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	10/28/2015 11:15:06	
1	Benjamin Woodhouse Havensight Capital LLC #5 Company St. Christiansted, USVI 00820 805 478 1958	(T 1977-197
2	#5 Company St. Christiansted, USVI 00820 K. Martin, Deputy Clerk	
3	805 478 1958 California Bar #261361	
4	THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN LUIS	
5	OBISPO	
6		
7	Havensight Capital LLC, A	
8) Complaint	
9	Corporation Corporation	
10	Dlaintiff	
11		
12	Facebook, Inc., A California By	
13	BRUTT BLEHK	
14	Corporation,	
15	Does 1 to 10	
16	Defendant	
17	COMPLAINT	
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19		
20	Jurisdiction and Case History	
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23	The Superior Court of California of San Luis Obispo	
24	County has personal and subject matter jurisdiction, as	
25	both parties, here, are citizens of California. C.C.P.	
26		
27	Section 410.10. Facebook Inc., here, is headquartered	
28	in Menlo Park, CA., and is a citizen of, both,	

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Delaware, and California. The Federal Court of the Central District of California determined, after the Plaintiff's initial filing, in case 2:15-cv-03758, that the Plaintiff, here, is dual citizenship, and is a citizen of the USVI, and California, after reviewing two show of causes on citizenship prior to the discovery period, and without adjudicating any matters The case, there, was dismissed with in the case. prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, without any adjudication of any of the substantive issues, involved in this case. See Court Record. Thus, this California State Court, here, has been determined by the Federal Court, to be the proper Court for adjudication of this case.

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Venue

Venue is proper, here, because both parties serve customers that are located in the County of San Luis Obispo and have substantial contacts with the County.

C.C.P. Sections 392 - 403. The Plaintiff actively serves a number of physical store customers, which are located in San Luis Obispo, along with the Defendant. Id. Moreover, this forum is the most convenient forum for the parties, based on respective customer locations for the parties. Id. Parties 1. Plaintiff is a Limited Liability Company, and has a mailing address, at #5 Company Street, Christiansted, USVI 00820. Attached, is its Certificate of Existence. 16

17 Exhibit A. 18

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2. Facebook Inc., is a Delaware Corporation, and headquartered, at 1601 Willow Rd, Menlo Park, CA. The Company has an agent of process, at C.S.C., 94025. 2710 Gateway Oaks Dr. Ste. 150N, Sacramento, CA 95833. Statement of Facts

Havensight Capital LLC ("Plaintiff") owns and operates, a number of consumer products companies, including: a soccer brand, golf brand, men's razor company, and a financial convenience company. The Plaintiff relies primarily, on online advertising to market its products, and services. The Plaintiff's existence is dependent, on, both, placing online advertisements to drive sales, and recording customer acquisition data, to understand the unique customer acquisition costs, associated with marketing its products, and services in the market.

The Defendant, here, Facebook Inc. is currently the only viable social networking option of notable scale for online marketing. Facebook customers, here, are able to check a success, and effectiveness reporting tool that records the number of visits, to a specified website that occur, as a direct result of a purchase of Facebook's online advertising product. This specific

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success reporting tool of the Defendant's, is entitled "Ads Manager" on Facebook. The Plaintiff, here, purchased ads on Facebook, with the sole purpose of gaining website visits, to a single specified website address, for one of the websites associated with its various business lines, on the following dates: Nov. 11, 2013 Jan. 28, 2014, July 11, 2014, March 13, 2015, March 23, 2015, May 14th 2015, and May 24th, 2015.

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Further, the Plaintiff, here, in conjunction, also utilizes Google analytics, a tool offered by Google Inc, a third independent party to this case, on each individual website that it owns, and operates. Google Analytics, here, records all website visits, and data associated, with such visits for all global online traffic generated from the Web to a specified site.

The Plaintiff, here, was shocked and outraged, to find that the Google Analytics data did not reconcile at all, with that of the data exhibited, on the Facebook Ads manager reporting tool for the duration of any of the placed Facebook marketing campaigns. In fact, the differences in reported Website visits data were materially substantial, and significant. For the most recent campaigns, the Facebook Ads manager allegedly reported website visits, to the specified site at well over 30% more than those reported, on the Google analytics, based on a campaign, in the high hundreds of dollars, with hundreds of visits purchased, as the sample size.

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Moreover, the Google Analytics tool, here, records not only the site visits, as a result of Facebook marketing, but also all site visits generated from the Web. Google analytics also records visits from spam bots, and visitors that spend less than one second on your site. Thus, the data presented in the Exhibits, which already reflect a 30% gross inflation rate of successful visits to one's site could be allegedly even further over valuing the actual traffic generated by Facebook advertising.

Additionally, this alleged over inflation practice was observed for each and every campaign that was placed by the Plaintiff, here, and roughly at the same 30% or more level. This seems to allegedly be a pattern of fraud. <u>Attached, for the Court are</u> <u>screenshots from identical time periods of, both, the</u> <u>Facebook Ads manager reporting page, and the Google</u> <u>analytics reporting page from the most recent campaign.</u> <u>See Attached Exhibits B,C,D, and E.</u> Both Companies update the data, on these tools on a real time basis, and there is no reasonable innocent explanation for such substantial discrepancies and over inflation, in the reporting data.

In Exhibit B, here, reflected is data collected from a campaign, through the dates of May 17, 2015, to May 17th, with the reading taken simultaneously at the

very beginning of May 18th, 2015. There is a difference, here, of 378 visits, vs. 342 visits for Google, which collects all visits, and not just visits from Facebook, like the Facebook Ads Manager does. Additionally, in Exhibit C, here, data is reflected for the single date of May 26, 2015, Facebook Ads Manager reported 819 visits, vs. the 645 visits, which Google The Court should also take note, here, that reported. Facebook Ads manager reports, in a different section 12[.] 13 all clicks on the Facebook Ad and not just actual visits to one's website from the Facebook Ad, which is reflected in the Exhibited Data. The Defendant, here, cannot defend these discrepancies, on a beguiling argument that the reported data, represents more than website visits to the ad purchaser's site, as an explanation for the discrepancy, as this is simply not the case.

Further, although this is just two sample periods frozen in time, the Plaintiff observed a similar amount

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of over inflation for all campaigns, across various time periods. More importantly, the Facebook Ads Manager displays a count of 378 clicks, at a random pricing of \$.67 a click, which was not ordered by the client, but is generated by Facebook, in contrast the Google Analytics, which measures all traffic, including non-Facebook ad traffic reported, 342 sessions. Id. Whereas, the Plaintiff paid close to .\$25 a click for each website visitor found, according to Facebook alleged over inflated reporting, which creates a discrepancy, in pricing of over 300%. Such a pricing discrepancy is more than a product of a magical private making market within Facebook, it is material and substantial.

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The Plaintiff has relied, here, on this alleged fraudulent data to make business decisions, and determine the feasibility of the market for products, and also has been allegedly overcharged for these critical business marketing services, as a result of Facebook's alleged fraudulent conduct. Moreover, the Plaintiff contends that a taking of these businesses has occurred, here, as the Plaintiff's launch depended on these online marketing campaigns, and potential success was constricted, as a result of Facebook's allegedly unfairly and fraudulently reporting, and predatory pricing practices, on services delivered.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff also believes that the Defendant may have been enticed to engage in such alleged fraud, as it possesses an illegal monopoly, on online marketing, and social networking. There are no other social networking service providers, which offer such Website click marketing models, with a substantial network size, as Facebook possess. <u>The Plaintiff</u> <u>believes that the Defendant's illegal industry monopoly</u> <u>is a driving force, behind this fraudulent behavior.</u>

Lastly, the Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant practices product tying, and **Vertical price**

fixing, here, as it requires all customers to sign up, as social networking members and create a social networking profile, in order to access the online marketing products, offered by the Defendant.

Moreover, the Defendant also utilizes a bid for clicks model, which forces the customer to bid across various online platforms for online marketing service, which is the very definition of product tying - the forced purchase of different products. Furthermore, the <u>Plaintiff is not allowed to use an online campaign,</u> to market multiple products, or services, here. Facebook intentionally limits one brand cover picture, and website to be marketed for each respective campaign, which makes the marketing services inefficient, and unfairly costly, and is a per se example of alleged vertical price fixing.

In addition, the Plaintiff, here, has attached two articles on Facebook, one published by CNET, and the

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other by Bloomberg, which are both respected sources. 1 Exhibit F, and Exhibit G. The first discussed how 2 3 Facebook's European marketing leader believes that they 4 should remove certain advertising products from their 5 6 mix, here, and that some of their products are unfairly 7 marketed, and improper, in his own words. The second 8 article discusses how the Billionaire leader of 9 10 Facebook purports to be bringing free internet to the 11 poor in South Africa, through a pseudo non-profit, 12 13 which is owned by Facebook, called Internet.org. 14 Unfortunately, the article notes that the customers are 15 actually only allowed to visit about ten selected 16 17 internet sites by Facebook, and are then encouraged to 18 purchase services from Facebook. This demonstrates 19 20 that Facebook perhaps allegedly preys on the poor, and 21 implements alleged improper pricing schemes, on a 22 global level, and in an all-inclusive manner. The 23 24 indigent are not protected from their greed. 25

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Finally, the Plaintiff also, here, <u>was restricted</u> <u>from gaining access to private capital markets, and</u> <u>potentially public capital markets, in order to obtain</u> <u>capital for its business operations, as a result of the</u> <u>Defendant's alleged fraudulent reporting, and inflated</u> <u>predatory product pricing</u> for its online marketing services. Venture leaders rely, on these customer acquisition costs, and generated online sales, to determine whether or not to allow, a startup company, access to capital. Thus, a taking of the Plaintiff's company, across all of its five major business lines, has allegedly occurred, here, as a result of this improper behavior.

Claims

I. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations

The Court should probably find that the tort of Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage has been violated. In Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 71, the Court held that there are "five elements for the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, are: (1) [a]n economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship; intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant." Also See Ab Group v. Wertin, 59 CA 4th 1022, 1034. Whether or not such a relationship exists, is a question of fact for the Court to determine, and a Defendant can be liable for only having negligent knowledge of any such economic relationship. Buckaloo v. Johnson, (1975) 14C3d, 815, 830.

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The Defendant, here, either, knew, or had constructive notice of the fact that the Plaintiff has contractual relations, with, both, existing customers, and potential customers. The Defendant, here, offered online business marketing services, thus it is reasonable for the Court to infer, here, that the Defendant would expect this business online marketing tool to be used for contractual relations. It also had actual notice when the data entered Facebook's physical servers, which are in the Company's possession. Specifically, here, business owners use Facebook products, in order to create contractual relations with 16 customers, through the purchase of products online. The Plaintiff, here, used the Facebook online marketing products, to create contractual relations with purchasers of soccer, golf, men's care, and financial convenience products and services.

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Moreover, there was actual damage, here, to contractual relations, and economic advantage, as the

Plaintiff, here, alleges that the Defendant fraudulently conveyed the number of potential customers that were reached, as a result of the online marketing purchase on a continuous, and methodical basis.

Specifically, the Defendant, here, allegedly inflated the number of website visits reported, in excess of 30%, which is neither, insignificant nor inadvertent. Thus, the Plaintiff, here, lost potential sales, and its economic advantage was damaged by the Plaintiff making incorrect business decisions, here, based on the alleged fraudulent customer acquisition cost data, exhibited by Ads Manager data, and the Defendant arbitrary and inconsistent alleged price fixing scheme.

II. Unfair Competition and Trade Practices

The Court should probably find that the Defendant has committed the tort of Unfair Competition and Trade

practices. Under California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. of Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. the UCL 3 defines unfair competition as, among other things, 4 "including any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business 5 6 act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or 7 misleading advertising." The Defendant, here, allegedly 8 engages, in monopolistic behavior, and has violated 9 10 anti-trust statutes, in its fraudulent conveyance of 11 marketing services. Further, it is the sole player, 12 13 here, in the social networking online marketing arena, 14 with any significant member scale, and leverages this 15 anti-competitive positon to unduly charge customers, 16 clandestinely price its online marketing products, and 18 inappropriately misrepresent actual service provided. 19 20 This is a direct violation of Section 15 U.S.C. Title 21 2, commonly known as the Sherman 22 Act. 23 Further, the definition of monopolistic behavior is 26

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the power to "exclude competition." See United States

v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). The Defendant, here, is able to unfairly exclude competition through its predatory pricing for online marketing services, and fraudulent misrepresentations, about the success of these services. Specifically, the Defendant, here, grossly inflated the success of its online marketing products by 30%, provides no transparency on pay for click pricing, and abolishes efficiencies by requiring customers to create completely separate campaigns for individual products, and services. A customer can only enter, here, on picture and website in a campaign.

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The Court can find liability, here, if the Defendant has acted in any one of the following three prong capacities: unlawfully, fraudulently, and unfairly. State Farm Fire Cas Co. v. Superior Court, (1996) 45 CA 4th 1093, 1104. "Unfair" is defined, as any action, which contravenes anti-trust policy or threatens competition. Id. Moreover, the fraudulently

prong can be found to be satisfied, with any presentation that is misleading by the Defendant. Boslina v. Home Loan Center Inc. (2011) 198 CA 4th 230, 129. Unlawful business practices can be found by the Court, simply if the Defendant has committed an act, which threatens the laws of competition. Cal Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel Co., (1999) 20 C 4th 163, 187.

The Defendant, here, violated this Unfair business tort, as clearly the prong of misleading, and fraudulent representations in marketing, is satisfied, here, through the Defendant's exhibited alleged gross over inflation of website visits, as a result of its online marketing services. *Boslina v. See Attached Exhibits.* Specifically, the alleged misrepresentation and inflation of website clicks on the Defendant's Ads Manager page. This behavior, here, has been shown to be systematic, and continuous, as the Plaintiff alleges that all purchased campaigns, demonstrated, this

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fraudulent reporting, and the presence of material discrepancies between, Ads Manager, and Google Analytics.

Further, the Court, here, can also see that the Defendant has engaged in behavior, with the intention of "excluding competition," through allegedly exaggerating, here, the effectiveness, and success of its online marketing products, and fraudulently manipulating, the customer acquisition data, sent to Facebook customers. State Farm v. See Attached Exhibits. Further, the Defendant also has created a predatory pricing structure, here, through its nontransparent bid for clicks pricing model, and has unfairly raised prices on unsuspecting customers, here, as a direct result of these **presented** alleged fraudulent conveyances. The Court has a duty, here, to protect the public from monopolistic companies that allegedly take advantage of their position, to inflate results, and unfairly overcharge customers for

services, and do not deliver on what they provide to the consumer, in order to remain illegally dominant in the marketplace. *Id*.

Furthermore, the fact that the Defendant's own head of European marketing states that the products are dated, ineffective, and serve no purpose in his own words, also lend support for the violation of the alleged tort. Exhibit E. In fact, the Defendant proclaims in the article that no one gives a expletive about your website, referring to Facebook customers. Such a statement demonstrates a lack of respect for Facebook's customers, and a sense of entitlement across Facebook's management that such alleged unfair business practices have probably inspired. The Court, here, can send the Defendant a message that small business owners need to be respected, products need to be priced fairly, and products always need to be calibrated - and not just defended on the hopes of boiler plate legal jargon, which references potential ineffectiveness. In

conclusion, the Court should find that the Defendant has committed the Tort of Unfair business practices.

III. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations

The Court should probably find that the defendant committed the tort of Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, *Leasing Corp. v. Geltman*, 406 Mass. 811, 812, 551 N.E.2d 20 n. 6 (Mass. 1990), the Court held that a party is liable for intentional interference with contractual relations, if a valid contract existed, that defendant had knowledge of the contract, that defendant acted intentionally and improperly, and that plaintiff was injured by the defendant's actions.

In this case, there was an intentional interference with contractual relations, here, because the Defendant probably had constructive notice of contractual

The Defendant, here, offered an online relations. marketing tool for business owners, and for the sole purpose of creating contractual relations with e-Id. The Contractual relations, commerce customers. here, were valid, as they were relations for consumer products, and services, and the Plaintiff, here, allegedly was injured by the Defendant, as a direct result of the Defendant's fraudulent behavior and alleged misrepresentation of its delivery of marketing services. Id. The Plaintiff, here, had its businesses damaged, as a direct result of being sent improper customer acquisition data, overpaying for online marketing services, and making improper business decisions, based on the alleged improper data.

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Moreover, such allegedly fraudulent data also materially affected, here, the Plaintiff's ability to access private capital markets, and potentially public capital markets, to obtain capital for ongoing business purposes. The Plaintiff, here, was improperly denied access to customers for potential sales of products, and was potentially denied institutional funding, based on alleged improperly reported customer acquisition data. Hence, the Court, here, can determine that a taking of the Plaintiff's business has occurred, as a direct result of the Defendant's alleged <u>improper</u> <u>pricing, fraudulent conveyances, and non-delivery of</u> <u>undeniably critical online marketing services</u>.

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This case is also analogous to Nautical Solutions Mktg. v. Boats.com, 2003 WL 2607869, a Company improperly used property to re-direct customer traffic from one online business to another. The Court, there, found the Defendant to be liable for improperly interfering with the flow of customer traffic between sites. The Defendant, here, has either, constructive, or actual notice of contractual relations with customers as it sells business ads, and the Defendant, here, has improperly affected those relationships, like the Defendant, in Nautical Solutions Mktg v., through

its alleged over reporting of website visits. Thus, the Court, here, should find the Defendant has committed the tort of IICR, through its alleged failure to affirmatively calibrate its products, and to provide accurate data to customers.

IV. Negligence

The Court should probably, here, find that the Defendant committed the tort of Negligence. In U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 174 (2nd Circuit 1947), the Court ruled that a Defendant, here, is liable for Negligence if the risk outweighed the burden of prevention of the obstruction. In this case, the Defendant, here, should have known that its alleged monopolistic behavior, and alleged fraudulent conveyances, would materially affect small business owners. Id. Moreover, under the tort of negligence, a Defendant has a reasonable care of duty to the whole world, and, here, probably had a heighted care of duty, as the Plaintiff became an invitee, once a paying customer relationship was established. *Coates v. Mulji Inn*, Inc., 342 S.E.2d 488 (Ga. App. 1986). The Court, here, specifically recognized an affirmative duty of care, and an even heightened standard for businesses that rely on customers entering their premises, or using their physical computer servers. *Id*. This duty is a common law duty and cannot be waived by illegal boiler plate contractual language. *Id*.

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The Defendant, here, has a duty to check and see if its online marketing products are working properly, and as advertised to the consumer. In fact, the Plaintiff, here, could not imagine a more important business investment for a social networking company, which relies primarily on online marketing for revenue, than a checks and balance system for the accurate delivery and reporting of online marketing services. Moreover, the Defendant, here, possesses tens of billions of dollars, thus the burden of investing in system to ensure that customers are not receiving fraudulent service, does not outweigh the risk of obstruction, here, which is global damage to the businesses of customers.

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Specifically, here, the Defendant was negligent in its operation of Ads Manager, and in fraudulently conveying grossly inflated success rates, in conjunction, with amorphous, and non-transparent pricing schemes. See Attached Exhibits. The Defendant, here, did not provide the Plaintiff with a price per click for the campaign on initiation and then proceeded to fraudulently misrepresent the number of customers that the products, drove to the Plaintiff's business websites. The Court, here, should probably find that the Defendant was negligent, and protect the public from such injustices in the future.

The Defendant should probably be found to have violated the tort of Vertical, and Horizontal price fixing. A Defendant should be found liable for any action that adversely affects the marketplace, and competition, without legal justification. Marin Country Bd. Of Realtors Inc. v. Palsson, (1976) 16 C 3d 920, 930, 931. See also Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois Inc., (1987) 191 CA 3d 1341. Moreover, a Defendant can also be found liable for the tort for "tying" products, under California Business and Practices Code Section 16727. This is where a Defendant forces a customer, to purchase a separate product concurrently, with another product which is marginally distinct. Id. In Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, (1999)

V. Vertical and Horizontal Price Fixing

77 CA 4th 171, 188, 189, the Court found liability for the Defendant interfering, with the distributor's

ability to set, raise, or maintain prices through the manipulation of capacity. Also See Kowlong v. Dow Jones & Co. Inc., (1982) 137 CA 3d 709. Finally, the Court has upheld this law on many occasions, and recently in an analogous case, upheld a government fine of close to \$300MM for a tech company illegally inflating the price of DRAM products, to their customers. State of California v. Infineone Tech., 2010 WL 3411378 (N.D. Cal.)

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The Defendant, here, should be found liable of the tort of price fixing because like in *Freeman v.*, and *State of California v.*, the Defendant constrained trade, and affected the market through allegedly grossly inflating the results of its online marketing product, and engaging in Vertical price fixing in the sales of its online products. Specifically, the Defendant, here, allegedly represented that it had delivered more website visits from potential customers than it actually had, to the Plaintiff, and thus

allegedly inappropriately charged for these online marketing services. See Attached Exhibits.

Further, the Defendant, here, engages in Vertical price fixing. Specifically, here, the Defendant constrains capacity, like in Freeman v., as a Plaintiff is unable to determine how much it will cost to obtain a click for its business website upon purchase of Defendant's marketing products, and the Plaintiff is constrained from marketing multiple products, within a single campaign. This is clearly evidenced in the exhibited data, which shows a 300% price increase across identical marketing campaigns, in almost all shapes and forms. Exhibits B,C,D,E. The Plaintiff in one campaign paid close to \$.67 a click, and then \$.25 a click for another. As the Defendant allegedly inflated the website click rate anyway, here, these prices could be even more distorted, and unfair. There is no reason why the Defendant, here, should not be requested to demonstrate to the Court why these pricing

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discrepancies exist, after a through discovery period, on product calibration, and pricing schemes.

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The Defendant, here, operates an ultra clandestine bid system, which generates inequitable prices per Website click across customers, and its Ads creation tool, here, does not allow customers to add additional pictures or websites to a purchased campaign. This monopolistic behavior creates market inefficiencies, and capitalizes, on the fact that other social networking sites of Facebook's scale, neither, exist, nor offer such online marketing services.

Moreover, the Defendant should also be found to have violated the tort of Price Fixing, here, as the Defendant engages, in product tying. *California Business and Practices Code Section 16727*. The Defendant, here, required the Plaintiff's staff to sign up, and create a profile in its social networking business, in order to gain access to its online marketing products. The Plaintiff, here, was not able, to purchase the online marketing products, without this social networking sign up. This is product tying per se, as the Plaintiff staff, here, was forced to sign up for Facebook, in order to access the Defendant's online marketing products.

Lastly, the Defendant, here, as mentioned above, also provides online marketing products only, in a bid format, where a customer bids for clicks in a nontransparent virtual online market. This bidding pricing structure, here, also constitutes product tying, as the Plaintiff, here, allegedly is required to make bids on a variety of different, and distinct, online platforms, in order to obtain potential website clicks, thus bids on multiple types of online marketing platforms are unduly being forced, on all of the Defendant's customers, as a result of the Defendant's predatory pricing schemes.

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Moreover, such a bidding format, here, as also mentioned above, does not provide for the Defendant to commit to the cost per click of an online ad, rather the customer is told through the Ad manager what price per click is charged to the customer, based on Facebook's magical bid system. See Attached Exhibits.

If the Ads Manager, here, demonstrates fraudulent conveyances, regarding clicks, then the Court should also consider, here, the Defendant's non transparent and inequitable pricing model, to aid in the fraud. This is per se Vertical price fixing. The Defendant is constricting trade, and altering market forces by charging individual customers different respective prices for online marketing services, on a per click basis. Perhaps, some content warrants a higher marketing click price, but the pricing should still be uniform for customers, either, across intended industries, or, target audiences.

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Furthermore, the Plaintiff has attached an article, on the Defendant's pseudo non profit, which was launched in South Africa. *Exhibit G*. The Defendant advertised it as a non profit venture, in which it provided free internet to indigent citizens of South Afirca - a very noble cause for the almost trillion dollar company. Unfortunately, the non profit only provides access to about ten chosen websites, and then seeks to encourage the indigent citizens to purchase services via their phones from Facebook.

The fact that the Defendant would engage, here, in such behavior supports the allegations of unfair business practices, and price fixing. The Defendant, here, should demonstrate a stronger respect for small business owner customers through its policies, and its potential commitment to some kind of calibration program. The idea that it is using these alleged schemes on indigent people is abhorrent, and the Court

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should send a strong message to the Defendant, here, that such alleged tortious behavior is unacceptable.

In conclusion, the Court, here, should find that the Defendant allegedly purposefully engages, in constrictive and fraudulent marketing behavior, whose sole purpose, here, is to extort unduly earned money from its customers, inflate the success of its offered services, and solidify, its impenetrable industry monopoly on online social networking marketing. The Court has a duty to protect the public, and not allow Facebook to continue to engage, in an alleged predatory price fixing scheme, which capitalizes on its monopoly, and also emboldens the Defendant, to engage in alleged fraudulent conveyances of the success of its products. Such Fraudulent conveyances of bid clicks, in turn, are further increasing, the actual costs associated, with the Defendant's illegal price schemes. The Defendant will continue to cause takings, here, of startup companies, which rely heavily on the Defendant's

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alleged marketing services, unless the Court, here, steps in, and sends Facebook a message, about these Unfair business, and price fixing practices.

Request for Jury Trial

The Plaintiff, here, requests the Court to grant a Jury trial pursuant to Section 16 of Article I of the California Constitution.

Request for Relief

Plaintiff seeks U.S. \$390 million, in compensatory damages for the damage to, and taking of its business property, and the damage to all exiting, and potential relations with Plaintiff's customers. Also, in *Waits v. Frito Lay*, Inc. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), the Court held that punitive damages are available where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant is guilty of either, fraud, or malice. The

Defendant, here, clearly engages, in fraud through the alleged fraudulent conveyance of the website clicks generated by its Online marketing products, and gross predatory product pricing, thus punitive relief should be duly granted, in the amount of U.S. \$200 million, and a total of U.S. \$590 million, should be awarded in damages. Respectfully submitted, 1.4 /s/ Benjamin Woodhouse Benjamin Woodhouse esq. Havensight Capital LLC #5 Company St. Christiansted, VI 00820 805 478 1958 California Bar #261361 Complaint

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EXHIBIT A

Corp No10/28/25#211:15:06 AM

GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES ---- 0 ----CHARLOTTE AMALIE, ST. THOMAS, VI 00802

CERTIFICATE OF EXISTENCE

To All To Whom These Presents Shall Come:


I, GREGORY R. FRANCIS, Lieutenant Governor of the Virgin Islands do hereby certify that I am, by virtue of the laws of the Virgin Islands, the custodian of the corporate records and the proper officer to execute this certificate.

I further certify that the records of this office disclose that

HAVENSIGHT CAPITAL, LLC

Limited Liability Company

was duly registered to conduct business in the Territory on August 19, 2014 and has a legal existence as a Limited Liability Company so far as the records of this office show.



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Witness my hand and the seal of the Government of the Virgin Islands of the United States, at Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, this 28th day of August, 2014.

GREGORY R. FRANCIS Lieutenant Governor of the Virgin Islands

ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION OF HAVENSIGHT CAPITAL LLC

The undersigned, acting pursuant to The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act of the Territory of the United States Virgin Islands (the "Act"), adopt the following Articles of Organization for the purpose of organizing a Virgin Islands Limited Liability Company (the "Company").

1. Name. The Company's name is:

HAVENSIGHT CAPITAL LLC.

Designated Office. The physical address of the Company's designated office is 2128 Company Street, Christiansted, VI 00 00.
4945. The Company's mailing address is 2975 Bayview Drive Pismo
Beach, CA 93449.

LT. GOV. OFFICE

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- 3. Agent For Service of Process. The name and physical address of the initial agent of the Company for service of process is Trust Company of the Americas, Inc. The physical address of the agent is 5030 Anchor Way, Christiansted, VI 00820 and the mailing address of the agent is 5030 Anchor Way, Christiansted, VI 00820.
- 4. Organizer. The name and physical address of the organizer of the Company is Donovan M. Hamm, Jr., 5030 Anchor Way, Christiansted, VI 00820.
- 5. **Minimum Capital**. The minimum amount of capital with which the Company will commence business shall be One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00).
- 6. **Term**. The Company will be an at-will company.
- 7. Management. The Company will be a manager-managed company. The name and the physical and mailing addresses of each initial manger of the Company are as follows:

Havensight Capital LLC Articles of Organization Page 2

Name of Manager	Physical Address	Mailing Address
Benjamin James Woodhouse	2128 Company Street, Christiansted, VI 00820-4945	2128 Company Street, Christiansted, VI 00820-4945


- 8. The members of the Company will not be Liability of Members. liable for the debts and obligations of the Company as permitted by Section 1303(c) of the Act.
- Purpose. The Company's purpose is to engage in any lawful act or 9. activity for which a limited liability company may be organized under 1 ~ 2 the Act.

the Act.			ö	-		
Dated: August 15, 2014	\bigcirc	/	RPORA	AUG 19	LT. GOV	, J
ACKN	Donova n M. Hamm, Jr., O IOWLEDGMENT	Organiz	S-SNO	e uu e	EIVED	
TERRITORY OF THE VIRGIN ISLA JUDICIAL DIVISION OF ST. CROIX		•	1	20		

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 15th day of August, 2014 by

Edu Public Notary

EILEEN DES JARDINS Notary Public #NP-114-11 My Commission Expires: 12/14/15 St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands




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Exhibit C

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May 14, 2015 - May 18, 2015

Audience Overview



Pages / Session	Avg. Session Duration	Bounce Rate
1.35	00:00:48	83.92%
	Į.	8



% New Sessions 92.69%

Language	Sessions	% Sessions
1. en-us	228	. 66.67%
2. (not set)		30.70%
3. en	2	0.58%
4. en-gb	. 2	0.58%
5. es-419	1	0.29%
6. es-es	1	0.29%
7. es-us	. 1	0.29%
8. fr	1	0.29%
9. tr	1	0.29%




Exhibit E

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10/28/2015 11:15:06 AM May 26, 2015 - May 26, 2015 udience Overview nail Export - Add to Dashboard Shortcut All Sessions + + Add Segment 100.00% . _ _ _ _ Overview ____. Sessions - VS. Select a metric Homiy Day | Week ------Sessions 600 ð 400 Tuesday, May 26, 2015 -----🖪 New Visitor 🛛 📓 Returning Visitor Avg. Session Duration · Users Pageviews Pages / Session Bounce Rate Sessions 567 784 1.22 00:00:41 86.67% 345 ÷ . 1 . . % New Sessions 34.65% . Sessions % Sessions lemographics Language 600 anguage 1. en-us 93.02% • lountry 20 3.10% 2. (not set) ---ây 3. es-419 20 3.10% 3 0.47% ystem Yes Not for this site Would you like to store your password for google.com? Why am I seeing this?

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Facebook chec warns brand

How can a brand reach genuine fans on Facebook and persuade them to go to a show, buy a product or otherwise support the brand? By paying, says Facebook's Niall Fagan.

Click "Like" to win! Click "Like" to find out more! It seems like we're forever being begged to Like pages on Facebook; whether they belong to a company, a band or a brand jostling for our attention. But a Facebook marketing boss has warned that blindly amassing fans is "the biggest mistake so many people are making" -- because "no one gives a s^{**}t about your page!"

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Speaking on a panel at music industry conference Sound City 2015 in Liverpool on Thursday, Niall Fagan, leader of Facebook's entertainment marketing vertical for Europe, the Middle East and Africa, said, "I'd like to be completely honest, fans are not a metric that anybody should measure on Facebook. Don't go acquiring fans just for vanity reasons."

First introduced on Facebook posts in 2009, the cheery little blue thumbs-up of the Like button can now be found everywhere across the Web. As a social plug-in on websites, adverts and articles like this one, it connects your activity around the Web to a brand's page on Facebook. Companies, startups, celebrities and other brands launched a frenzy of urging customers to press the Like button on their page or products.

Fagan now admits, "It's Facebook's fault originally for making it a thing to do," but says, "It's the biggest mistake so many people are making,"

That's because amassing a big pool of fans on Facebook, the world's largest social network, doesn't mean that in the future the brand will even be able to communicate with them. Facebook's algorithm tailors what shows up in our News Feeds, and a brand's post has a slim chance of making the cut. Unless they pay for it, but we'll get to that in a second. Last year, Facebook began reducing the number of "promotional" messages showing up in users' News Feeds, meaning companies that previously sent ads from their free Facebook pages now face a harder time reaching fans.

Fagan says there are simple ways to genuinely reach fans on Facebook. "If you are a musician or you manage a band, get that band to do a 20- or 30-second video clip of a well-known cover song, or just something a little bit durky, a little bit different. If you run that video against an audience of people you are confident will love that video, you can build an audience off the people who watched it to the full length."

Shorter videos work better on Facebook, especially when it directs you to a full-length video on YouTube, a track on Spotify or any other place where a fan watching and listening will actually earn you some money. While Facebook doesn't directly pay out when someone watches a video or interacts with a brand, it does give the opportunity to reach potential *new* fans are who are likely to spend money. That's through a feature called Lookalike Audiences, which allows brands to find people with similar interests or background to current fans.

"So if you ran that video against 100,000 people," explains Fagan, "and 10,000 people watched it right through to the end, Facebook will say, 'here's those 10,000 people'. And you can say, 'I don't want to target those 10,000 because they've already watched it', but you can use Lookalike Audiences to show you people similar to these 10,000: that live in London, that are over 18, that are male, whatever you want. It's targeted.

"And that's how you get awareness on Facebook -- not through 'Like my page'. No-one gives a s**t about your page!"

When that little truth bomb sent a ripple of laughter around the room, Fagan qualified his statement by pointing out that a Like clicked does not a genuine fan make.

"The truth is; looking at all football clubs in the UK or anywhere, if a football club has 50 millions fans, 25 million of those fans are fans of their biggest rival," says Fagan. "So if you're [Spanish soccer club] Real Madrid and you're posting about a player you've just signed, you have no control where the message is going to go. It may very well go to fans of Barcelona [a rival.Spanish soccer club]. The only real way to reach fans of Real Madrid is, yeah, post on your page, but target people that are also fans of Ronaldo or things that make it obvious that they've been to [Real's stadium] the Bernabau, they're fans of [Real striker] Ronaldo, they're fans of a player that other teams wouldn't consider a hero. That's how you get to the real fans."

At the time of writing, Real Madrid's Facebook page has 82 million Likes.

"Most fan pages acquire fans in the wrong way, through competitions and stuff," Fagan said,

But while that gets people clicking Like, it doesn't go the extra mile to actually reaching genuine fans and persuading them to go to a show, buy a product or otherwise support the brand. How can a brand achieve that? By paying, obviously.

When I asked Fagan to qualify his statements, he said, "Having a page is important. Hosting a page and hoping everybody sees it is the problem. That's the myth...With the decline in organic traffic [people clicking on unpaid posts] you're just getting no reach. That number [of fans] might look pretty, but eventually none of them will see it, unless you pay for it."

Fagan reckons brands have to put their money where their mouth is to boost their posts into News Feeds, even if they're reluctant to pony up cash to a network that's supposed to be free.

"All the clients I work with, every single one of them, is very wary of spending money with Facebook," he said. "They

Exhibit G

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Bloomberg Business Article. Authenticated at:

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-24/facebook-to-offer-south-african-cell-c-users-free-web-access?cmpid=yhoo

Facebook to Offer South African Cell C Users Free Web Access

Christopher Spillane

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June 24, 2015 — 3:30 AM PDT

Facebook Inc. will offer customers of Cell C Pty Ltd. access to its free application Internet.org in South Africa as the social-networking service seeks to add users in the continent's most developed economy.

The service will allow Cell C users to see Facebook and about 30 websites offering information about healthcare and jobs without being charged for data, Markku Makelainen, Facebook's director of global operator partnerships, said in an interview on Wednesday. It will be available from July.

"It's a method for users who want to try out free basic services on the Internet, they can do it without any cost and then they can basically move up the ladder to paid services," Makelainen said at Cell C's Johannesburg headquarters. "We want to take away the fear of use. Less than half of the population is connected."

Facebook Chief Executive Officer Mark Zuckerberg is pushing Internet.org to bring online access to people who can't afford it around the globe. More than 1.1 billion people worldwide don't have access to the Internet, according to estimates by McKinsey & Co.

Customers of Cell C, the third-largest South African wireless carrier, will have free data access to the full version of Facebook's application for two months before downgrading access to a more basic version of the service.

"After the promotion basically we'll take away the baby pictures and cat videos," Makelainen said. "If users want to see the full experience then getting a data plan from Cell C obviously enables the full Facebook."