign hasn't started yet."

Mr. Hamilton. So there was no denial by Mr. Mitchell in your presence that he had authorized a $250,000 budget?

Mr. Mardian. That is what I think I testified to.

Mr. Hamilton. I think I testified I don't recall Mr. Mitchell saying "Yes, I approved $250,000" but simply when that question came up he did not deny it.

Mr. Hamilton. Now, on page 4827 you testified that after Mr. Mitchell informed you that he could not fire Mr. Magruder and Mr. Porter you advised him to prepare a memorandum for the file to protect himself, and you then said that he instructed you to have one prepared and that O'Brien was going to be the actual author of this memorandum?

Mr. Mardian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Hamilton. Now, what facts did you intend to put into this memorandum?

Mr. Mardian. To put in all the facts that Mr. Mitchell was aware of at the time the discussion took place.

Mr. Hamilton. Could you fix that time for us?

Mr. Mardian. I am sorry; it would have been immediately before July 1, probably, maybe I would guess that is in the timeframe.

Mr. Hamilton. About July 1?

Mr. Mardian. Yes.

Mr. Hamilton. And you also testified, Mr. Mardian, at page 4827 of the transcript, that after Clark MacGregor had made certain "flat statements," I believe was the term you used, regarding noninvolvement of campaign personnel, you complained to him that certain of his statements were untrue and unsuccessfully attempted to brief him about the tremendous exposure of certain people in the campaign.

Now, in this briefing that you tried to give Mr. MacGregor, what facts were you going to tell him?

Mr. Mardian. I was going to tell him of the involvement of— I thought he ought to know about the involvement of Mr. Magruder and Mr. Porter with reference to their activities.

Mr. Hamilton. When you say "the involvement of Mr. Magruder," you mean the involvement as recounted to you by Mr. Liddy?

Mr. Mardian. No; I was not going to relate what Mr. Liddy told me but I felt that any admission on the part of those men, and I felt this admission was going to come forward, at least as far as dirty tricks and other unethical activities were concerned, that they had to come out even if they didn't admit to the Watergate adventure, who were still employed in the Committee To Re-Elect the President would reflect adversely on the President of the United States in his campaign for reelection.

Mr. Hamilton. Are you saying you were not going to tell Mr. MacGregor that it was your feeling that Mr. Magruder had been involved in the Watergate affair?

Mr. Mardian. I wasn't going to accuse Mr. Magruder. I think I was going to tell him my suspicions and I felt he ought to know those suspicions before he made any further statements.
scheduled an appointment, he would from time to time stop in my 
office, indicate the nature of his business. He from time to time had 
stopped in and on one occasion I can remember him giving me a 
sheet of paper which I would identify only as being a blank sheet 
of paper with such typing on it. I don't remember. A letterhead. On 
this sheet of paper, the only recollection I have of the sheet of paper 
that we have discussed is there was some figures in the right-hand 
side of the page. Mr. Liddy made the statement to me that he hated 
to write something like this down and that is literally the extent of 
the statement. It was clear to me that I shouldn't, that it wasn't for 
my consumption either because of the way in which he gave me the 
piece of paper, as he handed it to me it was put face down on the 
desk, and I would say within a matter of minutes given to Mr. Magruer 
and that is—

Mr. LENZNER. Do you remember if there was a total amount on 
the paper?

Mr. REISNER. We discussed this. My best recollection is there could 
have been a total and I seem to remember the figure "250." Sub-
sequently I have read newspaper accounts indicating there was 
$250,000 in a certain alleged budget. It is supposition on my part to 
say what the piece of paper was. I don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, did Mr. Magruder go to Florida in late 
March 1972?

Mr. REISNER. In late March 1972, yes, he did.

Mr. LENZNER. Is that reflected in the documents in front of you, 
that trip for March 29, 30, and 31?

Mr. REISNER. Yes. On the 29th there is an entry saying: "Jeb 
leaving for Miami."

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know who he was going to see?

Mr. REISNER. Yes, at that time it is my recollection that Mr. 
Mitchell was at Key Biscayne and that Jeb had a meeting with Mr. 
Mitchell in Key Biscayne and that is who he was going to see.

Mr. LENZNER. And are there any notations reflecting Mr. Liddy's 
name on any of those dates in your documents?

Mr. REISNER. OK. I think what you are referring to is, well it says 
"leave for Key Biscayne" also on the 29th, on the 30th; there are a 
number of references to Mr. Liddy.

Mr. LENZNER. In the upper left-hand corner of the 30th, what does 
that reflect?

Mr. REISNER. It says "Get Gordon Liddy."

Mr. LENZNER. What does that represent?

Mr. REISNER. It says, that column I believe would have referred 
to the fact that I had been asked to get Gordon Liddy. But my best 
recollection of this is that the reason I was asked to get Gordon 
Liddy, I was asked to reach him and have him call Mr. Magruder. 
That is just a vague recollection. It could have come at another time 
but it makes sense in conjunction with this entry.

Mr. LENZNER. And that entry is in your handwriting; is that 
correct?

Mr. REISNER. That is correct.

Mr. Magruder was not in Washington at the time as is indicated 
here also and I think that was the reason for being asked to get Mr. 
Liddy to call him.
Mr. Lenzner. There is an entry on March 31 in the upper right-hand corner—Mr. Liddy's name.

Mr. Reisner. Gordon Liddy give answer.

Mr. Lenzner. What does that represent?

Mr. Reisner. The nature of this diary is that it is not a diary, the nature of this log, is a recording of activities that are taking place in the office. It is just a random recording of interruptions. It appears from the way in which this appears that Mr. Liddy would have interrupted me and said he needed an answer. I don't know whether this represented a phone call, Mr. Liddy simply stepping by the office. This illustrates the purpose for keeping the log in the first place. There were lots of interruptions like that and a lot of activities and that was the reason for writing it down, just to remember it.

Mr. Lenzner. Now, after Mr. Magruder returned from Florida, did he give you a message or instructions to pass on to Mr. Liddy?

Mr. Reisner. No. I am not certain it was when he returned from Florida. What I remember was on one occasion—the timing of the occasion roughly coincides with this—Mr. Magruder standing in my doorway and telling me to call Mr. Liddy. Now, it was his habit to frequently do that. That was the nature of my job. He would come and give me numerous instructions and I was to pass on approvals, disapprovals, that sort of thing, reactions to decisions or matters that he was handling. He appeared in my doorway and said, "Call Liddy, tell him it is approved or tell him it is approved and that we need to get going in the next 2 weeks." That was a perfectly characteristic thing for him to say because I frequently called other senior members of the committee and told them similar things. I made such a phone call. I related roughly in time to this because I have the feeling that the first week or two in April had something to do with the 2 weeks. That is a very vague recollection. I called Mr. Liddy and his reaction was a little bit different than the reaction of most people that I communicated this kind of decision to and I remember it; he said "But I can't, it is going to be hard," or something like that, and he protested and I indicated to him that he was going to have to talk to Mr. Magruder about it, and I didn't know what I was telling him about, that whatever he had talked about with Mr. Magruder was approved and if it made sense to him then I was glad to pass it on to him. He said he subsequently did talk to Mr. Magruder on a number of occasions. I assume whatever the matter was was resolved.

Mr. Lenzner. I am going to show you now, Mr. Reisner, some documents which have previously been used here and ask you if there came a time in June of 1972 when you observed those documents in the possession of Mr. Magruder.

Mr. Reisner. These documents were shown to me by you and other members of the staff. They seem to me to be similar to documents that I observed. I remember on one—on two occasions seeing something similar to the envelope. I remember seeing something similar to the material—to this letterhead.

I believe I tried to describe this on one earlier occasion and that was when I appeared before the grand jury and was asked about the nature of observing documents similar to this. At that time, I identified documents which are not exactly like this. Upon seeing them on a
7.6 NOTE: The following testimony received by the House Judiciary Committee from the Watergate Grand Jury contained blank portions.
APRIL 18, 1972

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Present:
A quorum of grand jurors, with the Foreman presiding.
Mr. Earl J. Silbert, Principal Assistant U. S. Attorney.
Mr. Seymour Glanzer, Assistant U. S. Attorney.
Mr. Donald E. Campbell, Assistant U. S. Attorney.
Q And were you in the offices of the Committee to Re-elect the President on a fairly regular basis?

A Yes. I would generally come in Monday or Tuesday, spend the balance of the week and then go home Friday. Sometimes if there was something of a pressing nature I might stay over for the weekend. I might come up on a few occasions only two or three days a week.

Q All right. Now turning your attention, sir, to April, 1972. Did there come a time that you visited Key Biscayne, Florida?

A Yes, sir. I think in the latter part of March I accompanied the Mitchells to Key Biscayne for, I think, probably ten days or two weeks for Easter vacation.

Q All right, and where did you stay in Key Biscayne?

A We stayed at, I think it's called the 3520 House or something of that nature. It's a house that is -- it is not adjacent to it but in the vicinity of the compound of Key Biscayne.

Q When you say compound is that the Presidential --

A The Presidential Compound at Key Biscayne.

Q Did there come a time while you were down there that Mr. Mitchell was visited by Mr. Magruder?

A Yes.

Q And also by Mr. Fleming?

A That is correct.

Q Can you tell us what transpired at that time, the circumstances, etc.?

A Yes. Mr. Magruder and Mr. Fleming got into Key Biscayne
one afternoon -- I can't be specific as to dates. I would, you know, looking back from Easter Sunday, I would assume it would be the 4th, 5th or 6th of April. Mr. Magruder came over to the compound and brought some briefcases with several memoranda that required -- what we call action memoranda, required signing off on by the campaign director. He came over to the house where we were staying. Mrs. Mitchell became quite upset about this because she did not want Mr. Mitchell's vacation interrupted by any working sessions and so I informed Mr. Magruder to leave his briefcases there and go on back to the hotel where he was staying and I would be back in contact with him.

Q And then did you have occasion to examine the contents of the briefcases?

A Yes. I think I told him that I would go through the memos and prioritize them so that we could -- in case we didn't have time to complete action on all the memos, that at least we would get the more pressing ones out of the way.

Q And did you go through them to --

A Yes.

Q -- to determine the priority?

A Yes, that night I went through them. In the interim we had gotten Mrs. Mitchell calmed down and she agreed that we could spend the next day at the other end of the house and, you know, work on these, whatever -- work on whatever problems and decisions we had to make.
BY MR. CLANZER:

Q So you did determine what the priorities were with respect to these memos; I take it?
A That is correct.

Q Incidentally, did Mr. Fleming come over with Mr. Magruder?
A No, he did not. I don't know if he came on the same flight or not. I don't know exactly what time he got to Key Biscayne, whether they came together or --

Q But he did not come to this meeting?
A No, he did not come in that afternoon when Mr. Magruder came over.

Q You did make a determination of which action memos had to be acted upon and the order in which they would be acted upon?
A I, you know, to the best of my ability, prioritized the memos so we could proceed on the more important ones first.

Q As you reviewed these memos did you come across a memo
that in substance discussed or had a topic in it or subject matter which related to electronic surveillance?

A That is correct.

Q Electronic intrusion?

A Yes, I did.

Q Do you recall the substance of it?

A I can't recall the specific substance of the memo. I recall -- the only thing I can specifically recall, because it caught my attention, was that the memo did discuss an operation regarding or involving electronic surveillance and that there was a budgetary figure attached to the memo.

Q Do you remember any more details in the memo about any targets of the electronic surveillance or anything like that?

A I can't honestly sit here and tell you I could, I mean --

Q Apart from the general fact that it was obviously --

A I can't recall what the target was; no, sir, I really can't.

Q But it was obvious that it was electronic intrusion related to the adversary party?

A That is correct.

Q Now you mentioned the budgetary figure. Can you tell us the sum of money?

A I cannot give you a specific sum of money. I can only state that, as I recall, it involved a figure of several hundred thousand dollars.

Q All right, sir. Did there come a time that there was a meeting at which this memo was discussed?

A Yes.
Q This was an action memo, I take it?
A This was an action memo; yes, sir.
Q Which required a sign off?
A Yes.
Q By the campaign chairman?
A Yes.
Q By Mr. Mitchell?
A Yes.
Q Did there come a time there was a meeting?
A Yes, we had a meeting next day.
Q Who was that?
A At that meeting was Mr. Fleming, Mr. Magruder and Mr. Mitchell and I.
Q Was Mr. Fleming present when that memo was discussed?
A No, he was not.
Q How was that arranged that he was not?
A Next morning when Mr. Magruder came over I asked him as to what in the world was this memo regarding this electronic surveillance. I said this was the first knowledge I had of any such contemplated course of action, and he said that the memo required action. I said, "Well, I don't want to bring this up with Mr. Fleming in the room, and I've got it on the bottom of the stack. When we get through with everything else we can maneuver Mr. Fleming out of the room and take this matter up."
Q And was that done?
A Yes, that was.
Q All right. Who sat in on the meeting?
A At the meeting at which the memo was discussed was Mr. Magruder, Mr. Mitchell and myself.
Q  And can you tell us in substance what was said at the meeting and by whom, to the best of your recollection?

A  To the best of my recollection the memo was given, as I recall, by Mr. Magruder to Mr. Mitchell. He read the memorandum. He looked over at me and he asked if I had seen this and I said I had, and he said, "What do you think?" I said, "I don't think it's worth the risk." As I recall, Mr. Mitchell sat there a few minutes, or few seconds, and he said, "Well, we don't have to do anything on this now."

Q  All right. And was that the end of the meeting?

A  That was the end of the meeting.

Q  All right. Now thereafter did there come a time that this matter of electronic surveillance came to your attention in one form or another?

A  Yes, on two or three occasions there were situations in which I was at meetings or had conversations with people where, I don't say this specific memo was raised, but allusions to some sort of operation going on or other operations contemplated. You want me to go on?

Q  Yes, could you give us details of that?

A  There was one meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office and which was attended by Mr. Magruder, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Liddy and myself. The purpose of this meeting, as I recall, was to discuss the convention, the Republican Convention, and at that time it was Miami Beach. During the course of this meeting Mr. Liddy raised the concept that Senator McGovern would be occupying the same room as the Democratic Convention which Mr. Mitchell would be occupying at the Republican Convention, and that it would afford
7.7 NOTE: The following testimony received by the House Judiciary Committee from the Watergate Grand Jury contained blank portions.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

IN RE: POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF 18 USC 2511 and 2512

Grand Jury Room No. 3
United States District Courthouse
3rd & Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Wednesday, May 2, 1973

The testimony of JEB S. MAGRUDER was presented to a full quorum of the Grand Jury.

BEFORE:

EARL J. SILBERT, ESQ.
Principal Assistant United States Attorney

SEYMOUR GLANZER, ESQ.
Assistant United States Attorney

DONALD E. CAMPBELL, ESQ.
Assistant United States Attorney
Now, I want to direct your attention to on or about March 29th, 1972. Did you have occasion to go down to Key Biscayne in Florida?

A Yes.

Q And for what purpose?
A The purpose was many-fold. We had -- Mr. Mitchell had not been actively involved in the campaign in the past number of weeks because of the ITT problem, and he was on vacation.

So I had approximately 30-some decision papers for Mr. Mitchell for our discussion and we were lagging behind in the campaign. So I went down there, basically, to get many decisions from him.

Q Did you have with you a proposal concerning the Liddy project?

A Yes. Liddy, of course, was anxious to get his project going and we had held it because I hadn't had an opportunity to discuss any of these proposals with Mr. Mitchell, and our agreement with Mr. Mitchell was that nothing was done in the campaign without his approval. So I could not give Mr. Liddy any approval on his project, and so he was being held up and claimed that he was having great difficulty.

So one of the proposals that we brought down was Mr. Liddy's third proposal for this intelligence gathering.

Q Now, when you say "brought down the proposal", what was the form of that proposal and was it any different in form from other proposals that you brought to Mr. Mitchell at that time?

A Yes, it was different. Most of the proposals to Mr. Mitchell had a standard form. They were to Mr. Mitchell, as
Attorney General, from me, with copies to Mr. Haldeman, and
they discussed a project and then asked for approval, dis-
approval, for both the project and the funds necessary.

This, because of the sensitivity of the nature, I
only had these blank sheets of paper with the various budgets
for each of the activities on them. Not a formal proposal
as I would have had on the other activities.

Q And who was at Key Biscayne besides Mr. Mitchell?
A Mr. Mitchell was there with his wife and his daughter,
Mrs. Mitchell's social secretary, and Fred LaRue was staying
at the house at Key Biscayne.

Q And did you have occasion to discuss the Liddy pro-
posal with Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mitchell?
A Yes.

Q And what was the nature of this package or this
proposal?
A This proposal would only include, basically, wire-
tapping for the Democratic National Committee at the Watergate,
for the possible surveillance, electronically, of the Democratic
National Convention Headquarters at the Foutain Bleu; and for
possible electronic surveillance at the Democratic Headquarters
and, at that time, we were getting to realize that Mr. Muskie
was failing and so it would be someone else, so we didn't have
a specific individual in mind at that time.

All of the other activities had been eliminated from
the proposal.
Q And what was the size of the proposed budget?
A Approximately $250,000.
Q All right. And did you, at that meeting, discuss
with Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mitchell the various pros and cons with
respect to that budget?
A Yes. Mr. LaRue had been aware of Mr. Liddy's pro-
posals but not in the depth that we had, because he had not
attended those past meetings.

Mr. LaRue had some misgivings relating to the project
Mainly that the possibility was limited information; that, of
course, this was illegal; and I think we all agreed that there
was potentially problems in dealing with Mr. Liddy because of
his stability.

But, basically, we did agree to firm the projects,
because we felt that there were enough individuals that were
interested in this information and we thought that there
possibly could be some use put to this information by ourselves
as well as other individuals at the White House.

Q Now, after the meeting, did you report the results
of that meeting to anyone?
A Yes. I had a standard procedure where Mr. Reisner,
who was my assistant. If I was in Washington, I would sit down
with him and go over all the decisions. Of course, we had a
tremendous amount of decisions, many of them quite critical,
because they'd been held up for quite a bit of time.
The testimony of ROBERT A. F. REISNER was presented to a full quorum of the Grand Jury.

BEFORE:

MRS. JILL VOLNER
Assistant Special Prosecutor
United States Department of Justice

KENNETH S. GELLER, ESQ.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
United States Department of Justice
"I've got to have an answer," really was more of what he was saying.

Q And did you pass these messages onto Mr. Magruder?
A That was the kind of thing that lots of people in the campaign would do. Sometimes they'd call me, and that was really the nature of my job, to sit in front of Magruder's office and just --

Q But did you pass these things along?
A Oh, yes, I would have, definitely.
Q And what did Mr. Magruder say when you passed that particular message along?
A Just, "Okay."

Q Did there come a time when Mr. Magruder told you to tell Mr. Liddy that he had approval?
A That's right. I'm very vague on the time of this, but the reason I place the time at the beginning of April was that part of the message to Mr. Liddy was to tell him to get going within two weeks and when I passed that message on, I have the feeling that "two weeks", that I was thinking in terms of when two weeks would be, and the time was going to be the first two weeks of April.

Mr. Magruder, as I remember, stopped in the entrance to my office and said, "Call Liddy and tell him its approved. Tell him we want to get going in the next two weeks." And, as I remember, part of the message may have been, "Tell him
the first part is approved," but that's as close as I can come to Mr. Magruder's message.

Q When do you place the time of this event?
A In the beginning of April, is the best I can do.
Q And was this by telephone or in person with Mr. Magruder?
A As I remember, Mr. Magruder stopped in the entrance to my doorway and told me to tell Mr. Liddy that.
Q Was this after his return from Key Biscayne?
A Well, if I'm correct about the date, then it would be after his return from Key Biscayne. However -- and I think my general reluctance about this is that I don't remember it in reference to Key Biscayne. I just remember it in the beginning of April.
Q Did he call you from Key Biscayne and give you a similar message?
A Not that I remember.
Q Did he call you from Key Biscayne at all?
A Yes, he did.
Q What was the purpose of it?
A I think he called me a number of times and probably -- well, he would have called me for the normal kinds of things he would call me about.

He took to Key Biscayne with him 26 or 30 documents that he needed approval on -- 26 or 30 documents that he needed
approval on -- and as he, maybe, got approval, he would call
me and say, "Call so-and-so and tell him that this plan is
approved but that he should only spend so much money," and
that sort of thing. I mean, he was calling me and giving me
instructions.

Q I'd like to show you a book marked RR-1, and can you
identify this, please?

A Yes. It's a log that I kept. It's not an accurate
calendar but a log that I kept during the year 1972.

Q All right. When you say it's a log, it's a log of
your activities or a log of Mr. Magruder's activities?

A It's a log of my activities in 1972.

Q Does it also reflect some of Mr. Magruder's activi-
ties?

A Yes, it does. Particularly because my job was
related to his and, therefore, my activities related to his.

Q Now, concerning the Key Biscayne meeting, does it
indicate in your diary when Mr. Magruder left for Florida?

A Yes. It indicates that he was scheduled to leave
at 11:00 o'clock on Wednesday, the 29th, and there also is an
entry --

Q Let me just ask you, does your recollection conform
to that? Do you have any personal knowledge that he did leave
on that day?

A Well, no, I don't, but there also is an entry of my
activities saying that he would leave for Miami, unless there was some other entry which I don't see.

I believe that he did leave on the 29th.

Q Okay. Now, there's an entry on the 30th. Would you like to read that to the Grand Jury -- at 4:00 o'clock?

A The entry on the 30th refers to the matter that we were just discussing, where he did call asking that decisions be transmitted concerning activities that he had memoranda in Florida about and he was getting approval for the memoranda.

Q Now, what were those specific items? Did they include the Liddy proposal?

A Not that I can see here. It seems that the decisions that he was getting approval on were concerning the plans for the Maryland primary. Some sort of a decision, and I had to transmit that to Al Calpin; and something concerning the convention, that related to Dick Herman and Bill Timmins.

Q Was there any reference to Mr. Liddy on the 30th?

A Yes. There's a request that I get Gordon Liddy, and, to the best of my recollection, what I was asked to do was to find Mr. Liddy and have him call Mr. Magruder in Florida.

Q And, therefore, your entry on Thursday, March 30th, indicates to you that Mr. Magruder had either before leaving or from Florida asked you to get Mr. Liddy to call him in Florida?

A That's correct. I think he left on the 29th and I
was asked by Mr. --

Q  And that entry is at 9:00?

A  That's just a rough entry.

Q  Somewhere in the area of 9:00 o'clock a.m.?

A  Well, I could have been called the previous evening and had written down that I had to find him and I might have written that on the calendar to do that early in the day.

Q  Did you get Gordon Liddy?

A  As I remember, I had him call Mr. Magruder in Miami.

Q  All right. Now, on the 31st, I note that there's an entry that just says Key Biscayne. Does that indicate that is where Mr. Magruder was?

A  Yes, it does.

Q  Is there also a mention of Mr. Liddy on the 31st?

A  Yes. There's a column in this log which I use just to note the things that were coming up that were interrupting me, because there were a lot of activity and a lot of interruptions and just so I didn't forget about things that I'd been asked to do.

And in that column -- which I think means it was an interruption -- there is the word Gordon Liddy and then it says next to him, "Give answer", and I believe that what that refers to is Mr. Liddy must have stopped by my office on Friday morning and said he talked to Magruder yesterday, "I need an answer" or "I'm waiting for an answer," or something
Q Is it possible that Mr. Magruder had called you and given an answer to Mr. Liddy?
A Because I do not have a specific recollection of that, it is a possible interpretation.
Q Now, and then following this sometime -- because you think it's in early April -- you did, in fact, give Mr. Liddy an answer?
A Yes. Except that I have no recollection of being called by Mr. Magruder and asked to give Mr. Liddy any answer.
Q Your recollection is he was in the doorway when he asked you. And what was Mr. Liddy's reaction to your saying, "It's approved. Get started in the next two weeks?"
A Well, he used to call a lot of people in the campaign and give them messages exactly like that. "The Maryland plan is approved," or something like that, and I wouldn't know what the Maryland plan was, but I assume that Bob Merrick -- who had submitted the Maryland plan -- knew what it was and when I said it was approved, he knew what that meant.

So I called Mr. Liddy, and his reaction was not characteristic of other people in the campaign. He said, "But I can't," or "It's going to be difficult. I've got people," or something like that.

So I said to Mr. Liddy, "I don't know what it is that you're talking about. You're going to have to discuss
that with Mr. Magruder." And he said, "Well, all right."
I said, "You're just going to have to talk about it to Mr.
Magruder. I don't know what it is that you and he were talking
about."

Q  Now, I'd also like to show you what is marked MG-1,
and can you identify this please?
A  Yes, that's Mr. Magruder's calendar -- diary.
Q  And do you know what year it's for?
A  Yes. 1972.
Q  Now, I note, in MG-1, under Thursday, March 9th,
there's an entry that just says, "8:00 - Gordon Liddy." Be-
neath that it says, in a different pen, "Florida Rally. Leave
11:00."

Now, can you explain what that entry on the 9th
means or those two entries on the 9th?
A  Well, I assume the 8:00 o'clock entry, which is
written in Mr. Magruder's handwriting, indicates that Mr.
Magruder had at sometime, perhaps the previous evening, called
Mr. Liddy and made an appointment to see Mr. Liddy at 8:00
o'clock in his office.

The other entry indicates that Mr. Magruder then,
after that, left for Florida on a chartered airplane with a
large number of other people for a rally that took place in
Florida.

Q  Now, would this have been the "Get Out the Vote
8. On March 31, 1972 Gordon Strachan reported in writing to H.R. Haldeman in a Political Matters Memorandum that Magruder had reported that CRP "now has a sophisticated political intelligence gathering system including a budget of [$]300,000." Strachan attached tabs to the Memorandum, including a tab referring to political intelligence reports on Senator Humphrey's Pennsylvania campaign organization by a source identified as "Sedan Chair II." On or before April 4, 1972 Strachan prepared a talking paper for Haldeman's use during a meeting with Mitchell scheduled for April 4, 1972 at 3:00 p.m. The talking paper included a paragraph relating to the intelligence system, raising questions as to whether it was adequate and whether it was "on track."

(As indicated below in Paragraph 9, both the Political Matters Memorandum and the talking paper were destroyed following the break-in at the Watergate offices of the DNC.)

8.1 Gordon Strachan testimony, 6 SSC 2441-42, 2452-54.

8.2 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 8 SSC 3036-37.
that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Dean were shocked by Liddy's plan; Mr. Magruder's staff man, Gordon Liddy, was apparently quite humiliated, and nothing was approved. In other words, if those meetings were routinely reported to Mr. Haldeman, as evidence of Mr. Magruder's administrative ability and judgment, the January and February meetings would not very likely inspire the confidence of Mr. Haldeman or the President.

Yet, Mr. Magruder testified that "as he recalled" he returned to his office after both these embarrassing meetings and routinely called Mr. Haldeman's staff assistant, me, and told me about his blunder, presumably so that I could inform Mr. Haldeman. That testimony is difficult to reconcile with good sense. Presumably, Mr. Magruder knew that Mr. Dean would report on the meetings to Mr. Haldeman—as Mr. Dean has testified he did—why would Mr. Magruder want two people reporting the same disaster to Mr. Haldeman?

It is true, however, that Mr. Magruder called me after he returned from the March 30, 1972, meeting at Key Biscayne with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. LaRue and reported on about 30 major campaign decisions. Each of these decisions was briefly described in that rather short phone conversation. During this call, he told me, and I am repeating his words rather precisely: "A sophisticated political intelligence-gathering system has been approved with a budget of 300." Unfortunately he neither gave me, nor did I ask for any further details about the subject.

Soon thereafter I wrote one of my regular "political matters" memos for Mr. Haldeman. This particular memo for early April was 8 to 10 pages long with more than a dozen tabs or attachments, but it contained only one three-line paragraph on political intelligence. That paragraph read almost verbatim as Mr. Magruder had indicated to me over the phone. I wrote in the memo to Mr. Haldeman—Again this is almost a quote:

Magruder reports that 1701 now has a sophisticated political intelligence-gathering system with a budget of 300. A sample of the type of information they are developing is attached at tab "H."

At tab "H", I enclosed a political intelligence report which had been sent to me from the committee. It was entitled Sedan Chair II. This report and two others somewhat like it that I had received began with a statement such as, "A confidential source reveals" or "a reliable source confidentially reports." This was followed by a summary of some political information.

In April 1972, I was mainly interested in reporting to Mr. Haldeman on those 30 campaign decisions and other relevant political items. I did not give much thought to what Mr. Magruder meant by "sophisticated political intelligence-gathering system." Nor did I give much thought to the real identity of Sedan Chair II, but I remember that the information dealt with Senator Humphrey's Pennsylvania organization.

However, on June 17, 1972, and afterward, as the news began unfolding about the break-in at the Democratic National Committee, I certainly began to wonder who else but people from 1701 could have been involved. I suspected that maybe the Watergate break-in was part of the sophisticated political intelligence operation Mr. Magruder had
mentioned to me on the phone in early April. And worse, I feared that Sedan Chair II's so-called confidential source might really have been a wiretap, or might in some way have been connected with the Watergate break-in. I immediately tried to call Mr. Magruder so I could have a report for Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Magruder did not return my calls on Saturday and I was not able to reach him until around noon on Sunday, when I again called him in California.

When I finally reached him and began to ask him what he knew about the Watergate break-in, he cut me off and said that he had been on the phone with Mr. Haldeman that morning and the matter was being taken care of.

I doubted that Mr. Magruder had actually spoken with Mr. Haldeman so I called Mr. Higby who clears most calls to Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Higby told me that Mr. Magruder had talked to Mr. Haldeman and that Mr. Ehrlichman was handling the entire matter.

I met with Mr. Haldeman on June 19 or 20 and showed him the April political matters memo that mentioned the intelligence gathering system. After speaking to him, I destroyed that memo and Sedan Chair II, as well as several other documents I have told this committee and the prosecutors about. I also told Mr. Dean that I had destroyed a political matters memo to Mr. Haldeman showing a $500,000 intelligence budget at the committee and three confidential source memos which I said could possibly have been wiretap reports with the sources carefully camouflaged. I did not tell Mr. Dean that I had, in fact, destroyed wiretap logs, because I was not then sure what they were, I only had suspicions.

I also told the prosecutors in April of this year what specific items I destroyed. And I told them I still suspected Sedan Chair II might have been a wiretap summary. It was not until Mr. Reisner and Mr. Porter testified before this committee in June that I learned Sedan Chair II was not an illegal wiretap, but was, instead, an informer planted in the Humphrey camp. In fact, you will recall that Mr. Magruder's testimony has established that I never received his wiretap data. Nor could I have passed it on to others or shredded a wiretap transcript. He says he made only one copy of the Watergate wiretap log, code-named "Gemstone." He testified that it was so sensitive that he would not let it out of his office.

Turning to matters after the election, I have told the committee that I returned approximately $850,000 in cash to Fred LaRue. I was not told by anyone, nor did I know what use was being made of this money. I had received the money from the campaign committee on Mr. Haldeman's instructions and, at that time, returning it to Mr. LaRue seemed appropriate since he was the top official left at the committee. I took it to him in December 1972, or January 1973, after I had left the White House staff. This money was the fund I had picked up in April 1972, for the purpose of conducting White House polling. It had not been used to pay polling expenses or originally planned and after the election I had been asking Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Dean, and Mr. Higby what to do with the money.

The delivery to Mr. LaRue was made in two parts, on two occasions. In December or January, after talking to Mr. Dean, I took approximately $40,000 in two envelopes to Mr. LaRue at his apartment at the Watergate. I lived two blocks away and the delivery was made on my way home from work.
that would strike me as far more sensitive a matter to send through the normal messenger channels than some file which other witnesses have indicated was not patently illegal on its face.

Mr. DASH. In other words, what you are saying is that you never did see the Gemstone file, Mr. Magruder never invited you over to see it, and that prior to March 30, you had no knowledge of any so-called Liddy intelligence plan?

Mr. STRACHAN. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. Now, did that change, at least after March 30? If it did, could you tell us how it changed?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes; I was aware that Mr. Magruder would be going down to Key Biscayne to review several campaign decisions that had accumulated during John Mitchell's working on the ITT problem. He called me up in an apparently fairly brief telephone conversation and reviewed the 30 or so pending campaign decisions. I took notes on that telephone conversation and prepared shortly thereafter a political matters memorandum for Mr. Haldeman, summarizing that telephone conversation as well as other information.

Mr. DASH. And what did that include? I mean did it include a Liddy intelligence plan?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes; Mr. Magruder told me that a sophisticated political intelligence gathering system had been approved and I reported that to Mr. Haldeman.

Mr. DASH. Were you aware that that was one of the items for decision that went down to Key Biscayne with Mr. Magruder?

Mr. STRACHAN. No; I was not.

Mr. DASH. So that it was after he came back that he reported that to you?

Mr. STRACHAN. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. Can you recall approximately when he made that report to you?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, it was shortly thereafter. I would guess either Friday, March 31, maybe Saturday. My secretary recalls having typed the memorandum on Friday.

Mr. DASH. And it is clear in your mind that Mr. Magruder reported that Mr. Mitchell had in fact approved a sophisticated intelligence plan?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, I concluded that Mr. Mitchell had approved it. I believe that when Mr. Magruder was gone through the decisions and the way I would usually report it to Mr. Haldeman would be that Mr. Magruder reports that Mr. Mitchell has approved the following matters, and I would put a colon, and then I would list the items.

Mr. DASH. But did you do it with regard to this plan?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes; that was one of the 30 items that was listed.

Mr. DASH. I think in your statement you referred to a sophisticated intelligence system with a budget of 300. Three hundred what?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, it is $300,000. On almost all of the memorandums that I wrote to Mr. Haldeman, I would leave off the last three zeroes, because usually the figures that we were dealing with were very, very large.

Mr. DASH. Now, you say that you then prepared a political matters memorandum for Mr. Haldeman, and you included this approved
sophisticated intelligence plan, that $300,000 budget, in that political matters memorandum.

Do you recall the number of that memorandum?

Mr. Strachan. Yes; it was political matters memorandum No. 8.

Mr. Dash. And how many political matters memorandums did you write after that, if you can recall approximately?

Mr. Strachan. Well, through the campaign and toward the end of the campaign they got a little further apart, but I wrote 28.

Mr. Dash. Did you receive any information or indication that Mr. Haldeman, in fact, read the political matters memorandum with specific reference to the sophisticated intelligence plan with a budget of $300,000?

Mr. Strachan. Yes; it was Mr. Haldeman’s practice when he would read such a memorandum to make notes and check off those paragraphs which he had indicated and then, he would write it up in the upper right-hand corner “To Strachan,” in this case indicating the memorandum should be returned directly to me, and I would go through his memorandums after he had read them, and this particular one I reread, and noted his checking off of all the paragraphs that I had prepared for him.

Mr. Dash. Was there any other comment besides that particular one?

Mr. Strachan. Besides the paragraph that you are concerned about there was simply a blank check.

Mr. Dash. Now, did there come a time shortly afterwards when you were asked to do anything about that particular matter?

Mr. Strachan. I am sorry.

Mr. Dash. Did there come a time shortly afterward when you were asked to write either any other paper or memorandum or take any further action with regard to that particular matter?

Mr. Strachan. I am sorry. I do not understand the

Mr. Dash. Well, you testified that you submitted to Mr. Haldeman a report on your political matters memorandum concerning this sophisticated intelligence plan, and then that this was checked off, indicating to you that he had read it. What happened afterward concerning that particular matter? Did that just stay in your file or did Mr. Haldeman take any further action on it to your knowledge?

Mr. Strachan. Well, after the memorandum came back out Mr. Haldeman was going to meet with Mr. Mitchell on April 4.

Mr. Dash. How did you learn about that?

Mr. Strachan. Mr. Haldeman had a system on his telephones where he could push a button and have one of his personal aides monitor the telephone conversation.

Mr. Dash. Would this be similar to an extension phone where somebody would be asked to get on an extension phone and just listen in?

Mr. Strachan. Well, it would be different from an extension phone because you could not detect the fact that it was picked up, and there was no way that the person listening on the phone could make any noise either by talking or by a secretary typing to indicate that there was someone else on the phone.

Mr. Dash. How were you notified or how was it indicated to you that you were to pick up the line?
Mr. Strachan. Well, there was a button on the call director phone that I had which would buzz when I was to pick that line up, and I pushed down the button and began listening to the conversation usually at that time which was already in progress.

Mr. Dash. All right. In this particular case now with a call I take it, you are testifying to Mr. Mitchell, could you tell us, having picked up the line, what you heard?

Mr. Strachan. Well, Mr. Mitchell indicated that he was either going to return or had returned from Florida, and Mr. Haldeman jokingly said, "Well, that is clearly a mistake. You ought to stay down there and vacation some more," and Mr. Mitchell indicated that "Well, we had better get together and talk about some matters." Haldeman asked him if 3 o'clock that day would be convenient.

Mr. Dash. And that day was when?

Mr. Strachan. April 4, 1972.

Mr. Dash. All right. Now, in this talking paper, did you include the item of the sophisticated intelligence plan with a budget of $300,000?

Mr. Strachan. Yes. In most talking papers I would frequently pose the question is the intelligence system adequate? Is the proposal on track, just to get the conversation going on the subject, and in this particular one I did include that paragraph.

Mr. Dash. Now, prior to that meeting and when you were preparing that talking paper, was there any other political intelligence plan operative or being considered to your knowledge?

Mr. Strachan. No; not to my knowledge.

Mr. Dash. Did you receive back that talking paper after you had given it to Mr. Haldeman?

Mr. Strachan. Yes, I did.

Mr. Dash. And to your knowledge, was there any indication as to whether all the items on the talking paper had been discussed?

Mr. Strachan. Well, usually if a matter had not been discussed he would indicate that it should be raised again. In this case it was not raised again, indicating that he would have covered the subject.

Mr. Dash. What did you do with that talking paper then when you received it back?

Mr. Strachan. I put it back in the file with the political matters memo 18 files.

Mr. Dash. And there was no indication from Mr. Haldeman that he had either not discussed it or it needed any further action on your part?

Mr. Strachan. That is correct.

Mr. Dash. Now, did there come a time after that meeting between Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman, and also in the same month of April.
manned when I was in the office. If my principal secretary wasn't there, another girl would fill in while she left the desk.

The log does have some potential inaccuracies in the effort to record my participation in meetings outside of my office because then she was only aware that I had left the office and was not always aware where I had gone or with whom I had met.

Mr. Dash. Well, then, leaving aside any report that Mr. Dean made to you of these meetings, were you not informed by Mr. Strachan through a political matters memorandum of a sophisticated intelligence system that the Committee for the Re-Election of the President had developed for the approval of Mr. Mitchell sometime shortly after March 30?

Mr. Halderman. I don't recall Dean so informed but I don't recall any of the other 30 or 29 decision items that were apparently also covered in that memorandum and it is not surprising that I wouldn't.

Mr. Dash. Would a political matters memorandum dealing with a sophisticated intelligence plan for the committee at a budget of $300,000 strike your attention?

Mr. Halderman. As Mr. Strachan has described it, a three-line item in a rather thick political matters memorandum dealing with, among other things, apparently 30 decisions that had been made by Mr. Mitchell at the Key Biscayne meeting, would not strike my attention; no.

Mr. Dash. Well, do you recall asking or having Mr. Strachan prepare a talking paper that covered a number of these items and including the intelligence plan?

Mr. Halderman. No; and that wouldn't be the normal process Mr. Dash. You are referring to, I assume, the talking paper that he referred to—

Mr. Dash. Yes.

Mr. Halderman [continuing]. In terms of the—

Mr. Dash. That is right.

Mr. Halderman [continuing]. Meeting I was to have sometime shortly after that—

Mr. Dash. The April 4 meeting.

Mr. Halderman [continuing]. With Mr. Mitchell. And Mr. Strachan, when he knew that I was having a meeting with Mr. Mitchell or having a meeting with anyone else with regard to the campaign or the committee, on his own initiative and within his area of responsibility prepared for me a talking paper listing those items of discussion that he assumed would be useful or desirable to discuss at that meeting. The talking papers were not drawn up jointly by the two of us and I did not tell him what to put on them. I knew what I wanted to talk about. What he was doing was trying to jog me by way of a talking paper on items that I might not think about that he thought might be useful to discuss.

Mr. Dash. Now, when you received a political matters memorandum and read the item, how did you indicate that you had noted the item or read it?

Mr. Halderman. Varying ways. I sometimes made margin notes, I sometimes made checks by items, and I sometimes made no mark at all.
Mr. Dash. And if you had read it and made a check that would appear on them, I take it?

Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.

Mr. Dash. And if there was a talking paper for a meeting with Mr. Mitchell on April 4, that would be part of that political matters file, would it not?

Mr. Haldeman. I don't know.

Mr. Dash. I am asking the question if there were such, it would be part of the file, would it not?

Mr. Haldeman. I don't know that it would be. I am not—

Mr. Dash. A number—

Mr. Haldeman [continuing]. I am not sure I understand what you mean.

Mr. Dash. Are there a number of political matters memorandums you received—you say you received a number.

Do you recall how many political matters memorandums Mr. Strachan sent you?

Mr. Haldeman. Over the 2 years?

Mr. Dash. No; during the period, say, from January 1972, through June 17, 1972.

Mr. Haldeman. I don't recall a number. I would have to guess.

Mr. Dash. All right.

Mr. Haldeman. Probably in that sort of a period it would be 10, something like that.

Mr. Dash. All right; his testimony is that this particular political matters memorandum was numbered No. 18 and if you wanted to find out what was included in political matters memorandum No. 18 to refresh your recollection right now, where would you go?

Mr. Haldeman. I would go to Mr. Strachan.

Mr. Dash. Mr. Strachan doesn't have the document, I take it. Would the document be at the White House?

Mr. Haldeman. Well, I understand from Mr. Strachan's testimony that he destroyed the document, so I presume it wouldn't be.

Mr. Dash. Is it not at the White House?

Mr. Haldeman. I don't know whether it is or not, Mr. Dash.

Mr. Dash. Have you gone to the White House in preparation for your testimony?

Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dash. To look at papers of yours?

Mr. Haldeman. I have looked at my notes, yes.

Mr. Dash. Your notes. Have you looked at any of the political matters memorandum?

Mr. Haldeman. No; I haven't.

Mr. Dash. You heard Mr. Strachan's testimony prior to your testimony here. Did you go to the White House to see if there was a political matters memorandum No. 18 at the White House?

Mr. Haldeman. No, sir.

Mr. Dash. Now Mr. Strachan has testified that he did present to you, shortly after the break-in when you returned to Washington, this particular political matters memorandum No. 18, which included the reference to the sophisticated intelligence plan at $500,000 and the talking paper and I think some other matters, and that you said, and this is his testimony, you said that the file should be clean after
9. On April 4, 1972, from approximately 3:00 p.m. until approximately 4:00 p.m., Mitchell and Haldeman met in Haldeman's White House office. Haldeman has testified that he does not believe political intelligence was discussed at the meeting. From 4:13 p.m. until 4:50 p.m., Haldeman and Mitchell met with the President. Haldeman testified that his notes of this meeting indicate a discussion of the "ITT-Kleindienst" hearings and the assignment of regional campaign responsibility and do not indicate a discussion of intelligence. Haldeman later returned to Gordon Strachan the talking paper specified in the preceding paragraph. It was Haldeman's practice to indicate on the talking paper agenda matters that had not been discussed. In this instance there was no such indication with respect to the agenda items covering political intelligence. Strachan has testified that on June 20, 1972, shortly after the break-in at the DNC headquarters in the Watergate office building, he showed Haldeman the Political Matters Memorandum referring to the sophisticated intelligence gathering system and other sensitive materials from Haldeman's files, and that he was instructed by Haldeman to clean out the files. Strachan immediately destroyed the Political Matters Memorandum, the talking paper he had prepared for the April 4, 1972 meeting between Mitchell and Haldeman, and other sensitive documents. Haldeman has testified that he has no recollection of giving Strachan instructions to destroy any materials.

9.1 Log of meetings and conversations between the President and H.R. Haldeman, April 4, 1972 (received from White House).
9.2 John Mitchell log, April 4, 1972 (received from SSC).

9.3 H. R. Haldeman calendar, April 4, 1972 (received from Watergate Grand Jury).

9.4 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 8 SSC 3180-81.

9.5 Gordon Strachan testimony, 6 SSC 2454, 2458-59.

9.6 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2881.

9.7 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 933-34.
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<td>President placed local call to Haldeman</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>5:28</td>
<td>5:30</td>
<td>President placed local call to Haldeman</td>
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<td>7:11</td>
<td>7:12</td>
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<td>President placed local call to Haldeman</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>President met with Haldeman</td>
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[183]
Mr. Mitchell -- April 4, 1972 -- Tuesday

8:15 AG arrived in office
8:30 AG SAW Mardian and DAG
9:20 AG SAW Mardian, LaRue and Dick Herren
10:15 AG called Clark MacGregor
11:15 AG SAW Cliff Miller, Fred LaRue, Mardian and Magruder
11:40 DAG called AG and t.
12:30 Haldeman called AG and t.
1:10 AG called Bebe Rebozo
2:45 AG left for meeting with Haldeman
5:00 AG ret. to office
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5:07 AG ret. DAG's call and t.
5:10 AG SAW Fred La Rue
6:10 AG left office

Retyped from indistinct original
Mr. Mitchell -- April 5, 1972 -- Tuesday.

2:15 AG arrived in office
6:30 AG SAM Mardian and DAG
9:20 AG SAM Mardian, LaRue and Dick Harves
10:15 AG called Clark MacGregor
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5:10 AG SAM Fred LaRue
6:10 AG left office.
**Tuesday, April 4**

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*Cheyenne for Current Day*
Mr. Haldeman. That is correct. And it wasn't.

Senator Ervin. And you knowing that while you deny authorship of this? Do you deny authorship of this?

Mr. Haldeman. I deny dictating this memorandum, but I have accepted responsibility for its contents, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Ervin. I will come back. Wait a minute. Mr. Strachan was your liaison between you and the Committee To Re-Elect the President, was he not?

Mr. Haldeman. Yes, sir.

Senator Ervin. And he brought you memorandums and documents?

Mr. Haldeman. He sent them to me, yes.

Senator Ervin. And he testified that he brought you a memorandum which stated at Key Biscayne on the 30th of March, John Mitchell had approved of what he called a sophisticated intelligence plan and that you put a mark indicating that you had read that. You say he did not bring you that or do you say you just do not have any recollection of it?

Mr. Haldeman. I said I did not have any recollection of that specific item or of that memorandum in the clear specific sense. I have no question that I was sent political memorandum No. 18 to which he referred. I do not think it was quite as specific as you just made the reference to the thing. As I recall Mr. Strachan's testimony, which is the only thing I can go on, he said that among the other 30 items that he reported from that meeting was one saying the committee now has a sophisticated intelligence operation budgeted at $300,000.

Senator Ervin. Now, did Mr. Strachan have a custom of preparing what I call talking papers for you when you were going to have interviews with people?

Mr. Haldeman. When I was having meetings with Mr. Mitchell.

Senator Ervin. Right after the Key Biscayne meeting of March 30, 1972, Mr. Mitchell had an appointment with you, did he not, in the White House?

Mr. Haldeman. We met on April 4.

Senator Ervin. April 4. And Mr. Strachan has testified here that he prepared for you a talking paper mentioning this same subject as something you should make inquiry of Mr. Mitchell about. Now, do you recall that talking paper?

Mr. Haldeman. No, I do not in any—not specifically, but Mr. Strachan had a practice of preparing the—a paper that would include his suggestion of items that might—that I might want to raise in meetings with Mr. Mitchell.

Senator Ervin. Now, I take it you are not denying that he furnished you such a talking paper but you merely state you have no recollection of having seen it. Is that correct?

Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.

Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney.

Mr. Haldeman. I might, if I could, Mr. Chairman, just on that same point, however, follow up with the point that in that meeting with Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Strachan in his own testimony said he had no knowledge of what was discussed, that those talking papers were his suggestion of things he thought I might want to raise with Mr. Mitchell. He has no knowledge that I did raise any of them with him, and I do not believe that that was discussed at the meeting of April 4 with
Mr. Mitchell, because that meeting was in conjunction with the meeting Mr. Mitchell and I had with the President the same day at which other matters were discussed relating to the ITT meetings, and the plans that Mr. Mitchell was making for assigning regional campaign responsibility to individuals that he reviewed with the President.

Senator Ervin, Senator Gurney.

Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am sure there are many more questions that could be asked of the witness on various phases in this whole Watergate affair but as I understand this phase, it is restricted to the break-in and the cover-up. I think the witness has testified very fully on that. Frankly, I cannot think of any other questions that I could ask him that would shed any more light on those two issues. I think that the central theme of what we are trying to get at in this phase is the involvement or noninvolvement of the President of the United States in the break-in and the cover-up, and as I say, I cannot think of a single question to ask the witness on this.

The committee has agreed. I think—we have discussed it in executive session—that it is important to expedite this phase of the hearings so we can get them over, hopefully, next week. My own personal view is that I think these hearings are damaging this Government seriously, the Nation, and also its relations in the world abroad. Therefore, I do not intend to ask any more questions of this witness.

Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye.

Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. Haldeman, just for the record, since there are a few unanswered questions relating to the tapes, will you tell the committee as to who knew about the existence of the recording system in the White House?

Mr. Haldeman. Other than the members of the Technical Security Division of the Secret Service, and I do not know who in that organization knew of it, but it was the smallest number of people feasible within the requirements they had technically to conduct the preparation of the tapes and the storage of them.

The only other people that I am aware of that knew of the existence of the tapes at the time I was at the White House were the President, myself, Alex Butterfield, and Mr. Higby. I did not know Mr. Butterfield's secretary was aware of them but I understand he has testified. I do not believe anyone else did and I do not recall whether Mr. Butterfield has indicated that anyone else did. If he has and if you want to check those names with me, I can confirm my knowledge as to their knowledge.

Senator Inouye. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation—was he aware of this?

Mr. Haldeman. Not to my knowledge.

Senator Inouye. Was the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency aware of this?

Mr. Haldeman. Not to my knowledge.

Senator Inouye. Did you have a room that was secure, with no recording devices, where Mr. Helms could discuss highly sensitive matters with the President of the United States?

Mr. Haldeman. Well, there were only two rooms—excuse me, three, because the Cabinet room also had this capability on a switched-on-and-off basis. The only two rooms which were covered by this taping
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, AND 25, 1973
Book 6

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973

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Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 53
Stock Number 570-01098
Mr. Strachan. Well, there was a button on the call director phone that I had which would buzz when I was to pick that line up, and I pushed down the button and began listening to the conversation usually at that time which was already in progress.

Mr. Dash. All right. In this particular case now with a call, I take it, you are testifying to Mr. Mitchell, could you tell us, having picked up the line, what you heard?

Mr. Strachan. Well, Mr. Mitchell indicated that he was either going to return or had returned from Florida, and Mr. Haldeman jokingly said, "Well, that is clearly a mistake. You ought to stay down there and vacation some more," and Mr. Mitchell indicated that "Well, we had better get together and talk about some matters." Haldeman asked him if 5 o'clock that day would be convenient.

Mr. Dash. And that day was when?

Mr. Strachan. April 4.

Mr. Dash. 1972?

Mr. Strachan. 1972.

Mr. Dash. And was there, in fact, a meeting on April 4, 1972, between Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. Strachan. Well, I did not attend the meeting so I could not testify that there was in fact but I prepared a talking paper for the meeting and we would prepare a folder which would include the talking paper, and the talking paper went into his office and came back out afterwards.

Mr. Dash. All right.

Now, in this talking paper, did you include the item of the sophisticated intelligence plan with a budget of $300,000?

Mr. Strachan. Yes. In most talking papers I would frequently pose the question is the intelligence system adequate? Is the proposal on track, just to get the conversation going on the subject, and in this particular one I did include that paragraph.

Mr. Dash. Now, prior to that meeting and when you were preparing that talking paper, was there any other political intelligence plan operative or being considered to your knowledge?

Mr. Strachan. No; not to my knowledge.

Mr. Dash. Did you receive back that talking paper after you had given it to Mr. Haldeman?

Mr. Strachan. Yes, I did.

Mr. Dash. And to your knowledge, was there any indication as to whether all the items on the talking paper had been discussed?

Mr. Strachan. Well, usually if a matter had not been discussed he would indicate that it should be raised again. In this case it was not raised again, indicating that he would have covered the subject.

Mr. Dash. What did you do with that talking paper then when you received it back?

Mr. Strachan. I put it back in the file with the political matters memo 18 files.

Mr. Dash. And there was no indication from Mr. Haldeman that he had either not discussed it or it needed any further action on your part?

Mr. Strachan. That is correct.

Mr. Dash. Now, did there come a time after that meeting between Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman, and also in the same month of April,
Mr. Dasil. Did you also pull out that memorandum or these little notes that you had taken concerning the communication that you had from Mr. Haldeman to contact Mr. Liddy about his capabilities being switched from Muskie to McGovern?

Mr. Strachan. Well, I pulled that document out but I did not take that up to Mr. Haldeman.

Mr. Dasil. All right. Now, what did you believe at that time when you took the document out?

Did you believe that a break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters was in fact related to this plan?

Mr. Strachan. I didn't know for sure, but I had pretty strong suspicions.

Mr. Dasil. Did you meet with Mr. Haldeman shortly after you pulled that file out?

Mr. Strachan. Yes, I did.

Mr. Dasil. Could you tell us when?

Mr. Strachan. I believe it was the morning of June 20. He had returned from Florida. I had given a note to Mr. Highy that I thought I should see Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Haldeman summoned me to his office, and I walked in with the political matters memorandum.

Mr. Dasil. I think you had indicated that you were somewhat concerned about Mr. Haldeman's reaction to you about not being informed. Were you still concerned when you met with Mr. Haldeman on June 20?

Mr. Strachan. Yes, I was scared to death. I thought I would be fired at that point for not having figured that out.

Mr. Dasil. Were you fired or did he berate you?

Mr. Strachan. No, he did not berate me. He said almost jokingly, "Well, what do we know about the events over the weekend?" And I was quite nervous and retreated to sort of legal protective terms and I said, "Well, sir, this is what can be imputed to you through me, your agent," and opened the political matters memorandum to the paragraph on intelligence. showed it to him. He acknowledged his check and that he had read that, and said that he had not read the tab, which had been attached, turned, began reading it, said, maybe I should have been reading these, these are quite interesting, and read the tab. Mr. Dasil. What tab was that?

Mr. Strachan. That was Sedan Chair II.

Mr. Dasil. Then what, if anything, did you tell him or did he tell you after he had gone through this memorandum again?

Mr. Strachan. He told me, "Well, make sure our files are clean."

Mr. Dasil. What did that mean to you?

Mr. Strachan. Well, I went down and shredded that document and others related.

Mr. Dasil. Now, did you do that on your own initiative as such, or did you feel that you were making sure that you were following Mr. Haldeman's instruction that you should make sure the files are clean?

Mr. Strachan. No, I believed I was following his orders.

Mr. Dasil. And you shredded all of No. 18, the political matters memorandum No. 18?

Mr. Strachan. That is correct.

Mr. Dasil. What about the memorandum that you had made on the communication with regard to Mr. Liddy?
Mr. Strachan. Yes, I shredded that also.

Mr. Dash. Were there any other documents that you shredded?

Mr. Strachan. Yes, I did go through and make sure our files were clean. I shredded the talking paper between Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell on April 4. I shredded a reference to Mr. Segretti. I shredded Mr. Segretti's telephone number.

Mr. Dash. What reference was that to Mr. Segretti?

Mr. Strachan. Well, there had been a dispute between whether or not Mr. Segretti should continue out in the field functioning somewhat independent. Mr. Magruder wrote a memorandum to Mr. Mitchell entitled "Matter of Potential Embarrassment" in which he described this individual in the field and how that individual should be under the direction of Mr. Liddy. Mr. Mitchell had a copy of that and Mr. Haldeman had a copy of that. And Mr. Haldeman had told me to call up Mr. Segretti and to tell him to expect a call and his directions from Mr. Liddy. I shredded that memorandum also.

Mr. Dash. Were there any other documents that you shredded?

Mr. Strachan. Well, we gave the committee a list.

Mr. Dash. You may have stated, but did that include the talking paper that you had prepared for Mr. Haldeman for his meeting with Mr. Mitchell on April 4?

Mr. Strachan. Yes, I think I said that that was one of the items.

Mr. Dash. Now, after you shredded these papers on the 20th of June 1972, did you inform anybody that you had done this?

Mr. Strachan. Yes, I went over to John Dean's office and gave him a list orally of the documents that I had shredded and told him that those had been Mr. Haldeman's instructions.

Mr. Dash. Why did you inform John Dean?

Mr. Strachan. Well, John Dean was, as you know, the counsel to the President and the man who would presumably be handling this problem.

Mr. Dash. Did you inform anybody else?

Mr. Strachan. No.

Mr. Dash. Now, have you since had an opportunity to go through the White House records to look at the various memorandums that you have prepared in the past?

Mr. Strachan. Yes, I have gone back into an Executive Office Building office, room 322, to go through the files.

Mr. Dash. And did these files still have the political matters memorandum that you had prepared for Mr. Haldeman?

Mr. Strachan. Well, they contained all political matters memorandums except No. 18.

Mr. Dash. Is that missing?

Mr. Strachan. That is right.

Mr. Dash. So you reaffirmed the fact that you had destroyed 18?

Mr. Strachan. Well, I did not forget that.

Mr. Dash. No. It had not been replaced, anyway?

Mr. Strachan. No.

Mr. Dash. Now, later, did you ever inform Mr. Haldeman that you wanted to make sure that the files were clean or that you had destroyed, in fact, the particular files that you were worried about?

Mr. Strachan. Yes, on July 1, I was invited to go out with the presidential party on Air Force One. There were going to be a series of discussions out there with Mr. MacGregor and Mr. Malek regarding
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 26, 27, AND 30, 1973
Book 7

Printed for the use of the
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 10
John Dean, in his Camp David report—which is now exhibit 34-43—before this committee—says that when he arrived in Washington on Sunday afternoon, June 18, he realized that the President would have to know everything that he could find out. He realized at that point that he would be asked to assemble all of the facts so that the White House could be fully informed as to what had transpired and how it would affect the President, but having been on an airplane for approximately 23 hours he did nothing further that evening.

The next morning, after reading all of the news accounts of the Watergate incident, he spoke with John Ehrlichman, who instructed him to get the facts together and report to him. He then called the Attorney General to get what facts he knew. He called Gordon Liddy and met with him. Dean asked Liddy if anyone at the White House was involved and he told him no.

During the days and weeks that followed, Dean discussed the incident with everyone who he thought might have any knowledge or involvement.

The source of these facts is John Dean’s report, or the start of it, which he wrote at Camp David in March of this year. There is absolutely no question in my mind, or I’m sure, in the minds of anyone at the White House, or at the Justice Department, that John Dean was in fact conducting an investigation for the White House regarding the Watergate as it might involve the White House. It is inconceivable to me that there could be any doubt in Dean’s mind.

Dean moved in immediately after the incident as sort of the Watergate project officer in the White House. This was in keeping with our usual procedure; the responsibility was his and he had the authority to proceed. Dean kept Ehrlichman and me posted from time to time on developments and, through us, the President. He apparently did not keep us fully posted and it now appears he did not keep us accurately posted.

The President, Ehrlichman and I were very much involved in many other vital matters through this entire period and we made no attempt to get into the details of, or in any way take over, the Watergate case.

*See Book 3, p. 1293.
fensive and stated that he was merely on his payroll as a consultant
because Ehrlichman had so requested. He asked me to determine if
Hunt was still on his payroll and I said I would check. Colson also
expressed concern over the contents of Hunt's safe. Several weeks
later—probably 1 or 5—I learned from Paul O'Brien, who was
representing the reelection committee, that he had learned from Mr.
Hunt's attorney, Mr. William Bittman, that Hunt and Colson spoke
on the telephone over the weekend of June 17-18, and that Hunt had
told Colson to get the materials out of his-Hunt's-office safe.

Mr. Hugh Sloan called me to tell me he was worried. At that time
I knew of no reason why Mr. Sloan should be worried so I told him
not to worry. He told me that he would like to meet with me and I
told him that I was trying to find out what had happened and re-
quested we meet in a few days. I do not recall the precise date we did
meet.

I next contacted Liddy and asked him to meet with me. He said he
would come to my office. As he came into the office I was on my way
out. I suggested we take a walk. It was shortly before noon and we
walked down 17th Street toward the Corcoran Gallery.

I will try to reconstruct the conversation to the best of my memory.
While I cannot recall every detail, I do indeed recall the major items
we discussed.

Mr. Liddy told me that the men who had been arrested in the DNC
were his men and he expressed concern about them. I asked him why
he had men in the DNC and he told me that Magruder had pushed
him into doing it. He told me that he had not wanted to do it, but
Magruder had complained about the fact that they were not getting
good information from a bug they had placed in the DNC sometime
earlier. He then explained something about the steel structure of the
Watergate Office Building that was inhibiting transmission of the bug
and that they had gone into the building to correct this problem. He
said that he had reported to Magruder that during the earlier entry
of the DNC offices they had seen documents—which I believe he told
me were either Government documents or classified documents—and
Magruder had told him to make copies of those documents.

Liddy was very apologetic for the fact that they had been caught and
that Mr. McCord was involved. He told me that he had used Mr.
McCord only because Magruder had cut his budget so badly. I asked
him why one of the men had a check from Mr. Howard Hunt and he
told me that these men were friends of Hunt and Hunt had put him
in touch with them. I do not recall Liddy discussing any further in-
volvement of Hunt, other than Hunt's putting him in touch with the
Colons. I asked him if anyone from the White House was involved
and he told me no.

As the conversation ended he again expressed his apology and his
concern about the men in jail. I told him I couldn't help and he said he
understood. He also told me that he was a soldier and would never talk.
He said if anyone wished to shoot him on the street, he was ready.
As we parted I said I would be unable to discuss this with him further.
He said he understood and I returned to my office.

After returning to my office I arranged a meeting with Ehrlichman
in his office for mid-afternoon. Gordon Strachan came to my office
shortly after I had met with Liddy. Strachan told me that he had been
instructed by Haldeman to go through all of Mr. Haldeman's files
over the weekend and remove and destroy damaging materials. He
told me that this material included such matters as memorandums from
the reelection committee, documents relating to wiretap information
from the DNC, notes of meetings with Haldeman, and a document
which reflected that Haldeman had instructed Magruder to transfer
his intelligence gathering from Senator Muskie to Senator McGovern.
Strachan told me his files were completely clean.

I spoke with Mr. Kleinheister and he told me that both the FBI
and the D.C. Metropolitan Police were investigating, and he assumed
that the FBI would take full jurisdiction of the case shortly. He also
alluded to his encounter with Liddy at Burning Tree Country Club,
but did not explain this in full until I later met with him. I do not
have a record of when I met with Mr. Kleinheister, but it was either
on Monday, the 19th, or the next day. I will describe that meeting
shortly.

I met with Ehrlichman in the mid-afternoon and reported in full
my conversation with Liddy. I also told Ehrlichman about the earlier
meetings I had attended in Mitchell's office in late January and early
February and my subsequent conversation with Haldeman. He told
me he wanted to meet later with Colson and told me to attend. Ehrlich-
man also requested that I keep him advised and find out from the
Justice Department on what was going on. I did not mention my con-
versation with Strachan because I assumed that Ehrlichman was aware
of this from Haldeman himself.

Later that afternoon I attended a second meeting in Ehrlichman's
office with Colson. I recall Ehrlichman asking where Hunt was. I said
I had no idea and Colson made a similar statement. At that point, be-
fore the meeting had started, Ehrlichman instructed me to call Liddy
to have him tell Hunt to get out of the country. I did this, without
even thinking. Shortly after I made the call, however, I realized that
no one in the White House should give such an instruction and raised
the matter. A brief discussion ensued between Ehrlichman and myself.
As I recall, Ehrlichman said that he was not a fugitive from justice,
so why not. I said that I did not think it was very wise. At this point,
Colson chimed in that he also thought it unwise and Ehrlichman
agreed. I immediately called Liddy again to retract the request but he
informed me that he had already passed the message and it might be
too late to retract.

Following this brief telephone skirmish regarding Hunt's travel
plans, the meeting turned to Hunt's status at the White House. I had
learned from Fred Fielding, who I had asked to check on it, that Hunt
had not drawn a check from his White House consultantship since late
March of 1972. But as far as I knew, the records indicated that Hunt
was still a White House consultant to Colson. After discussions of this
by Colson, who at this point was disowning Hunt as a member of his
staff, Ehrlichman called Mr. Bruce Kohri and requested that he bring
Hunt's personnel records up to Ehrlichman's office. Before Kohri ar-
ived, Colson raised the matter of Hunt's safe. Colson, without getting
specific, said it was imperative that someone get the contents of Hunt's
safe. Colson suggested, and Ehrlichman concurred, that I take custody
of the contents of the safe.
10. On or about April 7, 1972 Gordon Liddy showed a budget of $250,000 to Hugh Sloan, Treasurer of the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President (FCRP). Liddy told Sloan that he would be coming back to Sloan in a day or two to pick up the first cash payment, which was to be $83,000. Sloan telephoned Magruder, who authorized Sloan to disburse to Liddy the $83,000 requested. Magruder told Sloan that Magruder was to approve all subsequent disbursements of money to Liddy.

10.1 Hugh Sloan testimony, 2 SSC 538-39.
10.2 Jeb Magruder testimony, 2 SSC 795-96.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
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OF THE
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NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
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Book 2

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side. During that period of time, he had established a procedure with Mr. Mitchell of sending down a monthly budget in writing. I inherited that procedure from him and with regard to the operating expenses of the committee, each month, I would send down to the Justice Department a memorandum outlining the projected expenses of the campaign at that point for the following month. Generally, his secretary would call back and say line. So that anything that fell within that budget would be approved in that kind of way. Any extraordinary item, I would have to call him and call his secretary and ask him.

Mr. Dasu. When you said call him, you meant Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. Sloan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dasu. And his secretary, who would that be?

Mr. Sloan. Miss Lee Jablonski. What was happening was that Mr. Magruder was meeting with Mr. Mitchell regularly at the Justice Department with regard to planning for the political side of the campaign. During those meetings, he evidently was discussing financial matters, expenditures, and so forth, and getting clearance from Mr. Mitchell to go ahead and make those expenses. Following the strict instructions I had from Mr. Kalmbach, when Mr. Magruder came back to me and said, this has been approved, I would turn around and call back down to the Justice Department. I understand from Lee Jablonski at that point in time that Mr. Mitchell was getting irritated about being double-teamed on the same issue and issued instructions for Mr. Magruder and I to work out the clearance authority for expenditure.

This was resolved in terms of Mr. Magruder saying to me, any time I ask you for money, you can count on the fact that this has Mr. Mitchell's clearance. Conversely, he indicated to me that anything I said with regard to the finance committee, he would assume that I had Mr. Stans' permission. Although Mr. Stans had not come into the campaign at that point, it was known he would be assuming the finance chairmanship.

Mr. Dasu. Now, with regard to that $100,000, approximately, that Porter received, do you know of your own knowledge why he received that money?

Mr. Sloan. No, sir. I do not.

Mr. Dasu. Now, with regard to Mr. Liddy?

Mr. Sloan. Mr. Liddy's situation is very similar to Mr. Porter's situation.

Mr. Dasu. Talking about Mr. Liddy, who is Mr. Liddy?

Mr. Sloan. Gordon Liddy was at that period of time, the time he began receiving cash payments, was general counsel to the political committee, the Committee To Re-Elect the President. At a subsequent time, he became general counsel for the Finance Committee To Re-Elect the President.

Mr. Dasu. I think the chart shows a total amount of $199,000. Is that correct, to the best of your recollection?

Mr. Sloan. To the best of my recollection, yes, sir.

Mr. Dasu. Could you review very briefly how that money was paid to him and under what circumstances?

Mr. Sloan. It was a similar type of arrangement. Mr. Porter had blanket authority from Mr. Magruder to come to me and give me a
Sloan

figure of how much cash he would need. He generally, up to that time, received funds in the same type of increments as Mr. Porter received them—generally $10,000 or $15,000 at a time. There came a time when, it came very close to the April 7 date and I am not positive whether it was before or after and my best recollection would be the chart. He came to me with a budget of $250,000. He did not release that from his hand; he merely showed me the figure. He said, I will be coming to you for substantial cash payment, the first item of which will be $83,000 and I would like to pick that up in a day or two.

He said, in the case of these additional expenditures, distributions beyond what I had given him previously, he indicated that the procedure had changed; that I was to clear each and every distribution from that point on with Mr. Magruder. I called Mr. Magruder with regard to this $250,000 budget. He indicated to me that what Mr. Liddy told me was correct, that I was to go ahead and pay the $83,000 on request, but that subsequent distributions were to be personally cleared with him by telephone prior to their being made and he wanted at that time to review both the timing and the amount.

Confronted with this, I at that point in time took up with Secretary Stans. I went to see him. I indicated to him that there was a situation where we had a budget running into the post-April 7 period out of pre-April 7 cash funds. I said in my judgment, because I had been sitting on top of the total figures that it seemed to me that the cash distributions were becoming massive and that this particular distribution of $83,000 was totally out of line with anything we had done before.

At that point in time, I requested that he reconfirm to me Mr. Magruder's authority to make these kinds of decisions and he indicated to me that he would take the matter up with Mr. Mitchell.

He returned from that meeting with Mr. Mitchell and he confirmed that Mr. Magruder continued to have this authority, that I should pay these funds, and with regard to my question of concern about purpose, he said, "I do not want to know and you don't want to know."

Mr. Dash: Now, you have referred in the testimony, Mr. Sloan, to a pre-April 7 period and a post-April 7 period. So that we fully understand what you mean by that, this did refer to a new law, election law?

Mr. Sloan: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dash: That was passed that took effect as of April 7?

Mr. Sloan: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dash: Could you very briefly indicate that was the significance of pre-April 7 funding and post-April funding?

Mr. Sloan: Well, the pre-April 7 period, as I understand it, from certainly the 1963 election and precedent, the interpretation had been put on the Corrupt Practices Act, that prenomination fundraising activities of Presidential candidates were not required to be reported. This made a tremendous difference in terms of the administrative overhead, how many people you had to keep track of, no requirement to have receipts. From an internal standpoint it is obviously a much easier thing to deal with. There was no disclosure.
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Mr. Dash. All right.

Now, this quarter-million-dollar project you say Mr. Mitchell approved in Key Biscayne, what was that project specifically as you recall?

Mr. Magruder. It was specifically approved for initial entry into the Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington, and that at a further date if the funds were available we would consider entry into the Presidential contenders' headquarters and also potential at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami.

Mr. Dash. When you returned to Washington, Mr. Magruder, did you communicate to anyone that the Liddy plan on the quarter million dollar budget was approved?

Mr. Magruder. Yes, I attempted to reach Mr. Liddy while I was at Key Biscayne because he had indicated time problems. I was unable to do so, so when I came back to Washington I indicated to Mr. Beischer that Mr. Liddy's project had been approved and would be notify Mr. Liddy. I called Mr. Strachan and indicated to him that the project had been approved, and I indicated to Mr. Sloan that Mr. Liddy would be authorized to draw $250,000 over the entire period of the campaign but that he probably would need a sizable amount of that initially.

Mr. Dash. Now, when you say that project as approved included the entry of the Democratic National Committee headquarters and perhaps other entries, did that also include the use of electronic surveillance or bugging?

Mr. Magruder. I am sorry?

Mr. Dash. When you said the project that was approved in Key Biscayne—

Mr. Magruder. With Mr. Strachan I discussed it in detail.

Mr. Dash. I am not referring to Mr. Strachan but the project Mr. Mitchell approved in Key Biscayne. I think you said the project included an approval of the entry into the Democratic National Committee headquarters. Did it also include the use of electronic surveillance and bugging?

Mr. Magruder. It included electronic surveillance and photography of documents, photographing of documents.

Mr. Dash. Mr. Sloan was told what?

Mr. Magruder. That Mr. Liddy was allowed to draw $250,000.

Mr. Dash. But Mr. Strachan was given a fairly complete report on what was approved.

Mr. Magruder. Yes.

Mr. Dash. Do you recall Mr. Sloan questioning an initial large sum of money, $83,000, which Mr. Liddy requested after the approval of the plan?

Mr. Magruder. Yes.

Mr. Dash. Could you tell us what happened and how that was resolved?

Mr. Magruder. Well, he had called me and said that Mr. Liddy wanted a substantial sum at that time. I did not recall the amount, but Mr. Sloan indicates it is $83,000 and I would assume he is correct. I indicated that Mr. Liddy did have that approval. Mr. Sloan evidently then went to Mr. Stans. Mr. Stans went to Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell came back to me and said why did Gordon need this much money and I explained to him this was in effect front-end money that he needed
for the equipment, and the early costs of getting this kind of an operation together. Mr. Mitchell understood, evidently told Mr. Stans it had been approved and the approval was complete.

Mr. Dashi. Did you receive, Mr. Magruder, any progress reports after the approval by Mr. Liddy?

Mr. Magruder. No, I did not.

Mr. Dashi. Did you know that there was to be an entry in the Democratic National Committee headquarters?

Mr. Magruder. Well, I assumed that it would be. I did not know specifically when Mr. Liddy would do that, as I recall, I do not remember that he discussed the exact date with me, no.

Mr. Dashi. Well, do you recall a discussion that you had with Mr. Liddy concerning an effort to enter the McGovern headquarters?

Mr. Magruder. Yes. I think after the, as I recall, it was after thefirst entry of the DNC headquarters, Mr. Strachan and I were in my office and Mr. Liddy came in, not in a formal meeting sense, just came in and indicated that he had had trouble the night before, that they tried to do a survey of the McGovern headquarters and Mr. Liddy indicated that to assist this he had shot a light out. At that time both Mr. Strachan and I both become very concerned because we understood from Mr. Liddy that he would not participate himself nor would anyone participate in his activities that could be in any way connected with our committee.

Mr. Dashi. Now, after this entry into the Democratic National Committee headquarters, which you have testified to before this committee, which occurred on May 27, or around Memorial Day weekend of 1972, did Mr. Liddy report that to you?

Mr. Magruder. Yes.

Mr. Dashi. And what did Mr. Liddy tell you when he reported that?

Mr. Magruder. He simply indicated that he had made a successful entry and had placed wiretapping equipment in the Democratic National Committee.

Mr. Dashi. Did he report to you at all that he had a monitoring station at the Howard Johnson motel across the street?

Mr. Magruder. My understanding, my recollection was that he had it in the truck somewhere but I guess he did not. That is, my recollection was that it was in the truck but I gather it was in the Howard Johnson.

Mr. Dashi. Were you aware at any time of Mr. Baldwin's participation in this?

Mr. Magruder. No, sir.

Mr. Dashi. When did you get any of the fruits or the results of this bugging and photography operation?

Mr. Magruder. Approximately a week, a week and a half after the initial entry we received, I received, the first report; they were in two forms, one was recapitulation of the telephone conversations. They were done in a form in which you would know they were telephone conversations but they were not direct references to the phone conversations. And the second, photography, the pictures of documents that they had taken at the Democratic National Committee headquarters.

Mr. Dashi. Was there any special feature about these photographs?