1. On December 2, 1971 Gordon Strachan reported in writing to H. R. Haldeman, Assistant to President Nixon, on activities relating to the President's re-election campaign. In his Political Matters Memorandum of that date Strachan reported:

John Dean -- The Attorney General discussed with John Dean the need to develop a political intelligence capability. Sandwedge has been scrapped. Instead, Gordon Liddy, who has been working with Bud Krogh, will become general counsel to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, effective December 6, 1971. He will handle political intelligence as well as legal matters. Liddy will also work with Dean on the "political enemies" project.

Jack Caulfield will go over to the Committee when the Attorney General moves. Caulfield will handle the same projects he currently does. In addition he will assume responsibility for the personal protection of the Attorney General.

1.1 Memorandum from Gordon Strachan to H. R. Haldeman, December 2, 1971 (received from White House).

1.2 Gordon Strachan testimony, 6 SSC 2448-49.


1.4 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 924-25.

1.5 John Caulfield testimony, 1 SSC 251-52.
1.1 Gordon Strachan memorandum

1.1 NOTE: The portions of the following memorandum that pertain to the above paragraph are the last paragraph on page 3 and the first paragraph on page 4.
The Nixon Finance Committee of Lee Nunn and Hugh Sloan has received 1,700 and disbursed 630, leaving a balance of 1,070. The receipts are low because fundraising was curtailed before the November 9 RNC dinner and Secretary Stans does not return from Russia until December 6. On his return the Attorney General is prepared to discuss with him the position of Financial Chairman for 1972.

Herb Kalmbach now has pledges of 11,600 but "in the barn" receipts are only 1,000. However, he believes there will be a 95% delivery on the pledges.

The RNC financial situation will be reviewed by the Attorney General on December 4. Magruder will meet with Tom Evans on December 2 and 3 to get detailed budget and receipt figures from the RNC with particular focus on the November 9 dinners.

Concerning ambassadorships, Kalmbach will get a case by case determination from the Attorney General as he did in the case of John Safer. Kalmbach has tried to approach Flanigan but continues to have the same problems of having telephone calls returned and reaching an understanding.

The Committee for the Re-Election of the President has a December budget of 100,000, of which 50,000 is salary, 16,000 travel and entertainment, and 36,000 operating expenses. The budget submitted to the Attorney General does not list the 40 employees and their individual salaries.

Cliff Miller — He met with the Attorney General on December 2 for one hour to review the Campaign. The Attorney General asked Miller to know the details and to supply independent advice on polling and research, advertising, the PR - press area, and telephone - direct mail. Miller expressed his view, that the weakest part of the Campaign was Harry Flemming's
field operation. The Attorney General admitted that there was a problem, which the Attorney General planned to alleviate by bringing in "fellows with a little more stature", such as Mardian. Also, the Attorney General has kept Flemming under "very close reins" so far.

The Attorney General agreed that it might be a good idea to have Miller or someone else go to New Hampshire to take an independent look at the New Hampshire campaign operation.

The Attorney General is concerned that the Shumway move did not proceed quicker and with more careful checking by Miller. Miller assured him that all parties were now in agreement and that he will work directly with Fred Malek.

Without any hard evidence, Miller believes that the Attorney General is pleased with Magruder's performance.

Harry Dent -- The Attorney General is being urged to talk to Governor Holton about a Byrd Coalition candidate for Senator Spong's seat so that Virginia will be an easy victory for the President.

Ehrlichman received a political briefing from Dent on North Carolina in connection with his trip to Duke University. The memorandum emphasizes the impending party primary fight between Jim Holshouser and Jim Gardner for the governorship and the problems getting Jim Broyhill to run for Senator Jordan's Senate seat. However, "the President seems to be in good shape in North Carolina".

After you questioned whether Wallace would forfeit delegates or electors if he runs in the Democratic primary in Florida and then as an independent in another state, Dent double checked. The Florida Democratic Executive Committee passed and then rescinded a provision that would have denied Wallace his delegates. The Secretary of State did not follow the Democratic party's example and rule that he would also lose his electors.

Dent talks with Kevin Phillips periodically. Last week the Attorney General "hit Phillips hard" on some of his recently published remarks. Dent has the highest regard for Phillips' "political brain" and says that although Phillips hates Colson, Ehrlichman, Flemming and Kleindienst, he is only beginning to turn sour on the Administration. Dent, at the Attorney General's direction, will continue to stay in touch with Phillips, but Dent believes you should see Phillips briefly to convince him that the President still looks to Kevin Phillips for political advice.
Dent attended the Republican Governors Conference on November 20-21 in Indiana and reports that "their public statements and actions were very good". The Governors want to be more political and help the President. They also feel that more information should be made available to the Vice President.

Martha Mitchell was a "smash hit" at a GOP fund raising appearance in South Carolina, November 19.

Dent is urging the Attorney General to contact the Vice President to have him reconsider his change of plans cancelling his appearance before the Southern GOP Conference on December the 4th.

Wallace Henley is tracking George Wallace and reports that he has resigned himself to running as an independent in Alabama because of his problems with the Legislature. The new AIP platform is like a reprint of the Burchers Blue Book. The AIP National Convention will be held in Toledo. The date has not been set.

Murray Chotiner -- Because of Governor Peterson's unpopularity in New Hampshire, Chotiner advised you and the Attorney General that he believes Peterson would "make an excellent appointee somewhere in the Administration".

Cliff White is still meeting with Conservatives and blaming the President for the U.N. result.

John Dean -- The Attorney General discussed with John Dean the need to develop a political intelligence capability. Sandwedge has been scrapped. Instead, Gordon Liddy, who has been working with Bud Krogh, will become general counsel to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, effective December 5, 1971. He will handle political intelligence as well as legal matters. Liddy will also work with Dean on the "political enemies" project.
Jack Caulfield will go over to the Committee when the
Attorney General moves. Caulfield will handle the same
projects he currently does. In addition he will assume
responsibility for the personal protection of the Attorney
General.

Campaign Related Action Memo -- A Sigma Delta Chi Convention
identified the Campaign's principle issues as the economy
(107 of 122 votes), international affairs (9), and law and
order (3). While reading the news summary report of this
the President "strongly stated that the Democrats must
not be allowed to get away with this ... international
affairs is our issue and the economy is theirs -- regardless
of what happens to it because the liberals can always
promise more". You, Ehrlichman, and Colson received the
memorandum.

You, Ehrlichman, and Colson were also advised that "our
political types working the precinct in the ghettos and
Navaho Reservations for Republican converts would do well
to focus their attention upon the Holy Name Society, the
Women's Sodality, and the Polish-American Union".

Magruder's Projects -- The weekly report submitted to the
Attorney General on December 1 is briefer and better than
previous reports. It is attached at Tab A for your review
instead of being summarized because you had asked about
the youth registration drives, which are covered in some
detail.

Magruder reports that the Attorney General met with Lyn
Nofziger on December 1. On November 4 you and the Attorney
General talked about the importance of getting a Nofziger
interpretation of the Dole-Evans split. Unfortunately,
Magruder believes this subject was not covered because the
meeting focused on the California situation.

Magruder will meet with Tom Evans of the RNC on December
2 and 3 to get his views of the role of the RNC in the
Campaign. Magruder and Flemming meet with the Attorney General
on December 4 to decide on the role and budget of the RNC vis
a vis the Committee. On December 6 the Attorney General,
Magruder and Flemming will tell Tom Evans of their decisions.
Tom Evans will explain the decisions to the RNC at the
meeting in Washington on December 9-12. Besides the Budget,
Magruder considers the voter registration and get out the
vote functions as the only important areas that have not
been resolved.
Magruder and some of his top people have moved into new offices adjoining Mudge Rose Guthrie and Alexander at 1701 because everyone is still under the impression that the Attorney General will become a partner in the law firm when he leaves Justice. You may already have discussed this matter of joining the firm with the Attorney General pursuant to the Len Garment memorandum.

Magruder now receives a copy of the news summary. He says he needs another copy for Harry Flemming and Ken Rietz.

Approve additional copy of news summary

Cancel Magruder's news summary

Other

Magruder submitted memoranda to the Attorney General on transient voters, women in the Campaign, the Middle American, and the functions of a Citizens organization. The Attorney General has not yet reviewed them. The one on the Middle American received substantial input from Colson but is very long. You will receive it for reading on one of the trips this month.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, AND 25, 1973

Book 6

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Stock Number 027-010-0"
Mr. STRACHAN. No; not all matters would be communicated for action. He had very little interest, for example, in what the field organization would be doing. I would advise him on an FYI basis of who had been selected to head the campaigns in the various States but he showed very little interest in that.

Mr. DASH. When you made your reports to Mr. Haldeman, especially those reports that came from the committee, could you briefly tell us, but in some detail, what kind of reports you made? How did you report to Mr. Haldeman?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, as I mentioned in my opening statement I prepared periodically, usually once a week or once every 2 weeks memorandums entitled "Political Matters Memos."

These memorandums would summarize the information that I had accumulated from the politically active people on the White House staff, Mr. Colson, Mr. Dent, information I had accumulated from 1701, from the various State organizations, he had quite an interest.

Mr. DASH. When you say 1701 what are you referring to?

Mr. STRACHAN. That is the Committee To Re-Elect the President. He had quite an interest in California so I would talk with the California people, and then I would write a memorandum, usually quite long, 8, 9, 10 pages, with several attachments as backup. The main purpose of attaching the tabs would be that I would refer in the paragraphs to information that I thought he should read in the original form, and would attach it as a tab.

Mr. DASH. Were some of your communications in an oral form rather than in a memorandum form?

Mr. STRACHAN. He prefers to communicate in writing. Of course, I would have oral communications with him but the great bulk of information that he received from me regarding the campaign would be in writing.

Mr. DASH. All right, now, when he received from you a political matter memorandum with the various items indicated, and the tabs, how would he respond to you concerning those items that were brought to his attention by you?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, he would always read with a pen and he would write his comments beside them or check the item as he read each particular paragraph. Occasionally he would write his views on the political matters memo the paragraph that dealt with the particular subject.

Mr. DASH. In instances, I take it, you would be given, or at least get indications from him, as to what he wanted you to do to follow up on various matters?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, usually, his comments on the side would be cryptic and humorous. If he had a disagreement as to the way things were being done at the committee, he would send a memorandum to John Mitchell or on occasion to Jeb Magruder, or make a note to me that I should contact a particular individual about something.

Mr. DASH. Now, when, on the basis of any particular information that you presented Mr. Haldeman in the form of, say, a political matters memorandum, he wanted to have a meeting with somebody, would you prepare any particular paper with regard to that meeting?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes, I would prepare what would be characterized as a talking paper. They were fairly structured, formalized in Mr.
Haldeman's office. Prior to a meeting, for example, with John Mitchell, I would prepare a talking paper of subjects I thought he should cover with him.

Mr. DASH. By the way, when Mr. Haldeman would put a check.

I think you mentioned, by an item, what would that mean to you?

Mr. STRACHAN. That would indicate that he had read it.

Mr. DASH. Now, do you recall whether Mr. Magruder, who frequently, I take it, did give you information concerning the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, gave you any information concerning an intelligence plan prior to March 30, 1972?

Mr. STRACHAN. Prior to March 30, 1972?

Mr. DASH. Yes.

Mr. STRACHAN. No; he did not.

Mr. DASH. Now, have you read or heard Mr. Magruder's testimony?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes; I have.

Mr. DASH. We have the testimony here, but I think I can expedite matters by briefly referring to it. Mr. Magruder did testify that certainly after the February 4, 1972, meeting, he communicated to you about the meeting, about the contents of the meeting, and in fact, sent you copies of the notes or memorandums of the so-called Liddy plan that had been presented to Mr. Mitchell in Mr. Mitchell's office where Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder, Mr. Liddy met with Mr. Mitchell. Are you familiar with Mr. Magruder's testimony in that regard?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes; I am.

Mr. DASH. Did Mr. Magruder do that?

Mr. STRACHAN. No; he did not. Mr. Magruder—and I have read his testimony carefully—relies on the fact that automatically, materials would have come over to me. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has established that that is not true. Materials do not automatically come over to me. And in this particular case—

Mr. DASH. How did the Federal Bureau of Investigation establish that that is not true?

Mr. STRACHAN. They interviewed several of his secretaries and people in his office and they indicated that matters were not always sent to Mr. Strachan or to the White House, that they would be held back at the express direction of Mr. Magruder.

Mr. DASH. Would it be true that important matters, matters of significance, would be sent over to you? Would you not agree that a plan such as the so-called Liddy plan to engage in electronic surveillance for political intelligence was a significant matter?

Mr. STRACHAN. Obviously, that is a significant matter, but I think Mr. Magruder probably relied upon the fact that John Dean was present at the meeting to report to the appropriate people at the White House.

Mr. DASH. Could you tell us at this point about that separate relationship? What was Mr. Dean's relationship with Mr. Haldeman as apart from your relationship?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, Mr. Dean had line responsibility as distinguished from mine of staff responsibility. He would have a certain amount of independent authority and would function on projects on his own and report to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman on matters on which he needed guidance.
Kunzig, who is now an associate judge of the U.S. Court of Claims.

Mr. Sampson has been Acting Administrator of General Services since June 2, 1972. He joined the General Services Administration in 1969 as Commissioner of the Federal Supply Service. From 1970 to 1972 he was Commissioner of the Public Buildings Service in GSA and the first Deputy Administrator of GSA for Special Projects.

He came to the General Services Administration after 6 years in Pennsylvania State government, where he was secretary of administration and budget secretary under Gov. Raymond P. Shafer, and deputy secretary for procurement, department of property and supplies, under Gov. William W. Scranton. Prior to entering government service, he was employed by the General Electric Co. for 12 years.

Mr. Sampson was born on October 8, 1926, in Warren, R.I. He received his B.S. degree in business administration from the University of Rhode Island in 1951 and has done graduate work at the George Washington University.

Active in several professional organizations, Mr. Sampson was presented the Synergy III Award for outstanding contributions toward the advancement of architecture by the Society of American Registered Architects in 1972. In 1973 he was selected as one of the Top Ten Public Works Men of the Year, and he was named an honorary member of the American Institute of Architects.

He and his wife, Blanche, have four children and reside in Washington, D.C.

*Note:* For the President's statement upon announcing his intention to nominate Mr. Sampson, see the preceding item.

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**The Watergate Investigation**

**Statements by the President. May 22, 1973**

Recent news accounts growing out of testimony in the Watergate investigations have given grossly misleading impressions of many of the facts, as they relate both to my own role and to certain unrelated activities involving national security.

Already, on the basis of second- and third-hand hearsay testimony by persons either convicted or themselves under investigation in the case, I have found myself accused of involvement in activities I never heard of until I read about them in news accounts.

These impressions could also lead to a serious misunderstanding of those national security activities which, though totally unrelated to Watergate, have become entangled in the case. They could lead to further compromise of sensitive national security information.

I will not abandon my responsibilities. I will continue to do the job I was elected to do.

In the accompanying statement, I have set forth the facts as I know them as they relate to my own role.

With regard to the specific allegations that have been made, I can and do state categorically:

1. I had no prior knowledge of the Watergate operation.
2. I took no part in, nor was I aware of, any subsequent efforts that may have been made to cover up Watergate.
3. At no time did I authorize any offer of executive clemency for the Watergate defendants, nor did I know of any such offer.
4. I did not know, until the time of my own investigation, of any effort to provide the Watergate defendants with funds.
5. At no time did I attempt, or did I authorize others to attempt, to implicate the CIA in the Watergate matter.
6. It was not until the time of my own investigation that I learned of the break-in at the office of Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist, and I specifically authorized the furnishing of this information to Judge Byrne.
7. I neither authorized nor encouraged subordinates to engage in illegal or improper campaign tactics.

In the accompanying statement, I have sought to provide the background that may place recent allegations in perspective. I have specifically stated that executive privilege will not be invoked as to any testimony concerning possible criminal conduct or discussions of possible criminal conduct, in the matters under investigation. I want the public to learn the truth about Watergate and those guilty of any illegal actions brought to justice.

Allegations surrounding the Watergate affair have so escalated that I feel a further statement from the President is required at this time.

A climate of sensationalism has developed in which even second- or third-hand hearsay charges are headlined as fact and repented as fact.

Important national security operations which themselves had no connection with Watergate have become entangled in the case.

As a result, some national security information has already been made public through court orders, through the subpoenaing of documents, and through testimony when witnesses have given in judicial and Congressional proceedings. Other sensitive documents are now threatened with disclosure. Continued silence about those operations would compromise rather than protect them, and would also serve to perpetuate a grossly distorted view—which recent partial disclosures have given—of the nature and purpose of those operations.
memorandum of the options approved. After reconsideration, however, prompted by the opposition of Director Hoover, the agencies were notified 5 days later, on July 28, that the approval had been rescinded. The options initially approved had included resumption of certain intelligence operations which had been suspended in 1966. These in turn had included authorization for surreptitious entry—breaking and entering, in effect—on specified categories of targets in specified situations related to national security.

Because the approval was withdrawn before it had been implemented, the net result was that the plan for expanded intelligence activities never went into effect.

The documents spelling out this 1970 plan are extremely sensitive. They include—and are based upon—assessments of certain foreign intelligence capabilities and procedures, which of course must remain secret. It was this unused plan and related documents that John Dean removed from the White House and placed in a safe deposit box, giving the keys to Judge Sirica. The same plan, still unused, is being headlined today.

Coordination among our intelligence agencies continued to fall short of our national security needs. In July 1970, having earlier discontinued the FBI’s liaison with the CIA, Director Hoover ended the FBI’s normal liaison with all other agencies except the White House. To help remedy this, an Intelligence Evaluation Committee was created in December 1970. Its members included representatives of the White House, CIA, FBI, NSA, the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Defense, and the Secret Service.

The Intelligence Evaluation Committee and its staff were instructed to improve coordination among the intelligence community and to prepare evaluations and estimates of domestic intelligence. I understand that its activities are now under investigation. I did not authorize nor do I have any knowledge of any illegal activity by this Committee. If it went beyond its charter and did engage in any illegal activities, it was totally without my knowledge or authority.

The Special Investigations Unit

On Sunday, June 13, 1971, The New York Times published the first installment of what came to be known as “The Pentagon Papers.” Not until a few hours before publication did any responsible Government official know that they had been stolen. Most officials did not know they existed. No senior official of the Government had read them or knew with certainty what they contained.

All the Government knew, at first, was that the papers comprised 47 volumes and some 7,000 pages, which had been taken from the most sensitive files of the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA, covering military and diplomatic moves in a war that was still going on.

Moreover, a majority of the documents published with the first three installments in The Times had not been included in the 47-volume study—raising serious questions about what and how much else might have been taken.

There was every reason to believe this was a security leak of unprecedented proportions.

It created a situation in which the ability of the Government to carry on foreign relations even in the best of circumstances could have been severely compromised. Other governments no longer knew whether they could deal with the United States in confidence. Against the background of the delicate negotiations the United States was then involved in on a number of fronts—with regard to Vietnam, China, the Middle East, nuclear arms limitations, U.S.-Soviet relations, and others—in which the utmost degree of confidentiality was vital, it posed a threat so grave as to require extraordinary actions.

Therefore during the week following the Pentagon Papers publication, I approved the creation of a Special Investigations Unit within the White House—which later came to be known as the “plumbers.” This was a small group at the White House whose principal purpose was to stop security leaks and to investigate other sensitive security matters. I looked to John Ehrlichman for the supervision of this group.

Egil Krogh, Mr. Ehrlichman’s assistant, was put in charge. David Young was added to this unit, as were E. Howard Hunt and C. Gordon Liddy.

The unit operated under extremely tight security rules. Its existence and functions were known only to a very few persons at the White House. These included Messrs. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean.

At about the time the unit was created, Daniel Ellsberg was identified as the person who had given the Pentagon Papers to The New York Times. I told Mr. Krogh that as a matter of first priority, the unit should find out all it could about Mr. Ellsberg’s associates and his motives. Because of the extreme gravity of the situation, and not then knowing what additional national secrets Mr. Ellsberg might disclose, I did impress upon Mr. Krogh the vital importance to the national security of his assignment. I did not authorize and had no knowledge of any illegal means to be used to achieve this goal.

However, because of the emphasis I put on the crucial importance of protecting the national security, I can understand how highly motivated individuals could have felt justified in engaging in specific activities that I would have disapproved had they been brought to my attention.

Consequently, as President, I must and do assume responsibility for such actions despite the fact that I at no time approved or had knowledge of them.

I also assigned the unit a number of other investigatory matters, dealing in part with compiling an accurate record of events related to the Vietnam war, on which the Government’s records were inadequate (many previous
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SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
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UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 25 AND 26, 1973
Book 3

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Mr. Dean. Again, because of the very sensitive nature of information contained in these documents, and the problems that information might unfairly cause those individuals, I shall not discuss the documents further, other than to point out to the committee that the interest in Mr. Larry O'Brien dates back, from my records, to the time I first joined the White House staff in July 1970, while the interest in Senators Muskie and McGovern developed as the reelection campaign developed.

I would now like to turn to a political intelligence and security plan that was designed for the campaign, but ultimately was rejected.

**Operation Sandwedge**

While Caulfield was a member of my staff, the use of Mr. Ulasewicz slowly diminished, in that I had no need for such investigative work, and I only requested Caulfield to obtain investigative information when someone else on the staff requested it. While I did try to find assignments for Caulfield that related to the work of the counsel's office, it was difficult in that he was not a lawyer.

Mr. Caulfield was aware of this situation and in the spring of 1971 he came to me and told me that he was thinking of leaving the White House staff and establishing an investigative/security consulting corporation. He felt that there was a need and a market for what he described as a “Republican intertel” — Intertel being a firm being a long established firm that has been in existence working in this field. He told me that he could have a going concern by campaign time and that his firm could provide investigative/security assistance to the campaign.

We casually discussed this on several occasions. The basic and initial concept he had developed was an operation that could be funded by contracts with corporations. Mr. Caulfield's firm would provide services for these corporations, but it would also provide free services to the 1972 reelection campaign. I recall telling Caulfield that I could not help him in the intelligence field because I did not have any expertise in the area but I advised him that he should work with a lawyer in developing the concept he had outlined to me because it was fraught with legal problems. For example, I told him corporations are prohibited under Federal law from making direct campaign contributions.

Shortly after these conversations, Caulfield informed me that he had formed a group to develop a plan to submit to Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, and Mr. Mitchell. The planning group intended to become the principal officers of the corporation once it commenced its activity. Caulfield and the group spent several months developing their plans and in early August or September of 1971 Caulfield brought me a copy of a memorandum entitled Operation Sandwedge and told me he was seeking a meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman to discuss the matter and requested that I assist him in getting a meeting with Mr. Mitchell. I do not know if Mr. Caulfield met with Mr. Ehrlichman. If he did, I was not present and have no knowledge of the meeting.

I read the memorandum and found it to be a privately operated extension of the types of things that Caulfield had been performing for Ehrlichman. I returned the memorandum to Caulfield and told him I would raise it with Mitchell. To the best of my recollection Operat-
tion Sandwedge envisioned the creation of a corporation called Security Consulting Group, Inc., which was to have offices in Washington, Chicago, and New York. It was to have an "overt" and "covert" capacity. The covert capacity would have operated out of New York—presumably under the aegis of Mr. Ulasevicz—and was to be separate and apart from the other operations in Washington and Chicago. The principal activity of the Security Consulting Group, Inc., was to provide private security for all phases of the campaign, but the New York "covert" operation would have the capacity to provide "bag men" to carry money and engage in electronic surveillance—if called upon to do so.

Although I returned the copy of the Operation Sandwedge memorandum given me by Caulfield, I did find in my records a copy of the proposed budget, which reflects some of the items I have just mentioned. I also found a number of memorandums relating to the campaign security aspects of the plan. I have submitted these documents to the committee.

"[The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 34-9."

Mr. DEAN. I did discuss Operation Sandwedge with Mr. Mitchell. I recall that he was not interested at all. He told me that he thought Jack Caulfield was a fine person, but he felt the principal problems would relate to security and the problems that demonstrators might pose to the campaign. Mitchell said he wanted a lawyer to handle any such operation and asked me to think about candidates. I told him that Jack Caulfield had requested an opportunity to discuss his plan with him, and I told him that I told Jack I would convey the message. Mitchell did not wish to discuss the proposal, so I kept putting Caulfield off when he raised it with me because I liked Jack and did not want to hurt his feelings, so I continued to keep putting him off.

I also recall that Ehrlichman raised Operation Sandwedge with me. I do not know if this was a result of his meeting with Caulfield or Caulfield sending him a copy of the memorandum. Ehrlichman told me that he would like to keep Tony Ulasevicz around during the campaign, but he did not think much of Caulfield's proposed grand plan. Ehrlichman told me that Mitchell knew about Tony Ulasevicz and that Mitchell and Jack should talk about Tony's future.

Meanwhile, Caulfield kept requesting an answer on his plans. He had his heart set on his proposal; he had spent long hours preparing it and I knew he was going to be very disappointed to learn that it had been shot down. Every few weeks Caulfield would send an item to me to prompt me to take some action. I have submitted to the committee the type of items he would send.

"[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-10."

Mr. DEAN. I would just file them and do nothing, as I had decided that the best course of action to save Jack's feelings was to let the matter die a natural death through no action. Indeed, that happened.

By November 1971, Caulfield realized that his plan was dead and he abandoned the idea. Realizing this, he told me he would like to work for Mr. Mitchell during the campaign as an aide-de-camp, and requested that I assist him in getting an appointment with Mitchell. I arranged for him to meet with Mr. Mitchell on November 24, 1971.

*See p. 1121.
**See p. 1155.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
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at which Mr. Mitchell told me that while my work was highly thought of, there had been a decision made to "semimilitarize" the U.S. Marshal's Office and therefore they were considering a retiring, high, military official for this post. Between December 1968 and April of 1969, I was interviewed for and pursued a variety of possible appointive jobs in Washington.

In late March 1969, I received a telephone call from Mr. Ehrlichman who asked me if I would visit him in his office a day or two later. I did so and at that meeting he asked if I would be willing to set up a private security entity in Washington, D.C., for purposes of providing investigative support for the White House. I told him that I would think this over but by the time I had returned home that evening, I had decided that I did not wish to do this. I called him the next day with a counterproposal, namely, that I join the White House staff under Mr. Ehrlichman and, besides providing liaison functions with various law enforcement agencies, thereby be available to process any investigative requests from the White House. I mentioned to him that if he agreed with my proposal I would intend to use the services of one Mr. Anthony Ulasewicz who was a detective with the New York City Police Department nearing retirement. He said he would think about it and get back to me.

A few days later I received a call from his office asking if I would come to Washington to discuss the matter and that meeting resulted in my appointment to the White House staff on April 8, 1969.

My duties at that time consisted of being a White House liaison with a variety of law enforcement agencies in the Federal Government, through arrangements worked out with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Herbert Kalmbach, and Anthony Ulasewicz. Mr. Ulasewicz retired from the New York City Police Department and was paid on a monthly basis by the Kalmbach law firm, that employment commencing on July 9, 1969. During the next 3 years, first on orders from Mr. Ehrlichman and later in some instances, on orders from Mr. John Dean, Mr. Ulasewicz, under my supervision, performed a variety of investigative functions, reporting the results of his findings to the White House through me. I do not fully recall all of the investigations performed in this fashion but have available a list of those which I do recall if the committee wishes to examine it.

In July of 1970 Mr. John Dean became counsel to the President and Mr. Ehrlichman was named to the position of Presidential Assistant for Domestic Affairs. Thereafter I worked directly for Mr. Dean, but on occasion, Mr. Ehrlichman continued to call upon me directly for investigative work involving the services of Mr. Ulasewicz.

In the spring of 1971, I began to notice that, for some reason, the amount of investigation work handled by Mr. Ulasewicz through me had diminished. Much of the talk around the White House was beginning to center more and more on the 1972 Presidential election and I began to examine ways in my mind in which I might become involved. Since I had performed security duties in the 1968 election campaign, and realizing some of the security demands of a Presidential campaign, I wished to become involved in the security area of the campaign.

Toward that end, I composed a memorandum suggesting that an outside security capability be formed to handle the demand of the
1972 campaign. Such an organization would have a capability to perform various security functions to insure the security of the traveling staff, the Committee to Re-Elect the President headquarters, the convention site and would employ various guards and security people. In short, I was suggesting the formation of a capability to cover all the security needs of a Presidential campaign. The name I gave to this suggested operation was “Sandwedge.”

I further suggested that I leave the White House staff and set up this security entity, if it were approved, and suggested a budget of approximately $300,000 to $400,000. I gave the memorandum to Mr. Dean and got the strong impression from him that it went to higher levels, but I have no knowledge of who saw it. During the summer of 1971, I had high hopes that my proposal would be accepted and had one other direct conversation at lunch about its contents with Mr. Dean and with Jeb Magruder. Between the end of June and October of 1971, I inquired of Mr. Dean as to the status of my proposal on numerous occasions but ultimately was told by Mr. Dean that he didn’t think my suggestion was “going anywhere.”

I was disappointed that my memorandum had been refused. I next spoke with Mr. Dean concerning obtaining a position as a personal aide to John Mitchell, when he became campaign director. Mr. Dean agreed to ask Mr. Mitchell if such a position was available; he did so, and on November 24, 1971, he accompanied me to an interview at Mr. Mitchell’s office.

I explained to Mr. Mitchell that what I wanted was a position similar to that occupied by Dwight Chapin in relation to the President and that in addition to handling the kinds of activities that Chapin handled for the President, I could be of value to Mr. Mitchell as a bodyguard. Mr. Mitchell listened to what I had to say but was non-committal as to what status I would occupy with him. He said, however, that we would “get that all straightened out when I arrived at the reelection committee.” He was unsure as to when he would join the reelection committee but thought that it would be sometime in January or February of 1972. I left his office and walked back to the White House by myself. Mr. Dean remained and as I was walking through Mr. Mitchell’s outer office I noted Mr. Gordon Liddy sitting with Mr. Dean evidently waiting to see Mr. Mitchell.

At that time, I was sure I had a position with Mr. Mitchell but the nature of my duties was quite unsettled. Ultimately, on the 1st of March 1972, I went to the reelection committee to commence my duties there. It soon became clear to me that Mr. Mitchell regarded me only as a bodyguard which was not what I had had in mind at all. During March I took two trips with Mr. Mitchell outside of Washington, one brief trip to New York City and the other to Key Biscayne, Fla. Since Mr. Mitchell regarded me as his personal bodyguard I carried a revolver in my briefcase.

By the time the trip to Florida occurred in late March, I was already in touch with a friend of mine at the Treasury Department about possible employment there. After being in Florida for approximately 2 to 3 days, I received word that my house in Fairfax, Va., had been burglarized and so I flew home to attend to my wife and family. Mr. Fred LaRue had joined us in Florida after our arrival and upon my departure, he asked that I leave my revolver in his possession since
2. In response to a Political Matters Memorandum from Strachan dated December 6, 1971, Haldeman approved Gordon Liddy's transfer to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President (CRP) at an increase of $4,000 per annum above his White House salary, as an exception to the rule that no White House employee would receive a salary at CRP higher than that which he was receiving at the White House.

2.1 Memorandum from Gordon Strachan to H. R. Haldeman, December 6, 1971 (received from the White House).
2.1 NOTES: The section of the following memorandum which pertains to the above statement is the first paragraph of point 5, beginning on page 4 and ending after "Other" on page 5.

The handwritten notes on the memorandum are not readable on the xerox copy of the memorandum received by the House Judiciary Committee.
Jeb Magruder met with the Attorney General for four hours on December 4. Some of the matters covered require decisions by you:

1) Julie Nixon Eisenhower - "Registration '72"

Jeb Magruder has recommended to the Attorney General that Julie Nixon Eisenhower become the Honorary Chairman for "Registration '72", which is a joint registration effort by the Committee (Ken Rietz) and the RNC (Ed DeBolt) in the largest counties of California, Florida, and Texas. This position would require Julie to "make appearances, write letters, and otherwise get publicity" for these registration drives. In terms of a particular scheduling requirement, she would have to appear at the RNC meeting this week for the announcement. Dave Parker reports that she will be in Virginia and so is available. The Attorney General defers entirely to you on whether she should become Honorary Chairman. The Attorney General feels that you should consider if this appointment of Julie Nixon Eisenhower as Honorary Chairman of Registration '72 is "too gimmicky". (The original memorandum to the Attorney General is attached at Tab A.)

Yes, Julie Nixon Eisenhower is to be named Honorary Chairman of Registration '72

- No, Julie is not to be Honorary Chairman
- Other

2) RNC Budget - White House Support

The RNC is currently preparing their budget for 1972. The Attorney General will receive a report from Tom
Evans today on the general financial condition of the RNC. A copy of the report will be forwarded for you. In 1971 the White House subsidiary account was $500,000. This paid for advancements, White House special events and receptions, the Colson/Klein printing and distribution of materials, and the Vice President's expenses. Tom Evans of the RNC wants to continue to have a White House account of 500 to pay for these support activities. The Attorney General estimates that there will be an additional 1,000 in "political expenses" for the White House in 1972. The Attorney General believes that their should be a single White House political account of 1,500 for 1972. According to Magruder, the Attorney General believes this account should be controlled at the Committee instead of the RNC to assure a unified accounting mechanism and to protect against any "McCloskey type" criticism of the RNC for giving financial assistance to the political activities of the President.

Since Tom Evans and the RNC must be told before the RNC meeting this week, the Attorney General asks that you consider this general approach without the specific budget information from the RNC.

Recommendation:

That you approve of the transfer of all "political expenses" for the White House to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President.

Approve Disapprove

If you approve I will inform the Attorney General through Magruder. Upon receipt of the detailed RNC budget information Bruce Kehrli (as the new Staff Secretary) and I will develop recommended procedures with Hugh Sloan and Jeb Magruder.

3) The Nixon Re-Elector

Jeb Magruder, Lyn Nofziger and Frank Leonard prepared the materials at Tab B regarding a "campaign publication to get the message out to the organization". The format would be similar to that of 1968. The Attorney General basically thinks it would be a good idea but asks whether you believe it is a generally good or bad idea. If you
give your general approval, Magruder will have Peter Dailey prepare a detailed proposal for review by you and the Attorney General. Frank Leonard would have primary responsibility for the publication that may be called the Nixon Re-Elector.

Recommendation:

That you approve the general idea of a tabloid publication for the Campaign similar to the Nixon Re-Elector, subject to review of the Peter Dailey detailed proposal.

Approve  Disapprove

--------------------------------------------

4) Committee Press Relations

The question of whether and at what salary Van Shumway is to move to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President raises several related matters. According to Magruder, the Attorney General assumes that the President will announce his candidacy for re-election on January 6. Although Magruder is not privy to the decision he believes that there will be just a low-key Presidential statement. The candidacy will not be announced at a press conference or during a "conversation with the President" as had been suggested. It may be that the Attorney General has reviewed these matters with the President.

The Attorney General expects that after the announcement, Ziegler will not answer "political questions" but rather will refer them to the Committee. This means that on January 6 the Committee must have a sophisticated individual to handle the questions. If Shumway cannot definitely be transferred to the Committee by January 6 or some other date certain, the Attorney General believes the Committee must hire someone else. The Attorney General respects the fact that Shumway must be replaced but also appreciates Malek's assessment of the chances of finding a replacement: 50/50 for Shumway replacement by January 3; 75/25 by January 15; but 25% chance that it will be impossible to obtain a Shumway replacement that is acceptable to Colson and Klein. The Attorney General wants the press man at the Committee to be compatible with Colson. The Attorney General rejected Jim Holland, the very capable PIO at the Post Office because Colson rejected Malek.
One alternative would be to have Cliff Miller become the press man on January 3. He currently has no operational responsibilities but serves as a "consultant" to the Attorney General on public relations, press, polling and research, and advertising. The Attorney General has given some thought to making Cliff Miller the top PR man for the Campaign. He could serve as the Herb Klein of the 1968 Campaign for 1972. The possibility of Miller performing this function is increasing because Colson told Magruder not to consider Neal Freeman because Colson may be hiring him.

Magruder wants a "reading" from you about Cliff Miller as the top PR man so that he can advise the Attorney General. After three years of observation Higby believes Cliff Miller is not that good. The one project I have worked with Miller on -- the Shumway transfer -- leads me to the same conclusion.

Agree, Miller not strong enough to handle top PR spot in Campaign
Disagree, Miller strong and should be considered by the Attorney General
Other

In the meantime, Ann Dore, a New York PR person recruited by Magruder and Miller, will begin handling some press relations at the Committee, work with the 10 Nixon State Chairmen to prevent another New Hampshire press announcement disaster, and eventually work with the surrogate candidates on radio and TV coverage. She begins December 13.

The net result of this sketch of the Committee's press/PR situation is that you must decide whether Malek should be instructed to have a replacement for Shumway locked with Colson and Klein by a date, hopefully January 3.

Yes, Malek must find a Shumway replacement by a date certain
No, Malek should assist Magruder in finding someone else to handle press relations at the Committee
Other

5) General Counsel to the Committee

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Gordon Liddy will become General Counsel to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President on December 14. He has been working with Bud Krogh on the declassification project. Liddy is paid $26,000 by the Domestic Council. Bud Krogh had been urging Ken Cole to raise his salary, but nothing happened during the freeze. Krogh talked with the Attorney General and recommended that Liddy receive an increase. Dean agrees that Liddy should receive an increase to $30,000 because of his age (41), experience, and prior sacrifice. The Attorney General said the Committee will hire Liddy, and he won't be paid any less than he is receiving from the Domestic Council. Magruder has put a hold on Liddy's transfer to the Committee at $30,000 because of the rule that no one goes to the Committee a salary higher than he is receiving at the White House. Dean and Krogh are familiar with this rule, but strongly urge an exception in this case.

Grant exception, Liddy to receive 30,000 per annum at Committee

Deny exception, Liddy accept job at 26,000 or find someone else

Other

The subject of salaries at the Committee appears in the talking paper for you to cover with the Attorney General. An updated version of this talking paper of subjects pending will be submitted separately.

Other matters which Magruder discussed with the Attorney General which do not require decisions by you include:

1) Advertising Advisory Group

The Advertising Advisory Group (list attached at Tab C) will hold its first meeting December 9. The group will meet periodically to advise Peter Dailey.

2) Direct Mail Fund Raising

The Richard A. Viguerie Company will probably handle direct mail fund raising for the Committee. In addition, the Attorney General has authorized the Viguerie Company to conduct direct mail fund raising for former Senator McCarthy on the condition that he run "in another party", not as a Democrat.
3) Americans for Agnew Group

The Attorney General decided against doing anything to encourage or discourage the Americans for Agnew group that recently sent out a 50,000 mailing over John Wayne's signature.

4) The Middle Level Campaign Strategy Group

The middle level Campaign Strategy Group met on November 29 and December 1. The minutes are attached at Tab D. The minutes cover New Hampshire Campaign details, Campaign publications, and suggestions for the Florida primary.
3. On January 27, 1972 Attorney General Mitchell, John Dean, Jeb Magruder, acting CRP campaign director, and G. Gordon Liddy, who had assumed his position as CRP counsel, met in Mitchell’s office. At this meeting Liddy proposed a $1 million political intelligence operation, which contemplated the use of electronic surveillance of political opponents, abduction of radical leaders, muggings, and the use of call girls. Mitchell rejected the proposal.

3.1 John Mitchell log, January 27, 1972 (received from Senate Select Committee (SSC)).
3.2 Jeb Magruder testimony, 2 SSC 787-88.
3.3 John Mitchell testimony, 5 SSC 1843.
3.4 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 929-30.
Mr. Mitchell -- Thursday, January 27, 1972

7:20  Arrived in NBC Studio, 4001 Nebraska Avenue, Today Show
7:30  Introduction
7:38  Interview begins
7:50  Interview ends
7:55  Left for Department of Justice
8:25  Arrived in office
9:00  SAW Ambassador Graham A. Martin, Amb. to Italy
9:30  SAW Russ Ergood
10:00 SAW Pat Gray
10:10 SAW Harry Flemming
10:25 Dr. Kissinger called & t.
11:10 SAW Charles Turgeon
11:15 SAW John Dean, Gordon Liddy and Jeb Magruder
1:15  Ret. Fred Malek's call & t.
1:25  SAW Harold Clancy and Bob Collier

Retyped from indistinct original
Mr. Mitchell -- Thursday, January 27, 1972

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11:10 SAW Charles Tregoe

11:15 SAW John Dean, Gordon Liddy and Jeb Magruder


1:15  Ret. Fred Volkle's call & t.

1:20  Ret. Bill Crampton's call & t.

1:25  SAW Harold Chace and Bob Collier
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, AND 14, 1973
Book 2

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WASHINGTON : 1973
tioned particularly Mr. Dean. He did mention other individuals but I cannot recall their names, and indicated he had been told he would have approximately $1 million budget. I indicated to him at that time that $1 million budget was a sizable budget and that he should prepare the background documents necessary to justify this budget and that he would then have an opportunity to present the budget to the Attorney General.

Mr. DASH. Now, did there come a time when Mr. Liddy did present his plan to the Attorney General, Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. In February I set up an appointment with Mr. Mitchell and John Dean on February 27 at 4 in the afternoon.

Mr. DASH. On February——

Mr. MAGRUDER. The first meeting was February 27.

Mr. DASH. May I refresh your recollection, Mr. Magruder, do you mean February 27 or January 27?

Mr. MAGRUDER. I am sorry, January 27, 1971. And we had a meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office at 4 in the afternoon as I recall it.

Mr. DASH. Who attended that meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office on January 27?

Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean, Mr. Liddy, and myself.

Mr. DASH. Prior to the meeting on January 27, did you know any of the details of the plan that Mr. Liddy was going to present on that day?

Mr. MAGRUDER. No, I did not.

Mr. DASH. Could you describe in detail what occurred on January 27 in Mr. Mitchell's office?

Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Liddy brought with him a series of charts, they were professionally done charts, and had color, some color, on each of the charts. As I recall there were approximately six charts. Each chart contained a subject matter and was headed by a code word. I cannot recall many of the code words, the one I do recall is Gemstone. I think one was called Target but I cannot specifically recall the other code words. Each chart had a listing of certain types of activities with a budget and, as I recall, there was one chart that totaled the activities and the budget totaled to the $1 million figure that he had mentioned previously.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Liddy was presenting this in the form of a show and tell operation?

Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. DASH. What were the size of these charts?

Mr. MAGRUDER. As I recall, they were approximately probably the size of the chart that is on the display stand.

Mr. DASH. Were they on an easel or display stand in the Attorney General's office?

Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes.

Mr. DASH. Do you have any idea where these charts were prepared or who prepared them?

Mr. MAGRUDER. No, I do not.

Mr. DASH. You say the charts dealt with various projects and they had code names on them. Could you give us your best recollection what some of these projects were?

Mr. MAGRUDER. This was, of course, the projects, including wire-tapping, electronic surveillance, and photography. There were projects
relating to the abduction of individuals, particularly members of radical groups that we were concerned about on the convention at San Diego. Mr. Liddy had a plan where the leaders would be abducted and detained in a place like Mexico and that they would then be returned to this country at the end of the convention.

He had another plan which would have used women as agents to work with members of the Democratic National Committee at their convention and here in Washington, and hopefully, through their efforts, they would obtain information from them.

Mr. Dash. With regard to these women—

Senator Ervin. I am going to ask the audience to please refrain from laughter or any kind of demonstration.

Mr. Dash. With regard to the use of these women as agents, did this involve the use of a yacht at Miami?

Mr. Magruder. He envisioned renting a yacht in Miami and having it set up for sound and photographs.

Mr. Dash. And what would the women be doing at that time?

Mr. Magruder. I really could only estimate, but—

Mr. Dash. Based on his project, from your recollection, what did he indicate?

Mr. Magruder. Well, they would have been, I think you could consider them call girls.

Mr. Dash. Do you recall any project dealing with a mugging project involving demonstrators?

Mr. Magruder. I do not specifically recall that.

Mr. Dash. Now, what was the total budget that he presented at this meeting?

Mr. Magruder. Approximately $1 million.

Mr. Dash. How long did Mr. Liddy's presentation take?

Mr. Magruder. Approximately 30 minutes.

Mr. Dash. Mr. Magruder, what was Mr. Mitchell's reaction, Mr. Dean's reaction, and your own reaction when you heard this presentation?

Mr. Magruder. I think all three of us were appalled. The scope and size of the project was something that at least in my mind was not envisioned. I do not think it was in Mr. Mitchell's mind or Mr. Dean's, although I can't comment on their state of mind at that time.

Mr. Mitchell, in an understated way, which was his method of dealing with difficult problems like this, indicated that this was not an acceptable project.

Mr. Dash. And did Mr. Mitchell give Mr. Liddy any instructions at the end of this meeting?

Mr. Magruder. He indicated that he would go back to the drawing boards and come up with a more realistic plan.

Mr. Dash. So it would be true that Liddy, at least, left that meeting without being discouraged from continuing to plan an intelligence operation.

Mr. Magruder. I would say he was discouraged, but he was given the right to come up with a more reasonable plan.

Mr. Dash. Did you have any discussion with Mr. Liddy after the meeting?

Mr. Magruder. Yes, he left with John Dean and I on our way back to the committee and indicated his being disturbed because he had
Mr. Mitchell. Authorize their transmission and inspection by whom, sir?

Senator Montoya. The transmission of FBI reports to the CRP or the inspection of FBI reports at the Department of Justice.

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir.

Senator Montoya. Do you know of anyone who did?

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir; I do not.

Senator Montoya. Do you know whether or not these reports were received at the Committee To Re-Elect the President?

Mr. Mitchell. I have no knowledge of any such procedure.

Senator Montoya. This has been testified to that effect heretofore.

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, are we to make perfectly clear we are talking about FBI reports?

Senator Montoya. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, my answers that I have given you stand. I was not aware that anybody testified that FBI reports were being received by the Committee To Re-Elect the President.

Senator Montoya. Now, let us go back to the meetings that you had at the Department of Justice with respect to the Liddy plan on January 27. To put the matter in proper focus, it is my understanding that you met Mr. Liddy on or about November 17 when Mr. Dean brought him to you and introduced him to you, is that correct?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir; November 24.

Senator Montoya. Then, subsequent to this, and to wit, on January 27, you, Mr. Liddy, Mr. Magruder, and Mr. Dean met in your Department of Justice office, where the original Liddy intelligence operation unfolded in charts?

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, sir.

Senator Montoya. Now, how long did you spend at this meeting?

Mr. Mitchell. The meeting, according to the recollection that I have, which comes mainly from my log, was 1 hour or less and there were other—there was another subject matter discussed, which, of course, was the upcoming election law.

Senator Montoya. Now, what was specifically discussed? Will you please relate the dialog that occurred there in the discussion of the Liddy intelligence-gathering plan?

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Senator, I could not possibly relate a dialog that took place that long ago. But I can tell you that the format of it was that Mr. Liddy unfolded his program and everybody just sat with their mouths open while he discussed it and then it was terminated and that was the basis of it. There was not any dialog with respect to the discussion of it other than to shut it off and tell him to go burn it.

Senator Montoya. Then, was there any discussion or statement made—was there any discussion there or any statement made to the effect that he should go back and scale the plan down?

Mr. Mitchell. No.

Senator Montoya [continuing]. Because the $1 million budget that it encompassed was excessive?

Mr. Mitchell. No. Senator, the discussion, as I recall it, was to the effect that that is not what the individuals that were participating in that meeting—certainly, Mr. Dean and myself—and in mind. What we had in mind was going back to information-gathering and taking care of security against demonstrators rather than the contents of that particular proposal.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 25 AND 26, 1973
Book 3

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WASHINGTON : 1973

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a good deal of contact with Liddy, so I requested that he be permitted to keep his pass. This request was turned down, however, because they had decided to provide a fixed number of passes for the people at the reelection committee and Magruder would decide who got the passes. I so informed Liddy and never heard any more about the matter.

Liddy's Plan—Meetings in Mitchell's Office

The next time I recall meeting with Mr. Liddy—I might say before this that I did have a brief occasion to see him in early January, I believe about the 9th through the 14th or 15th, when he attended a general conference in San Diego on the entire scope of the convention and the security problems that were going to confront the commission in San Diego.

After that, the next time I recall meeting Mr. Liddy was at a meeting in Mitchell's office on January 27, 1972. Magruder called my office to set up the meeting and only after I called Magruder to ask why he wanted me to attend the meeting did I learn that Liddy was going to present his intelligence plan. I met Magruder and Liddy at Mitchell's office. Liddy had a series of charts or diagrams which he placed on an easel and the presentation by Liddy began.

I did not fully understand everything Mr. Liddy was recommending at the time because some of the concepts were mind-boggling and the charts were in code names, but I shall attempt to reconstruct the high points that I remember as best I can. Liddy was in effect making a sales pitch. He said that the operations he had developed would be totally removed from the campaign and carried out by professionals. Plans called for mugging squads, kidnapping teams, prostitutes to compromise the opposition, and electronic surveillance. He explained that the mugging squad could, for example, rough up demonstrations that were causing problems. The kidnapping teams could remove demonstration leaders and take them below the Mexican border and thereby diminish the ability of the demonstrators to cause problems at the San Diego convention. The prostitutes could be used at the Democratic convention to get information as well as compromise the persons involved. I recall Liddy saying that the girls would be high class and the best in the business. When discussing the electronic surveillance, he said that he had consulted with one of the best authorities in the country and his plan envisioned far more than bugging and tapping phones. He said that, under his plan, communication between ground facilities and aircraft could also be intercepted.

I might also add that he gave an elaborate description of intercepting various microwaves to travel around the country through various communication facilities and I cannot explain to the committee what that was, because to this day, I do not understand it.

Each major aspect of his proposal was on a chart, with one chart showing the interrelationship with the others. Each operation was given a code name. I have no recollection of these code names. With regard to surveillance, and I do not recall that this was necessarily limited to electronic surveillance, he suggested several potential targets. I cannot recall for certain if it was during this meeting or at the second meeting in early February that he suggested the potential targets. The targets that I recall he suggested were Mr. Larry O'Toole, the Democratic headquarters, and the Fontainebleau Hotel during the Demo-
ocratic Convention. Mr. Liddy concluded his presentation by saying that the plan would cost approximately $1 million.

I do not recall Magruder's reaction during the presentation plan because he was seated beside me but I do recall Mitchell's reaction to the "Mission Impossible" plan. He was amazed. At one point I gave him a look of bewilderment and he winked. Knowing Mitchell, I did not think he would throw Liddy out of the office or tell him he was out of his mind, rather he did what I expected. When the presentation was completed, he took a few long puffs on his pipe and told Liddy that the plan he had developed was not quite what he had in mind and the cost was out of the question. He suggested to Liddy he go back and revise his plan, keeping in mind that he was most interested in the demonstration problem.

I remained in Mitchell's office for a brief moment after the meeting ended, as the charts were being taken off the easel and disassembled and Mitchell indicated to me that Mr. Liddy's proposal was out of the question. I joined Magruder and Liddy and as we left the office I told Liddy to destroy the charts. Mr. Liddy said that he would revise the plans and submit a new proposal. At that point I thought the plan was dead, because I doubted if Mitchell would reconsider the matter. I rode back to my office with Liddy and Magruder, but there was no further conversation of the plan.

The next time I became aware of any discussions on such plans occurred, I believe, on February 4, 1973. Magruder had scheduled another meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office on a revised intelligence plan. I arrived at the meeting very late and when I came in, Mr. Liddy was presenting a scaled down version of his earlier plan. I listened for a few minutes and decided I had to interrupt myself into the discussions. Mr. Mitchell, I felt, was being put on the spot. The only polite way I thought I could end the discussions was to inject that these discussions could not go on in the Office of the Attorney General of the United States and that the meeting should terminate immediately.

At this point the meeting ended. I do not know to this day who kept pushing for these plans. Whether Liddy was pushing or whether Magruder was pushing or whether someone was pushing Magruder, I do not know. I do know, in hindsight, that I should have not been as polite as I was in merely suggesting that Liddy destroy the charts after the first meeting. Rather, I should have said forget the plan completely. After I ended the second meeting, I told Liddy that I would never again discuss this matter with him. I told him that if any such plan were approved, I did not want to know. One thing was certain in my mind, while someone wanted this operation. I did not want any part of it, nor would I have any part of it.

After this second meeting in Mitchell's office, I sought a meeting with Mr. Haldeman to tell him what was occurring, but it took me several days to get to see him. I recall that Haldy got me into Haldeman's office when another appointment had been canceled or postponed. I told Haldeman what had been presented by Liddy and told him that I felt it was incredible, unnecessary, and unwise. I told him that no one at the White House should have anything to do with this. I said that the reelection committee will need an ability to deal with demonstrations, it did not need bugging, nailing, prostitutes, and kidnappers. Haldeman agreed and told me I should have no further dealings on the matter.
4. On February 4, 1972 Attorney General Mitchell, John Dean, Jeb Magruder and Gordon Liddy met in Mitchell's office. Liddy presented a modified version of his proposal with a budget of $500,000. The proposal included plans for electronic surveillance of political opponents. Magruder and Dean have testified that the targets included the office of Lawrence O'Brien, the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee (DNC); the DNC headquarters; and the Democratic Convention headquarters at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami, Florida. Magruder has also testified that the office of Henry Greenspun, editor of the Las Vegas Sun, was mentioned as another target. Mitchell has denied that there was discussion of specific targets. The meeting ended when Dean stated that these subjects should not be discussed in the office of the Attorney General of the United States. Following the meeting, Dean reported on the meeting to Haldeman.

4.1 John Mitchell log, February 4, 1972 (received from SSC).
4.2 Jeb Magruder testimony, 2 SSC 789-90.
4.3 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 930.
4.4 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1611-12.
Mr. Mitchell -- Friday, February 4, 1972

2:55 Called Harry Flemming and talked.
3:15 Called Sen. Sears and talked.
3:30 Called Director J. Edgar Hoover, and talked.
4:00 SAW John Dean, Gordon Liddy and Jeb Magruder.
4:30 Harry Dent called and talked.
5:15 SAW J. Hushen and DAG.
6:30 Left office.

Retyped from indistinct original
Mr. Mitchell -- Friday, February 4, 1972

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PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, AND 14, 1973
Book 2

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973

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assumed that everyone would have accepted this project at face value.
We indicated that certain of these things were inappropriate and
that he would have to redo them and come back at a later date.
Mr. Dash. Did you make any report of the meeting to anyone after
the meeting?
Mr. Magruder. Yes, I made a report to Mr. Strachan at the White
House.
Mr. Dash. Now, did you disclose everything concerning that meet-
ing to Mr. Strachan?
Mr. Magruder. I do not recall at that meeting whether Mr. Liddy
had had these charts put into 81/2 x 11 size to hand out. If he had, I
would have sent those over to Mr. Strachan. I do not remember dis-
cussing it. I do not recall in this meeting whether we had working papers and
so I can't recall specifically; I think just on the phone I discussed the
general nature of his proposal.
Mr. Dash. Was this telephone conversation with Mr. Strachan in
which you reported the general nature of the discussion consistent with
your general reporting to Mr. Strachan as you did from time to time,
matters that should get to the White House staff?
Mr. Magruder. Yes, everything that I did at the committee, every-
things we did was staffed to Mr. Strachan so that he could alert
other officials at the White House as to our activities.
Mr. Dash. Was there a second meeting on the Liddy plan, Mr.
Magruder?
Mr. Magruder. Yes, the following week in February, February 4,
as I recall, we met at 11 in the morning.
Mr. Dash. How did that meeting come about, who attended?
Mr. Magruder. Mr. Liddy indicated that he was ready to discuss a
reduced proposal. I alerted Mr. Dean and he set up an appointment
with Mr. Mitchell and we reviewed a reduced proposal.
Mr. Dash. Where was this meeting?
Mr. Magruder. At the Justice Department.
Mr. Dash. Was it in Mr. Mitchell's office?
Mr. Magruder. Yes. We met in Mr. Mitchell's office. He did not have
charts this time, but rather had—
Mr. Dash. You mean Mr. Liddy did not?
Mr. Magruder. Mr. Liddy did not have charts. He had them reduced
on 81/2 x 11 pages and the scope was reduced considerably.
Mr. Dash. What was retained and what was out?
Mr. Magruder. I cannot recall specifically what was in or what was
out. I do know that the discussion, after his discussions with us, related
only to the wiretapping and photography and not to any of the other
projects. They had been basically discarded.
Mr. Dash. I think you may have testified to this, but who was present
at this second meeting, Mr. Magruder?
Mr. Magruder. Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean, Mr. Liddy, and myself. Mr.
Dean came in approximately 15 minutes or so late, but was there for
most of the meeting.
Mr. Dash. At this time, as you have stated, the project primarily
dealt with wiretapping and photography. Were any targets specifically
mentioned, either by Mr. Liddy or anybody at the meeting?
Mr. Magruder. At that meeting, we did discuss potential targets, we
discussed the potential target of the Democratic National Committee
headquarters, primarily because of information we had relating to Mr. O'Brien that we felt would be possibly damaging to the Democratic National Committee. We discussed the possibility of using electronic surveillance at the Fontainebleau Hotel, which was going to be the Democratic National Committee headquarters, and we discussed the potential of using the same method at the Presidential headquarters. At that time, we did not know who the candidate would be, so it was simply an indication that that would be a target of interest.

Also at that meeting, Mr. Mitchell brought up that he had information as I recall, and I think it was Mr. Mitchell—it was either Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Dean—that they had information relating to Senator Muskie that was in Mr. Greenspun's office in Las Vegas. He was a publisher of the newspaper in Las Vegas.

Mr. Dash. Do you know his full name?

Mr. MacFadden. As I recall, Mr. Henry Greenspun, I think, or spun—Greenspan or Greenspun, I think was his name. He is the publisher of the Las Vegas newspaper.

Mr. Liddy was asked to review the situation in Las Vegas to see if there would be potential for an entry into Mr. Greenspun's—

Mr. Dash. Potential for what?

Mr. MacFadden. Potential for an entry into Mr. Greenspun's office. Mr. Dash. Do you know what it was they were looking for in Mr. Greenspun's office?

Mr. MacFadden. No, I do not.

Mr. Dash. Do you know what the information was that Mr. Mitchell mentioned concerning Mr. O'Brien?

Mr. MacFadden. Yes. We had had information from reliable sources that at the Democratic National Convention, they had a business exposition. The business exposition was being put on by a separate business exposition company. It was our understanding that the fee the business concern paid to this business company was then kicked back or partially kicked back to the Democratic National Committee to assist them in the payment of their debts.

Mr. Dash. Aside from that kind of information, what was the general information or general kind of information that you would be looking for in these break-ins or electronic surveillance?

Mr. MacFadden. Well, I think at that time, we were particularly concerned about the ITT situation. Mr. O'Brien has been a very effective spokesman against our position on the ITT case and I think there was a general concern that if he was allowed to continue as Democratic national chairman, because he was certainly their most professional, at least from our standpoint, their most professional political operator, that he could be very difficult in the coming campaign. So we had hoped that information might discredit him.

Mr. Dash. All right.

How did that meeting end? What was Mr. Mitchell's reaction to this presentation at the second meeting?

Mr. MacFadden. It still was disapproval or, let's say, I should say we agreed that it would not be approved at that time, but we would take it up later; that he just didn't feel comfortable with it even at that level.

Mr. Dash. But again, would it be true to say that at least Mr. Liddy was encouraged to continue in his planning?
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
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cratic Convention. Mr. Liddy concluded his presentation by saying that the plan would cost approximately $1 million.

I do not recall Magruder's reaction during the presentation plan because he was seated beside me but I do recall Mitchell's reaction to the "Mission Impossible" plan. He was amazed. At one point I gave him a look of bewilderment and he winked. Knowing Mitchell, I did not think he would throw Liddy out of the office or tell him he was out of his mind, rather he did what I expected. When the presentation was completed, he took a few long puffs on his pipe and told Liddy that the plan he had developed was not quite what he had in mind and the cost was out of the question. He suggested to Liddy he go back and revise his plan, keeping in mind that he was most interested in the demonstration problem.

I remained in Mitchell's office for a brief moment after the meeting ended, as the charts were being taken off the easel and disassembled and Mitchell indicated to me that Mr. Liddy's proposal was out of the question. I joined Magruder and Liddy and as we left the office I told Liddy to destroy the charts. Mr. Liddy said that he would revise the plans and submit a new proposal. At that point I thought the plan was dead, because I doubted if Mitchell would reconsider the matter. I rode back to my office with Liddy and Magruder, but there was no further conversation of the plan.

The next time I became aware of any discussions of such plans occurred, I believe, on February 4, 1973. Magruder had scheduled another meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office on a revised intelligence plan. I arrived at the meeting very late and when I came in, Mr. Liddy was presenting a scaled down version of his earlier plan. I listened for a few minutes and decided I had to interject myself into the discussions. Mr. Mitchell, I felt, was being put on the spot. The only polite way I thought I could end the discussions was to inject that these discussions could not go on in the Office of the Attorney General of the United States and that the meeting should terminate immediately.

At this point the meeting ended. I do not know to this day who kept pushing for these plans. Whether Liddy was pushing or whether Magruder was pushing or whether someone was pushing Magruder. I do not know, I do know, in hindsight, that I should have not been as polite as I was in merely suggesting that Liddy destroy the charts after the first meeting. Rather, I should have said forget the plan completely. After I ended the second meeting, I told Liddy that I would never again discuss this matter with him. I told him that if any such plan were approved, I did not want to know. One thing was certain in my mind, while someone wanted this operation, I did not want any part of it, nor would I have any part of it.

After this second meeting in Mitchell's office, I sought a meeting with Mr. Haldeman to tell him what was occurring, but it took me several days to get to see him. I recall that Highy got me into Haldeman's office when another appointment had been canceled or postponed. I told Haldeman what had been presented by Liddy and told him that I felt it was incredible, unnecessary, and unwise. I told him that no one at the White House should have anything to do with this. I said that the reelection committee will need an ability to deal with demonstrations, it did not need bugging, mugging, prostitutes, and kidnappers. Haldeman agreed and told me I should have no further dealings on the matter.
Mr. Dash. Now, just carrying on from what my previous observation was as to what Mr. Liddy may have come away from the meeting, obviously Mr. Magruder and Mr. Liddy did not get the impression that you completely disapproved of the program because they did set up only 8 days later a meeting in your office on February 4 with the same participants in which they presented a half million dollar program I understand which included electronic surveillance.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Mr. Dash, I would disagree with the testimony to which you refer insofar as Mr. Magruder or Mr. Liddy either one of them was invited back under the basis of the same concept with respect to the presentation of a plan, and I think Mr. Dean, if I recall his testimony, agrees a little bit more with what my recollection was and it was to the point of this was not what we were interested in. What we were interested in was the gathering of information and the security and protection against the demonstrations.

Mr. Dash. But nevertheless Mr. Magruder and Mr. Liddy did come back and Mr. Dean attended that meeting with you, on February 4, and did present a scaled down version which included electronic surveillance and break-ins, did it not?

Mr. Mitchell. It did but there again there are faulty recollections with what was discussed at that meeting, what the concept of it was. I violently disagree with Mr. Magruder's testimony to the point that the Democratic National Committee was discussed as a target for electronic surveillance for the reasons that he gave, number one with respect to the Democratic back story. We are talking now about the 4th of February.

Mr. Dash. Yes, I know, the reason for centering in on Mr. O'Brien, I believe—

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, and, of course, the newspaperman did not have his column that Magruder referred to until the 23rd of February. He said we were focusing on the Democrats and Mr. O'Brien because Mr. O'Brien's vocal activities in connection with the ITT case, and Mr. Anderson did not publish his column until the 29th of February, and so that what I am pointing out is that this meeting was a relatively short meeting and it was rejected again because of the fact that it had these factors involved. But these targets were not discussed.

Mr. Dash. Were any targets discussed, Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. Mitchell. To the best of my recollection, there were none.

Mr. Dash. Do you also disagree with Mr. Magruder's testimony that you actually volunteered a particular target which was Hank Green spoon's office in Las Vegas for the purpose of obtaining some documents that might involve a political candidate?

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dash, you gave me a great opportunity to correct the record on this. You know, Mr. Magruder said that it could have been Mitchell or Dean and then when you picked up the questioning you said Mitchell, so we are now correcting that record. To the best of my recollection, there was no such discussion of any—

Mr. Dash. However, your recollection is there was no discussion of it?

Mr. Mitchell. No discussion whatsoever.

Mr. Dash. Do you recall Mr. Dean's reaction at that meeting?
Mr. MITCHELL. I recall both of our reactions to it. Although it has been given, Mr. Dean's reaction has been given a different connotation and, of course, it depends on who is telling the story and under what circumstances to who looks like the White Knight and who looks like the Black Knight, of course.

The fact of the matter is that Dean, just like myself, was again aghast that we would have this type of presentation. John Dean, as I recall, not only was aghast at the fact that the program had come back again with electronic surveillance, perhaps a necessary entry in connection with it, I am not sure that entries were always discussed with electronic surveillance because they are not necessarily synonymous, but Mr. Dean was quite strong to the point that these things could not be discussed in the Attorney General's office. I have a clear recollection of that and that was one of the bases upon which the meeting was broken up.

Mr. DASH. And broke up on that basis, I believe.

Mr. MITCHELL. And broke up, along with my observations.

Mr. DASH. What specifically did you say?

Mr. MITCHELL. I cannot tell you specifically any more than I can tell you specifically what Mr. Dean said but my observation was to the point that this was not going to be accepted. It was entirely out of the concept of what we needed and what we needed was again an information-gathering operation along with, of course, the program to get information on and to be able to have security against the demonstrators that we knew were coming.

As you recall, Mr. Dash, at this particular time they had already started to form in substantial numbers in San Diego in connection with the proposed convention, even though that convention was not to happen until August of that year.

Mr. DASH. Well, since this reappearance and presentation of the so-called Liddy plan to you which included these obviously objectionable portions to you as you testified, and since you did not take any violent action at the preceding meeting, did you take any action against Mr. Liddy as a result of his coming back again on February 4 and re-presenting it?

Mr. MITCHELL. Other than to cut off the proposals; no.

Mr. DASH. Why not? Here is a man talking to you as Attorney General about illegal wiretapping and perhaps break-ins. Why, if you did not have him ordered arrested for trying to conspire to do things like this, why didn't you have him fired?

Mr. MITCHELL. In hindsight, I would think that would have been a very viable thing to do. And probably should have been done. Liddy was still an employee of the campaign and I presumed that he would go back to the duties that he was performing without engaging in such activities.

Mr. DASH. Well, you had to be aware at least at that time, Mr. Mitchell, that Liddy could become a very embarrassing employee of the campaign.

Mr. MITCHELL. Not necessarily, unless he violated directions under which he was operating to that point there was no such thing, there was no such evidence that he was violating.
The testimony of JOHN W. DEAN, III, was presented to a full quorum of the Grand Jury.

BEFORE:

RICHARD BEN-VENISTE
Assistant Special Prosecutor
United States Department of Justice

GEORGE T. FRAMPTON, JR.
Assistant Special Prosecutor
United States Department of Justice

JILL VOLNER
Assistant Special Prosecutor
United States Department of Justice
Q Now, on or about February 4, 1972, did you attend another meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office at which the same people were present -- that is, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Liddy and Mr. Magruder and yourself?

A I did, yes.

Q And who called you about this meeting or contacted you about it?

A Again, it had been set up by Mr. Magruder, as the first meeting had, also.

Q Did he tell you what the purpose of the meeting was before you arrived?

A I was aware of the fact that Mr. Liddy was going to present his revised plan.

Q Now, who was present when you arrived at Mr. Mitchell's office?

A Well, I arrived at the meeting quite late. I don't know how long it had been proceeding before I arrived. I had some hesitations about even going to the meeting and then thought I ought to go ahead and go and see what was going on.

When I arrived, the meeting was in progress and Mr. Liddy and Mr. Magruder and Mr. Mitchell were talking about some of the same things that had been talked about in the first presentation. This was really sort of a scaled-down version.
Q Did Mr. Liddy again have charts?
A He didn't have charts. He had handed out some papers, as I recall, and I believe they were budget papers on the revised budget for the plan.

Q When you say papers, you mean eight by eleven?
A Eight by eleven, right.

Q Or legal size?
A Typing size. Eight by eleven, right, I believe was the size.

Q Did you say that the others at the meeting had copies of these documents?
A Yes, they did.

Q While you attended the meeting, was there some discussion of the substance of the scaled-down proposal?
A Well, there was enough discussion that I was aware of what was going on, and I don't know how long I was at the meeting, but it wasn't three, four, five minutes when I thought that I should interject myself in the meeting and I didn't think it was appropriate to be discussing these things. So I tried to do it in as graceful a way as I could, but I said to all present, I said I thought the meeting should stop that these were matters that should not be discussed in the office of the Attorney General of the United States.

Q Now, did you learn, while at the meeting, what the budget for Mr. Liddy's scaled-down program was?
A As I recall it, it had been cut in half.

Q And did you learn whether the revised or scaled-down plan also entailed a considerable amount of electronics surveillance?

A I was certainly aware of the fact that it did involve electronics surveillance, yes.

Q Now, during either of these meetings, or both of these meetings, were any targets discussed for surveillance or other surreptitious intelligence?

A Yes. I can't tell you in which meeting, for certain I recall discussion of this, but I do recall a couple of potential-type targets being mentioned.

I remember one was the Fontaine Bleu Hotel in Miami, because I remember Mr. Liddy saying that they had already explored the possibility of getting rooms in the hotel near some of the candidates who would be staying in that hotel.

Q Democratic candidates?

A Democratic candidates, yes, during the Democratic Convention. I also remember a discussion of Mr. Larry O'Brien as a target. I recall a discussion of the Democratic Headquarters as a potential target.

Q When you say Democratic Headquarters, what do you mean by that?

A Well, you know, I can't recall -- in my mind now, of course, the DNC here in Washington jumps into my head.
Whether it was necessarily limited to that, at the time, I'm just not certain.

Q Now, was there any particular interest in getting information about Larry O'Brien, among the White House staff, at this time?

A Well, there had been a long interest in Larry O'Brien at the White House. The first time I became aware of it was about a month after I joined the White House staff when Mr. Haldeman sent me a request -- and this is really the first sort of political intelligence request I had ever had -- to get certain information about Larry O'Brien.

So it started as early as August of 1970, and there had been periodic requests along the way that had come to my attention for information about Mr. O'Brien, and I was aware of general interest, in the White House, in Mr. O'Brien, yes.

Q After you said that these matters ought not to be discussed in the presence of the Attorney General anymore, did that break up the meeting?

A Yes, it did.

Q And did Mr. Mitchell say anything, to your knowledge, to Mr. Liddy about the future of this plan, at that time?

A There may have been discussion, but I don't have any recollection of it. I think my comments put a real damper on the meeting. That ended it.

Q Now, as you were leaving the meeting -- after the
meeting -- did you again have a conversation with Mr. Liddy?

A I did.

Q And what was the substance of that conversation?

A I told him that I would not talk to him any further about this matter. I said it just wasn't something that I was going to be at all interested in or be willing to talk to him about.

Q Did you tell Mr. Liddy then, in substance, that if this plan went forward you didn't want to hear about it any more, you didn't want to have any discussions with him about it?

A That is correct.

Q And did you also have a conversation with Mr. Magruder?

A Mr. Magruder was present when that conversation transpired and he was aware of my comments to Mr. Liddy.

Q So as far as your own knowledge of the substance of the meeting was concerned, Mr. Mitchell did not disapprove Mr. Liddy's overall going ahead with this plan, or some intelligence plan?

A Well, of course, I can only speak for the part of the meeting I was present at and there was no disapproval then, no.

Q Now, did you shortly thereafter seek an opportunity to report on these meetings to Mr. Haldeman?
Yes, I did.

And did you get a meeting with him?

Well, I recall some difficulty in scheduling the meeting. So Mr. Higby was aware of the fact that I wanted to see Mr. Haldeman and, as had been done on other occasions when I wanted to see him, Mr. Higby worked me into the schedule when another meeting had either been postponed or cancelled or delayed, and made an opportunity for me to get in there and see him.

And what was said by you and Mr. Haldeman when you made this report to him?

Well, I described to Mr. Haldeman what had been going on in Mr. Mitchell's office. I gave him a brief description of the type of plan that Mr. Liddy had developed. I told him that I certainly didn't think that muggings and buggings and prostitutes and the like were necessary to deal with the problems as I saw them, and that I didn't really want to have any part of this, and I didn't think anybody at the White House should have any part of it.

And Mr. Haldeman agreed that I, indeed, shouldn't, and so instructed me.

In substance, what did he tell you?

He told me that he agreed that, you know, this was not necessary and I shouldn't have any part of it.

So he just told you to stay out of it?
Q Now, in February and March did you have any further conversations with Mr. Liddy about legal matters or other matters?

A Well, as I referred to earlier -- and I was referring in the broader context of when Mr. Liddy first went over and continued after -- he would come to my office and seek information regarding election laws, or he would prepare memoranda on a given matter of the election law.

They would often be referred to my office to determine whether I fully agreed or might disagree with Mr. Liddy's opinions. So I did have contact with him, and I can recall one instance when he came to my office and he wanted to talk about the intelligence plan, which he said he just couldn't get off the ground.

And I said, "Well, Gordon, you recall that we're not going to talk about that." And he said, "Yes, I understand." And we did not talk about it.

Q Now, when he said he couldn't get it off the ground, what did he mean by that?

A Well, he couldn't get it approved is what the substance of the conversation was.

Q Now, in about late March of '72, did you learn that Liddy and Magruder had had some kind of an argument or disagreement -- falling out?
5. In February 1972 H. R. Haldeman directed that $350,000 cash in campaign funds be placed under his unquestioned personal control. The money was picked up by Gordon Strachan, Haldeman's assistant, in early April 1972. Strachan in turn delivered it to Alexander Butterfield, a deputy assistant to the President. Butterfield delivered the money to a personal friend for safekeeping. This fund was maintained substantially intact until after the November election.

5.1 Memorandum from Gordon Strachan to H. R. Haldeman February 1, 1972 (received from White House).
5.2 Memorandum from Gordon Strachan to H. R. Haldeman, February 16, 1972 (received from White House).
5.3 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2878-80.
5.4 Maurice Stans testimony, 2 SSC 698.
5.5 Hugh Sloan testimony, 2 SSC 530-37.
5.6 Gordon Strachan testimony, 6 SSC 2494-95, 2461-64.
5.7 Herbert Kalmbach testimony, 5 SSC 2095-96.
5.1 NOTE: The portions of the following memorandum that pertain to the above paragraph are page 1 and the handwritten notation "make it 350 green..." at the bottom of the page.
February 1, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H.R. HALEDSMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Political Matters

Finances

1) Herb Kalmbach reviewed his current financial situation and related hard decisions with the Attorney General and Secretary Stans on January 28. Kalmbach asked that you consider:

a) Of the 1.2 fund Kalmbach has a balance of $900 plus under his personal control. From the original 1.2, 100 went to Lee Nunn for the Kentucky Governorship Race; 50 went to Caulfield for Sandwege; and 70 has been disbursed to Derge for polling over the last six months. Of the 900, 230 is in "green" boxes, 570 is in a New York checking account and 120 is in a Newport checking account.

b) In light of the campaign spending legislation, Stans, Kalmbach, and Dean recommend that the 690 in accounts be spread back into legal committees and kept under Finance Chairman Stans' control. The 230 green would be put in a Riggs box with access by any combination of two of the following people: Tom Evans, New York -- France Raine, Jr. (who Kalmbach wants to use generally in the finance area) -- and Kalmbach. If this recommendation is not accepted Kalmbach is willing to retain personal control of the 900 and run the very high risk of violating the criminal provisions of the campaign spending legislation. Stans is opposed to paying for any polls other than through a correct committee; the risk from using green is just too high.

Recommendation:

That the advice of Stans, Kalmbach, and Dean be followed in that the 690 would be put in legal committees; that only the 230 green would be held under Kalmbach's personal control; and that any polling would be paid for by regular Nixon Finance Committees.

Approve Disapprove

Comment:

[Handwritten notes: "Make it 330 green"]
c) Kalmbach is very concerned about his involvement in the milk producers situation. He believes that Jacobsen and Nelson will deliver though they have cut the original 2,000 commitment back to 1,000. Kalmbach's concern centers around the recent press disclosures that link Jack Gleason and the '70 campaign election funding. Kalmbach will accept the risk of being subpoenaed by the court in connection with the Nader milk suit. The Attorney General believes Kalmbach should continue to handle the milk project, but Kalmbach wants your advice.

Recommendation:
That Kalmbach not be involved in the milk project because of the risk of disclosure.

Approve Disapprove
Comment I'll see, up to you.

d) Kalmbach cleared the Ed Nixon campaign post with the Attorney General. Ed Nixon will begin February 1st, at 25 per year plus expenses, living costs, and travel. Kalmbach estimates the total will be "thrilling" but is pleased that he will be off the Foundation payroll.

e) Governor Nelson Rockefeller is in Kalmbach's 100 club with a 250 commitment.

2) Stans will officially move to the Nixon Finance Committee on February 16. In the meantime, he, Kalmbach, Hofgren, Nunn, and Sloan are conducting a 60 day blitz to get funds in before the campaign spending legislation becomes law.

When Stans arrives at 1701 he will send a personal letter to the 5000/$3000+ contributors. He will also authorize a much larger Walter Wentz -- Readers Digest direct mail appeal from various lists.

The current financial position of 1701 is 3,600 received, 1,300 disbursed, leaving a 1,300 balance of which only 50 is in green.

Stans is moving into operational responsibility, but there is still no budget set for the various parts of the 1701 efforts.

Through Kalmbach, Stans is requesting Executive Mess Privileges. As you may recall, Cabinet Officers have
honorary memberships in the regular White House Staff Mess. To my knowledge, only Secretary Hodgson uses this privilege.

Recommendation:

That Stans receive Executive Mess privileges.

Approve / Disapprove

Comment

Harry Dent

1) He believes that the President's "drop by" at the Bob Brown dinner was one of the most important, successful, politically astute moves made toward blacks in this Administration;

2) Hugh Chatham may seek and win the North Carolina Senate seat in 1972; Pete Domenici may beat Dave Cargo for the nomination to seek the New Mexico Senate seat;

3) Thurston Morton may lead a drive to get Louie Nunn into the Kentucky Senate race if there is some financial assistance;

4) The first practical test of the Harry Dent theory of obtaining black votes has developed since your meeting with Mr. Dent during the week of January 12. Don Johnson of the Veterans Administration reports that the Urban League claims that the President promised Whitney Young, in Oval Office meetings, 9 million in make-work projects. Dent says there is no written record of this promise. Dent says Len Garment will favor creating these jobs for the Urban League. Garment has not been contacted personally because he has been on a trip and unavailable. Dent is convinced that Don Johnson can reject this request without undue political flak. Dent strongly recommends that he do so, and that any available funds be channelled to Dent/Bob Brown recruited blacks who can deliver for the President on November 7, 1972. I am not sure whether you have discussed Dent's theory of Southern black voters with the Attorney General. Dent has not contacted the Attorney General.

Recommendation:

If you have not discussed the Dent/Brown theory with the Attorney General, Dent should be advised to do so and then follow the Attorney General's advice on the disposition of the Urban League request.

Approve / Disapprove

Comment
3) Rose Mary Woods and Clark MacGregor were invited to Harry Dent's Political Issues Group meeting but did not attend. At that meeting all strongly urged that you tell Frank Shakespeare to make sure no USIA prestige poll similar to the one that damaged Nixon in 1960 is conducted in 1972. A talking paper was prepared for you, but there was only a "check mark" on the cover memorandum (original attached at Tab A) with no indication whether you accepted or rejected the advice of the Political Issues group.

- Yes, Haldeman will cover with Shakespeare
- No, the Attorney General will cover with Shakespeare
- Neither Haldeman nor the Attorney General will cover it, drop the suggestion
- Other

According to Magruder, rumors are circulating in the Washington Press Corps that Shakespeare will be leaving USIA to join the Campaign. Magruder checked with the Attorney General and he confirmed that Shakespeare will not join the Campaign.

Fred LaRue

He has begun sitting in the Campaign Strategy meetings, working with Flemming, and generally making a contribution to the Campaign.

The Attorney General has asked LaRue to assume supervisory control of the RNC. In that connection, LaRue has asked that you send the memorandum attached at Tab B to the White House Staff. It would enable LaRue to determine who is asking for what at the RNC.

Cliff Miller

On January 27 Miller told the Attorney General that Harry Flemming and the field operation needed Fred LaRue to add stature and ability. The Attorney General agreed and plans on meeting with Flemming and LaRue this week.

The Attorney General told Miller that he would set the date of his official move to 1701 in a discussion with the President on January 29. Miller does not know what was decided.
RNC Convention

1) John Dean summarized an Intelligence Evaluation Committee report on the demonstrations planned for the Republican National Convention in San Diego (Tab C);

2) Bill Timmons submitted three memoranda to the Attorney General on San Diego and the 1972 Convention. The first indicates that original estimates of income and costs must be revised substantially. As to income, the City of San Diego is failing to honor its commitment to pay for convention hall expenses. The RNC is "reluctant" to accept the ITT-Sheraton money. Expenses projected by Dick Herman are not essential. Timmons is asking for authority from the Attorney General to direct Herman to cut expenses and force San Diego to deliver on its commitments. The second memorandum describes the success Timmons had, working with the Attorney General, in persuading Senator Scott to accept the position of "floor leader". Finally, Timmons notes that LIFE has an investigative reporter working on what may be a rather negative article on San Diego, the RNC Convention, and C. Arnholt Smith. (Timmons' three memoranda are attached at Tab D).

Jack Gleason

As you know, Jack Gleason's name has appeared in the recent "milk money" stories in the STAR. Gleason is "sick and fed up with this type of material appearing in the press". Gleason blames Bob O'Dell and Eleanor Williams at the RNC. However, Gleason is also mad at Colson stemming from Colson's "summoning" him to his office and "accusing" Gleason of leaking derogatory information to the press about Colson. Gleason is seeking advice whether he should have a quiet, off-the-record, discussion with reporters Jules Whitcover and Polk to demonstrate that Gleason is a "nice" guy. It's hard to imagine a worse idea than having Gleason talk with reporters, but told Gleason I would check.

Yes, Gleason see reporters

No, Gleason should continue to avoid reporters

Other

Don Rumsfeld

1) Schedule Matters -- Updated lists of surrogate candidates' appearances in New Hampshire and Florida are attached at Tab B.

2) Older Voters -- You asked what the various Administration officials were doing to cultivate the older voters. Ken Cole does not receive reports from Vicki Keller of the Domestic Council but does regularly review her work. Bud Evans, Colson's older voter's project manager is following an older voter plan developed in Colson's office. A final version of the report will be submitted to you and the Attorney General. Keller and Evans are working with Arthur Fleming and Danny Todd of the Committee to Re-Elect the President.

3) Magruder as Spokesman -- Magruder was quite upset by your January 17 memorandum to the Attorney General indicating that Magruder should not be a spokesman for the Campaign. Magruder emphasizes that he and the Attorney General agree but that since May until February 7 there was no one else who could "get out the lines requested". There were only three series of interviews and most were quite positive. Magruder anticipates another series around the time of the Attorney General's move, but Shumway will handle the Committee's relations with the press at that time.

4) Polling -- The Attorney General directed Magruder to give Bob Teeter three weeks to deliver on his poll results scheduled or seek employment elsewhere. Magruder believes Teeter will now begin delivering the results and the projects you have requested. However, the Campaign polling system is currently working poorly. You are receiving chunks of survey data with no recommendations as to what should be held by you and the Attorney General and what should be distributed to Peter Dailey, Harry Fleming and other members of the Campaign Strategy Group. I would welcome the assignment of reviewing these materials, recommending data for release, and processing requests to Teeter. One alternative, which Magruder is urging, is a meeting with you, the Attorney General, Teeter, and Magruder to resolve the polling problems of the quantity and quality of Teeter's work and the access to polling information.

Haldeman meet with the Attorney General, Magruder, and Teeter

Strachan review polling materials

Other
5.2 NOTE: The portion of the following memorandum that pertains to the above paragraph is 2) on page 1.
February 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Political Matters

Finances

1) Herb Kalmbach will serve as Associate Chairman of the Finance Committee under Secretary Stans. The Attorney General concurs.

2) Kalmbach cleared with the Attorney General and Stans the 350 in green under your unquestioned personal control. A separate box of green is being developed for the Campaign.

3) Kalmbach will receive an additional 100 from Dick Watson in Paris raising Watson's total from 200 to 300.

4) Kalmbach is working with the milk people to increase the 233 currently banked to 1,000 by April 7.

5) Kalmbach saw Don Nixon and informed him that he should channel all requests of the White House through Kalmbach. This is exactly the same treatment Jack Drown receives.

6) Kalmbach granted the full-time gardener at San Clemente, Brigado Garcia, a $25 per month raise bringing his monthly salary to $539.00.

7) Concerning the Star story on Kalmbach, discussions with John Dean, Fred Malek, Jack Gleason, Hugh Sloan, Jeb Magruder, and Herb Kalmbach developed these tentative conclusions:

a) The material is primarily the result of thorough investigative reporting by skilled newspapermen;
b) The material was probably not directly leaked but rather the result of careless, loose talk disclosing the only new information, Kalmbach's name;
c) Information from 1968 may have come from Dan Hofgren (Herb Kalmbach lectured him harshly); the 1970 information may have come from Eleanor Williams (Jack Gleason and Herb Kalmbach say she is vindictive and cannot be influenced) and the 1972 information may have come from Jon Huntsman, who was mentioning Kalmbach's name to people when leaving the White House Staff. Kalmbach personally talked to him. These
tentative conclusions regarding sources of information have not been confirmed by polygraphs.

8) The budget committee for the Committee for the Re-Election of the President will be Stans and the Attorney General as Co-Chairman, Herb Kalmbach as Associate Chairmen, and Lee Nunn, Cliff Miller, and Fred Malek as members. Magruder is not on the Committee. Paul Barrik, a Stans' recruit, will act as Controller and Hugh Sloan will continue as Treasurer.

9) Within the strictly finance area, Stans will be Chairman and Leonard Firestone, Gus Levy, Max Fisher, John Rollins, and Mrs. Ogden Phipps will serve as Co-Chairmen. In House the Vice Chairmen will be Dan Hofgren, Lee Nunn, and Newell Weed.

10) Stans' goal of 10,000 in by the Campaign Spending Legislation effective date of April 7 is approximately one-third complete.

11) The Campaign has raised 5,000 but spent 2,000 in its first nine months. Expenses for January totalled 550 while projected expenses for February are 900. The Attorney General has asked Magruder for a list of the 124 employees and their salaries.

1) Magruder believes he was the source of the February 14 Evans and Novak story on political aides at the White House criticizing the "consciously aiding" comment you made. The meeting could have been the Campaign Strategy Group meeting of February 7. Magruder has re-cast the Campaign Strategy Group to exclude Dent.

2) Dent advised the Attorney General that if Governor Nunn does not seek John Sherman Cooper's Senate seat, Robert Gable should be encouraged. Gable is a wealthy, loyal Republican.

3) Dent advised the Vice President that he should speak to the California Republican Assembly on April 1. Governor Reagan urged that the Vice President appear, and the Vice President accepted.

4) In the New Mexico Senate race Dave Cargo may cause problems in the GOP primary even though our 1970 candidate for Governor, Domenici, is the only one who could beat the Democrat, Jack Daniels.
5) A nationwide voter turnout survey indicates that only in the South has there been a rise in voter turnout, while the key states, Ohio and Missouri, suffered a decline of 7.9% and 8.1% respectively between 1960 and 1968. The rise in the South is attributed to the black vote while the decline in certain states is attributed to apathy.

6) Wallace Henley monitors George Wallace for Harry Dent through Tom Turnipseed, Wallace's former Campaign Manager. A third party challenge by Wallace in November is not anticipated but could develop if Wallace receives enough money and publicity.

7) West Virginia Governor Arch Moore will seek re-election according to Dent because he has a poll showing him ahead of Jay Rockefeller. The President leads all Democratic contenders in West Virginia by at least 13% when Wallace is in the race.

8) David Treen lost the Louisiana Gubernatorial race to Congressman Ed Edwards because of the solidarity of the Democratic Party and the heavy black vote. Dent believes that this relatively narrow defeat augurs well for the President even if Wallace is in the race.

9) In North Carolina, Charlie Jonas, Jr. has turned out to be a weak Nixon Chairman who will not dissociate the Jim Holshouser effort to become Governor. Dent has assured the Attorney General that he will continue to try to separate the Nixon and Holshouser operations and to prevent any other campaigns from tying into the President's campaign.

Don Rumsfeld

He forwarded an anonymous political assessment of Hawaii which indicates that "the likelihood of the President carrying Hawaii seems very slender". There are no races statewide in Hawaii in 1972.

Tom Evans

1) The primary responsibilities of the RNC in the 1972 Campaign will be voter registration, voter turnout, and ballot security. The registration drive (Target '72) began in Florida and Texas in January and will continue through the spring. Ed DeBolt at the RNC is the man responsible to register 1 1/2 million Republicans by May 15 and 8 million by October 1972.
2) Tom Evans asked Jeb Magruder to censure John Lofton for his POW wife call last week. Evans does not feel he controls Lofton. Chuck Colson is exerting more control over Lofton and Monday with only occasional complaints from Evans.

Charlie McWhorter

During the campaign he will continue to travel at AT&T's expense. However, he has terminated his formal ties with the Vice President's office to protect against any suggestion of impropriety.

Magruder's Projects

1) Advertising -- The newspaper ads that Peter Dailey prepared and you reviewed on February 14 will run in New Hampshire. You did not view the TV spots which are not scheduled to run in New Hampshire. The decision as to the extent of the media campaign in Florida will be made when the Florida follow-up telephone poll arrives.

2) New Hampshire/Florida -- The extensive direct mail ($75,000 in New Hampshire and $100,000 in Florida) and telephone ($25,000 in New Hampshire) campaigns are continuing as planned.

3) Wisconsin -- A campaign plan prepared by the Davis Agency for Nixon State Chairman John MacIver has been submitted to Magruder for review before submission to the Attorney General. Why aren't we Daily? What's the Hurry?

4) Farm -- Clayton Yeutter, the farm director at 1701, hired John Foltz, visited Secretary Butz, farm Senators and Congressmen, and worked with USDA on the rural development issue.

5) Elderly -- Fred Malek has been asked to "untangle" the White House/1701 confusion. His report is due March 1. Arthur Flemming is now scheduled by the 1701 speakers bureau. Danny Todd and Peter Dailey are re-working HEW films for the elderly.

6) Spokesmen Resources -- Schedules for New Hampshire, Florida and Wisconsin are submitted weekly.
7) California -- The California delegation list for the RNC Convention has been submitted to the Attorney General. The Los Angeles County list has not been completed. The Attorney General authorized $150,000 for a special 1,000,000 new young voters drive in California under the direction of Ken Rietz.

8) Campaign Strategy Group -- At the February 7 meeting the group approved the title for the campaign newspaper (The Re-Elector). Bob Teeter informed the group that the "President was in good shape in 17 of 19 target states, and was running ahead of his 1968 margin. Important issues are Vietnam, inflation, and order/calmness (in the President's favor), environment, race, health care (even), unemployment, crime/drugs (negative)."

9) Campaign Briefing -- Fred Malek and Jeb Magruder are considering a briefing for the White House staff on the activities at the Committee for the Re-Election of the President.

10) Media Monitoring -- Van Shumway is establishing state by state systems to review press coverage and to counteract negative comments. The Illinois program with weekly reports will serve as the model. The Attorney General does not receive the proposal, but Shumway is proceeding with Magruder's concurrence.

11) RNC Convention -- Timmons and Magruder have asked the Attorney General to establish a permanent office in San Diego with Chick Cudlip as Executive Director. No decision has been reached. Timmons is meeting bi-weekly with Senator Dole, Representative John Rhodes, Dick Heran, John Dean and Bryce Harlow on plans for the Convention.

12) New York -- The Attorney General is using Bob Marik (generally considered the best man at J701) as the staff man for regular contact with Governor Rockefeller's staff.

13) Magruder is seeking authority for approval of Campaign media by Cliff Miller instead of you for the White House. Repeated explanations to Magruder that you only want to see the material on an FYI basis have not convinced him that this is unnecessary. Magruder frequently finesses Miller (e.g. the infamous RNC film) in spite of the fact that Miller is the final media review for the Attorney General. However low your interest in the media materials you should continue to receive them on an FYI, not approval, basis.
14) Magruder and Colson are increasingly at odds. The most recent dispute concerns the "line" as to whether Muskie should be personally attacked on his war stand. After your "consciously aiding" statement Magruder and Miller thought they had an agreement on behalf of the Attorney General that Colson was not to continue programming hits at Muskie. Colson continued the attack on Muskie through Cabinet and Hill spokesmen. Magruder plans on seeking authority from the Attorney General to be the only contact with the spokesmen to the express exclusion of Colson.

This is not acceptable —

Colson is acting without express instructions. Tell Waugh to talk to me if he has a problem.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 26, 27, AND 30, 1973
Book 7

Printed for the use of the
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WASHINGTON : 1973

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Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 54
in a safe deposit box or safe by another individual outside the Government. It is my understanding from Strachan that this transfer was made immediately and the entire $350,000 was placed in safekeeping outside the White House.

I did not feel we should keep such a large amount of cash at the White House, nor did I feel it was a good idea for it to be in the physical custody of a member of the White House staff which was why these arrangements were made. I never at any time saw or handled the currency and I must rely on Strachan's reports to me as to how it was handled.

I have been informed by Strachan that there was one withdrawal in April or May of 1972 of $22,000 to pay for some advertising not directly related to the election campaign. This was at the request of Dick Howard of Chuck Colson’s office. I think Strachan said the money was delivered directly to the advertising agency.

The balance of $328,000 was not used. I instructed Strachan after the election in November to turn over the unused funds to the committee since the White House had no further need for them. I told him to work out with John Dean the means of doing this. Strachan has informed me that the funds were turned over in January 1973, although he incurred some difficulty in doing so after he took possession of the funds on November 28, 1972.

In December I became aware, probably via Dean, that there was some difficulty in turning over the cash to the committee, presumably because it posed reporting problems.

At a later time, Dean mentioned to me the committee's need for funds for legal and family support for the Watergate defendants. I suggested to Dean that he try to work out a way of solving both the problems of our desire to deliver funds to the committee and the committee's need for funds.

Dean later told me that he had worked this out and that part of the cash, I believe $40,000, could be delivered immediately to the committee via Fred LaRue. He had Strachan do this, I am told, and several days thereafter, Dean had Strachan deliver the balance to LaRue.

To sum up: After my original instruction to Strachan to transfer the money to the committee, my involvement in the transfer of the funds was entirely through John Dean. He told me of the problem in transferring the $330,000 to the committee. He told me he had worked out the problem. He told Strachan how, when, and to whom to make the transfer. He told me the transfer had been made.

He did not, at any time in this sequence, advise me or imply that the transfer itself or the purpose of the transfer was to buy the Watergate defendants’ silence or that it was in any way illegal or improper.

It is my understanding that all this took place in the period of November to January, but I am not sure of the timing.

I have no recollection of any knowledge of the reported transaction on November 26 when Dean had Fred Fielding of his office pick up $22,000 in cash from Mr. Stans, ostensibly for the purpose of replacing the $22,000 that had been expended from the $350,000 in April.

I do recall that one of Dean’s problems in the process of transferring the $330,000 to the committee was the fact that $22,000 had been
for information purposes and usually took the form of a summary memorandum, backed up by a huge amount of supporting material which I rarely read.

In the specific case of advertising and promotional materials the standard procedure required a final signoff by me before the ads or materials were considered approved. Thus, in this particular area I did, in effect, exercise approval authority but even here I did not have control over either the personnel or the policies involved in developing the material. I only had a final signoff on the end product.

Strachan also routed these materials to others in the White House who were concerned with them.

I also had a particular interest in polls and in scheduling and paid more detailed attention to these areas.

I think it was very clear to all concerned that the committee was running the campaign, not the White House.

I do not believe I had control over any funds at the committee nor did I exercise any authority or direction as to the utilization of funds, except in a general sense. I never signed a campaign check.

I was, to some degree, involved in the decision process regarding funds to be used for advertising and polling. The committee also allocated funds to pay for expenses incurred by the President or the White House that were clearly campaign expenses as contrasted to Government expenses. This would include such things as cost of campaign travel, advance men, etc.

Some indication of my role in the campaign may be found in the fact that I visited the committee headquarters only once during the entire campaign period and that was on the occasion of the President's visit to see the headquarters and meet the campaign workers.

Also, I had very few meetings with any members of the staff of the Committee To Re-Elect the President, except those with John Mitchell which were on a frequency of about once a week during the time he was campaign director. In addition to that, I did sit in the semiweekly campaign review meetings held in John Ehrlichman's office and, of course, as has been indicated, Mr. Mitchell and Mr. MacGregor sat in the regular morning White House staff meeting so that there could be full coordination between the White House and the committee on overall strategy.

My contact with the campaign, in other words, was through fairly infrequent meetings with Mr. Mitchell and fairly infrequent meetings with Gordon Strachan of my staff; but I kept in general touch with campaign activities through Strachan's summary memorandums and the meetings described above.

THE $350,000

Prior to the April 7 date on which the new campaign spending legislation took effect it was agreed by Mitchell, Stans, I believe Mr. Kalmbach and me that $350,000 of the 1968 surplus cash funds should be set aside to cover possible needs for special private polling by the White House apart from the regular polls conducted by the committee. This was in anticipation of a possibly hard-fought close election.

I understand from Gordon Strachan that he received the cash from Hugh Sloan on April 8. He, in turn, arranged to have this cash held
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, AND 14, 1973
Book 2

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WASHINGTON: 1973
my knowledge, Mr. Sloan did not tell me about that budget and I did not know that Mr. Liddy had authority to draw an amount of money of that size.

Now, with respect to Bart Porter, I think that Mr. Sloan's recollection is somewhat confused, because my understanding of it is somewhat different. I had learned prior to April 7 that Mr. Porter had a cash fund in his safe, that he sometimes received money from one or more sources and used it to pay for certain campaign purposes. I objected to that, because I wanted there to be only one treasurer in the campaign. So there was an understanding which Mr. Sloan has confirmed in his testimony that Mr. Porter would not receive any more money from him. And to the best of my knowledge, he did not receive any money from Mr. Sloan after April 7.

Now, subsequently, some date in August, I asked Mr. Sloan how much money he had given Porter after April 7, and he said none.

More importantly, on September 6, I met with Mr. Sloan's attorney, and the attorney for the committee, to learn some more information about Mr. Sloan's activities after April 7, and Mr. Sloan's attorney told us that after April 7, Sloan had given Porter only $500. Both the committee's attorney, Mr. Parkinson, and I have our notations of that conference. Subsequently, as you know, it was developed that Mr. Porter had received $3,300 from Mr. Sloan and that was cited by the General Accounting Office. Later, it evolved that the amount was $11,000, and I understand Mr. Porter testified last Friday or Thursday that he received $17,000 from Mr. Sloan. So I have no knowledge of those transactions or the use to which they were put, except as I have learned subsequently in testimony.

Mr. Edmisten. So we have some conflicting testimony again regarding the transactions.

Mr. Stans. I do not want to be critical, but I believe that Mr. Sloan's memory in that respect is faulty and perhaps confused. He may have discussed with someone else the question of authority to give money to Bart Porter.

Mr. Edmisten. Now, Mr. Stans, did you learn of the payment of cash of some $350,000 from the finance committee to Gordon Strachan and when that payment was made?

Mr. Stans. Yes, I learned a little bit more about it, I think, than Mr. Sloan did, because back in February of last year, I heard from someone—I think it was Mr. Kalmbach, but I am not sure—that the White House would like to have some of the 1968 money that he had turned over to our committee, to use for special polling purposes. No amount was mentioned at that time and I have no recollection of any other discussion about this subject until after the $350,000 was given by Mr. Sloan or Mr. Kalmbach to Gordon Strachan. I believe that Mr. Kalmbach takes full responsibility for that transaction. At a later date, I asked Mr. Sloan if the White House had ever gotten the money it wanted, and he said, "Yes, they got $350,000." I do not think that the difference in our recollections is material on this point, because I certainly would not have objected to the item in any event, had I been asked about it beforehand. I did not object to it when I heard about it in February. I think it was a perfectly proper transaction.

Mr. Edmisten. Now, Mr. Stans, I do not want to drag this out, but I think the committee does want to know something about all of the allegations that have been made regarding four so-called Mexican
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, AND 14, 1973
Book 2

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In the case of Mr. Kalmbach, he, in a period from March 1971 up until Secretary Stans came into the campaign, was essentially my senior, from whom I took instructions. He was the principal fund raiser for the President's reelection campaign, during that period. He, over this period from March until April 7, received, to the best of my recollection, approximately $250,000 in cash. I would qualify that by saying that in raising the funds, there were occasions, and I cannot give you what proportionate amount, where we would raise the funds, not give it to me but give me the name of the donor, so in terms of my own internal bookkeeping, I would receive the funds from that individual to Mr. Kalmbach. So the entire $250,000 figure, that amount of money did not physically go through my hands.

Mr. Dasch. Now, do you know of your knowledge why Mr. Kalmbach received, either by holding on to receipts of his own or by actual disbursement by you, this amount, $250,000?

Mr. Sloan. No, sir. I have no knowledge.

Mr. Dasch. Did you receive any receipt from Mr. Kalmbach concerning any money that was received by him from you?

Mr. Sloan. No, sir. Not only in the case of cash, but in this entire pre-April 7 period, receipts just were not used in the campaign, period.

Mr. Dasch. Then will you go to the next person listed?

Mr. Sloan. Mr. Gordon Strachan, who was the political liaison between Mr. Haldeman at the White House and the campaign committee. This $350,000, Mr. Kalmbach, on a day just prior to April 7, and I am not sure of the precise date but my best recollection would be within 10 days prior to the effective date of the new law, came to me and indicated that he had had a request from the White House for $350,000 in cash, would I get that together for him. In the conversation, he indicated that he had talked to Bob Haldeman.

At some point in the same day, Mr. Strachan was present in the committee. Mr. Kalmbach indicated to me that Mr. Strachan would arrange to have this picked up. I had put the money in a briefcase and I do not believe I was there when the money was physically picked up, so I do not confirm that Mr. Strachan in fact personally picked this up. But I either turned it over to Mr. Kalmbach or to my secretary. I believe I was going out to lunch and was not there when this was picked up.

Mr. Dasch. With regard to the $350,000 or any other cash, could you tell us what denominations generally the cash was in?

Mr. Sloan. I would say generally the cash was in $100 bills, although at times, there were $50's, $20's, $10's. At one point, I think we even had some $1,000 bills.

Mr. Dasch. Now, with regard to Mr. Porter.

Mr. Sloan. I might add one further remark about the $350,000. To the best of my recollection, after having the authority from Mr. Kalmbach to do this, there was a meeting in Secretary Stans' office in which he was present and I was present. I do not believe this was the subject of the meeting. I think it was a very brief reference. My recollection is that Mr. Kalmbach indicated to Mr. Stans that he had had this request for $350,000. That he had asked me to get it together. My best recollection is that Mr. Stans said fine.

Mr. Dasch. Now, do you know of your own knowledge the purpose or reason for the $350,000 being sent to the White House?
Mr. Sloan. No sir, I do not.

Mr. Dash. Go to the next person, please.

Mr. Sloan. Mr. Herbert Porter, who was a member of the staff of the Committee to Re-Elect the President. He was in charge of scheduling surrogates, speakers for the President, in place of the President. This $100,000 covered a period probably starting in either December 1971 or January 1972. He had a blanket authority to draw cash funds from Mr. Magruder. He would come to me and indicate on various occasions, I need $10,000, would you have it ready for me.

This $100,000 is not a single disbursement. The increments of disbursement or distribution were probably in the range of $10,000 to $15,000 over a period of time, running up to April 7 and beyond.

To the best of my recollection, I turned over approximately $6,000 to Mr. Porter following the April 7 date, under my understanding that these were committee funds.

In that case, he—excuse me.

Mr. Porter, I understand from his testimony to the General Accounting Office, puts the figure higher, at $11,000. So I say, this is from memory. I would not dispute his recollection. I believe he also recollects the total figure to be somewhat less.

I had instructions, and I forget from whom—possibly Mr. Magruder—that Mr. Porter would receive no further funds after April 7.

When Mr. Porter came to me with that request, I went to Mr. Stans. I asked him—I indicated to him that my clear understanding was that Mr. Porter would no longer receive any cash funds. He indicated to me at that time that was his understanding as well, that he would take the matter up with Mr. Mitchell and let me know.

On his return, he indicated to me that I should continue making payments on request from Mr. Porter.

Mr. Dash. I think you have indicated that Mr. Porter had a blanket authority from Mr. Magruder and that later you checked or it was checked with Mr. Mitchell. Generally, who had the authority to approve your making cash payments to anybody?

Mr. Sloan. In the earlier period, it would have been Mr. Kalmbach alone. He did not physically spend much time in Washington, D.C. He would be in and out every week or two. He would visit with Mr. Mitchell. At some point in time, fairly early, he indicated to me—and I believe that initially, it was with regard to all funds—that I was not to disburse any money without Mr. Mitchell's approval.

Mr. Dash. This is what period you are now talking about?

Mr. Sloan. This would be prior to Mr. Mitchell leaving the Justice Department. It would be in probably the summer of 1971.

Mr. Dash. Did you check with Mr. Mitchell to get his approval on making cash payments?

Mr. Sloan. What happened in this regard was essentially that I don't believe any cash payments came up before the authority issue was resolved. What had been done prior to my assuming the disbursement side of the campaign, going back to the Citizens Committee, when we first moved into the campaign, before there was a division of the finance and political arms of the campaign. Mr. Harry Fleming was handling the disbursement side and I was handling the receipt.
5.6 Gordon Strachan testimony

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase I: Watergate Investigation
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, AND 25, 1973
Book 6

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Mr. Strachan. Well, I cannot take notes in the Executive Office Building, but my best recollection is that it was shortly after the June 30, 1971, talking paper.

Senator Gurney. You testified that you prepared political memos daily, as I recall, from Mr. Haldeman and some of them were rather lengthy. Where did you get your information that went into these memos?

Mr. Strachan. The memorandums were not prepared daily. They would be prepared as frequently as once a week, usually once every 2 weeks, sometimes as late as once every 3 weeks, and I would get the information by talking to people on the White House staff who were politically active, such as Mr. Dean or Mr. Colson; people in the States, and particularly California, in which Mr. Haldeman had quite an interest; people at 1701.

Senator Gurney. Who did you contact at the Committee To Re-Elect the President?

Mr. Strachan. I would try to contact many of the senior individuals personally.

Senator Gurney. Who?

Mr. Strachan. Mr. Teeter for the polling information; Mr. Dailey, Mr. Joanou for advertising information; Mr. Flemming for reports on the field organization; Mr. Marik for reports on general research done in the campaign. There was a fellow in charge of direct mail, Bob Morgan.

Senator Gurney. How about Magruder? Did you talk to him?

Mr. Strachan. Definitely.

Senator Gurney. How often?

Mr. Strachan. Probably daily.

Senator Gurney. What kind of information did he give you?

Mr. Strachan. Well, most memorandums submitted to Mr. Mitchell would be submitted through Mr. Magruder; that is, the memorandums to Mr. Mitchell would have Mr. Magruder's signature on them, and his office would be a funnel for much of the information, if they had decided that internal disputes had been resolved at 1701, to send copies of memorandums to me.

Senator Gurney. How often did Magruder send you memorandums?

Mr. Strachan. I received packages of information from the committee daily.

Senator Gurney. But your testimony is that he never told you anything about surveillance or wiretapping and bugging, is that correct?

Mr. Strachan. That is correct.

Senator Gurney. The $350,000—do I understand—I can't understand why this went to this Lilly. This was supposed to be used in the White House for polling or something in connection with the campaign. Why would you pick it up and then it be given to somebody who later gave it to somebody else? What was the point of that?

Mr. Strachan. Well, various pollsters who would conduct the polls for me would have to be paid and neither Mr. Butterfield nor I could go very far from the White House physically.

Senator Gurney. Well, what about Lilly? Is he connected with the White House at all?

Mr. Strachan. No, he is not. He is a personal friend of Mr. Butterfield who could travel.
Senator Gurney. Why would he, not connected with the White House at all, be given $350,000 worth of money that was supposed to be used in this campaign in one way or another?

Mr. Strachan. Because he could take the cash to a polling organization in Princeton or if we conducted one in California to the pollster in California.

Senator Gurney. How many people were on the White House staff during this period of time?

Mr. Strachan. Well, there is quite an argument as to who is officially on the White House staff and who isn’t. I would guess somewhere in the neighborhood of 400, but that is just a ballpark guess.

Senator Gurney. Don’t you think it would be possible to find one of these 400 who could have been entrusted with the custody of the $350,000?

Mr. Strachan. Yes, and that was one of the alternatives posed to Mr. Haldeman in the memorandum.

Senator Gurney. But why would it be given to somebody totally unconnected with the White House? That is a very large sum of money which would be used in this campaign.

Mr. Strachan. Well, Mr. Butterfield indicated that he had known the man for a long time, that he was able to travel and that he would be willing to accept the custody of the cash. Mr. Dean had indicated that neither he nor anyone that he could think of on the White House staff would be able to do it.

Senator Gurney. You mean not one of those 400 would be able to have custody of this $350,000?

Mr. Strachan. Well, I am not sure how many people Mr. Dean asked. He told me that he would not be able to arrange for the holding of the money fairly close to the campaign spending law enactment date, and so I scrambled for some alternatives to present to Mr. Haldeman.

Senator Gurney. Was Mr. Liddy somebody—Lilly, I guess—somebody who constantly handled large sums of money in custody for other people?

Mr. Strachan. I don’t know. I have never met the man.

Senator Gurney. When the $350,000 was returned, you had left the White House staff, hadn’t you?

Mr. Strachan. That is correct.

Senator Gurney. Why was it that you returned it and not somebody who was working at the White House then?

Mr. Strachan. It was just one of the matters that I had been asked to do before I left the White House staff that I hadn’t wrapped up. It was like many functions with the Kennedy Center. I was Mr. Haldeman’s staff man and I went to a meeting on his behalf in January, although I was off the White House staff. It was a matter—the last matter that I had not taken care of prior to leaving.

Senator Gurney. Cleaning up pieces of business?

Mr. Strachan. That is correct.

Senator Gurney. I don’t have any further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Ervin. Senator Baker.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I thank Senator Talmadge for letting me go out of sequence so I can take care of another matter shortly and then return to the committee.
wards, when Mr. Dean attended all these meetings over at the committee, he would be the one that would communicate this information to Mr. Haldeman if anybody did.

Mr. STRACHAN. That is correct, and I would guess that he would report directly rather than through me or one of his aides. But I didn't know that for a fact.

Mr. DASH. Now, did there come a time when you became aware of a transfer of $300,000 from the Committee To Re-Elect the President to Mr. Haldeman or the White House under Mr. Haldeman's control?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes. The subject had been discussed for a couple of months before that.

Mr. DASH. What time now are we talking about?

Mr. STRACHAN. This would be from December 1971 through April 1972. Mr. Haldeman—his office conducted extensive polling—and he told me at one point, when I was having discussions with Mr. Kalmbach, to make sure that we have an ample supply of cash to pay for these polls.

I talked with John Dean about it, tried to arrange for John Dean a method for holding the money. He eventually told me that he could not do it.

On April 6, I prepared a memorandum for Mr. Haldeman saying that we are going to get that money from the committee before the new finance law and we have to get it very soon; John Dean can't make arrangements. You have four other alternatives. He checked the one indicating that I should go and pick up the money.

Mr. DASH. Which one was that?

Mr. STRACHAN. Alex Butterfield had a friend who would hold the money. And I went and got the money, brought it back to Alex, and presumably—

Mr. DASH. When you say went and got the money, where did you go?

Mr. STRACHAN. I went over to 1701, to the Committee To Re-Elect the President, either Mr. Kalmbach's office or to Mr. Sloan's office.

Mr. DASH. Was this in cash?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes, it was.

Mr. DASH. And you returned it back to the White House?

Mr. STRACHAN. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. You turned it over to Mr. Butterfield?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, I eventually turned it over to him. I walked into his office and the two of us began counting it and he said he would get it to his friend.

Mr. DASH. Actually, what was that money for? Was that for the command or the disbursement of Mr. Haldeman?

Mr. STRACHAN. Pardon?

Mr. DASH. Was this money that was taken over to the White House and turned over to Mr. Butterfield and then to his friend, was the disbursement of that money really at the discretion of Mr. Haldeman?

Mr. STRACHAN. Definitely.

Mr. DASH. Now, did you become aware of the fact that any money was in fact spent from that $300,000?

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes. Somewhere around the time of the Hanoi-Haiphong bombing, Mr. Howard came to me and indicated that Mr. Colson had an approved advertisement—I believe it was under the aus-
pieces of Tell It To Hanoi, but in any event, it concerned indicating public support for the bombing and mining decision. Mr. Howard said that Mr. Colson needed $22,000 and I asked Mr. Haldeman if we should authorize that expenditure. He said yes, and the money was delivered.

Mr. Dash. Now, did there come a time when the $350,000, or what was left of it, was returned to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, or to a particular person there?

Mr. Strachan. Well, we should back up a little. I think. After the election, I got the money back from Mr. Butterfield and—

Mr. Dash. Why did you get it back from Mr. Butterfield after the election?

Mr. Strachan. Because Mr. Haldeman had told me to return the money to the committee.

Mr. Dash. Then what happened?

Mr. Strachan. Then John Dean told me that he wanted to have the $350,000 intact and Fred Fielding gave me $22,000, which I placed with the $920,000—

Mr. Dash. Well, let's back up a bit here. You said John Dean told you he wanted the $350,000 intact. Was there any specific incident or event at that time when Mr. Dean communicated that to you?

Mr. Strachan. Yes.

Mr. Dean had told me. Chapin and me that Earl Silbert from the prosecutor's office wanted to interview us and that that interview was scheduled on November 28, and Mr. Dean indicated that one of the questions might be whether or not the $350,000 was in fact intact.

Mr. Dash. All right, now. You said Mr. Fielding brought back the $22,000. Do you know where Mr. Fielding obtained that $22,000?

Mr. Strachan. Well, I assumed at the time that he had received it from Mr. Stans. I have read his deposition. I don't personally know where he got the money.

Mr. Dash. Were you aware at any time that Mr. Dean had received any large sum of money, specifically around $15,200, from the unspent amount of the $22,000 that had originally been taken out of the $350,000?

Mr. Strachan. Yes, there is some confusion as to that amount Dick Howard and I did go to John Dean's office and give him some cash in an envelope. I don't think any of the three of us counted it. I always thought it was $7,000, but either $7,000 was spent on the ads and $13,000 was left, or $13,000 was spent on the ads and $7,000 was left.

Mr. Dash. I think we have Mr. Dean's testimony that he at least received $15,200, and I take it that it would be in his interest to have given a lesser sum, so—

Mr. Strachan. Oh, I wouldn't dispute Mr. Dean's account, for sure.

Mr. Dash. So I take it he did receive $15,200.

Can you tell us why you brought this balance or this amount back to Mr. Dean when it had been taken originally from the $350,000 pot?
Mr. KALMBACH. Yes, sir.
Mr. DASH. Could you describe the nature of that contact or any assignments that you gave Gordon Liddy?
Mr. KALMBACH. As best as I can recall, Mr. Dash, my first acquaintance with Mr. Liddy was in the latter part of March, although I think I had lunch with others, with Mr. Liddy in January, when I first met him, and the first time that I had really worked with him was in the latter part of March when he came aboard the finance committee as counsel to the committee.

In my position as associate chairman, I gave him several assignments asking for legal opinions and the like, and I can recall one or two trips that I asked him to take, to contact attorneys for contributors to help in legal problems.

Mr. DASH. You had no contact with him or any relationship with him on any intelligence or fact-gathering operations?
Mr. KALMBACH. No, sir.
Mr. DASH. Now, did you give Mr. Stans an advance on his expenses in February 1972?
Mr. KALMBACH. Yes, sir.
Mr. DASH. How much?
Mr. KALMBACH. I gave him $50,000.
Mr. DASH. Why did you give him that?
Mr. KALMBACH. I beg your pardon?
Mr. DASH. Why did you give him that? Why?
Mr. KALMBACH. Mr. Stans came to me and asked me for these funds as an advance for personal expenses for the forthcoming campaign.
Mr. DASH. Was a receipt given to you for that?
Mr. KALMBACH. No, sir.
Mr. DASH. Now, are you aware of the transaction whereby $350,000 left the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, the finance committee, and went over to the White House?
Mr. KALMBACH. I am.
Mr. DASH. Can you tell us briefly of your own knowledge how that took place?
Mr. KALMBACH. About the last part of March, the last week in March or very early in the first few days of April, and I am not certain, I was called by Mr. Higby from the White House and was asked as to how much cash would be available for transfer to the White House. I then checked with Mr. Sloan. I called Mr. Higby back and told him that I had found there was $350,000 in cash in Mr. Sloan's safe that would be available.

Then Mr. Higby—I think there were one or two additional calls back and forth and it is my recollection that Mr. Higby then called and informed me that Mr. Strachan would come over to the finance committee and pick up the $350,000 that afternoon. And again, this was within a week of April 7 or thereabouts.

I then spoke to Mr. Sloan and asked Mr. Sloan to give me the funds in time for the pickup by Mr. Strachan, which he did. And as I best remember it, Mr. Dash, the funds were put in my office in the finance committee. Mr. Strachan came over at 1:30 or 2 in the afternoon—I am not certain—and picked up the briefcase from my office and then left the office.
Mr. Dash. These funds were all in cash?
Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir, they were.
Mr. Dash. Do you know the denomination of the bills that went over?
Mr. Kalmbach. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. Dash. Now, you mentioned Mr. Higby and Mr. Strachan. You are aware that Mr. Higby and Mr. Strachan are both assistants of Mr. Haldeman?
Mr. Kalmbach. I am.
Mr. Dash. And you know that they could have—
Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Do you know why the request, why the $350,000 was needed?
Was any information given to you?
Mr. Kalmbach. I am not certain, Mr. Dash, that it was expressed to me, the purpose. But I know that it was my assumption, and it may have been expressed to me, but it was my assumption that it would be used for polling purposes.
Mr. Dash. When did this take place?
Mr. Kalmbach. I would think within 7 days of April 7, 1972.
Mr. Dash. Now, following this, Mr. Kalmbach, the break-in at the Watergate on June 17, did you receive a call from Mr. Stans asking you to come to Washington? Shortly after that period?
Mr. Kalmbach. Excuse me, Mr. Dash. Would you repeat that question?
Mr. Dash. Yes, I said following the break-in at the Watergate, which took place on June 17, sometime after that period, did you receive a call from Mr. Stans to come to Washington from California?
Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, my recollection is that I received a call from Mr. Stans, probably early in the week, the 20th or thereabouts, to come to Washington and to meet with Mr. Sloan to reconcile my cash records. There was no reference at all to the Watergate break-in.
Mr. Dash. Now, did you report to Mr. Stans after that meeting?
Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. What, if anything, did you say to Mr. Stans?
Mr. Kalmbach. I just informed him that I had met with Mr. Sloan and that we were in agreement on the cash records, and he said, fine, and as far as he was concerned, I was discharged from that responsibility and my accounts had balanced.
Mr. Dash. Did you destroy any records after that meeting with Mr. Sloan?
Mr. Kalmbach. Yes, I did. I destroyed my own personal cash records, knowing that the original record was in the finance office.
Mr. Dash. Now, on your visit to Washington on June 21 or June 22, did you discuss the Watergate break-in with anybody? That was right after that period of time?
Mr. Kalmbach. No, other than in casual conversation, I can't recall that I did, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Wasn't that a kind of topic of conversation over at the committee?
Mr. Kalmbach. It was, but other than just being a very major news item, that was the extent of it. I didn't discuss it beyond that.
Mr. Dash. It was a major news item especially with relation to the committee, was it not?